AIR AND SPACE STUDIES 400

National Security Affairs/Preparation for Active Duty

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Introduction to AS400

Reading Assignment:
- No reading associated with this lesson.

Affective Lesson Objective:
- Respond to the importance of the AS400 material to active duty preparation.

Affective Sample of Behavior:
- Actively participate in classroom discussion.

The US Constitution

Cognitive Lesson Objective:
- Know the key ideas and distinct features of the US Constitution and how it relates to servitude of the nation.

Cognitive Samples of Behavior:
- Define "servant" in terms of being a servant of the nation.

- Describe the relationship between servitude, the Constitution, and our second Core Value of Service Before Self.

- List the rights on which the Declaration of Independence is based.

- Describe the purpose of each article of the Constitution.

Affective Lesson Objective:
- Value the importance of the US Constitution to members of the US Armed Forces.

Affective Sample of Behavior:
- Defend the importance of the US Constitution as officers.

"If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal controls on government would be necessary. In framing a government, which is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself. A dependence on the people is, no doubt, the primary control on the government; but experience has taught mankind the necessity of auxiliary precautions."

~James Madison, The Federalist Papers, No. 51

The Constitution is our founding document—the backbone of our nation. As an officer in our United States Air Force, you will take an oath to support and defend our Constitution against all enemies, foreign and domestic. All officers must have a familiarity with this document and its content—it is what our nation is founded on.

DEFENDER OF THE CONSTITUTION AND SERVANT OF THE NATION

Excerpted from the *Armed Forces Officer*

By their oaths, members of the armed forces are defenders of the Constitution and servants of the nation. But theirs is a particular kind of Constitution and a unique kind of nation. The Constitution, with its Bill of Rights, is a compact of a self-governing people, providing for a framework of government by consent to complete work begun with an earlier statement of democratic principles, the Declaration of Independence. The Declaration's assertion of unalienable rights established early on the spirit in which the rules of the Constitution would be administered:

> We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights that among these are Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness. That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed.

The Constitution made implicit the principle of military subordination to civil authority, in recognition of the ultimate source of political sovereignty asserted in the Declaration of Independence. At the same time, it established the spirit that would govern the discipline of the American armed forces. General Washington emphasized military subordination to civil authority in his scrupulous deference to the Continental Congress in his role as military commander. The Declaration of Independence articulated the political expectations

of the Soldiers Washington sought to turn into a disciplined regular force to serve the revolutionary effort. Both democratic expectations are as valid today as they were at the beginning of our nation.

In a famous military anecdote, Major General Friedrich Baron von Steuben, the Prussian drill master who transformed the rag-tag Continental army into an organized, disciplined fighting force at Valley Forge, captured an important trait of American Soldiers in a letter to an old European comrade: "In the first place, the genius of this nation is not in the least to be compared with that of Prussians, Austrians, and French. You say to your soldier, 'Do this, and he doeth it'; but I am obliged to say, This is the reason why you ought to do this and that: and then he does it." Like their revolutionary counterparts, today's Soldiers, Sailors, Marines, Coastguardsmen, and Airmen, must understand not only what they must do, but why they must do it. With this in mind, the rest of this chapter explores the concepts behind the phrase, "Defender of the Constitution and Servant of the Nation."

The concept of being a "servant" is uncomfortable to most Americans. The word conjures an image of forced obedience, of slavery, or of menial servitude in contrast to our shared belief in individual freedom. Yet, an officer makes a voluntary choice to serve the nation, to place the nation's interests ahead of his or her personal desires. It is this voluntary commitment that forms the core of the oath of office, the solemn pledge to support and defend the Constitution of the United States. American officers embrace the concept of "service before self."

Officers in the United States armed forces swear to uphold the ideals and obligations embedded in our nation's Constitution, laws, and elected representatives. With the oath of office as an anchor, officers agree to serve the country by fulfilling their duties to the best of their ability and to be loyal, not only to military superiors and branch of service, but to constitutionally elected and empowered leaders and, by implication, to the citizens of our great country. Officers view this concept of service with pride. Instead of menial domestics, they view themselves as "Servants of the Nation," who commit their lives to serve a cause greater than themselves. They must trust willingly the judgment of elected officials and their fellow citizens. In this, officers pledge their abilities, their honor, and, when necessary, their lives. Officers subordinate themselves to civilian control, not as mere servants, but servant-leaders who set the example for their troops. Three historical examples further explain the chapter's concepts: the actions of General George Washington at Newburgh in 1783, General of the Army Douglas MacArthur during the Korean War in 1950-1951, and Major John Key during the Civil War in 1862.

Throughout his command of the Continental Army, Washington exhibited great deference to the position of the Continental Congress. No incident illustrated his stand better, however, than one that came at the end of the war, when victory had been assured. In 1783, two years after the victory at Yorktown, General Washington provided the defining example of a "Servant of the Nation."

As the Continental army began to disband, many officers faced a bleak future. Various states rejected legislation to provide adequate pensions and many officers had lost their property and personal wealth during the long Revolutionary War. These disheartened, disgruntled officers approached General Washington to lead the army to rectify their grievances; in the words of one, to use bayonets "to procure justice to itself." Washington rejected the idea of a military coup in a letter and spoke in a surprise visit to his assembled officers at their final encampment near Newburgh, New York. When his prepared words failed to quiet the gathering, Washington pulled a letter from his pocket to read in one last attempt. He stared at the letter in confusion and anxiety, and then pulled from his pocket something only a few had ever seen him use—a pair of glasses, stating, "Gentlemen, … you will permit me to put on my spectacles, for I have not only grown gray but almost blind in the service of my country." This simple act broke the opposition. As old comrades wept, George Washington ended the threat to liberty and the ideals of the Revolution in his closing remarks:

> And let me conjure you, in the name of our common Country, as you value your own sacred honor, as you respect the rights of humanity, and as you regard the Military and National character of America, to express your utmost horror and detestation of the Man who wishes, and who wickedly attempts to open the flood Gates of Civil discord, and deluge our rising Empire in Blood.

In maintaining the subordination of the Army to civilian authority, Washington inspired generations of American officers as the classic example an officer as the "Servant of the Nation."

Somewhat more than a century and a half later, at the end of World War II, General of the Army Douglas MacArthur appeared to most Americans as the ideal "Defender of the Constitution." Renowned for his courageous defense of the Philippines, daring escape from Corregidor, and brilliant "island-hopping" campaign to outmaneuver and outfight the Japanese, MacArthur ranked as the second most popular man in America. Indeed, MacArthur's signature corn cob pipe and crushed, bemedalled service cap created a legendary image, not unlike the heroic image of George Washington. Little did the public expect that within five years, MacArthur would be embroiled in what some scholars called "the gravest and most emotional constitutional crisis" of the twentieth century.

According to John W. Spanier, "The issue at stake was no less than the continuation of civilian supremacy and of the President's authority as Commander in Chief." The Truman-MacArthur controversy shows that defending the Constitution means more than a willingness to risk your life in battle. It also entails that the officer must subordinate personal political, military, strategic, and social views to those of our nation's elected leadership.

Even before the Korean War, General MacArthur challenged President Harry S. Truman's leadership. Following the euphoria of victory in World War II, the nation rode an emotional roller coaster as harsh realities of an emerging Cold War bucked the nation's psyche. In light of the Iron Curtain, the Berlin crisis, the Communist victory in China, the Soviet explosion of an atomic bomb, and other events demonstrating the end of the wartime

alliance, some Americans considered President Roosevelt's successor, Harry S. Truman, a political hack, both unsuited and unqualified for the awesome responsibilities of the office.

In contrast, General Douglas MacArthur's flair, rhetorical skills, and proven battlefield leadership appeared worthy of a great president. MacArthur's benevolent, enlightened rule of occupied Japan further enhanced his presidential appeal. Thus, MacArthur backers placed his name on the 1948 Republican primary ballots in Wisconsin and Nebraska, even while he served in uniform. Although MacArthur was never an official candidate and poor primary showings proved disappointing, the general remained a popular figure and symbol of leadership. The apparent contrast of unequal personalities—the heroic, dazzling MacArthur and the pedestrian, drab Truman—underscored one of the major civil-military crises in American history. Like Washington's behavior at Newburgh, the Truman-MacArthur controversy helps define the concepts of "Defender of the Constitution and Servant of the Nation."

When Communist North Korea launched a sudden, surprisingly effective invasion of South Korea in June 1950, Douglas MacArthur returned to the limelight as a battle leader. Although stung by early, humiliating defeats, American forces rallied, and MacArthur's reputation soared with a spectacular amphibious assault at Inchon that turned the tide of the war.

Buoyed by success, General MacArthur made a series of public remarks critical of the Truman Administration's conduct of the war. In a letter to the Veterans of Foreign Wars, the general, whose strategic responsibilities included affairs in China and Taiwan, repudiated the President's policy to limit war to the Korean peninsula and described government officials as advocating "appeasement and defeatism." Hesitant of rebuking a national hero, the president and Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) communicated their displeasure and attempted to restrain MacArthur's policy statements in careful, guarded memoranda and messages. Apparently undeterred, or perhaps unsure of the president's intent, General MacArthur continued harsh criticism of Truman's strategic policies, in particular with regard to the administration's attempt to fight a limited war.

In October 1950, President Truman met with MacArthur at Wake Island to clarify strategic issues and affirm his role as commander in chief. Skeptics thought the unpopular Truman was simply trying to cash in on MacArthur's Inchon success. In their only meeting, MacArthur presented a wide range of strategic issues, apologized for his previous remarks, and assured the president that a United Nations advance into North Korea would not provoke the Communist Chinese into entering the war. After two days of talks, the president and his theater commander departed on good terms. President Truman remarked to reporters, "There was no disagreement between MacArthur and myself. It was a most successful conference."

When a surprise Chinese onslaught smashed American and United Nations troops in November, MacArthur called for drastic measures to defeat the new enemy. Calling for air attacks against China and Manchuria, a naval blockade, the construction of air bases on Formosa, and the addition of Nationalist Chinese troops to Allied forces, MacArthur

pressured Truman to widen the war at the same time the president sought to prevent escalation and a possible third world war. Despite the Wake Island meeting and formal guidance from the president and Joint Chiefs of Staff prohibiting unapproved public policy statements, MacArthur sent a strong letter to House Minority Leader Joseph W. Martin denouncing the administration's half-hearted conduct of the war. Representative Martin entered the letter into public debate by reading it to Congress. General MacArthur's text directly violated the president's directives and challenged the administration's policies of restraint with its famous cry that "there is no substitute for victory."

After ineffective attempts to rein in the celebrated general, President Truman relieved MacArthur from command on 11 April 1951, with the full support of his statutory military advisors, the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In his unexpected and unpopular announcement, President Truman stated, "I have, therefore, considered it essential to relieve General MacArthur so that there would be no doubt or confusion as to the real purpose and aim of our policy… General MacArthur is one of our greatest military commanders. But the cause of world peace is more important that any individual."

Although historians debate whether MacArthur intended for Representative Martin to publicize his letter, the distinguished Soldier violated specific orders and the spirit of the commander-in-chief's guidance. MacArthur described his own ideas of what constituted loyalty to the Constitution in a speech to the Massachusetts legislature following his dismissal:

> I find its existence a new and heretofore unknown and dangerous concept, that the member of our armed forces owe primary allegiance or loyalty to those who temporarily exercise the authority of the Executive Branch of the Government rather than to the country and its Constitution which they are sworn to defend. No proposition could be more dangerous.

On the surface, this statement might seem consistent with "supporting and defending" the Constitution, but it is terribly flawed. It presumes to give to the military leader the right or obligation to judge the decisions of his political masters. Officers do not have this right. Wiser words had been offered 50 years before by General John Schofield, who observed before Congress, "Nothing is more absolutely indispensable to a good soldier than perfect subordination and zealous service to him whom the national will may have made the official superior for the time being." (Emphasis added.) Distinguished British military thinker General Sir John Winthrop Hackett points out that MacArthur's concept violates principles basic to any successful democracy:

> That the will of the people is sovereign and no refusal to accept its expression through the institutions specifically established by it—whether in the determination of policies or in the interpretation of the constitution—can be legitimate.

No individual officer, not even a theater commander, possesses the right to determine the legitimacy of the president's positions on national policies. Armed forces officers must serve loyally all elected officials even though those officials might "temporarily exercise the authority of the Executive Branch." The American officer must refrain from individual

interpretations of the Constitution. To be a "Defender of the Constitution and Servant of the Nation," officers must promptly and effectively obey the chain of command, regardless of political party or ideological bent. An officer's duty must be to implement state policy and to execute without challenge the lawful orders of elected leadership, reserving advice for legitimate forums and restricting it to matters of professional competence. Officers must not publicly question the effectiveness or validity of national policy.

MacArthur, writes Professor John W. Spanier, "went beyond challenge by appealing over the heads of his civilian and military superiors to the opposition party in Congress and the American people themselves in an attempt to change that policy." This act constituted the heart of a constitutional crisis that stands in striking contrast to Washington's ending of the Newburgh conspiracy.

Washington, of course, was commander in chief of the Continental army at the moment of the nation's birth. MacArthur was a legendary commander who had been chief of staff of the Army 10 years before the Second World War. What does "Defender of the Constitution and Servant of the Nation" mean at less exalted levels of the armed forces? Professor Eliot Cohen tells a story of a Major John J. Key, aide-de-camp to General Henry Halleck in 1862. President Abraham Lincoln cashiered Major Key for saying publicly that the object of military operations against the Confederacy intended no more than to draw out the war to the point where a compromise peace was possible. At the time, General George McClellan, many of his staff officers, and the opposition Democratic Party held these views.

Lincoln dismissed Key, observing: "It is wholly inadmissible for any gentleman holding a military commission from the United States to utter such sentiments as Major Key is within proved to have done." Key's disgrace, which Lincoln never reversed, was based on the president's belief that Key represented some in the Army who were not fully committed to the defense of the Constitution and restoration of the sovereignty of the national government. By his action the president made clear that total commitment was expected.

By accepting the commission and swearing the Constitutional oath, American officers embrace the concept of civilian control of the military and pledge full loyalty and commitment to the policies of civilian leaders. Officers must strive to be nonpartisan in conduct, speech, and actions, so long as they wear the uniform. Toward the end of his life, MacArthur apparently recognized his previous errors when he reminded West Point cadets:

> Others will debate the controversial issues, national and international, which divide men's minds; but serene, calm, aloof you stand as the nation's war-guardian, as its lifeguard from the raging tides of international conflict, as its gladiator in the arena of battle… Let civilian voices argue the merits or demerits of our processes of government; whether our strength is being sapped by deficit financing, indulged in too long, by federal paternalism grown too mighty, by power groups grown too arrogant, by morals grown too low, by taxes grown too high, by extremists grown too violent, whether our personal liberties are as thorough and complete as they should be. These great national problems are not for your professional participation or military solution.

Although this may be difficult advice to follow in today's world of instant access to global communications and news media, it stands even more important. The American people trust their commissioned officers to carry out lawful orders energetically and implement public policies without hesitation. To be a "Defender of the Constitution and Servant of the Nation" means that you not only protect and obey the laws of our nation, but also the ideals expressed by the Declaration of Independence. American officers must safeguard the public trust in impartial, nonpartisan armed forces through their willing subordination and enthusiastic obedience.

THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE
A TRANSCRIPTION

Excerpted from the *Armed Forces Officer*

IN CONGRESS, July 4, 1776.

The unanimous Declaration of the thirteen united States of America,

When in the Course of human events, it becomes necessary for one people to dissolve the political bands which have connected them with another, and to assume among the powers of the earth, the separate and equal station to which the Laws of Nature and of Nature's God entitle them, a decent respect to the opinions of mankind requires that they should declare the causes which impel them to the separation.

We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness. That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed,— That whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new Government, laying its foundation on such principles and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness. Prudence, indeed, will dictate that Governments long established should not be changed for light and transient causes; and accordingly all experience hath shewn, that mankind are more disposed to suffer, while evils are sufferable, than to right themselves by abolishing the forms to which they are accustomed. But when a long train of abuses and usurpations, pursuing invariably the same Object evinces a design to reduce them under absolute Despotism, it is their right, it is their duty, to throw off such Government, and to provide new Guards for their future security. Such has been the patient sufferance of these Colonies; and such is now the necessity which constrains them to alter their former Systems of Government. The history of the present King of Great Britain is a history of repeated injuries and usurpations, all having in direct object the establishment of an absolute Tyranny over these States. To prove this, let Facts be submitted to a candid world.

He has refused his Assent to Laws, the most wholesome and necessary for the public good. He has forbidden his Governors to pass Laws of immediate and pressing importance, unless suspended in their operation till his Assent should be obtained; and when so suspended, he has utterly neglected to attend to them.

He has abdicated Government here, by declaring us out of his Protection and waging War against us. He has plundered our seas, ravaged our Coasts, burnt our towns, and destroyed the lives of our people. He is at this time transporting large Armies of foreign Mercenaries to compleat the works of death, desolation and tyranny, already begun with circumstances of Cruelty & perfidy scarcely paralleled in the most barbarous ages, and totally unworthy the Head of a civilized nation. He has constrained our fellow Citizens taken Captive on the high Seas to bear Arms against their Country, to become the executioners of their friends and Brethren, or to fall themselves by their Hands. He has excited domestic insurrections amongst us, and has endeavoured to bring on the inhabitants of our frontiers, the merciless Indian Savages, whose known rule of warfare, is an undistinguished destruction of all ages, sexes and conditions.

In every stage of these Oppressions We have Petitioned for Redress in the most humble terms: Our repeated Petitions have been answered only by repeated injury. A Prince whose character is thus marked by every act which may define a Tyrant, is unfit to be the ruler of a free people.

Nor have We been wanting in attentions to our British brethren. We have warned them from time to time of attempts by their legislature to extend an unwarrantable jurisdiction over us. We have reminded them of the circumstances of our emigration and settlement here. We have appealed to their native justice and magnanimity, and we have conjured them by the ties of our common kindred to disavow these usurpations, which, would inevitably interrupt our connections and correspondence. They too have been deaf to the voice of justice and of consanguinity. We must, therefore, acquiesce in the necessity, which denounces our Separation, and hold them, as we hold the rest of mankind, Enemies in War, in Peace Friends.

We, therefore, the Representatives of the united States of America, in General Congress, Assembled, appealing to the Supreme Judge of the world for the rectitude of our intentions, do, in the Name, and by Authority of the good People of these Colonies, solemnly publish and declare, That these United Colonies are, and of Right ought to be Free and Independent States; that they are Absolved from all Allegiance to the British Crown, and that all political connection between them and the State of Great Britain, is and ought to be totally dissolved; and that as Free and Independent States, they have full Power to levy War, conclude Peace, contract Alliances, establish Commerce, and to do all other Acts and Things which Independent States may of right do. And for the support of this Declaration, with a firm reliance on the protection of divine Providence, we mutually pledge to each other our Lives, our Fortunes and our sacred Honor.

The 56 signatures on the Declaration appear in the positions indicated:

Column 1	Column 2	Column 3
Georgia *Button Gwinnett* *Lyman Hall* *George Walton*	**North Carolina:** *William Hooper* *Joseph Hewes* *John Penn* **South Carolina:** *Edward Rutledge* *Thomas Heyward, Jr.* *Thomas Lynch, Jr.* *Arthur Middleton*	**Massachusetts:** *John Hancock* **Maryland:** *Samuel Chase* *William Paca* *Thomas Stone* *Charles Carroll of Carrollton* **Virginia:** *George Wythe* *Richard Henry Lee* *Thomas Jefferson* *Benjamin Harrison* *Thomas Nelson, Jr.* *Francis Lightfoot Lee* *Carter Braxton*

Column 4	Column 5	Column 6
Pennsylvania: *Robert Morris* *Benjamin Rush* *Benjamin Franklin* *John Morton* *George Clymer* *James Smith* *George Taylor* *James Wilson* *George Ross* **Delaware:** *Caesar Rodney* *George Read* *Thomas McKean*	**New York:** *William Floyd* *Philip Livingston* *Francis Lewis* *Lewis Morris* **New Jersey:** *Richard Stockton* *John Witherspoon* *Francis Hopkinson* *John Hart* *Abraham Clark*	**New Hampshire:** *Josiah Bartlett* *William Whipple* **Massachusetts:** *Samuel Adams* *John Adams* *Robert Treat Paine* *Elbridge Gerry* **Rhode Island:** *Stephen Hopkins* *William Ellery* **Connecticut:** *Roger Sherman* *Samuel Huntington* *William Williams* *Oliver Wolcott* **New Hampshire:** *Matthew Thornton*

THE CONSTITUTION
A TRANSCRIPTION

Excerpted from the *Armed Forces Officer*

The following text is a transcription of the Constitution in its original form. Items that are italicized have since been amended or superseded.

We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defense, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America.

Article. I.

Section. 1.

All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives.

Section. 2

The House of Representatives shall be composed of Members chosen every second Year by the People of the several States, and the Electors in each State shall have the Qualifications requisite for Electors of the most numerous Branch of the State Legislature.

No Person shall be a Representative who shall not have attained to the Age of twenty five Years, and been seven Years a Citizen of the United States, and who shall not, when elected, be an Inhabitant of that State in which he shall be chosen.

Representatives and direct Taxes shall be apportioned among the several States which may be included within this Union, according to their respective Numbers, which shall be determined by adding to the whole Number of free Persons, including those bound to Service for a Term of Years, and excluding Indians not taxed, three fifths of all other Persons. The actual Enumeration shall be made within three Years after the first Meeting of the Congress of the United States, and within every subsequent Term of ten Years, in such Manner as they shall by Law direct. The Number of Representatives shall not exceed one for every thirty Thousand, but each State shall have at Least one Representative; and until such enumeration shall be made, the State of New Hampshire shall be entitled to choose three, Massachusetts eight, Rhode-Island and Providence Plantations one, Connecticut five, New-York six, New Jersey four, Pennsylvania eight, Delaware one, Maryland six, Virginia ten, North Carolina five, South Carolina five, and Georgia three.

When vacancies happen in the Representation from any State, the Executive Authority thereof shall issue Writs of Election to fill such Vacancies.

The House of Representatives shall choose their Speaker and other Officers; and shall have the sole Power of Impeachment.

Section. 3

The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two Senators from each State, chosen by the *Legislature* thereof for six Years; and each Senator shall have one Vote.

Immediately after they shall be assembled in Consequence of the first Election, they shall be divided as equally as may be into three Classes. The Seats of the Senators of the first Class shall be vacated at the Expiration of the second Year, of the second Class at the Expiration of the fourth Year, and of the third Class at the Expiration of the sixth Year, so that one third may be chosen every second Year; and *if Vacancies happen by Resignation, or otherwise, during the Recess* of the Legislature of any State, the Executive thereof may make temporary *Appointments until the next Meeting of the Legislature, which shall then fill such Vacancies.*

No Person shall be a Senator who shall not have attained to the Age of thirty Years, and been nine Years a Citizen of the United States, and who shall not, when elected, be an Inhabitant of that State for which he shall be chosen.

The Vice President of the United States shall be President of the Senate, but shall have no Vote, unless they be equally divided.

The Senate shall choose their other Officers, and also a President pro tempore, in the Absence of the Vice President, or when he shall exercise the Office of President of the United States.

The Senate shall have the sole Power to try all Impeachments. When sitting for that Purpose, they shall be on Oath or Affirmation. When the President of the United States is tried, the Chief Justice shall preside: And no Person shall be convicted without the Concurrence of two thirds of the Members present.

Judgment in Cases of Impeachment shall not extend further than to removal from Office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any Office of honor, Trust or Profit under the United States: but the Party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to Indictment, Trial, Judgment and Punishment, according to Law.

Section. 4.

The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to the Places of choosing Senators.

The Congress shall assemble at least once in every Year, and such Meeting shall be on the first Monday in *December,* unless they shall by Law appoint a different Day.

Section. 5.

Each House shall be the Judge of the Elections, Returns and Qualifications of its own Members, and a Majority of each shall constitute a Quorum to do Business; but a smaller Number may adjourn from day to day, and may be authorized to compel the Attendance of absent Members, in such Manner, and under such Penalties as each House may provide.

Each House may determine the Rules of its Proceedings, punish its Members for disorderly Behavior, and, with the Concurrence of two thirds, expel a Member.

Each House shall keep a Journal of its Proceedings, and from time to time publish the same, excepting such Parts as may in their Judgment require Secrecy; and the Yeas and Nays of the Members of either House on any question shall, at the Desire of one fifth of those Present, be entered on the Journal.

Neither House, during the Session of Congress, shall, without the Consent of the other, adjourn for more than three days, nor to any other Place than that in which the two Houses shall be sitting.

Section. 6.

The Senators and Representatives shall receive a Compensation for their Services, to be ascertained by Law, and paid out of the Treasury of the United States. They shall in all Cases, except Treason, Felony and Breach of the Peace, be privileged from Arrest during their Attendance at the Session of their respective Houses, and in going to and returning from the same; and for any Speech or Debate in either House, they shall not be questioned in any other Place.

No Senator or Representative shall, during the Time for which he was elected, be appointed to any civil Office under the Authority of the United States, which shall have been created, or the Emoluments whereof shall have been increased during such time; and no Person holding any Office under the United States, shall be a Member of either House during his Continuance in Office.

Section. 7.

All Bills for raising Revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives; but the Senate may propose or concur with Amendments as on other Bills.

Every Bill which shall have passed the House of Representatives and the Senate, shall, before it become a Law, be presented to the President of the United States: If he approve he shall sign it, but if not he shall return it, with his Objections to that House in which it shall have originated, who shall enter the Objections at large on their Journal, and proceed to reconsider it. If after such Reconsideration two thirds of that House shall agree to pass the Bill, it shall be sent, together with the Objections, to the other House, by which it shall likewise be reconsidered, and if approved by two thirds of that House, it shall become a Law. But in all such Cases the Votes of both Houses shall be determined by yeas and Nays, and the Names of the Persons voting for and against the Bill shall be entered on the Journal of each House respectively. If any Bill shall not be returned by the President within

ten Days (Sundays excepted) after it shall have been presented to him, the Same shall be a Law, in like Manner as if he had signed it, unless the Congress by their Adjournment prevent its Return, in which Case it shall not be a Law.

Every Order, Resolution, or Vote to which the Concurrence of the Senate and House of Representatives may be necessary (except on a question of Adjournment) shall be presented to the President of the United States; and before the Same shall take Effect, shall be approved by him, or being disapproved by him, shall be repassed by two thirds of the Senate and House of Representatives, according to the Rules and Limitations prescribed in the Case of a Bill.

Section. 8.

The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States; but all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform throughout the United States;

To borrow Money on the credit of the United States;

To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes;

To establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization, and uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States;

To coin Money, regulate the Value thereof, and of foreign Coin, and fix the Standard of Weights and Measures;

To provide for the Punishment of counterfeiting the Securities and current Coin of the United States; To establish Post Offices and post Roads;

To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries;

To constitute Tribunals inferior to the supreme Court;

To define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas, and Offences against the Law of Nations;

To declare War, grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water;

To raise and support Armies, but no Appropriation of Money to that Use shall be for a longer Term than two Years;

To provide and maintain a Navy;

To make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces;

To provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions;

To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia, and for governing such Part of them as may be employed in the Service of the United States, reserving to the States respectively, the Appointment of the Officers, and the Authority of training the Militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress;

To exercise exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever, over such District (not exceeding ten Miles square) as may, by Cession of particular States, and the Acceptance of Congress, become the Seat of the Government of the United States, and to exercise like Authority over all Places purchased by the Consent of the Legislature of the State in which the Same shall be, for the Erection of Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, dock-Yards, and other needful Buildings;—And To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.

Section. 9.

The Migration or Importation of such Persons as any of the States now existing shall think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by the Congress prior to the Year one thousand eight hundred and eight, but a Tax or duty may be imposed on such Importation, not exceeding ten dollars for each Person.

The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.

No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be passed.

No Capitation, or other direct, Tax shall be laid, *unless in Proportion to the Census or enumeration herein before directed to be taken.*

No Tax or Duty shall be laid on Articles exported from any State.

No Preference shall be given by any Regulation of Commerce or Revenue to the Ports of one State over those of another; nor shall Vessels bound to, or from, one State, be obliged to enter, clear, or pay Duties in another.

No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law; and a regular Statement and Account of the Receipts and Expenditures of all public Money shall be published from time to time.

No Title of Nobility shall be granted by the United States: And no Person holding any Office of Profit or Trust under them, shall, without the Consent of the Congress, accept of any present, Emolument, Office, or Title, of any kind whatever, from any King, Prince, or foreign State.

Section. 10.

No State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation; grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal; coin Money; emit Bills of Credit; make any Thing but gold and silver Coin a Tender in Payment of Debts; pass any Bill of Attainder, ex post facto Law, or Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts, or grant any Title of Nobility.

No State shall, without the Consent of the Congress, lay any Imposts or Duties on Imports or Exports, except what may be absolutely necessary for executing it's inspection Laws: and the net Produce of all Duties and Imposts, laid by any State on Imports or Exports, shall be for the Use of the Treasury of the United States; and all such Laws shall be subject to the Revision and Control of the Congress.

No State shall, without the Consent of Congress, lay any Duty of Tonnage, keep Troops, or Ships of War in time of Peace, enter into any Agreement or Compact with another State, or with a foreign Power, or engage in War, unless actually invaded, or in such imminent Danger as will not admit of delay.

Article. II.

Section. 1.

The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America. He shall hold his Office during the Term of four Years, and, together with the Vice President, chosen for the same Term, be elected, as follows:

Each State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct, a Number of Electors, equal to the whole Number of Senators and Representatives to which the State may be entitled in the Congress: but no Senator or Representative, or Person holding an Office of Trust or Profit under the United States, shall be appointed an Elector.

The Electors shall meet in their respective States, and vote by Ballot for two Persons, of whom one at least shall not be an Inhabitant of the same State with themselves. And they shall make a List of all the Persons voted for, and of the Number of Votes for each; which List they shall sign and certify, and transmit sealed to the Seat of the Government of the United States, directed to the President of the Senate. The President of the Senate shall, in the Presence of the Senate and House of Representatives, open all the Certificates, and the Votes shall then be counted. The Person having the greatest Number of Votes shall be the President, if such Number be a Majority of the whole Number of Electors appointed; and if there be more than one who have such Majority, and have an equal Number of Votes, then the House of Representatives shall immediately choose by Ballot one of them for President; and if no Person have a Majority, then from the five highest on the List they said House shall in like Manner choose the President. But in choosing the President, the Votes shall be taken by States, the Representation from each State having one Vote; A quorum for this purpose shall consist of a Member or Members from two thirds of the States, and a Majority of all the States shall be necessary to a Choice. In

every Case, after the Choice of the President, the Person having the greatest Number of Votes of the Electors shall be the Vice President. But if there should remain two or more who have equal Votes, the Senate shall choose from them by Ballot the Vice President.

The Congress may determine the Time of choosing the Electors, and the Day on which they shall give their Votes; which Day shall be the same throughout the United States.

No Person except a natural born Citizen, or a Citizen of the United States, at the time of the Adoption of this Constitution, shall be eligible to the Office of President; neither shall any Person be eligible to that Office who shall not have attained to the Age of thirty five Years, and been fourteen Years a Resident within the United States.

In Case of the Removal of the President from Office, or of his Death, Resignation, or Inability to discharge the Powers and Duties of the said Office, the Same shall devolve on the Vice President, and the Congress may by Law provide for the Case of Removal, Death, Resignation or Inability, both of the President and Vice President, declaring what Officer shall then act as President, and such Officer shall act accordingly, until the Disability be removed, or a President shall be elected.

The President shall, at stated Times, receive for his Services, a Compensation, which shall neither be increased nor diminished during the Period for which he shall have been elected, and he shall not receive within that Period any other Emolument from the United States, or any of them.

Before he enter on the Execution of his Office, he shall take the following Oath or Affirmation: "I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will faithfully execute the Office of President of the United States, and will to the best of my Ability, preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the United States."

Section. 2.

The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several States, when called into the actual Service of the United States; he may require the Opinion, in writing, of the principal Officer in each of the executive Departments, upon any Subject relating to the Duties of their respective Offices, and he shall have Power to grant Reprieves and Pardons for Offences against the United States, except in Cases of Impeachment.

He shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur; and he shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by Law: but the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.

The President shall have Power to fill up all Vacancies that may happen during the Recess of the Senate, by granting Commissions which shall expire at the End of their next Session.

Section. 3.

He shall from time to time give to the Congress Information of the State of the Union, and recommend to their Consideration such Measures as he shall judge necessary and expedient; he may, on extraordinary Occasions, convene both Houses, or either of them, and in Case of Disagreement between them, with Respect to the Time of Adjournment, he may adjourn them to such Time as he shall think proper; he shall receive Ambassadors and other public Ministers; he shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed, and shall Commission all the Officers of the United States.

Section. 4.

The President, Vice President and all civil Officers of the United States, shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors.

Article. III.

Section. 1.

The judicial Power of the United States shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish. The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices during good Behavior, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services a Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office.

Section. 2.

The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority;—to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls;--to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction;—to Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party;—to Controversies between two or more States;— *between a State and Citizens of another State;*—between Citizens of different States;— between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under Grants of different States, and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.

In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, and those in which a State shall be Party, the supreme Court shall have original Jurisdiction. In all the other Cases before mentioned, the supreme Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction, both s to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress shall make.

The Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment, shall be by Jury; and such Trial shall be held in the State where the said Crimes shall have been committed; but when not committed within any State, the Trial shall be at such Place or Places as the Congress may by Law have directed.

Section. 3.

Treason against the United States, shall consist only in levying War against them, or in adhering to their Enemies, giving them Aid and Comfort. No Person shall be convicted of Treason unless on the Testimony of two Witnesses to the same overt Act, or on Confession in open Court.

The Congress shall have Power to declare the Punishment of Treason, but no Attainder of Treason shall work Corruption of Blood, or Forfeiture except during the Life of the Person attainted.

Article. IV.

Section. 1.

Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the Congress may by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof.

Section. 2.

The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States.

A Person charged in any State with Treason, Felony, or other Crime, who shall flee from Justice, and be found in another State, shall on Demand of the executive Authority of the State from which he fled, be delivered up, to be removed to the State having Jurisdiction of the Crime.

No Person held to Service or Labour in one State, under the Laws thereof, escaping into another, shall, in Consequence of any Law or Regulation therein, be discharged from such Service or Labour, but shall be delivered up on Claim of the Party to whom such Service or Labour may be due.

Section. 3.

New States may be admitted by the Congress into this Union; but no new State shall be formed or erected within the Jurisdiction of any other State; nor any State be formed by the Junction of two or more States, or Parts of States, without the Consent of the Legislatures of the States concerned as well as of the Congress.

The Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States; and nothing in this Constitution shall be so construed as to Prejudice any Claims of the United States, or of any particular State.

Section. 4.

The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of Government, and shall protect each of them against Invasion; and on Application of the Legislature, or of the Executive (when the Legislature cannot be convened), against domestic Violence.

Article. V.

The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary, shall propose Amendments to this Constitution, or, on the Application of the Legislatures of two thirds of the several States, shall call a Convention for proposing Amendments, which, in either Case, shall be valid to all Intents and Purposes, as Part of this Constitution, when ratified by the Legislatures of three fourths of the several States, or by Conventions in three fourths thereof, as the one or the other Mode of Ratification may be proposed by the Congress; Provided that no Amendment which may be made prior to the Year One thousand eight hundred and eight shall in any Manner affect the first and fourth Clauses in the Ninth Section of the first Article; and that no State, without its Consent, shall be deprived of its equal Suffrage in the Senate.

Article. VI.

All Debts contracted and Engagements entered into, before the Adoption of this Constitution, shall be as valid against the United States under this Constitution, as under the Confederation.

This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.

The Senators and Representatives before mentioned, and the Members of the several State Legislatures, and all executive and judicial Officers, both of the United States and of the several States, shall be bound by Oath or Affirmation, to support this Constitution; but no religious Test shall ever be required as a Qualification to any Office or public Trust under the United States.

Article. VII.

The Ratification of the Conventions of nine States, shall be sufficient for the Establishment of this Constitution between the States so ratifying the Same.

The Word, "the," being interlined between the seventh and eighth Lines of the first Page, the Word "Thirty" being partly written on an Erazure in the fifteenth Line of the first Page, The Words "is tried" being interlined between the thirty second and thirty third Lines of the first Page and the Word "the" being interlined between the forty third and forty fourth Lines of the second Page.

Attest William Jackson Secretary

Done in Convention by the Unanimous Consent of the States present the Seventeenth Day of September in the Year of our Lord one thousand seven hundred and Eighty seven and of the Independence of the United States of America the Twelfth In witness whereof We have hereunto subscribed our Names,

G. Washington President and deputy from Virginia

Delaware *Geo: Read* *Gunning Bedford jun* *John Dickinson* *Richard Bassett* *Jaco: Broom*	**Maryland** *James McHenry* *Dan of St. Thos Jenifer* *Danl. Carroll*	**Virginia** *John Blair* *James Madison Jr.*	**North Carolina** *William Blount* *Richard Dobbs Spaight* *Hu Williamson*
South Carolina *J. Rutledge* *Charles Cotesworth Pinckney* *Charles Pickney* *Pierce Butler*	**Georgia** *William Few* *Abr Baldwin*	**New Hampshire** *John Langdon* *Nicholas Gilman*	**Massachusetts** *Nathaniel Gorham* *Rufus King*
Connecticut *Wm Saml Johnson* *Roger Sherman*	**New York** *Alexander Hamilton*	**New Jersey** *Wil. Livingston* *David Brearley* *Wm. Peterons* *Jona: Dayton*	**Pennsylvania** *B. Franklin* *Thomas Mifflin* *Robt. Morris* *Geo. Clymer* *Thos. FitzSimons* *Jared Ingersoll* *James Wilson* *Gouv Morris*

THE BILL OF RIGHTS

Excerpted from the *Armed Forces Officer*

The following text is a transcription of the first ten amendments to the Constitution in their original form. These amendments were ratified December 15, 1791, and form what is known as the "Bill of Rights."

Amendment I

Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.

Amendment II

A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.

Amendment III

No Soldier shall, in time of peace be quartered in any house, without the consent of the Owner, nor in time of war, but in a manner to be prescribed by law.

Amendment IV

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

Amendment V

No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.

Amendment VI

In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.

Amendment VII

In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise reexamined in any Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common law.

Amendment VIII

Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.

Amendment IX

The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.

Amendment X

The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.

Bibliography:
The Armed Forces Officer, US Government Printing Office, 2006.

Roles of the President, the Executive Branch, Congress, and Civilian Control of the Military

Cognitive Lesson Objective:
- Know the roles of the President, the executive branch, Congress, and civilian control of the military.

Cognitive Samples of Behavior:
- Summarize the growth of executive dominance in foreign affairs.

- Describe key Constitutional powers of the US Congress.

- List the major differences between the two legislative houses.

- Describe Louis Smith's criteria that govern civil-military relations in democratic states.

Affective Lesson Objective:
- Respond to the importance of the Roles of the President, the executive branch, Congress, and civilian control of the military.

Affective Samples of Behavior:
- Willingly ask questions concerning the key issues behind the various roles discussed in this lesson.

- Discuss why comprehending these roles is important to the student as a member of the US Armed Forces.

"The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America. He shall hold his Office during the Term of four Years, and, together with the Vice President chosen for the same Term, be elected, The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several States, when called into the actual Service of the United States; he may require the Opinion, in writing, of the principal Officer in each of the executive Departments, upon any Subject relating to the Duties of their respective Offices, …"

- Article II, Sections 1 and 2, of the US Constitution.

As an Air Force officer, it is your responsibility to understand the unique role of your Commander in Chief and the Executive Branch. Just as importantly, you must understand how Congress can impact the US military and why civilian control of the US military is imperative.

President

The power of the executive branch is vested in the President, who also serves as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces. The President appoints the Cabinet and oversees the various agencies and departments of the federal government.

In order for a person to become President, he or she must be a natural-born citizen of the United States, be at least 35 years of age, and have resided in the United States for at least 14 years. Once elected, the President serves a term of four years and may be re-elected only once.

Historical Background

Established under Article 2 of the Constitution, the office of the President was unique and without precedent, although some of its features, including the designation "president," were foreshadowed in several state constitutions. The principal architect was James Wilson of Pennsylvania, head of the faction at the Constitutional Convention calling for a strong executive on the ground that in a country as large as the United States, only a strong President could have influence in distant parts of the land. As chairman of the Committee of Detail, he proposed a single rather than a plural head, which would have control of foreign affairs and be able to exercise a legislative veto. Wilson's view that the President must be a man of the people carried the day, though his desire that the President be elected directly by the people did not.

The question of how to choose the executive was commingled with the question of how to keep the office independent of the legislature. The outcome was the creation of an electoral college chosen by the state legislatures exclusively for the purpose of naming a president. The assumption that George Washington would be the first President and willing to serve indefinitely implied that there should be no limit on the reelection of the President. The committee, appointed late in the convention to deal with unfinished business, fixed the length of the President's term, much discussed, at four years.

Charged to see that the laws are faithfully executed, the President is head of the executive branch and Commander in Chief of the armed forces. Through the veto he exercises legislative power, and through his power to appoint judges and the requirement that he execute the laws, he exercises judicial power.

Constitutional and Political Powers

The executive branch of government has the major responsibility for the formulation and execution of foreign and national security policy. At the pinnacle of this system, of course, is the President, whose powers are both constitutional and political in nature. The President is assisted by relevant executive branch agencies, organized around, but not limited to, those advisers and agencies named by the National Security Act.

The constitutional responsibilities of the President in the national security area are stated succinctly in Article 2, Section 2 of that document. By constitutional provision, the President is designated as Commander in Chief of the armed forces, has the sole authority to negotiate treaties with foreign governments, and has the power to appoint and remove ambassadors and other officials. This short listing reflects both the compactness of the Constitution and the relative simplicity of the time in which it was written. In 1787, after all, governmental activity was considerably more restricted than it is today, and the international role of a young and physically isolated United States was marginal and circumscribed.

Presidential responsibilities have expanded as the United States' role in the world has increased. As the size of American armed forces has increased and American commitments with security implications have become global, the President's role as Commander in Chief has become much greater. The power of the President to act in this capacity, particularly in the actual employment of armed forces, is shared with Congress and is highly controversial. Important checks and balances are built into this role. For one thing, the President commands only those armed forces raised and maintained by Congress, and only Congress has the authority to declare war. This was originally a significant limitation of presidential power; but since nations now seldom formally declare war, it has become less important.

Such mechanisms as the controversial War Powers Act (which places reporting and approval requirements on the employment of American forces in combat) and the Arms Exchange Control Act (which limits the size of arms exchanges that can be undertaken without specific congressional approval) have been enacted to attempt to restore congressional power in this area.

The treaty-making power has also expanded. According to the Constitution, only the President or his representative (plenipotentiaries) can negotiate treaties with foreign governments. The framers of the Constitution assumed that agreements between the United States and other countries would be in the form of treaties and, as a result, gave Congress a check by requiring the President to secure the advice and consent of two-thirds of the Senate on any treaty.

The sheer volume of foreign affairs no longer allows all international interactions of the US government to be handled through the treaty process. Instead, the overwhelming majority of all formal relations now take the form of executive agreements, formal obligations between the United States and other governments that have the force of law but do not require senatorial approval. In these cases, the congressional check is informal. If the agreement requires spending American monies (they usually do), Congress can exercise the powers of purse; if not, Congress can retaliate against the president in some other area of public policy.

Another presidential power is the authority to appoint and remove officials. The advantage this confers to presidents is in helping to ensure the loyalty of key decision-makers and implementers. The power to appoint allows presidents to name those who share their views, and the power to remove assures continuing loyalty. Originally, the Constitution envisioned that this authority would apply mainly to ambassadors, but as the power and size of the federal government have expanded, so have the numbers of appointees. Now, literally thousands of so-called political appointees (presidential appointees who do not have civil service protection) are named at the senior and middle management levels of various cabinet and other agencies.

Once again, there is a congressional check in that almost all important presidential appointments require confirmation by the Senate. The confirmation process does not encompass the personal staff of presidents, which includes the professional staff of the National Security Council, an exemption that became controversial in the wake of the Iran-Contra affair. Congress, which does not have the time or resources to examine all appointees exhaustively, uses the check selectively and thus Congress reserves its detailed consideration for controversial positions and individuals.

If the constitutional prerogatives of presidents convey powers, their political powers can be even more impressive. Presidential political powers are in areas that are not subject to congressional checks and balances and thus can yield advantages over Congress. At least five such powers stand out.

The first is that the President is the only nationally elected official. Thus, the President is the only politician with a national constituency and the only person who can legitimately claim to be the representative of and speaker for "all the people." By contrast, Senators and Representatives can only speak for their states or districts. Thus, their individual views are generally not accorded the same weight as that of the President.

The second advantage presidents have is that, at least nominally, the entire federal bureaucracy works for them. Although presidents rapidly learn the limits of their control over elements of the bureaucratic structures (especially those structures run by people with civil service protection), the advantage in terms of access to information and expertise on the range of public matters is great, since the resources available to Congress are considerably smaller.

The third advantage is the mantle of office. Simply occupying the presidency bestows prestige, credibility, and deference to the holder of the office. As the political leader of the world's most powerful nation, the president is automatically a world leader. Aside from the prestige this provides, the position means presidents routinely have access to other world leaders and thus can claim personal, even intimate, knowledge of such contemporaries. At the same time, what presidents do and say is important simply because they are presidents.

The importance of the presidency and its occupants leads to a fourth advantage—unparalleled access to the electronic and print media. What any president does is news, and there is an entire White House press corps whose entire livelihood and success are based on its surmises about presidents. If a president wants publicity for a position that he does not wish to officially endorse, all he has to do is wander down to the press room, declare his remarks off the record (at which point the president becomes a "well-placed spokesman" or the like), and the total resources of the electronic and print media are at his beck and call. At times such attention may be closer than a president might like. On the other hand, no other public figure can command such media attention.

Fifth and finally, presidential power in the national security area has been enhanced by de facto delegation of authority from Congress. With certain high-profile exceptions, Congress does not enmesh itself in the day-to-day workings of national security policy, and with good reason. For one thing, national security affairs are almost invariably complex and multifaceted, and most congressmen have neither the expertise nor the interest to follow them in depth. For another thing, the sheer volume of national security affairs is beyond the capabilities of congressional scrutiny, especially since Congress must consider public affairs across the range of public policy areas. Finally, many security problems are time-sensitive. The structure and nature of Congress are best suited to situations that allow thorough deliberation and debate, both of which are time-consuming. National security situations often move faster than the pace of congressional debate, so that a president must act after only informal consultation with the leaders of the houses of Congress and the chairpersons of relevant committees.

The cumulative effect of the President's constitutional and political position is dominance of the national security system. Generally speaking, presidential ascendancy has been expanding throughout the period since World War II. Before that war, foreign and security policies were relatively uncomplicated. The chief, and virtually sole, institution responsible for carrying out foreign policy was the State Department. Concerns that we now routinely label as national security considerations were of comparatively minor importance.

The Executive Branch

The emergence of the United States as a major world power in competition with the Soviet Union after the war changed the executive branch. The national security implications of foreign policy became more important, and the terms foreign policy and national security policy came to be used interchangeably.

This change in orientation was recognized officially and organizationally in the National Security Act of 1947. In addition to creating an independent Air Force, the Central Intelligence Agency and the Department of Defense, the act provided a structure within which to fashion national security policy, known as the National Security Council (NSC). The members of the council are the President (who convenes it and serves as chair), the Vice President, the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense. In addition, the President may appoint additional members, and the act specifies that the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff serve as advisers to the NSC. Finally, the act contains a provision for a professional staff to coordinate the council's activities. The position of National Security Adviser (NSA) evolved from this provision.

In recent years presidents have had to wrestle with questions that were dealt with on the municipal or state levels. They are now involved with public health matters, homelessness, child care and innumerable other issues never dreamed of by the Founding Fathers. A consequence is that presidents have become, after a fashion, "super mayors" and "super governors," drawing political fire they formerly were spared. To meet the nation's myriad needs, the President must rely on an array of advisers, whom he selects on the basis of personal and political preference that is as varied as the presidents themselves.

The Cabinet, an extra constitutional body that came into existence in 1791, is the President's "official family." Originally consisting of the heads of the Departments of State, Treasury, and War and the Office of the Attorney General, today it has fifteen members, making it an unwieldy body for the making of decisions. The President relies heavily on in-house staff and particularly on the Chief of Staff, who is effectively the main consultant in generating policy.

Brief History of the Senate

The Congress of the United States was created by Article I, Section 1, of the Constitution, adopted by the Constitutional Convention on September 17, 1787, providing that:

> "All legislative powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives."

The first Congress under the Constitution met on March 4, 1789, in the Federal Hall in New York City. The membership then consisted of 20 Senators and 59 Representatives. The two houses of Congress resulted from the "Great Compromise" between large and small states reached at the Constitutional Convention in 1787. Membership of the House of Representatives is apportioned according to a state's population, while in the Senate each state has equal representation.

The Constitution assigns the Senate and House equal responsibility for declaring war, maintaining the armed forces, assessing taxes, borrowing money, minting currency, regulating commerce, and making all laws necessary for the operation of the government. The Senate holds exclusive authority to advise and consent on treaties and nominations.

The Constitution requires that senators be at least thirty years of age, citizens of the United States, and residents of the states from which they are chosen. Originally, the Constitution also provided that state legislatures would elect senators, but in 1913 the Seventeenth Amendment established direct election of senators by the people.

While the House in 1789 immediately opened its doors to the public, the Senate conducted its business in secret session for the first few years, when it met in New York and Philadelphia. Senators expected that they would act primarily as an advisory council to the president, and as a senior body perfecting, by amendment, legislation that came up from the House. However, public pressure encouraged the Senate to construct a visitor's gallery, which opened in 1795. In 1800, when the federal government moved from Philadelphia to the newly created District of Columbia, both the House and Senate chambers provided public galleries.

A major turning point in the Senate's history occurred with the passage of the 1946 Legislative Reorganization Act, which reshaped the committee system and provided the first professional staff for senators and committees. The Cold War brought an increase in legislation, with the expansion of the national defense program, foreign aid, and economic and military assistance to America's allies. During the 1950s the Senate engaged in sharp debates over civil rights policies, which stimulated lengthy filibusters, but which eventually resulted in passage of the landmark Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Voting Rights Act of 1965. The Senate also divided over American involvement in the war in Vietnam. Although senators overwhelmingly approved the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution in 1964, they later disagreed over its application, and voted for its repeal. Senate concern over

increased presidential powers in foreign affairs led to the passage of the War Powers Act of 1973, requiring Congressional notification and approval whenever American troops are sent into combat.

Congress Today

The Senate is composed of 100 Members, 2 from each State, who are elected to serve for a term of 6 years. There are three classes of Senators, and a new class is elected every 2 years.

The House of Representatives comprises 435 Representatives. Population determines the number representing each State, but every State is entitled to at least one Representative. The people elect members for 2-year terms, all terms running for the same period. Both the Senators and the Representatives must be residents of the State from which they are chosen. In addition, a Senator must be at least 30 years of age and must have been a citizen of the United States for at least 9 years; a Representative must be at least 25 years of age and must have been a citizen for at least 7 years.

A Resident Commissioner from Puerto Rico (elected for a 4-year term) and Delegates from American Samoa, the District of Columbia, Guam, and the Virgin Islands complete the composition of the Congress of the United States. Delegates are elected for a term of 2 years. The Resident Commissioner and Delegates may take part in the floor discussions, but have no vote in the full House or in the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union. They do, however, vote in the committees to which they are assigned.

Committees: Largely committees of both Houses of Congress do the work of preparing and considering legislation. Each House has standing committees, permanent groups conducting business throughout the Congress which focuses on a certain, long-lasting issue. In addition, there are select committees in each House, and various congressional commissions and joint committees composed of members of both Houses. Each House may also appoint special investigating committees.

The membership of the standing committees of each House is chosen by a vote of the entire body; members of other committees are appointed under the provisions of the measure establishing them.

Each bill and resolution is usually referred to the appropriate committee, which may report a bill out in its original form, favorably or unfavorably, recommend amendments, or allow the proposed legislation to die in committee without action.

Sessions: Section 4 of Article I of the Constitution makes it mandatory that "The Congress shall assemble at least once in every Year..." Under this provision, also, the date for convening Congress was designated originally as the first Monday in December, "unless they shall by law appoint a different day." Eighteen acts were passed, up to 1820, providing for the meeting of Congress on other days of the year. From 1820 to 1934, however, Congress met regularly on the first Monday in December. In 1934, the Twentieth Amendment changed the convening of Congress to January 3, unless Congress "shall

by law appoint a different day." In addition, the President, according to Article II, section 3, of the Constitution "may, on extraordinary Occasions, convene both Houses, or either of them, and in Case of Disagreement between them, with Respect to the Time of Adjournment, he may adjourn them to such Time as he shall think proper..."

Powers Of Congress: Article I, section 8, of the Constitution defines the powers of Congress. Included are the powers to assess and collect taxes—called the chief power; to regulate commerce, both interstate and foreign; to coin money; to establish post offices and post roads; to establish courts inferior to the Supreme Court; to declare war; and to raise and maintain an army and a navy. Congress is further empowered "To provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions;" and "To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof."

Prohibitions Upon Congress: Section 9 of Article I of the Constitution also imposes prohibitions upon Congress. "The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it." A bill of attainder or an ex post facto law cannot be passed. No export duty can be imposed. Ports of one State cannot be given preference over those of another State. "No money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law... " No title of nobility may be granted.

Rights Of Members: According to Section 6 of Article I, Members of Congress are granted certain privileges. In no case, except in treason, felony, and breach of the peace, can Members be arrested while attending sessions of Congress "and in going to and returning from the same..." Furthermore, the Members cannot be questioned in any other place for remarks made in Congress. Each House may expel a Member of its body by a two-thirds vote.

Enactment Of Laws: All bills and joint resolutions must pass both the House of Representatives and the Senate and must be signed by the President, except those proposing a constitutional amendment, in order to become law, or be passed over the President's veto by a two-thirds vote of both Houses of Congress. Section 7 of Article I states "If any Bill shall not be returned by the President within ten days (Sundays excepted), it shall have been presented to him, the same shall be a law, in like manner as if he had signed it, unless the Congress by their adjournment prevent its return, in which case it shall not be a law."

When a bill or joint resolution is introduced in the House, the usual procedure for its enactment into law is as follows:

- Assignment to House committee having jurisdiction;

- If favorably considered, it is reported to the House either in its original form or with recommended amendments;

- If the bill or resolution is passed by the House, it is messaged to the Senate and referred to the committee having jurisdiction;

- In the Senate committee the bill, if favorably considered, may be reported in the form as received from the House, or with recommended amendments;

- The approved bill or resolution is reported to the Senate, and if passed by that body, is returned to the House;

- If one body does not accept the amendments to a bill by the other body, a conference committee comprised of Members of both bodies is usually appointed to effect a compromise;

- When the bill or joint resolution is finally approved by both Houses, it is signed by the Speaker (or Speaker pro tempore) and the Vice President (or President pro tempore or acting President pro tempore) and is presented to the President; and

- Once the President's signature is affixed, the measure becomes a law. If the President vetoes the bill, it cannot become a law unless it is repassed by a two-thirds vote of both Houses.

MAJOR DIFFERENCES

BETWEEN THE TWO HOUSES OF CONGRESS

HOUSE	SENATE
435 members serving two-year terms	100 members serving rotating six-year terms
Speaker's referral of bills to committee is hard to challenge.	Referral decisions easy to challenge.
Committees almost always consider legislation first.	Committee consideration easily bypassed.
Rules Committee powerful; controls time of debate, admissibility of amendments.	Rules Committee weak; few limits on debate or amendments.
Debate usually limited to one hour.	Unlimited debate unless shortened by unanimous consent or by invoking cloture.
Non-germane amendments may not be introduced from floor.	Non-germane amendments may be introduced (riders).

Constitutional Role of the Senate

The Senate was designed to protect against the passions of the moment by exercising thorough deliberation over the wishes of the majority of the people. Senators stand for election only every six years—meant to provide them some distance from popular opinion. Until 1913, Senators were not directly elected by the citizenry, but by the legislatures of each state. Adoption of the 17th Amendment to the Constitution changed the election of Senators by each state assembly to direct election by the people.

The Senate is considered a continuing body, meaning it never goes out of existence. Only one-third of its membership runs for re-election at any one time. The continuity and six-year terms were meant to allow the Senate to serve as a restraining influence on the House. Since a Senator represents an entire state, he/she has a more heterogeneous electorate and must be concerned with a broader range of views and interests than a Member of the House with a narrower constituency.

Constitutional Duties

The Senate was given advise and consent power by the US Constitution. It has the responsibility for ratifying treaties negotiated by the President with foreign countries and approving the President's nominees for such high-level federal positions as cabinet officers, ambassadors, and federal judges.

Constitutional Officers

The Constitution gives the Senate two presiding officers: the Vice President of the United States is the President of the Senate, and in his absence, the President pro tempore of the Senate presides. Both are addressed as Mr. President when in the Chair presiding. The Vice-President rarely presides, arriving only for ceremonial occasions or to break a tie vote. The President pro tempore is also often absent since he also serves on a committee.

The House

The House leadership is structured essentially the same as the Senate, with the members in the political parties responsible for the election of their respective leader and whips.

The elected officers of the House of Representatives include the Clerk, the Sergeant at Arms, and the Chaplain.

The Clerk is custodian of the Seal of the House and administers the primary legislative activities of the House. These duties include: accepting the credentials of the Members-elect and calling the Members to order at the commencement of the first session of each Congress, keeping the Journal, taking all votes and certifying the passage of bills, and processing all legislation. Through various departments, the Clerk is also responsible for floor and committee reporting services, legislative information and reference services,

the administration of House reports pursuant to certain legislation including the Ethics in Government Act, the Federal Election Campaign Act, and the Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act; the distribution of House documents and supervision of the operations of the House Document Room; and administration of the House Page Program. The Clerk is also charged with supervision of the offices vacated by Members due to death, resignation, or expulsion.

The Sergeant at Arms maintains the order of the House under the direction of the Speaker, and is the keeper of the Mace. As a member of the US Capitol Police Board, the Sergeant at Arms is the chief law enforcement officer for the House, and serves as Board Chairman each even year. The ceremonial and protocol duties parallel those of the Senate Sergeant at Arms and include arranging the inauguration of the President of the United States, Joint Sessions of Congress, visits to the House of heads of state, and funerals of Members of Congress. The Sergeant at Arms enforces the rules relating to the privileges of the Hall of the House, including admission to the galleries.

The Chief Administrative Officer is charged with the administration of other House support services including: payroll, benefits, postal operations and internal mail distribution, office furnishings, office equipment, office supplies, and the administration of the House televised floor proceedings.

Special Powers Of The House Of Representatives: The House of Representatives is granted the power of originating all bills for the raising of revenue. Both Houses of Congress act in impeachment proceedings, which, according to the Constitution, may be instituted against the President, Vice President, and all civil officers of the United States. The House of Representatives has the sole power of impeachment, and the Senate has the sole power to try impeachments.

Constitutional Role of the House of Representatives

With its entire membership standing for election every two years, the House of Representatives is considered the chamber closest to the electorate. In constitutional theory, running so frequently for reelection is believed to allow Representatives to come to know their constituencies well. This enables House Members to accurately reflect the views of the local citizenry and better advocate the needs of each district. Members of the House are also likely to be more sensitive to changes in popular sentiment.

The House goes out of existence every two years, at the end of a Congress. With the beginning of each new Congress, it must reconstitute itself by readopting its rules and electing its leaders and officers anew.

Constitutional Duties

The House was given the authority to originate all revenue bills and over the years, tradition has extended this power of origination to spending bills as well. The House thereby sets the framework for the important questions of collecting taxes and raising money for the US treasury and then distributing it through legislative appropriations. However, the Senate must enact these same measures if they are to become law, and it is free to amend them. Language differences in the two versions must then be negotiated and agreed upon by both the House and Senate.

Constitutional Officer

The Constitution names the Speaker as the presiding officer of the House. Although it is true there is no requirement the Speaker be a member of the House, they always have been. In House tradition, both parties nominate a candidate for Speaker and the entire membership votes for their choice on the opening day of a new Congress. Because the majority party inherently has more votes than the minority party, the majority candidate for the post has always won.

The Speaker is not only the leader of the majority party; they are also the presiding officer of the entire chamber. In that capacity, they are given the power to recognize Members to speak, or to refuse recognition. The Speaker decides upon the legislative agenda, consulting with the Majority Leader, committee chairmen, and others. Given their many political responsibilities, the Speaker most often turns over the daily procedural responsibilities to a "Speaker pro tempore", a majority party Member of the House appointed by the Speaker to be their designated substitute.

Civilian Control of the Military

Both houses of Congress and the President play a key role in one of our most important standards, ensuring the military serves the people. Balancing the people's desire for liberty with the country's need for security is a very challenging task. Democracies, both old and new, must continually meet this challenge. In a democracy, the people ultimately decide how that balance is to be achieved, and whether it has been achieved in a satisfactory manner. That is to say, the people ultimately determine the military's purpose and whether that purpose has been fulfilled. The Armed Forces have a special responsibility to be held accountable to the people. The military must therefore solicit and maintain public trust. To achieve the balance between liberty and security in a democracy, society and the military which serves it must subscribe to shared values and a common purpose. Hence, there must be maximum free and open communication between the military and the society it is pledged to defend. It is up to you as an Air Force officer to understand the unique relationship between freedom, liberty and security.

EXCERPTS FROM DEMOCRACY AND DEFENSE:

CIVILIAN CONTROL OF THE MILITARY

IN THE UNITED STATES

by David F. Trask

In 1782, just after the Revolutionary War (1775 - 1781), certain officers who felt that they had received inadequate pay for wartime services in the victorious Continental Army contemplated a military revolt against the civilian government. These malcontents, hoping to secure the support of their commander, gathered in Newburgh, New York, to hear the views of General George Washington. Before he offered his prepared remarks, Washington donned a pair of eyeglasses and said: "Gentlemen, you will permit me to put on my spectacles, for I have not only grown gray, but almost blind, in the service of my country." Then he flatly refused to support a military mutiny, calling instead for disbandment of the army and continuing loyalty to the civilian government. Washington's firm stance forestalled the mutiny.

Ever since, US military leadership has accepted civilian control. Military coups and arbitrary military control of government are entirely absent from the experience of the United States. Even during periods of warfare, the nation has conducted regularly scheduled political events, including presidential elections during the years of the Civil War, World War II, and the Korean and Vietnam conflicts.

This enviable record results from the unshakable conviction of the American people that civilian control of the armed services is an essential aspect of government of, by and for the people. In a democracy, public policy is decided by the majority, subject to the rule of law instead of brute force. Civilian control of the military helps to ensure that decisions concerning defense policy do not compromise fundamental democratic values, such as freedom of speech, freedom of the press and freedom of religion.

However, as George Washington recognized, democratic nations such as the United States must maintain armed forces. From time to time, external threats develop, and on occasion, internal conflicts also occur, such as the American Civil War, to which the government must respond by enlarging the military. These circumstances generated some tensions between military and civilian leaders, but the latter always prevailed.

Certain criteria govern civil-military relations in democratic states. These influence the governmental structure of the United States. A part of the American way of life from the beginning of the nation, they are completely unchallenged. Louis Smith, a leading student of civil-military relations, has summarized them effectively. They include:

- Civilian leadership of the executive branch of government. The national leadership is accountable to a popular majority through frequent and regular elections. Also, the chief executive may be removed by the exercise of well-established constitutional processes. For example, the Congress of the United States may discharge presidents from office, if they commit "high crimes and misdemeanors."

- Statutory provisions to establish fundamental national security policies. Elected legislative representatives of the people enact laws that define the defense organization and policies of the nation. The chief executive enforces these directives. In the United States, the Constitution provides basic guidelines, and the Congress passes legislation that defines the scope of military activity.

- Judicial defense of civilian control. The judiciary prevents the military from compromising civil liberties, including those of the members of the armed services. In the United States, the Supreme Court is empowered to hear cases that involve military infringements on the rights of the citizenry.

How did the American people come to establish civilian control of the military? How did they manage to preserve such control despite significant challenges to national security at various points over the last two centuries?

Fear of Standing Armies: Colonial and Revolutionary Eras

Fear of military oppression motivated many of the Europeans who migrated to the New World prior to 1775. This was particularly true of the largest group who made the dangerous voyage across the Atlantic Ocean, those from the British Isles.

The English settlers remembered the disruptions associated with the revolutionary disturbances that had taken place in England between 1640 and 1689. Others—from Scotland, Wales and Ireland—retained powerful memories of their unsuccessful struggles to maintain independence. The experience of constant warfare and its hardships was no less important among immigrants from the European continent, especially Germans from central Europe. They opposed all forms of unfettered military activity.

Wrenching memories of the Old World lingered in the 13 original English colonies along the eastern seaboard of North America, giving rise to deep opposition to the maintenance of a standing army in time of peace. All too often the standing armies of Europe were regarded as, at best, a rationale for imposing high taxes, and, at worst, a means to control the civilian population and extort its wealth.

American colonists expressed antimilitary sentiments despite the fact that they often faced military dangers. There were conflicts with the Spanish and the French, and the colonists had to protect frontier areas from displaced Indian tribes. To meet most of these challenges, the colonists relied on a militia composed of male citizens between the ages of 18 and 45, who were called into temporary military service during emergencies. Militiamen provided their own equipment, including rifles and horses. They were occasionally mustered for limited training. However, during the four wars with France that took place between 1689

and 1763, the colonial legislatures turned to a volunteer force instead of the militia. Even then, England contributed the most important military and naval forces to these wars, especially during the last one, the French and Indian War (1754—1763), which ended French control of Canada and greatly weakened the hostile Indian tribes.

By 1775 the Americans found themselves in open revolt against English authority backed up by military might. It was reminiscent of the military tyranny they had come to the New World to escape. When the United States declared its independence in 1776, the Declaration of Independence singled out among colonial grievances a catalog of English military measures:

- The King [of England] has kept among us, in times of Peace, Standing Armies without the consent of our legislatures.

- He has affected to render the Military independent of and superior to the Civil Power.

- The King was also arraigned for quartering troops in the homes of the populace and for exempting them from trial in local jurisdictions when they committed crimes. Finally, he was charged with "transporting large Armies of foreign Mercenaries to complete the works of death, devastation, and tyranny." ("Mercenaries" referred to German-speaking troops known as Hessians who were brought to America to reinforce the English troops assigned to quell the Revolution.)

Conclusion

At the end of the twentieth century, the presidency more than ever was what Theodore Roosevelt called it, a "bully pulpit" for the exercise of moral leadership and the impartment of national values. It remained the richest political prize in the world, quested after like no other. Congress has continued their efforts to maintain the Constitutional intent of "checks and balances." An effective democracy requires the following:

- An effective democracy requires civilian control of the military.

- Civilian control of the military exemplifies the principle that military force is not an end in itself but a means that the civil authority can use to bring about certain political objectives.

- Civilian control means that tactical decisions regarding military operations in the field must serve the political and strategic goals established by the civil authority.

- The officers and enlisted personnel of the US armed services accept the principle of civilian control as a requirement of military professionalism.

- Reflecting views prevalent in the colonial period, the Constitution of the United States ensures effective civilian control of the military.

- The American public accepts military personnel for political office only if they retire from active military duty.

- The President is commander in chief of the armed forces, and civilians head the US Department of Defense and the individual service branches.

- In World Wars I and II, civilian officials were in charge of marshalling the resources needed to conduct successful combat operations.

- In the Cold War period, civilians ensured the development and maintenance of the forces necessary to deter the Soviet threat.

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Cognitive Lesson Objective:
- Know the fundamentals of terrorism and its impact on US policy.

Cognitive Samples of Behavior:
- State the definition of terrorism according to Joint Publication 3-07.2.

- Describe the three typologies of terrorists and terror groups.

- List the six possible terrorist objectives as described in the lesson.

- State the most common terrorist tactic.

- State the four enduring policy principles that guide US counterterrorism strategy.

- Outline the seven-step terrorist planning cycle.

Affective Lesson Objective:
- Respond to the importance of studying critical aspects of terrorism and understanding the effect it has on US national objectives.

Affective Samples of Behavior:
- Independently read the assigned student reader.

- Discuss how combating terrorism is important to you as a member of the US Armed Forces.

TERRORISM

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Terrorism—the deliberate creation and exploitation of fear for bringing about political change. All terrorist acts involve violence or, equally important, the threat of violence. These violent acts are committed by nongovernmental groups or individuals—that is, by those who are neither part of nor officially serving in the military forces, law enforcement agencies, intelligence services, or other governmental agencies of an established nation-state.

Terrorists attempt not only to sow panic but also to undermine confidence in the government and political leadership of their target country. Terrorism is therefore designed to have psychological effects that reach far beyond its impact on the immediate victims or object of an attack. Terrorists mean to frighten and thereby intimidate a wider audience, such as a rival ethnic or religious group, an entire country and its political leadership, or the international community as a whole.

Terrorist groups generally have few members, limited firepower, and comparatively few organizational resources. For this reason they rely on dramatic, often spectacular, bloody and destructive acts of hit-and-run violence to attract attention to themselves and their cause. Through the publicity generated by their violence, terrorists seek to obtain the leverage, influence, and power they otherwise lack.

What is Terrorism?

The word *terrorism* was first used in France to describe a new system of government adopted during the French Revolution (1789-1799). The regime de la terreur (Reign of Terror) was intended to promote democracy and popular rule by ridding the revolution of its enemies and thereby purifying it. However, the oppression and violent excesses of the terreur transformed it into a feared instrument of the state. From that time on, terrorism has had a decidedly negative connotation. The word, however, did not gain wider popularity until the late nineteenth century when it was adopted by a group of Russian revolutionaries to describe their violent struggle against tsarist rule. *Terrorism* then assumed the more familiar antigovernment associations it has today.

Terrorism as a Political Act

Terrorism is by nature political because it involves the acquisition and use of power for the purpose of forcing others to submit, or agree, to terrorist demands. A terrorist attack, by generating publicity and focusing attention on the organization behind the attack, is designed to create this power. It also fosters an environment of fear and intimidation that the terrorists can manipulate. As a result terrorism's success is best measured by its

ability to attract attention to the terrorists and their cause and by the psychological impact it exerts over a nation and its citizenry. It differs in this respect from conventional warfare, where success is measured by the amount of military assets destroyed, the amount of territory seized, and the number of enemy dead.

Terrorists typically attempt to justify their use of violence by arguing that they have been excluded from, or frustrated by, the accepted processes of bringing about political change. They maintain that terrorism is the only option available to them, although their choice is a reluctant—even a regrettable—one. Whether someone agrees with this argument or not often depends on whether the person sympathizes with the terrorists' cause or with the victims of the terrorist attack. The aphorism "One man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter" underscores how use of the label terrorism can be highly subjective depending upon one's sympathies.

At the same time terrorist acts—including murder, kidnapping, bombing, and arson—have long been defined in both national and international law as crimes. Even in time of war, violence deliberately directed against innocent civilians is considered a crime. Similarly, violence that spreads beyond an acknowledged geographical theater of war to violate the territory of neutral or noncombatant states is also deemed a war crime.

Government Definitions of Terrorism

Legal statutes in most countries around the world regard terrorism as a crime. Yet there is considerable variation in how these laws define terrorism, even in countries whose laws derive from a common origin.

In the United Kingdom, for example, legislation titled Terrorist Act 2000 states that terrorism is "the use or threat of action. . .designed to influence the government or to intimidate the public or a section of the public. . .for the purpose of advancing a political, religious or ideological cause." The legal system and code of law of the United Kingdom has influenced those of the United States, Canada, and Israel.

United States federal statute defines terrorism as "violent acts or acts dangerous to human life that. . .appear to be intended (i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; (ii) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or (iii) to affect the conduct of a government by assassination or kidnapping." This definition appears in United States Code, Title 18, Section 2331 (18 USC 2331). Canada's Anti-terrorism Act (Bill C-36) designates "terrorist activity" as "an act or omission. . .that is committed in whole or in part for a political, religious or ideological purpose, objective or cause and in whole or in part with the intention of intimidating the public, or a segment of the public, with regard to its security, including its economic security, or compelling a person, a government or a domestic or an international organization to do or to refrain from doing any act, whether the person, government or organization is inside or outside Canada . . . ."

Israeli law does not address terrorism specifically. But in the Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance No. 33, it defines a terrorist organization as "a body of persons resorting in its activities to acts of violence calculated to cause death or injury to a person or to threats of such acts of violence."

Causes of Terrorism

Terrorism has occurred throughout history for a variety of reasons. Its causes can be historical, cultural, political, social, psychological, economic, or religious—or any combination of these. Some countries have proven to be particularly susceptible to terrorism at certain times, as Italy and West Germany were during the 1970s. Terrorist violence escalated precipitously in those two countries for a decade before declining equally dramatically. Other countries, such as Canada and The Netherlands, have proven to be more resistant, and have experienced only a few isolated terrorist incidents.

In general, democratic countries have provided more fertile ground for terrorism because of the open nature of their societies. In such societies citizens have fundamental rights, civil liberties are legally protected, and government control and constant surveillance of its citizens and their activities is absent. By the same token, repressive societies, in which the government closely monitors citizens and restricts their speech and movement, have often provided more difficult environments for terrorists. But even police states have not been immune to terrorism, despite limiting civil liberties and forbidding free speech and rights of assembly. Examples include Russia under tsarist rule and the Communist-ruled Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, as well as the People's Republic of China, Myanmar, and Laos.

In broad terms the causes that have commonly compelled people to engage in terrorism are grievances born of political oppression, cultural domination, economic exploitation, ethnic discrimination, and religious persecution. Perceived inequities in the distribution of wealth and political power have led some terrorists to attempt to overthrow democratically elected governments. To achieve a fairer society, they would replace these governments with socialist or communist regimes. Left-wing terrorist groups of the 1960s and 1970s with such aims included Germany's Baader-Meinhof Gang, Italy's Red Brigades, and the Weather Underground in the United States. Other terrorists have sought to fulfill some mission that they believe to be divinely inspired or millennialist (related to the end of the world). The Japanese religious cult Aum Shinrikyo, responsible for a nerve gas attack on the Tokyo subway in 1995 that killed 12 people, falls into this category. Still other terrorists have embraced comparatively more defined and comprehensible goals such as the re-establishment of a national homeland (for example, Basque separatists in Spain) or the unification of a divided nation (Irish nationalists in Northern Ireland).

Finally, some terrorists are motivated by very specific issues, such as opposition to legalized abortion or nuclear energy, or the championing of environmental concerns and animal rights. They hope to pressure both the public and its representatives in government to enact legislation directly reflecting their particular concern. Militant animal rights activists, for example, have used violence against scientists and laboratory technicians in their

campaign to halt medical experimentation involving animals. Radical environmentalists have sabotaged logging operations and the construction of power grids to protest the spoiling of natural wilderness areas. Extremists who oppose legalized abortion in the United States have attacked clinics and murdered doctors and other employees in hopes of denying women the right to abortion.

National governments have at times aided terrorists to further their own foreign policy goals. So-called state-sponsored terrorism, however, falls into a different category altogether. State-sponsored terrorism is a form of *covert* (secret) warfare, a means to wage war secretly through the use of terrorist surrogates (stand-ins) as hired guns. The US Department of State designates countries as state sponsors of terrorism if they actively assist or aid terrorists, and also if they harbor past terrorists or refuse to renounce terrorism as an instrument of policy.

State sponsorship has proven invaluable to some terrorist organizations—by supplying arms, money, and a safe haven, among other things. In doing so, it has transformed ordinary groups, with otherwise limited capabilities, into more powerful and menacing opponents. State sponsorship can also place at terrorists' disposal the resources of an established country's diplomatic, military, and intelligence services. These services improve the training of terrorists and facilitate planning and operations. Finally, governments have paid terrorists handsomely for their services. They thereby turn weak and financially impoverished groups into formidable, well-endowed terrorist organizations with an ability to attract recruits and sustain their struggle.

The US Department of State has designated seven countries as state sponsors of terrorism: Iran, Iraq, Syria, Libya, Cuba, North Korea, and Sudan. (NOTE: As of publication date, only Cuba, Iran, Sudan, and Syria remain on this list.) In the year 2000, it named Iran as the most active supporter of terrorism for aid to groups such as Hezbollah, Hamas, and Palestine Islamic Jihad. Although the former Taliban government in Afghanistan sponsored al-Qaeda, the radical group led by Saudi exile Osama bin Laden, the United States did not recognize the Taliban as a legitimate government and thus did not list it as a state sponsor of terrorism.

The Increasing Deadliness of Terrorist Attacks

Although the total number of terrorist incidents worldwide declined during the 1990s, the number of people killed in terrorist incidents increased. Thus, while terrorists may have become less active, they also became alarmingly more lethal. One key factor behind this trend is the amount of terrorism motivated by religious views, as were the attacks on New York City's World Trade Center, the Pentagon in Arlington, VA, and the suspected attempt on the White House - which resulted in a crash in a Pennsylvania field - on 11 September 2001. Terrorism motivated by religion has frequently led to acts of violence with higher levels of fatalities than the relatively more targeted incidents of violence perpetrated by many *secular* (nonreligious) terrorist organizations.

Another key factor that has contributed to terrorism's rising deadliness is the ease of access to a range of low-tech and high-tech weapons. At the low-end of the weapons spectrum, terrorists rely on guns and bombs, as they have for more than a century. At the high end of the spectrum, there is evidence that groups such as al-Qaeda seek to acquire chemical, biological, and even nuclear weapons. Other terrorist groups, such as Aum Shinrikyo, already have carried out terrorist attacks using biological and chemical weapons. It is feared that the nuclear weapons stockpiles of the former Soviet Union could produce an international black market in fissionable materials that terrorists might potentially obtain. Finally, in the middle range of the weapons spectrum the world is awash in sophisticated items available to terrorists everywhere, including plastic explosives and hand-held, precision-guided surface-to-air missiles (SAMs).

An increase of suicide attacks has also contributed to terrorism's rising death count. Suicide attacks differ from other terrorist operations, because the perpetrator's own death is a requirement for the attack's success. Suicide bombers, therefore, are typically highly motivated, passionately dedicated individuals who decide voluntarily or upon persuasion to surrender their lives in fulfillment of their mission.

A wave of suicide attacks began in 1981 in Beirut, Lebanon, when a group called Al-Dawa used a car bomb to blow up the Iraqi Embassy. Al-Dawa, ("the call" in Arabic, as in "the call for Holy War") was a terrorist organization composed of Shia Muslims from Iraq who were backed by Iran. (Muslims belonging to the Shia branch of Islam form a minority in Iraq but the majority in Iran.) The Beirut attack killed 61 people and wounded more than 100 others. In 1983 a truck filled with explosives drove into the US embassy in Beirut, killing 49 and wounding 120 others. It was followed later that year by a suicide bombing of US Marine barracks in Beirut, which killed 241 persons. A group called Islamic Jihad claimed responsibility for both attacks. Another suicide bombing destroyed a Jewish community center in Buenos Aires, Argentina, in 1994, killing 96 persons. More recently, al-Qaeda staged attacks on the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998, causing nearly 300 deaths; on a US Navy warship the USS *Cole* in 2000, causing 19 deaths; and during the tragic events of 11 September 2001, causing about 3,000 deaths. Many of the attacks carried out by Palestinian organizations, such as Hamas and Islamic Jihad, in Israel and the Occupied Territories have involved suicide bombings. Other terrorist groups also have adopted this tactic, including Tamil separatists fighting in Sri Lanka and India, and Kurdish separatists in Turkey. These separatists belong to ethnic minorities that seek to set up separate homelands.

Terrorists today claim credit less frequently for their attacks than they once did, a fact that also reflects terrorism's increasing deadliness. Unlike today's reticent terrorists, the more traditional terrorist groups of the 1970s and 1980s not only issued communiqués explaining why they perpetrated an attack but also boasted proudly after a particularly destructive or deadly operation. The current trend toward less communication implies that violence may be less a means to an end than an end in itself for some terrorist groups. In other words, terrorists today may use violence simply as vengeance or punishment rather than as a means to achieve political change. Therefore, their actions require no explanation or justification outside the terrorist group itself or its supporters.

Characteristics of Terrorist Attacks

Planning and Organization. All terrorists share one characteristic: They never commit actions randomly or senselessly. Every terrorist wants an attack to generate maximum publicity because media attention helps achieve the intimidation needed for terrorism's success. Accordingly, terrorist acts are carefully planned. Testimony by a terrorist convicted in the 1998 bombing of the US embassy in Kenya revealed that al-Qaeda spent nearly five years planning the attack.

Several essential elements go into planning a major terrorist attack. Planning begins with gathering detailed reconnaissance and intelligence about a target: its defenses, vulnerabilities, and patterns of daily activity. Meanwhile, logistics specialists ensure that all the supporting tasks are accomplished. These tasks include assembling the weapons and other supplies and communications equipment needed for the operation, arranging for safe houses and transportation for the terrorist attack team, and mapping escape routes. A bombmaker or other weapons expert often joins the final planning phases. Finally, after all the preparations have been completed, the operation is handed off to the team that carries out the attack. For security reasons separate teams that do not know one another execute each step, from planning to logistics, attack, and escape.

All terrorist groups share another basic characteristic: secrecy about their operations. Terrorism operates underground, concealed from the eyes of the authorities and from potential informants among the populace. To maintain secrecy, terrorist groups are often organized into cells, with each cell separate from other cells in the organization but working in harmony with them. A terrorist cell can be as small as two or three people, with only one person knowing someone in another cell. Should the authorities apprehend a member of one cell, they can obtain information only about the activities of that cell—or at most about an adjacent cell—and not about the entire organization. For this reason terrorists prefer this organizational structure of interconnected cells. The structure narrows, in pyramid fashion, as it rises toward the group's senior command structure and leadership at the top, to whom very few have access.

Targets of Terrorism. Terrorism often targets innocent civilians in order to create an atmosphere of fear, intimidation, and insecurity. Some terrorists deliberately direct attacks against large numbers of ordinary citizens who simply happen to be in the wrong place at the wrong time.

More selective terrorist attacks target diplomats and diplomatic facilities such as embassies and consulates; military personnel and military bases; business executives and corporate offices; and transportation vehicles and facilities, such as airlines and airports, trains and train stations, buses and bus terminals, and subways. Terrorist attacks on buildings or other inanimate targets often serve a symbolic purpose: They are intended more to draw attention to the terrorists and their cause than to destroy property or kill and injure persons, although death and destruction nonetheless often result.

Despite variations in the number of attacks from year to year, one feature of international terrorism has remained constant: The United States has been its most popular target. Since 1968 the United States has annually led the list of countries whose citizens and property were most frequently attacked by terrorists. Several factors can account for this phenomenon, in addition to America's position as the sole remaining superpower and leader of the free world. These include the geographical scope and diversity of America's overseas business interests, the number of Americans traveling or working abroad, and the many US military bases around the world.

Demand of Terrorism. The demands of terrorist groups have ranged from such grand schemes as the total remaking of society along ideological lines to far narrower goals such as the release of hostages for money or the publication of a tract stating the terrorists' goals. During the 1970s and 1980s Marxist-Leninist groups such as the Baader-Meinhof Gang (later renamed the Red Army Faction) in West Germany and the Red Brigades in Italy waged campaigns to remake society along communist lines. Radical Islamic groups have pursued the creation of devoutly religious *theocracies* (governments under divine guidance). These groups include Osama bin Laden's al-Qaeda organization, the Abu Sayyaf group in the Philippines, and the Armed Islamic Group in Algeria. Other groups seek narrower goals, such as the reestablishment of a national homeland within an existing country, as does the Basque separatist movement active in Spain, or the unification of a divided nation, as do Irish nationalists in Northern Ireland.

Impact of Terrorism. Although most terrorist groups have failed to achieve their long-term, strategic aims through terrorism, terrorism has on occasion brought about significant political changes that might otherwise have been impossible. Moreover, despite the claims of governments to the contrary, terrorism has sometimes also proven successful on a short-term, tactical level: winning the release of prisoners, wresting political concessions from otherwise resistant governments, or ensuring that causes and grievances that might otherwise have been ignored or neglected were addressed.

Terrorism was used by some nationalist movements in the anticolonial era just after World War II, when British and French empires in Africa, Asia, and the Middle East dissolved. Countries as diverse as Israel, Cyprus, Kenya, and Algeria owe their independence to these movements.

Evidence of terrorist success has come more recently in the examples of Gerry Adams and Martin McGuinness in Northern Ireland and Yasir Arafat in the Middle East. Adams, president of the political wing of the Irish Republican Army (IRA) in Northern Ireland, and his deputy McGuinness both won election to the British Parliament in 1997. Arafat, as leader of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), won international recognition for the PLO. Through tactical victories and political achievements, each of their organizations demonstrated how a series of terrorist acts can propel to world attention long-standing causes and grievances.

At the same time, for every terrorist success, there are the countless failures. Most terrorist groups never achieve any of their aims—either short-term or long-term. The life span of most modern terrorist groups underscores this failure. According to one estimate, the life expectancy of at least 90 percent of terrorist organizations is less than a year, and nearly half of the organizations that make it that far cease to exist within a decade of their founding.

Terrorism is designed to threaten the personal safety of its target audience. It can tear apart the social fabric of a country by destroying business and cultural life and the mutual trust upon which society is based. Uncertainty about where and when the next terrorist attack will occur generates a fear that terrorism experts call "vicarious victimization." A common response to this fear is the refusal to visit shopping malls; attend sporting events; go to the theater, movies, or concerts; or travel, either abroad or within one's own country.

The public's perception of personal risk, however, often does not dovetail with the observable dimensions of the terrorist threat. Even though the United States was the country most frequently targeted by terrorists from 1968 to 2000, fewer than 1,000 Americans were killed by terrorists, either in the United States or abroad, during that 32-year period, according to figures tabulated by the US State Department and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Although more than three times that number were killed on 11 September 2001, the fact remains that the perception of the terrorist threat far outweighs the likelihood of being the victim of a terrorist attack. Nonetheless, terrorism's ability to engender so acute a sense of fear and unease is a measure of its impact on our daily life.

According to official Canadian government sources, no reliable list of terrorist incidents in Canada exists. An unofficial estimate, however, puts the number of Canadians killed by terrorists both in Canada and overseas since 1968 at roughly 294 persons. This figure includes 279 Canadian citizens among a total of 329 persons killed in 1985 when a bomb exploded aboard an Air India flight en route from Montréal, Québec, to London, England.

History

Early Terrorism. More than 2,000 years ago the first known acts of what we now call terrorism were perpetrated by a radical offshoot of the Zealots, a Jewish sect active in Judea during the first century A.D. The Zealots resisted the Roman Empire's rule of what is today Israel through a determined campaign primarily involving assassination. Zealot fighters used the *sica*, a primitive dagger, to attack their enemies in broad daylight, often in crowded market places or on feast days—essentially wherever there were people to witness the violence. Thus, like modern terrorists, the Zealots intended their actions to communicate a message to a wider target audience: in this instance, the Roman occupation forces and any Jews who sympathized or collaborated with the invaders.

Between 1090 and 1272 an Islamic movement known as the Assassins used similar tactics in their struggle against the Christian Crusaders who had invaded what is today part of Syria. The Assassins embraced the same notions of self-sacrifice and suicidal martyrdom evident in some Islamic terrorist groups today. They regarded violence as a sacramental or divine act that ensured its perpetrators would ascend to a glorious heaven should they perish during the task.

The French Revolution to World War I. Until the French Revolution (1789-1799), religion provided the main justification for the use of terrorism. This situation changed, however, as nationalism, anarchism, Marxism, and other secular political movements emerged during the 1800s to challenge divine rule by monarchs.

Modern terrorism was initially antimonarchical, embraced by rebels and constitutionalists during the late stages of the French Revolution and in Russia by the People's Will (Narodnaya Volya) organization.

The People's Will was active between 1878 and 1881. Its revolutionary, antigovernment orientation became the model for future terrorists. The group selected targets that represented the state's oppressive instruments of power, and it embraced "propaganda by the deed," using the terrorist act to instruct. It sought thereby to educate the public about the inequities imposed on them by the state and to rally support for revolution. Among the terrorists' targets were the governor general of Saint Petersburg, the head of the tsarist secret police, and even the tsar himself. Tsar Alexander II was assassinated by a member of the People's Will in March 1881.

The assassination of Alexander II, in particular, inspired a group of political radicals who met in London four months later, in July 1881, to discuss how to achieve revolution that was worldwide, not just national. Their idea was to create an Anarchist International, also called the Black International after the black flag they adopted, to coordinate and support a global terrorist campaign that would overthrow both monarchies and elected governments of democratic states, including the United States. Between 1881 and the first decade of the twentieth century, anarchists assassinated an American president (William McKinley); the president of France and Spain's prime minister; Empress Elisabeth of Austria and King Humbert I (Umberto I) of Italy.

Anarchist elements also became involved in, and were accused of fomenting, labor unrest in the United States. Sometimes these disputes turned bloody as a result of anarchist agitation. The most infamous incident was the 1886 Haymarket Square Riot in Chicago, where a bomb exploded in the midst of a demonstration by some 3,000 striking factory workers and their supporters. In the confusion that followed, both the police and armed demonstrators opened fire on one another. Seven policeman were killed and at least 60 others were wounded. At least four demonstrators were also killed, but no accurate tally of their death count exists.

An act of terrorism involving the assassination of a royal heir is credited with lighting the fuse that ignited World War I. On 28 June 1914, a young Bosnian Serb radical named Gavrilo Princip, seeking to free his country from Austrian rule, murdered Austrian archduke Francis Ferdinand, who was on an official visit to Sarajevo, Bosnia. The militant student group to which Princip belonged had close ties to the intelligence service and military forces of Serbia, Austria's archenemy in the Balkans. Like many contemporary state sponsors of terrorism, Serbia also provided arms, training, intelligence, and other assistance to a variety of revolutionary movements in neighboring nations.

Government Terror: From the 1920s On. During the 1920s and 1930s, terrorism became associated more with the repressive practices employed by dictatorial states than with the violence of nonstate groups like the anarchists. The word terrorism was used to describe the wanton violence and intimidation inflicted by the Nazi, fascist, and totalitarian regimes that respectively came to power in Germany, Italy, and the Soviet Union. The repressive means these governments employed against their citizens involved beatings, unlawful detentions, torture, so-called death squads (often consisting of off-duty or plain-clothes security or police officers), and other forms of intimidation. Such practices by governments against their own citizens continue today.

Recent history records the use of such measures by the military dictatorships that took power in Argentina, Chile, and Greece during the 1970s. But these state-sanctioned acts of violence are more generally termed *terror* to distinguish them from violence committed by nonstate entities. As noted previously, the word *terrorism* is generally reserved for acts committed by groups outside government.

Anticolonialist Terrorism. After World War II, terrorism reverted to its previous revolutionary associations. During the 1940s and 1950s, "terrorism" was used to describe the violence perpetrated by indigenous nationalist, anticolonialist organizations that arose throughout Asia, Africa, and the Middle East in opposition to continued European rule. Countries such as Israel, Kenya, Cyprus, and Algeria, for example, owe their independence at least in part to nationalist movements that used terrorism.

The most spectacular terrorist incident of the anticolonial period was the 1946 bombing of Jerusalem's King David Hotel, by a Jewish underground group known as the Irgun Zvai Le'umi (National Military Organization). The hotel was attacked because it served at that time as the military headquarters and offices of the British administration in Palestine. Ninety-one people were killed and 45 others injured: men, women, Arabs, Jews, and Britons alike. The bombing ranks among the most deadly terrorist incidents of the twentieth century. The Irgun's commander at the time was Menachem Begin, a future prime minister of Israel and 1978 Nobel Peace Prize cowinner.

Begin is not alone among those once called terrorists who later ascended to the highest levels of power in their newly independent countries. Others include Kenya's president Jomo Kenyatta, Cyprus's Archbishop Makarios, and Algeria's president Ahmed Ben Bella.

The Late 1960s and 1970s. During the late 1960s and 1970s terrorism assumed more clearly ideological motivations. Various disenfranchised or exiled nationalist minorities—as exemplified by the PLO—also embraced terrorism as a means to draw attention to their plight and generate international support for their cause. The PLO sought to create a state in what was historically known as Palestine: the land that became Israel in 1948 and the West Bank and Gaza Strip—territories occupied by Israel since the Six-Day War of 1967. A Palestinian group, in fact, was responsible for the incident that is considered to mark the beginning of the current era of international terrorism. On 22 July 1968, three armed Palestinians belonging to the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) hijacked an Israeli El Al commercial flight en route from Rome, Italy, to Tel Aviv, Israel. Although commercial planes had often been hijacked before, this was the first clearly political hijacking. The act was designed to create an international crisis and thereby generate publicity.

Two years later, the PFLP staged an even more dramatic international incident, when it hijacked three commercial airliners—two American and one Swiss—although an attempt to seize a fourth plane, a British aircraft, was foiled. The planes were flown to a remote airstrip in Jordan and blown up after the passengers were evacuated, as television cameras recorded the incident for a worldwide audience.

The murder of 11 Israeli athletes at the 1972 Olympic Games provides one of the most notorious examples of terrorists' ability to bring their cause to world attention. Members of a Palestinian group called Black September seized the athletes at the Summer Games held in Munich, Germany. A global audience that had tuned in to watch the Olympics found themselves witnessing a grisly hostage situation that ended in a botched rescue attempt by German authorities in which both the terrorists and their captives were killed.

The PLO effectively exploited the publicity generated by the Munich hostage taking. In 1974 PLO leader Yasir Arafat received an invitation to address the UN General Assembly and the UN subsequently granted special observer status to the PLO. Within a decade, the PLO, an entity not attached to any state, had formal diplomatic relations with more countries (86) than did Israel (72)—the actual, established nation-state. The PLO would likely never have attained such recognition without the attention that its international terrorist campaign focused on the plight of Palestinians in refugee camps.

At a time of growing ethnic and nationalist awareness worldwide, other nationalist groups began to emulate the Palestinian example to increase recognition of their grievances. In Canada, for instance, a group of French-Canadian separatists kidnapped James Cross, the British trade commissioner to Québec, and Pierre LaPorte, Québec's Minister of Labor, in October 1970. The group called itself the Front de Libération de Québec (FLQ), or Quebec Liberation Front. Although Cross was released unharmed, LaPorte was brutally murdered. Fearing more widespread unrest, Canadian Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau invoked the country's War Powers Act in Québec, which suspended civil liberties and accorded the army extraordinary powers to maintain order in the province and uproot the FLQ.

Also during the late 1960s and early 1970s, political extremists began to form terrorist groups that opposed American intervention in Vietnam and what they claimed were the fundamental social and economic inequities of the modern capitalist liberal-democratic state. These extremists were drawn mostly from radical student organizations and left-wing movements then active in Latin America, Western Europe, and the United States. Terrorist groups such as the Baader-

Meinhof Gang in Germany and the Red Brigades in Italy received training at Palestinian camps in the Middle East. Among Baader-Meinhof's most famous acts was the 1977 kidnapping and murder of Hanns Martin Schleyer, a wealthy Germany industrialist. The Red Brigades achieved their greatest notoriety for the kidnapping and execution of former Italian Premier Aldo Moro in 1978.

The 1980s and 1990s. Right-wing, or neo-fascist and neo-Nazi, terrorism movements also arose in many Western European countries and the United States during the late 1970s in response to the violence perpetrated by left-wing organizations. However, the right-wing groups lacked both the numbers and popular support that their left-wing counterparts enjoyed. Thus the violence of these right-wing groups—while occasionally quite deadly—was mostly sporadic and short-lived. The three most serious incidents connected to right-wing terrorists occurred in Bologna, Italy; Munich, Germany; and Oklahoma City, Oklahoma. In Bologna a 1980 bombing of a crowded rail station killed 84 people and wounded 180 others. The date of the bombing coincided with the opening of a trial in Bologna of right-wingers accused of a 1976 train bombing. Also in 1980 a bomb planted by a member of a neo-fascist group exploded at Munich's Oktoberfest celebration, killing 14 and injuring 215 others. In 1995 white supremacists carried out a truck-bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, which claimed the lives of 168 people.

Two of the most important developments in international terrorism during the 1980s were the rise in state-sponsored terrorism and the resurgence of religious terrorism. An example of an attack believed to be state sponsored was the attempted assassination in 1981 of Pope John Paul II by a Turkish citizen who allegedly was working for the Soviet and Bulgarian secret services. Other examples include the Iranian-backed car- and truck-bombings of the American embassy and US Marine barracks in Beirut, Lebanon, in 1983 and Libya's role in the in-flight bombing of Pan Am flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland, in 1988.

Religion was used to justify and legitimize, if not actually encourage, terrorist violence in the assassinations of Egypt's president Anwar al-Sadat in 1981 by Islamic extremists and of Israel's prime minister Yitzhak Rabin in 1994 by a Jewish militant. In both cases the assassins considered it a religious duty to halt the peace efforts of their victims. Muslim terrorists carried out the bombing of New York City's World Trade Center in 1993, and an obscure Japanese religious sect was behind the 1995 nerve gas attack on the Tokyo subway. Osama bin Laden's al-Qaeda organization carried out simultaneous suicide

bombings of the American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998; a suicide attack in 2000 on a US navy warship in the harbor of Aden, Yemen; and the suicide attacks of 11 September 2001.

11 September Attacks. The events of 11 September 2001, have no precedent in the history of terrorism. On that day 19 terrorists belonging to bin Laden's al-Qaeda organization hijacked four passenger aircraft shortly after they departed from airports in Boston, Massachusetts; Newark, New Jersey; and Washington, D.C. The first plane crashed into the north tower of the World Trade Center in New York City shortly before 9:00 am. About 15 minutes later, a second aircraft struck the south tower. Shortly afterward, a third plane crashed into the Pentagon in Arlington, Virginia. A fourth aircraft crashed into a field in rural Pennsylvania after its passengers, hearing by cell phone of the other hijackings, attempted to take control of the plane from the hijackers before they could strike another target. Before 11 September, terrorists had killed no more than about 1,000 Americans, in the United States and abroad, during the modern era of international terrorism, which began in 1968. Approximately three times that number perished on 11 September.

The attacks also showed a level of patience and detailed planning rarely seen among terrorist movements today. The hijackers stunned the world with their determination to kill themselves and take the lives of the hijacked passengers and crews as well as the lives of thousands of people working in or visiting the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. The United States reacted by declaring a global war against terrorism. In the first phase of the war, US forces launched a massive attack on al-Qaeda's training and logistics bases in Afghanistan and toppled Afghanistan's ruling Taliban movement. The Taliban had provided bin Laden and his followers with sanctuary and an opportunity to plan and orchestrate their worldwide terrorist campaign.

The 11 September attacks prompted intense scrutiny of why the United States government had failed to detect or thwart the attacks—and what it should do to prevent future attacks. In 2003 a congressional inquiry detailed systemic problems in the US government's counterterrorism efforts prior to the attacks. It revealed how the terrorists had entered and remained in the United States without raising suspicions, and how key opportunities to disrupt the attack were missed because of poor communication between the FBI, CIA, and other government agencies.

In 2004 an independent, bipartisan commission released an exhaustive account of the circumstances surrounding the attacks. The 9/11 Commission, known in full as the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, found "failures of imagination, policy, capability, and management" across the government. Government leaders, it said, had failed to fully appreciate the sophistication and lethality of al-Qaeda and the probability that the group would launch an attack on US soil.

The commission recommended a three-pronged strategy for preventing future attacks: (1) continuing to root out and attack terrorists, (2) preventing the further growth of Islamist terrorism, and (3) developing better protections against terrorist attacks. As part of this strategy, the commission recommended several changes in government structure. It

proposed the creation of a national intelligence director to coordinate all intelligence-gathering work. It also urged the establishment of a National Counterterrorism Center to analyze all terrorism-related intelligence and to plan counterterrorism operations.

The Future of Terrorism

Terrorism has existed for at least 2,000 years and is likely to remain a fixture on political agendas, both domestic and international, for years to come. Terrorism provides a means by which the weak can confront much stronger opponents. It therefore has an enduring appeal to the alienated and the disenfranchised, the aggrieved and vengeful, the powerless and the would-be powerful. In addition, it is relatively inexpensive to conduct while offering a vast potential payoff: the ability to evoke fear and alarm and inflict pain and suffering in the hope of compelling agreement to demands made.

Terrorism, moreover, is evolving constantly to overcome governmental countermeasures designed to defeat it. Terrorism thus involves an ongoing search for new targets and unidentified vulnerabilities in its opponents. This quest also raises the possibility that terrorists may pursue unconventional means of attack, such as chemical, biological, or *radiological* (radioactivity-spreading) weapons, or nuclear weapons. Future terrorist tactics could include *cyberterrorism* (sabotage using computers to destroy computer networks or systems) or electronic warfare that targets critical infrastructure, such as communications and power facilities, or societies in general.

Throughout the world, terrorism reinvents itself in new and more dangerous forms. As older groups are defeated or exhausted, more radical and more violent successors often take their place. Although terrorism likely can never be completely eradicated, countering its threat requires continuing vigilance. The highly individual nature of terrorism's causes, the diversity of its perpetrators, and the complexity of its fundamental characteristics present enormous challenges to those who must effectively counter this menace.

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The Need For Cross-Cultural Competence

Cognitive Lesson Objective:
- Know how cross-cultural competence leads to operational success when working with individuals and groups from other cultures.

Cognitive Samples of Behavior:
- Describe Building Partnerships.

- Identify the Air Force definition of culture.

- Identify knowledge, skills and attitudes that lead to Cross-Cultural Perspective-Taking.

- Define Cross-Cultural Competence.

- State the three skills of the Air Force Cross-Cultural Competence (3C) Development model.

Affective Lesson Objective:
- Value how officers who build their cross-cultural competence are more successful making decisions and working operationally with individuals from other cultures.

Affective Samples of Behavior:
- Demonstrate willingness to learn about universal elements of human culture.

- Appreciate the value of cross-cultural perspective-taking.

- Offer personal examples supporting the need for improved cross-cultural competence in order to achieve Air Force objectives.

IRREGULAR WARFARE

AND BUILDING PARTNERSHIPS

Editor's Note: The following article is largely based on direct excerpts from Air Force Basic Doctrine Volume I and Air Force Doctrine Annex 3-2, Irregular Warfare.

Quite often when Americans think of war, images from World War II, the Korean War, Operation DESERT STORM and the opening stages of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM come to mind - massive force-on-force operations when conventional forces were pitted against one another. However, today such scenarios that drove much of US Cold War planning are now viewed as the exception, replaced by the complex and unpredictable pace of irregular war against nontraditional enemies.

Joint Publication 1 defines Irregular Warfare (IW) as "a violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant population(s). IW favors indirect and asymmetric approaches, though it may employ the full range of military and other capacities, in order to erode an adversary's power, influence, and will."

The use of IW to unhinge and defeat a militarily stronger adversary is as old as war itself. Such strategies are a function of limited capability rather than choice and are designed to avoid the costs and risks of confronting superior powers directly. These weaker adversaries deliberately circumvent core military advantages and exploit vulnerabilities while seeking to undermine the superior power's international support and domestic resolve.

History is replete with examples of belligerents using IW to gain advantage and influence over relevant populations. Such tactics contributed to the defeat of major powers and the demise of empires through national overreach, erosion of will, and sheer exhaustion. Noteworthy examples include the Ottoman, the Napoleonic French, the Soviet and the Portuguese empires. In 21st Century warfare, irregular threats employ asymmetric capabilities (e.g., suicide bombers; improvised explosive devices; hazardous material devices; cyber attacks; provocation; subversion; and intimidation) while exploiting sanctuary among civilian populations in ungoverned and under-governed areas, or external sanctuaries in other states.

In the face of such asymmetric tactics, the US pursues a polar opposite IW strategy. Our IW strategy seeks to promote stability by assisting in the development and enhancement of the capabilities of friendly entities to address causes of conflict and challenges to their security, improve their capabilities and infrastructure, sustain their economic growth, and provide legitimate and effective governance to their population, thereby negating the effects of state or non-state belligerents. These friendly entities are often host nations; however, in unconventional warfare situations, the US and allies may work with opposition

groups and aspiring governments, not yet "host nations." Within this IW strategy, the ultimate goal is to enable such entities to address their own challenges in lieu of major US involvement.

In order to further such a strategy, the US must build partnerships with allied and coalition forces at all levels. The Air Force describes Building Partnerships as "Airmen interacting with international airmen and other relevant actors to develop, guide, and sustain relationships for mutual benefit and security." Building partnerships comprise an important defense against adversaries using IW. Regional partnerships serve the strategic purpose of reducing instability, preventing terrorist attacks, building multiple partner capacities, and reducing the potential for expanded conflict. Advance planning in building partnerships enables US forces, when the need arises, to rely on these states' indigenous forces rather than commit a significant US military force.

The US Air Force possesses unique capabilities and skillsets that can be employed to give host nations' forces an advantage. Asymmetric threats from belligerents lack the ability to effectively challenge the Air Force's dominance of the "high ground," a key advantage that superiority in air, space and cyberspace provides to US and coalition forces. Enhanced aviation enterprise capabilities can enable host nations to strengthen internal security, defend against external aggression, and act as trusted participants in regional security structures. Through careful building of partnerships, Air Force forces can favorably shape the strategic environment by assessing, advising, training, and assisting host nations' air forces in their efforts to counter internal or external threats.

The US Air Force has a history of building partnerships through disaster and humanitarian assistance by employing advantages in global airlift and air refueling. When responding to international disasters, natural or man-made, the US Air Force has the technology, resources and know-how to provide immediate relief supplies and personnel. The Air Force has shown this capability time and again, from the Berlin Airlift to earthquake relief operations in Pakistan. Air Force aircraft delivering relief supplies serve not only to alleviate the immediate situation, but also to provide a visible symbol of the care, concern, and capability of the United States.

To prevent, deter, disrupt, and defeat irregular threats, the Air Force partners with the joint force, other governmental agencies, multinational partners, as well as the host nation. A US whole-of-government approach leverages skill sets and capabilities that do not traditionally reside within the armed forces, but have direct application to IW. Keys to success include effective planning, integration, and delineation between the employment of military and civil personnel and resources.

In order for US IW strategy to be successful, all Airmen should be as competent in and capable of conducting IW as effectively as they would conventional warfare. However, IW goes beyond mere technical prowess. Cultural empathy, cross-cultural communication, conflict management, and negotiation skills are critical to today's war fight. Tactical IW competencies must be supported by each Airman's Cross-Cultural Competence (3C). In a general sense, 3C is defined as the ability to quickly and accurately comprehend, and then effectively act in any culturally complex environment to achieve the desired effect

for the mission. Airmen are called upon to use the skills of their specialty and leverage airpower's inherent flexibility and adaptability while building positive relationships with airmen from host nations, with the objective of countering and defeating both state and non-state adversaries.

CULTURAL BACKGROUNDS:

WHY CULTURE MATTERS

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Editor's Note: *Dr. Dulaney's article on "Why Culture Matters" speaks to the expectation that military professionals understand the importance of studying culture. The Air Force defines culture as the creation, maintenance, and transformation of semi-shared patterns of meaning, sense-making, affiliation, action, and organization by groups. To understand the cultures of societies with whom the US interacts, Airmen must actively practice cross-cultural perspective-taking. This requires essential knowledge, skills, and attitudes that will help you recognize cultural differences and behaviors, adapt to unfamiliar situations, and embrace a willingness to accept those differences. For the military to be effective on the ground we must understand the culture wherever we operate through their world viewpoint. While this is by no means an easy task, it is central to building those relationships that may help us understand and perhaps even predict and prevent the behavior of "bad actors."*

In every culture, there exists the possibility of a mob of people that could be easily compelled to action by those who know how. Understanding culture, for the military professional, should be thought of as the art and science of understanding cause and effect in social contexts. Period. In operational contexts, culture is human terrain; just as real as the ground on which we fight, the airspace we own, and the seas we dominate.

Culture subsumes, among so much else, a people's morals, values, and ethics. What is beautiful, right and wrong. What people will or will not fight and die for. These are all aspects of culture that military professionals need to understand to be successful in 21st Century warfare.

Why worry about what is beautiful? Military Information Support to Operations cannot produce effective media and/or conduct psychological operations without a working knowledge of what certain people regard as pleasing to the eye, ear, or heart.

Understanding what a people consider right or wrong is as important to the private on his first foot patrol through an Afghan village as it is to the four-star general who makes a speech to another nation on international television.

The knowledge of what people are willing to fight and die for should be obvious. Sadly, it is not. Evidence is clear that the spate of Green-on-Blue shootings in Afghanistan is overwhelmingly caused by cultural transgressions. From refusing to urinate in private to condemnations of the Qur'an, we as a military seem not to understand that we sometimes cause our own problems.

Military professionals must of necessity not succumb to flimsy explanations, such as those bandied about on television, radio, and internet news sources, that "those" people are just "crazies". Sure. Fanatics exist in the form of extremists all around the globe. Many of them are lobbing Molotov cocktails, rocks, and RPGs at our embassies and consulates across the north of Africa as experienced in 2012.

But one must ask him or herself: Which is more likely? An entire culture of people is crazy enough to be incited to violence by a poorly produced video clip downloaded from the Internet. Or, there are a few – maybe only one – individuals or organizations behind the violence. Experience has shown that the latter is usually the case.

One example is a band of bad actors that understand a culture so well that all they need do is search the Internet for the most effective stimulus to create a predetermined effect on the anniversary of the 9/11 attacks.

Leaders of extremist, Islamist, and illicit organizations understand well that culture is a fire burning in the heart of every human. All one needs to do to make that fire erupt into action is fan the flames just a little. And then sit back from a safe distance and watch. Watch as their small efforts spread across a region or even a continent. Watch as we Americans continue to try and explain what is happening while wearing what can only be described as blinders of ethnocentrism. Watch as we lose more American lives and treasure fighting an enemy that is overwhelmingly outmatched on every single plane of warfare save one: the human terrain.

So the challenge seems clear: Military leaders of all ranks must strive to cleave the extraneous information away from the actual causes of deadly effects. To understand that it is impossible to fight an idea or ideology, but very possible to target our awesome military might on the specific bad actors perverting ideas and ideologies. To bring the fight to the few who are manipulating the many.

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Relating and Communicating Cross-Culturally

Cognitive Lesson Objective:
- Comprehend how knowledge of cultural domains can enhance one's ability to relate and communicate cross-culturally.

Cognitive Samples of Behavior:
- State the definition of cultural domains.

- Recognize examples of cultural domains.

- Identify the three elements of cross-cultural communication.

- Explain sources of cross-cultural conflict.

- Predict how relating and communicating effectively builds partnerships.

Affective Lesson Objectives:
- Value how an understanding of cultural domains can help officers become more successful making decisions and working operationally with individuals from other cultures.

Affective Samples of Behavior:
- Demonstrate willingness to learn about cultural domains.

- Appreciate the value of effectively relating and communicating.

- Offer personal examples of how domains characterize one's own culture.

RELATING AND COMMUNICATING

CROSS-CULTURALLY

Cultural awareness can improve the military's ability to accomplish its mission by providing insight into the behavior, values, and intent of the various groups we will encounter. The success of US military operations calls for American military members to become knowledgeable in not only the culture of their adversaries, but also in the culture of their allies, civilian counterparts, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), international organizations, and others. Our ability to relate and communicate with the people we encounter on missions in foreign lands is essential to our success.

The doctrine of Building Partnerships emphasizes the importance of "Airmen interacting with international Airmen … to develop, guide, and sustain relationships for mutual benefit and security." Building Partnerships enables the US to build "the capacity of partner governments and their security forces," and requires "Airmen to perform their duties effectively and achieve influence in culturally-complex environments around the globe."

Cross-Cultural Competence

Cross-Cultural Competence (3C) education and training as outlined by Air University, may be viewed as two broad categories:

> **Culture-general:** "The ability to quickly and accurately comprehend, and then effectively act in any culturally complex environment to achieve the desired effect without necessarily having prior exposure to a particular group, region, or language."

> **Culture-specific:** "An approach that emphasizes specific aspects of particular cultures, affording individuals much of the knowledge and/or skills necessary to interact more competently with individuals of other cultural backgrounds."

The purpose of culture-general learning is to *develop Airmen who are cross-culturally competent.* That means they can operate effectively in culturally complex environments by exerting positive influence on themselves, their teams, partners, local inhabitants, and adversaries. Airmen must be able to do this with no particular expertise in a specific culture, region or language.

The Air Force 3C Development Model is built with a triad of skills supported by cultural knowledge, individual motivation, and both academic and experiential learning approaches. Looking at the center of the model, we see that it's focuses on the ultimate goal of Airmen achieving decisive influence using three skills: relate, communicate, and negotiate.

The first key to operational success in a culturally-complex environment is being able to relate by understanding universal elements of culture, or cultural domains.

Relate: The 12 Domains Of Culture

Cultural domains are twelve universal categories of interaction, belief and meaning shared by all cultures but dealt with differently by each culture. There are general aspects that every culture shares, such as the fact that each culture organizes people first by their family group and then by other social groups. Using that general information, you can then find out how specific cultures go about organizing the family and what other social groups are most important for them. These twelve cultural domains are not mutually exclusive. However, the cultural domains help you organize what you see and experience by allowing you to compare general information about culture to your experience, and by enabling you to use that information to understand others' cultural perspectives.

Here are brief descriptions of each domain.

1. **Family & Kinship:** This domain refers to the ways people recognize relatives and the rights and status accorded to those relatives. The domain covers cultural practices, structures and beliefs and values related to marriage, children, family size & structure, mating, descent, inheritance, residence, relations, etc. It also includes the relationships with people we treat like family regardless of our actual genetic relationship to them. The family and kin groups are the first social group in a person's life; it helps to define what is culturally acceptable and unacceptable, who are "friends" and "enemies," how a person's identity develops, who a person or group will turn to in times of trouble and the ways the culture will be transmitted to future generations. Beliefs about family and kinship also influence ideas and practices regarding origins, descent, residence, inheritance, etc.

2. **Sex & Gender:** This domain pertains to ways different cultures acknowledge biological differences between men and women (sex); the ways they assign roles, responsibilities and status to masculine, feminine or other identities (gender); and their beliefs and values that support gender differences. People's sex and gender often influence or even fully determine their relationship to parts of every other cultural domain and can control access to resources, their work, and the kinds of social and political relations they can enter and how they can worship. The domain also covers the social structures, beliefs and values related to sex and gender differences, such as gendered division of labor, reproductive rights, etc.

3. **Sustenance & Health:** This domain covers the ways humans feed themselves and treat their bodies. More specifically, a focus on sustenance leads to discussion of the patterns of subsistence (what people produce and eat at different times); the ways food is produced, collected and distributed; values placed on food rituals; food taboos; beliefs about properties of certain foods and the like. A focus on health includes discussion about what constitutes a healthy lifestyle, how to be or get healthy when one is sick, how illness is defined, the causes of illness, medical rituals, people who can treat illness, etc.

4. **Religion & Spirituality:** This domain refers to a culture's way of defining and relating to the sacred and supernatural. Spirituality refers to the practices, beliefs and values related to the sacred and supernatural. Religion, on the other hand, means an organized system of practices, structures and beliefs/values related to the sacred and supernatural. The domain covers cultural practices, structures and beliefs/values related to origin stories, deities, ways of worshipping, religious communities, birth/death/life/afterlife, rules, rituals, etc. Religion provides people a sense of identity and peace of mind; it can contribute to belief in control over certain aspects of life; and it can help to preserve or structure the social order.

5. **Political & Social Relations:** This domain refers to the cultural practices, structures and beliefs and values related to human organization and governance. Understanding of activity in this domain gives you broader information about how people interact with each other, how they enforce laws and standards, how

they collect and distribute food, etc. Political relations (or organization) refer to a culture's patterns of dividing power among people, exercising that power and governing groups of people. The term usually includes some form of governmental or legal structure in society. This term implies a much broader set of activities and relationships than the American concept of "politics." Social relations (or organization) refer more generally to a culture's patterns of relationships among people, usually outside of the governance or legal structure. Examples include the wide variety of groups we form and how we use those groups to "get things done," whether that means dividing up food, celebrating traditions, educating children, practicing religion, or any other human activity. The domain also covers community organization, ethnic groups, regional identities, national governments, ideas about status/leadership, passing of laws, etc.

6.   **Economics & Resources:** This domain pertains to the ways people allocate, produce, distribute and consume goods and services. Among other topics, it includes attention to the variety of practices, structures, beliefs and values related to raw natural materials, human labor, careers, means of production and methods of exchange (monetary, gift-giving, reciprocal, etc). Information about economics and resources can help one understand the importance assigned to different resources, jobs and forms of exchange; and others' goals, interests and expectations in many situations.

7.   **History & Myth:** This domain pertains to a culture's treatment of the past (its own and others'). It can include the study of history through evidence (ranging from material culture to documents to fictional stories), ideas concerning what is important/unimportant about the past, ways to maintain knowledge and a group's identity as supported by historical or mythical events. The practices, structures, beliefs and values that relate to history and myth may also incorporate a group's origins or its predicted end, as well as an individual's roles within the group.

8.   **Learning & Knowledge:** This domain pertains to the means and methods through which a culture transmits knowledge and the kinds of knowledge that are valued. The means and methods of learning and teaching may range from informal, as in a parent tutoring a child, to formal, as in an apprenticeship or college education. Learning may also take place in a number of ways, such as through experience, via a book, in a group, one-on-one, etc. Each culture values these to different extents. The kinds of knowledge that are valued depend on the socioeconomic, resource and technological context of the culture. Learning and knowledge are a human necessity for biological and cultural survival.

9.   **Technology & Material:** This domain refers to the resources to which a culture has access and the items the culture produces (both of these are 'material'); and the raw materials, equipment, knowledge and skills (these constitute technology) that people use to transform the natural environment into items necessary for cultural and biological survival. Each culture maintains practices, structures, beliefs and values concerning its technology and material. These may range from practices of

how to use tools, beliefs about who can use certain tools and who cannot and the structural hierarchy of people who receive the products of such work. The domain also incorporates both artistic and practical uses of technology and material, such as churches, museums, libraries, archaeological sites, architectural landmarks and their contents (i.e., "cultural property").

10. **Aesthetics & Recreation:** This domain refers to people's expressions of beauty and style (aesthetics) as well as people's methods of "having fun" (recreation); in all, this domain incorporates a variety of creative human activity. Aesthetic and recreational practices, structures, beliefs and values may surpass what is needed for physical survival, but they may also be an integral part of everyday life. These aspects of culture are often what people think of when one mentions "culture," since they are very observable in classical or folk art, clothing, music, games and sports. The underlying meaning of the activities and art may be interpreted quite differently across cultures, from good/bad to moral/immoral to beautiful/ugly (and everything in between).

11. **Language & Communication:** This domain pertains to the means and methods people have of exchanging information. Language refers to the biological capability of speech, to the existence of different languages throughout the world and to culturally-influenced designations for languages, such as "standard/nonstandard," "official/unofficial," "creole," and "dialect." Communication is the result of exchanges of information, whether verbal or non-verbal. Both language and communication are crucial to establishing and maintaining relationships; and to transmitting culture. We often speak of communication "styles," such as direct/indirect styles or high/low context styles. Each style or variant of language and communication is the result of the practices, structures, beliefs and values of a particular culture.

12. **Time & Space:** This domain refers to the practices, structures, beliefs and values that people of a culture apply to the concept of time and the use of space. It includes attention to differences in measurement of time and space (calendars, idioms, physical measures, passage of time); a culture's focus on the future, present or past; the meanings of time and space in communication (pauses, standing distance, etc.); and the division of living space into functional units. Attention to time and space helps a culture order its world and interact with its natural surroundings.

Important points about the domains of culture:

- Each domain is related to all the others;

- Each domain deals with change over time;

- Each domain is influenced by power variables (wealth, status, influence, etc.);

- Items in one naturally appear and influence in another (holistic nature of culture); and

- The types of activities incorporated in the domains exist in every culture.

Relating well with other cultures improves our ability to shape mission outcomes. It is important to be aware of the cultural beliefs and behaviors of each the 12 domains. In particular, the domain of Language and Communication is critical to keeping things from being misunderstood and misinterpreted. Let's take a look at some culture general information regarding the Air Force 3C skill of "communicate."

Communicate

Culture manifests itself in our communication. Whether we realize it or not, our verbals and nonverbals speak volumes about how our world views or notions of how the world is. They also provide clues into our norms or beliefs on how we think the world should be. These contextual clues, if misunderstood or overlooked, could spell disaster for a relationship or even an entire mission. While you may not know the native language of the country you are deployed to, there are three key elements that will impact your communication: paralanguage, nonverbal, and cultural context.

Paralanguage involves how our words are shaped by volume, word emphasis, use of silence and pauses, intonation, and rate of speech. It's often not what we say but how we say it that communicates meaning. Therefore, paralanguage plays a tremendous role in the way we perceive and are perceived by others. For example, Israelis view high volume as a sign of strong beliefs on an issue, and Germans assume a commanding tone that projects authority and self-confidence. However, people from Thailand, Japan, and the Philippines tend to speak very softly, almost in a whisper. They believe this communicates good manners and education. In Japan, laughing signals joy but it also often camouflages displeasure, anger, embarrassment, and sorrow.

Nonverbals consist of four types of communication that vary cross-culturally. The term "haptics" involves the functions, perceptions, and meanings of touch. When we think about haptics from a cross-cultural perspective, it becomes clear that factors related to who touches whom, when, where, and how are all connected to our cultural upbringing. Proxemics is the study of the communicative effects of space or distance. Because we all have needs for both privacy (distance) and to be interdependent (nearness), one way we manage this tension is by defining and defending a territory. Chronemics is the study of how people perceive the use of time and how they structure time in their relationships. This is a form of nonverbal communication because one's use of time sends a message without one uttering a single word. Whether in an academic, business, or social environment, members of different cultures use and perceive time differently. Finally, kinesics is the technical term for the study of movement and gesture, and it comes from the Greek word "motion." It includes gestures, body movements, facial expressions, and eye behavior.

Lastly, Cultural Context pertains to conditions or circumstances that impact communication. Context may be low or high depending on the culture or situation. Low and high-context communication is used in all cultures. One form, however tends to dominate that culture.

Many relatively individualistic cultures, like those predominant in North America and much of northern Europe, favor low context communication styles. These cultures tend to pay more attention to the explicit meaning of the verbal message. Low context communicators often stress lots of detail, facts and statistics with little regard given to how the message is delivered. They favor communication that gets directly to the point rather than communicating through analogies and high context hints. Since saving face for the group is less of a concern, "saying what you mean and meaning what you say" are more highly valued characteristics. In contrast, many collectivist cultures like those in East Asia as well as most Middle Eastern, Arab, Latino, and Mediterranean cultures tend toward high context communication styles. In these cultures, one's relationship to the group is a dominant factor in any interaction; it must be preserved and enhanced at all times. High context communication is dependent upon the message's context, verbal cues and nonverbal cues more so than in a low context culture. Those in high context cultures tend to consider how their words and actions reflect on the reputation of their family and their group. They are more likely to postpone making decisions and are less likely to disagree publicly with someone or openly criticize another person to avoid reflecting poorly on the other person's family or reputation. They also believe unexpected forces (such as the divine) may affect outcomes.

Cross-cultural competence is largely built upon the capacity to notice distinctions among others; in particular, contrasts in their moods, motivations, and intentions. In more advanced forms, this intelligence permits a skilled adult to read the intentions and desires of others, even when these have been hidden. This process begins once you become aware of and become mindful of others' paralinguistic behavior, nonverbal communication and the cultural context within which they operate.

CROSS-CULTURAL CONFLICT

Conflict has been identified as occurring when two related parties—individuals, groups, communities, or nation-states—find themselves divided by perceived incompatible interests or goals, or in competition for control of scarce resources. Furthermore, whenever two cultures come into contact, differences in the ways they relate and communicate can lead to cross-conflict. A precursor to resolving those conflicts is one's understanding the root cause or causes.

First, there is **value conflict**. Values dictate our interpretation of situations, relationships, and events. Since values are not universal and are deeply embedded in culture, it is not surprising that divergent values can cause conflict. Value conflicts are difficult to resolve. The best approach is to aim for mutual understanding of value differences, and try to find commonalities beyond the conflicting principles and ethics.

Second, there is **relationship conflict**, which involves clashes at the interpersonal, intergroup, or international levels. Relationship conflicts are often fueled by misperceptions, stereotypes, and poor communication. When addressing this type of conflict, it is important for those involved to communicate verbally and non-verbally to clarify rather than cloud the already difficult situation.

A third category, **data conflict**, examines how people perceive the data being used in the interaction. Data conflicts may result from a lack of information, misinformation, or contrasting perceptions or interpretations of the significance and role of data. If the parties involved in the conflict disagree on the relevance and interpretation of the data, it can negatively impact the outcome. It's important to note that although data itself is objective, the tools people use to interpret the data may be subjective, resulting in varying interpretations.

The final conflict type, **interest conflict**, results when parties have different interests. The majority of these conflicts revolve around how each party compares and measures the worthiness of their interests with the interest of others. Since interests are deeply rooted beliefs, it is unlikely that the interest conflict between the parties will change, but an acknowledgment of the other side's interests along with a willingness to understand the reasoning behind the interest is a good place to start.

Most cross-cultural conflicts will involve a combination of two or more of the types of conflict. You are very likely to run into conflicts that contain elements of value, interest, and relationship as you interact in other cultures. Oftentimes these conflicts will rise to the top, only to be discovered later that they were fed by erroneous data. As you work in culturally complex environments, always determine the root cause of the conflict to avoid falling into the trap of false assumptions.

STUDENT CULTURAL ASSIMILATOR #1

INSTRUCTION: Read the following scenario and as a group reach a consensus on the best explanation for the behavior. Address which cultural domains, elements of communication, and sources of conflict may be factors in this cross-cultural exchange.

"A FEW BEERS"

First Lieutenant Whitten had been deployed to a South Asian nation on a humanitarian relief mission for about six months. On one of his days off, he went to a nearby marketplace with two of the locals whom he had come to know. The older of the two locals was named Soleh. After walking around for some time observing the local crafts and food items that were for sale, the men stopped for a few beers. The conversation swayed between such topics as aid to developing nations and the role of women in society. Just after initiating a discussion of local politics, Lt Whitten excused himself to go buy a round of beers, thus treating everyone at the table. He returned clutching three bottles in his right hand. While still holding the bottles, Lt Whitten suddenly remembered a point he wanted to stress with Soleh. Leaning forward and reaching for Soleh's shoulder with his hand before sitting down, he proceeded to talk. Soleh and his companion began to appear uncomfortable. The conversation began to move away from Lt Whitten. When the two locals finished their beer, they politely excused themselves and left. Neither made contact with Lt Whitten again.

How can you explain the reaction of the locals? What did Lt Whitten do, if anything, that might have offended his South Asian partners?

Which cultural domains apply to this scenario?

Which elements of communication apply to this scenario?

Explain the sources of conflict.

STUDENT CULTURAL ASSIMILATOR #2

INSTRUCTIONS: Read the following scenario and as a group reach a consensus on the best explanation for the behavior. Address which cultural domains, elements of communication, and sources of conflict may be factors in this cross-cultural exchange.

"WATER PROJECT"

US civil engineers spent two years assisting a developing country in Africa with building a water treatment plant. Unlike some other situations they had encountered, this time they believed they had been able to acquire excellent materials for building the plant. The US engineers relied on local labor when building the plant. Once built, it functioned well and was an important point of interest for host country officials who visited regularly to check on progress and described the plant with great pride to visitors from other countries. However, 5 years after completion, the water treatment plant was not functioning very well. Parts had rusted, and no one seemed able to replace worn-out parts or otherwise look after system maintenance. Host country officials stopped praising the plant and, in fact, started to complain about the US military's efforts.

What is the most likely explanation for the worn-out parts and reaction by the host country officials?

Which cultural domains apply to this scenario?

Which elements of communication apply to this scenario?

Explain the sources of conflict.

STUDENT CULTURAL ASSIMILATOR #3

INSTRUCTION: Read the following scenario and as a group reach a consensus on the best explanation for the behavior. Address which cultural domains, elements of communication, and sources of conflict may be factors in this cross-cultural exchange.

"A NATURAL DISASTER?"

Captain Franks, an Air Force civil engineer, was assigned to a 6-month program in a Central American nation to help develop disaster preparedness programs following a particularly severe earthquake. Although he had some success in convincing local government leaders of the necessity for the measures, he was continually frustrated in trying to initiate building and health programs among the rural population, most of whom were native Indians. Franks was impressed with their rebuilding efforts after a disaster, but could not get them interested in preparing for future disasters.

What are possible explanations for the native peoples' approach to disaster preparedness? How could you help Franks interpret the most significant reason he could not get the natives interested in preparing for possible future disasters?

Which cultural domains applied to this scenario?

Which elements of communication apply to this scenario?

Explain the sources of conflict.

STUDENT CULTURAL ASSIMILATOR #4

INSTRUCTION: Read the following scenario and as a group reach a consensus on the best explanation for the behavior. Address which cultural domains, elements of communication, and sources of conflict may be factors in this cross-cultural exchange.

"INTRODUCTIONS"

You are serving as an Air Force operations staff officer and are tasked to assist in the planning of a joint training exercise utilizing DoD and host nation government agencies at multiple locations. To fit in with the local island culture at one of the locations, your US spokesperson acts gregarious and outgoing, waves his hands around, and expressively introduces participants by their first name starting with DoD personnel and continuing with the participants from the host nation government. Business is addressed immediately after the introductions. You notice that the minister of the host nation National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA) is becoming more and more agitated, impatient, and ultimately uncooperative throughout the day.

What are possible explanations for the reaction of the host nation's NEMA minister? How could you help the US spokesperson improve relations with the host nation?

Which cultural domains applied to this scenario?

Which elements of communication apply to this scenario?

Explain the sources of conflict.

STUDENT CULTURAL ASSIMILATOR #5

INSTRUCTIONS: Read the following scenario and as a group reach a consensus on the best explanation for the behavior. Address which cultural domains, elements of communication, and sources of conflict may be factors in this cross-cultural exchange.

"MILCON PROJECT"

As the Operations Flight Commander of a Civil Engineer Squadron in an overseas location near a provincial town, you are required to complete an environmental impact analysis before initiating a military construction (MILCON) project. As part of the analysis, a government official tells you that you will need permission from the local city council to access the land because it borders cultural property and resources that this clan society relies upon to grow crops and hunt for small game. The city council invites all citizens to a civic meeting to discuss the Air Force request, and provides you with a teenage boy who is learning English as your interpreter. A large number of people show up to the town's outdoor auditorium. After a long introduction in which each of the council members speaks without interruption, you are invited to make your case. You speak about the MILCON project and its projected impact on the physical environment. Several times, the elderly men interrupt you and speak loudly to the council while pointing at you and the trees. The teenager translates that they are telling stories about the history of the area. When you are finally able to finish presenting your case, you see the council members nodding with approval at the construction plan and the need to access the land. After the meeting, you tell your boss that the meeting went very well. However, days later when the contractor and his equipment arrive in the village, they are told that they do not have permission to access the land.

What are possible explanations for the miscommunication?

Which cultural domains applied to this scenario?

Which elements of communication apply to this scenario?

Explain the sources of conflict.

STUDENT CULTURAL ASSIMILATOR #6

INSTRUCTIONS: Read the following scenario and as a group reach a consensus on the best explanation for the behavior. Address which cultural domains, elements of communication, and sources of conflict may be factors in this cross-cultural exchange.

"HIRING WORKERS"

An overseas forward-based airfield has been severely damaged by a natural disaster. As the airfield damage repair Officer in Charge, you have been tasked with repairing the airfield operating surface so that sortie generation can resume as expeditiously as possible. To reduce costs and demands on logistics support systems, you are required to obtain construction resources (locally available contractors, skilled labor, construction equipment, and materials) from the host nation. You have to ensure that the contractor provides skilled workers and material that is of adequate quality and quantity.

Two weeks after hiring a contractor and starting construction, you are informed that villagers have organized round the clock highly vocal protests in the streets next to the base. Since you used a host nation contractor and are paying them good wages to complete the work, you do not see the linkage between the two incidents. However, your Commander tells you that the Wing has received complaints from the local village elders that the Americans are favoring and hiring workers from another region, who also happen to be from a different ethnic group. You meet with the contractor, and he tells you that there are no skilled workers that he can hire from the local village who will meet the contract requirements.

What course of action do you recommend to your Commander?

Which cultural domains applied to this scenario?

Which elements of communication apply to this scenario?

Explain the sources of conflict.

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Cultural Visual Expeditionary Skills Training

Cognitive Lesson Objective:
- Comprehend how cross-cultural competence (3C) skills can help in the negotiation process.

Cognitive Samples of Behavior:
- Describe the Air Force leadership core competency of Negotiation.

- Describe three considerations one must take into account when planning a cross-cultural negotiation.

- Given a scenario, explain how the Air Force 3C skills of relate and communicate can impact the negotiation process.

Affective Lesson Objective:
- Value how 3C skills can help officers negotiate and work more effectively with individuals from other cultures.

Affective Samples of Behavior:
- Demonstrate willingness to study and practice negotiation.

- Appreciate the value of effective cross-cultural negotiations.

NEGOTIATION: A CORE COMPETENCY

FOR TODAY'S OFFICER

All Airmen negotiate at some level on a daily basis. We negotiate over personal and professional matters with family members, friends, coworkers, and supervisors. We negotiate when shopping for expensive consumer items or conducting business on behalf of the government with contractors or non-governmental organizations. Even more critically, we negotiate in joint, interagency, and coalition environments with partners and other foreign entities during operational missions.

Once upon a time, military education and training programs failed to recognize negotiation as an essential tool for military leadership and management. Leaders used negotiation, but turned far more often to the authority of an established chain-of-command or application of traditional military power sources to influence. However, times have changed. Lessons learned in conflict, from remote areas of Iraq and Afghanistan to the inner rings of the Pentagon, teach us that skillful negotiation is an invaluable skill set for the military professional that must be codified, studied, and applied. No longer do US military leaders view negotiations as simply a battle of wills and skillful posturing. Rather we see them as collaborative searches for mutually acceptable solutions that take into account the various cultural perceptions and expectations of those we hope to influence.

To emphasize the importance of negotiation, Air Force senior leaders incorporated negotiation skills as a critical core leadership competency. Today's Air Force Doctrine Annex 1-1 Force Development under "Fostering Collaborative Relationships" highlights the core competencies of "Influencing" and / or "Negotiating." Furthermore, the Air Force established the Negotiation Center of Excellence (NCE) as a focal point for negotiation studies. The mission of the Air Force NCE is to design and deliver culturally adaptable education, training, and research in negotiation methodologies and techniques that foster collaborative relationships, build partnerships, and find interagency solutions.

The Air Force NCE defines negotiation as a "deliberate process between two or more people or groups to solve a difference or problem." Negotiation, although often learned through experience, is both an art and a science that requires extensive attention to the craft. Expert negotiators may devote a lifetime to the study, practice, and refinement of their skills. Throughout our day, situations dictate different negotiation styles and strategies, and we often switch strategies without realizing it.

On a basic level, an Airman may be required meet with peers in his or her squadron to map out a training schedule. At a higher level, he or she may need to bargain proposals both up and down the chain-of-command to balance resources and time to meet the unit's training objectives while also negotiating with outside agencies to find training locations and resources. In other instances, rules-of-engagement may add challenging variables. For example, a commander may have a large span-of-responsibility with a very limited span-of control. Forces available to the commander may reach across host-nation,

international coalitions, governmental civilian agencies, and non-governmental agencies. To accomplish the mission, the commander will need to partner with these groups when he or she in fact has no direct authority over them.

When such variables are applied, negotiation isn't easy, and one's ability or ineptitude to relate and communicate cross-culturally can have far-reaching implications. Lt Col Reyes Cole of the Army National Guard remarked, "Like it or not, each interaction that U.S. forces have with civilian leaders counts as a diplomatic venture that can have positive or negative effects. These company-grade leaders are often forced to deal with ancient hatreds between warring clans, failed local economies, corrupt legal systems and deficient civil infrastructures. If the adage holds true that 'all politics are local,' then we must arm our company-grade leaders with the skills and tools necessary to be successful."

US stories of negotiation shortcomings and successes abound. For example, during the early stages of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), the US opened several airbases in Southwest Asia. Because of various unplanned factors, US forces first to arrive at a particular base were only a security forces squad, two enlisted transportation troops, and a small civil engineering contingent. The senior US officer on the ground was a USAF security forces Major. Since the base was used by the US during the first Gulf War, facilities, bed-down locations, and required resources were not immediate issues. However, without an advanced party (ADVON) team present, the Major and his small contingency had to meet basic needs by their own designs. Negotiating with the host nation on the base's development became the dominant activity. Everything from water delivery times to what types of vehicles were allowed on the flight line were subject to negotiation with the host nation.

Even after the ADVON team arrived, this trend continued. Senior NCOs found themselves negotiating with senior host nation officials on issues such as US security forces patrol boundaries and whether wine was allowed for Catholic services. In fact, the Airmen quickly found that nearly everything was negotiable - price for water, dress for females, flying times, aircraft parking spaces – all negotiable!

Unfortunately inefficient US negotiations negatively affected the mission. On one occasion during the height of Afghanistan air operations, tanker sorties were cancelled when the host nation base commander and the air base commander could not agree on procedures for transporting and transferring fuel from fuel trucks to tanker aircraft. After much effort, the issue was resolved. Yet what might have happened if the base commander and his staff had more quickly recognized the mutual interests and started working cooperatively, instead of becoming competitively entrenched in positions? While this premise is "Cooperative Negotiations 101," none of the deployed Airmen at the time were familiar with this concept.

Effective negotiations begin with effective planning. First, one must be aware of cultural differences that might cloud issues or cause misunderstanding. Other cultures' beliefs, values, history and worldviews can have a huge impact on how they view matters. Then one must clearly define the US position and what we believe is the position of the other party. This will help determine what concessions are acceptable in order to achieve

what is needed to advance the mission. Finally, effective negotiations begin with a well-planned agenda. For example, trust-building may be first on the agenda. In cultures where people do not have a strong central legal system, or where the law is seen corrupt and unfair, building interpersonal trust and reliable relationships becomes job number one. Airmen may need to offer sincere "pre-emptive concessions" such as meeting at their location (balanced with force protection considerations) or establishing timetables that are less ambitious than what an American usually pursues. Such considerations were clearly overlooked or misunderstood a decade ago at the start of OEF but are far more ingrained in military education and training today.

The Air Force Culture and Language Center identifies negotiation as foundational to cross-cultural competence, and Air Force Doctrine Annex 1-1 lists negotiation as a critical part of leading people and teams. According to David Tressler of the Strategic Studies Institute, "in the current strategic environment, every junior leader is a 'strategic corporal' and all officers, from lieutenant to general, are expected to be especially adaptable, flexible leaders who are prepared to overcome obstacles and accomplish their missions in what is often a confusing, tense, unfamiliar environment." This environment is unlikely to change anytime soon. Current and future conflicts will require you as officers to commit lifelong study and practice to the craft of negotiation – as a core competency of your leadership.

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Cognitive Lesson Objective:
- Know the threats that the United States must confront in the domestic and international arena.

Cognitive Samples of Behavior:
- State the US Enduring National Interests.

- Identify the most pervasive threat to the US financial sector.

- Identify the terrorist activity that poses the most likely threat to the US homeland.

Affective Lesson Objective:
- Respond to the importance of studying and understanding existing threats to the US. Homeland.

Affective Sample of Behavior:
- Receive information on threats that the United States must confront in the domestic and international arena.

GLOBAL THREATS

Cyber

Attacks against us are increasing in frequency, scale, sophistication and severity of impact. Although we must be prepared for a catastrophic, large scale strike, a so-called "Cyber Armageddon," the reality is that we've been living with a constant and expanding barrage of cyber attacks for some time.

This insidious trend will continue. Cyber poses a very complex set of threats, because profit-motivated criminals, ideologically motivated hackers or extremists and variously-capable nation-states like Russia, China, North Korea and Iran are all potential adversaries, who, if they choose, can do great harm. Additionally, the methods of attack, the systems targeted, and the victims are also expanding in diversity and intensity on a daily basis.

2014 saw, for the first-time, destructive cyber attacks carried out on US soil by nation state entities, marked first by the Iranian attack against the Las Vegas Sands Casino Corporation in 2015 and the North Korean attack against Sony in November. Although both of these nations have lesser technical capabilities in comparison to Russia and China, these destructive attacks demonstrate that Iran and North Korea are motivated and unpredictable cyber actors.

Russia and China continue to develop very sophisticated cyber programs, with the Russian cyber threat being more severe than previously assessed. Chinese economic espionage against US companies remains a major threat despite detailed private sector reports, scathing public indictments and US demarcation.

With respect to non-nation state entities, some ideologically-motivated cyber actors, expressing support for Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), have demonstrated their capabilities by hacking several social media accounts. The so-called "Cyber Caliphate" successfully hacked USCENTCOM's Twitter account and YouTube page in January of 2015 and later hacked Newsweek Magazine's Twitter handle.

The most pervasive cyber threat to the US financial sector is from cybercriminals. Criminals were responsible for cyber intrusions in 2014 into JPMorgan, Home Depot, Target, Neiman Marcus, Anthem and other US companies. And in the future, we'll probably see cyber operations that change or manipulate electronic information to compromise its integrity, instead of simply deleting or disrupting access to it.

In the end, the cyber threat cannot be completely eliminated. Rather we must be vigilant in our efforts to detect, manage and defend against it.

Terrorism

2014 proved to be the most lethal year for global terrorism in the 45 years that such data has been compiled. There were 13,463 (documented) terrorist attacks carried out world-wide; with a death toll of more than 32,700 people with approximately another 34,700 wounded. This is a marked increase over the 2013 numbers where just over 11,500 terrorist attacks were carried out world-wide; killing approximately 22,000 people.

About half of all and about half of the fatalities occurred in just three countries: Iraq, Pakistan, and Afghanistan. Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) conducted more attacks than any other terrorist group in 2014. (Ref. Consortium of the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), University of Maryland.)

The recent terrorist attacks in Europe emphasize the threat posed by small numbers of extremists, radicalized by the conflicts in Syria and Iraq. The global media attention and widespread support in extremist circles for these attacks probably will inspire additional extremists to conduct similar attacks. A major concern going forward is that ISIL, al-Qa'ida, al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula, and most recently al-Shabab are calling on their supporters to conduct "lone-wolf" attacks against the United States and other Western countries.

Of the 13 attacks in the West since last May 2013, 12 were conducted by individual extremists. Since the conflict began, more than 20,000 Sunni foreign fighters have traveled to Syria from more than 90 countries to fight the Asad regime. Of that number, at least 13,600 have extremist ties.

More than 3,400 Western fighters have gone to Syria and Iraq. Hundreds have returned home to Europe. About 180 Americans have been involved in various stages of travel to Syria. That includes those who attempted and didn't go, those that went and fought, those that went and died and a small number who returned home.

Although we have not identified any individuals engaged in attack plotting since returning to the United States from Syria, homegrown violent extremists continue to pose the most likely threat to the homeland. Lone actors or insular groups who act autonomously will likely gravitate to simpler plots that don't require advanced skills, outside training or communication with others.

A small, but persistent number of Sunni terrorist groups remain intent on striking the US and the West, some of which see commercial aviation as an appealing target.

Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)

ISIL is increasing its influence outside of Iraq and Syria, seeking to expand its self-declared caliphate into the Arabian Peninsula, North Africa and South Asia, and planning terrorist attacks against Western and Shi'a interests.

ISIL's rise represents the greatest shift in the Sunni violent extremist landscape since al Qaida affiliates first began forming and is the first to assume some characteristics of a nation-state. Spillover from the Syrian conflict is raising the prospect of instability in Lebanon, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia.

In Iraq, sectarian conflict in mixed Shia-Sunni areas is growing and, if not blunted, will undermine progress against ISIL. Although Iraq has begun to alter the ethno sectarian tone, resistance from Shia political allies and persistent distrust among Iraqi leaders will limit progress toward a stable, inclusive political environment.

ISIL's ability to conduct large-scale offensive operations in Iraq has been degraded by coalition airstrikes, the provision of weapons and munitions by the US and other allies, and stiffened defenses by the Iraqi Security Forces, Kurdish Peshmerga, Shia militants and tribal allies; not to mention the Iranians. However, ISIL remains as we've seen a formidable and brutal threat.

Other Actors

In parts of western **Syria**, the Syrian regime made consistent gains in 2014, but it will require years for it to reassert significant control over the country. The regime has a clear advantage over the opposition, which is plagued by disunity, as well as fire power, manpower, and logistical shortfalls. Right now, they are incapable of militarily ousting Asad, and will probably remain so in 2015. Asad is confident; he thinks the war is winnable.

The conflict, with over 202,000 people estimated to be killed, will continue to threaten the stability of its regional neighbors, foster the rise of regional sectarianism and extremism, as well, it will strain the region's fragile economic balance as millions of refugees continue to flee the conflict. Over 52 percent of Syria's pre-war population, or about 11.4 million people, have been displaced.

Iran is exerting its influence in Syria, Iraq, and Yemen. Tehran has provided robust military support to Damascus and Baghdad, in the form of arms, advisers, funding, intelligence collection, electronic warfare and cyber support, and combat support.

More broadly, Iran will face many of the same decision points in 2015, as it did in 2014. Foremost is whether the Supreme Leader will agree to a nuclear deal. He wants sanctions relief, while at the same time, preserving his options on nuclear capabilities.

In **Libya**, two rival governments have emerged, so the country has no clear, legitimate political authority and is embroiled in a civil war. External support to both sides by countries in the region has stoked the violence. Extremists and terrorist groups affiliated with al-Qa'ida and ISIL are exploiting Libya's permissive security environment. They are using the country to train and to plot. ISIL's beheadings of the Coptic Christians highlight the growing threat posed by ISIL and affiliated groups in Libya.

In **Yemen**, the evacuation of our Embassy in Sanaa has reduced the effectiveness of our counterterrorism efforts. After President's Hadi's attempted resignation and the Huthis' unilateral dissolution of the government Yemen's political future and stability are very cloudy, particularly with Hadi's apparent escape to Aden and perhaps his reassertion of his presidential authorities.

In **Russia**, the crisis in Ukraine is entering its second year, and achieving a lasting solution that would allow Kyiv (aka Kiev) to pursue Western integration will be difficult to say the least. Moscow sees itself in direct confrontation with the West over Ukraine and will be very prone to overreact to any US actions. President Putin's goals are to keep Ukraine out of NATO and to ensure separatists control an autonomous entity within Ukraine. He wants Moscow to retain leverage over Kyiv and Crimea, in his view, it is simply not negotiable. Russian dominance over the former Soviet space is Russia's highest foreign policy goal.

Falling oil prices, Ukraine-related costs and Western sanctions have spurred double-digit inflation and have tipped Russia's economy towards recession. Russia will continue to possess the largest, most capable foreign nuclear ballistic missile force. Russia's weapons modernization plans will focus on strategic warfare and ways to mitigate are our advantages, like prompt global strike.

China is expanding and accelerating the buildup of its outposts in the South China Sea. This is part of an aggressive military modernization program directly aimed at our strengths. Their military training program last year included exercises unprecedented in scope, scale and complexity, to test its modernization progress and to improve their theater warfare capabilities.

However, China's leaders are primarily concerned with domestic issues: the Communist Party's hold on power, internal stability, and economic growth. Although China is looking for stable ties with the United States, it is more willing to accept bilateral and regional tensions in pursuit of its interests, especially on maritime sovereignty issues.

President Xi Jinping is pursuing an ambitious and potentially volatile reform agenda that runs the risk of fueling leadership tensions and domestic unrest. His anti-corruption campaign is spreading fears of recrimination, and may alienate people whose support he will need to advance broader reforms.

The slowdown of the Chinese economy is reinforcing the leaders' neuralgia about internal stability, and reinforcing a harsh crackdown on dissent.

There are other threats to US interests worldwide including Afghanistan, North Korea and weapons of mass destruction but due to the security classification will not be discussed here.

The National Military Strategy 2015

Today's global security environment is most unpredictable. Since the last National Military Strategy (NMS) published in 2011, global disorder has significantly increased while some of our comparative military advantage has begun to erode. We now face multiple, simultaneous security challenges from traditional state actors and transregional networks of sub-state groups – all taking advantage of rapid technological change. Future conflicts will come more rapidly, last longer, and take place on a much more technically challenging battlefield. They will have increasing implications to the U.S. homeland.

Despite what is likely to be a difficult future, we can count on the young Americans who choose to serve, to live an uncommon life, and to defend their fellow citizens. Our focus must remain that these individuals are the best-led and best-equipped force in the world. The 2015 NMS of the United States offers a blueprint towards that end.

The 2015 NMS describes how we will employ our military forces to protect and advance our national interests. We must be able to rapidly adapt to new threats while maintaining comparative advantage over traditional ones. Success will increasingly depend on how well our military instrument can support the other instruments of power and enable our network of allies and partners. It continues the call for greater agility, innovation, and integration. It reinforces the need for the U.S. military to remain globally engaged to shape the security environment and to preserve our network of alliances. The 2015 NMS echoes previous documents in noting the imperative within our profession to develop leaders of competence, character, and consequence.

It also asserts that the application of the military instrument of power against state threats is very different than the application of military power against non-state threats. We are more likely to face prolonged campaigns than conflicts that are resolved quickly. The control of escalation is becoming more difficult and more important. The over aching school of thought is we may have to hedge against unpredictability brought on with reduced resources and/or we may have to adjust our global posture.

The Strategic Environment

Complexity and rapid change characterize today's strategic environment, driven by globalization, the diffusion of technology, and demographic shifts.

Globalization is impacting nearly every aspect of human activity. People, products, and information are flowing across borders at unprecedented speed and volume, acting as catalysts for economic development while also increasing societal tensions, competition for resources, and political instability.

Central to globalization is the spread of new technologies that enable a global information environment and empower people to see more, share more, create more, and organize faster than ever before. Individuals and groups today have access to more information than entire governments once possessed. They can swiftly organize and act on what they

learn, sometimes leading to violent change. States, meanwhile,are using information sharing to develop advanced capabilities of their own. When applied to military systems, this diffusion of technology is challenging competitive advantages long held by the United States such as early warning and precision strike.

These changes are amplified by shifting demographics. Youth populations are rapidly growing in Africa and the Middle East, regions that face resource shortages, struggling economies, and deep social fissures. Meanwhile, populations in Europe and across northern Asia are set to decline and get older. Around the world, millions of people are flowing from the countryside into cities in search of work where they are exposed to cultural differences, alienation, and disease. They also are moving across borders and seas in growing numbers, accepting great risk and placing strain on nations that receive them.

Despite these changes, states remain the international system's dominant actors. They are preeminent in their capability to harness power, focus human endeavors, and provide security. Most states today — led by the United States, its allies, and partners — support the established institutions and processes dedicated to preventing conflict, respecting sovereignty, and furthering human rights. Some states, however, are attempting to revise key aspects of the international order and are acting in a manner that threatens our national security interests.

While Russia has contributed in select security areas, such as counternarcotics and counterterrorism, it also has repeatedly demonstrated that it does not respect the sovereignty of its neighbors and it is willing to use force to achieve its goals. Russia's military actions are undermining regional security directly and through proxy forces. These actions violate numerous agreements that Russia has signed in which it committed to act in accordance with international norms, including the UN Charter, Helsinki Accords, Russia-NATO Founding Act, Budapest Memorandum, and the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty.

Iran also poses strategic challenges to the international community. It is pursuing nuclear and missile delivery technologies despite repeated United Nations Security Council resolutions demanding that it cease such efforts. It is a state-sponsor of terrorism that has undermined stability in many nations, including Israel, Lebanon, Iraq, Syria, and Yemen. Iran's actions have destabilized the region and brought misery to countless people while denying the Iranian people the prospect of a prosperous future.

North Korea's pursuit of nuclear weapons and ballistic missile technologies also contradicts repeated demands by the international community to cease such efforts. These capabilities directly threaten its neighbors, especially the Republic of Korea and Japan. In time, they will threaten the U.S. homeland as well. North Korea also has conducted cyber attacks, including causing major damage to a U.S. corporation (SONY).

We support China's rise and encourage it to become a partner for greater international security. However, China's actions are adding tension to the Asia-Pacific region. For example, its claims to nearly the entire South China Sea are inconsistent with international law. The international community continues to call on China to settle such issues cooperatively and without coercion. China has responded with aggressive land reclamation efforts that will allow it to position military forces astride vital international sea lanes.

None of these nations are believed to be seeking direct military conflict with the United States or our allies. Nonetheless, they each pose serious security concerns which the international community is working to collectively address by way of common policies, shared messages, and coordinated action.

As part of that effort, we remain committed to engagement with all nations to communicate our values, promote transparency, and reduce the potential for miscalculation. Accordingly, we continue to invest in a substantial military-to-military relationship with China and we remain ready to engage Russia in areas of common interest, while urging both nations to settle their disputes peacefully and in accordance with international law.

Concurrent with state challenges, Violent Extremist Organizations (VEOs) — led by al Qai'da and the self-proclaimed Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) — are working to undermine transregional security, especially in the Middle East and North Africa. Such groups are dedicated to radicalizing populations, spreading violence, and leveraging terror to impose their visions of societal organization. They are strongest where governments are weakest, exploiting people trapped in fragile or failed states. In many locations, VEOs coexist with transnational criminal organizations, where they conduct illicit trade and spread corruption, further undermining security and stability.

In this complex strategic security environment, the U.S. military does not have the luxury of focusing on one challenge to the exclusion of others. It must provide a full range of military options for addressing both revisionist states and VEOs. Failure to do so will result in greater risk to our country and the international order.

The Military Environment

The United States is the world's strongest nation, enjoying unique advantages in technology, energy, alliances and partnerships, and demographics. However, these advantages are being challenged.

For the past decade, our military campaigns primarily have consisted of operations against violent extremist networks. But today, and into the foreseeable future, we must pay greater attention to challenges posed by state actors. They increasingly have the capability to contest regional freedom of movement and threaten our homeland. Of particular concern are the proliferation of ballistic missiles, precision strike technologies, unmanned systems, space and cyber capabilities, and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) – technologies designed to counter U.S. military advantages and curtail access to the global commons.

Emerging technologies are impacting the calculus of deterrence and conflict management by increasing uncertainty and compressing decision space. For example, attacks on our communications and sensing systems could occur with little to no warning, impacting our ability to assess, coordinate, communicate, and respond. As a result, future conflicts between states may prove to be unpredictable, costly, and difficult to control.

VEOs are taking advantage of emergent technologies as well, using information tools to propagate destructive ideologies, recruit and incite violence, and amplify the perceived power of their movements. They advertise their actions to strike fear in opponents and generate support for their causes. They use improvised explosive devices (IED), suicide vests, and tailored cyber tools to spread terror while seeking ever more sophisticated capabilities, including WMD.

Today, the probability of U.S. involvement in interstate war with a major power is assessed to be low but growing. Should one occur, however, the consequences would be immense. VEOs, in contrast, pose an immediate threat to transregional security by coupling readily available technologies with extremist ideologies. Overlapping state and non-state violence, there exists an area of conflict where actors blend techniques, capabilities, and resources to achieve their objectives. Such "hybrid" conflicts may consist of military forces assuming a non-state identity, as Russia did in the Crimea, or involve a VEO fielding rudimentary combined arms capabilities, as ISIL has demonstrated in Iraq and Syria. Hybrid conflicts also may be comprised of state and non-state actors working together toward shared objectives, employing a wide range of weapons such as we have witnessed in eastern Ukraine. Hybrid conflicts serve to increase ambiguity, complicate decision-making, and slow the coordination of effective responses. Due to these advantages to the aggressor, it is likely that this form of conflict will persist well into the future.

Continuum of Conflict

CONSEQUENCE

State Conflict:
Employs large-scale military force and sophisticated military technologies across multiple domains to defeat the enemy. May include use of WMD, anti-access/area denial systems, global strike systems, undersea platforms, advanced cyber tools, and counter-space systems, among other capabilities.

Hybrid Conflict:
Blends conventional and irregular forces to create ambiguity, seize the initiative, and paralyze the adversary. May include use of both traditional military and asymmetric systems.

Non-State Conflict:
Employs small units and networks to undermine governments and gain control over populations. May include use of IEDs, small arms, propaganda, and terror.

PROBABILITY

Figure 1. Continuum of Conflict

An Integrated Military Strategy

The U.S. military's purpose is to protect our Nation and win our wars. We do this through military operations to defend the homeland, build security globally, and project power and win decisively. Our military supports diplomatic, informational, and economic activities that promote our enduring national interests. As detailed in the 2015 National Security Strategy, our enduring national interests are: the security of the United States, its citizens, and U.S. allies and partners; a strong, innovative, and growing U.S. economy in an open international economic system that promotes opportunity and prosperity; respect for universal values at home and around the world; and a rules-b a s e d international order advanced by U.S. leadership that promotes peace, security, and o p p o r t u n i t y through stronger cooperation to meet global challenges.

U.S. ENDURING NATIONAL INTERESTS

• The security of the United States, its citizens, and U.S. allies and partners.

• A strong, innovative, and growing U.S. economy in an open international economic system that promotes opportunity and prosperity.

• Respect for universal values at home and around the world.

• A rules-based international order advanced by U.S. leadership that promotes peace, security, and opportunity through stronger cooperation to meet global challenges.

NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS

• The survival of the Nation.

• The prevention of catastrophic attack against U.S. territory.

• The security of the global economic system.

• The security, confidence, and reliability of our allies.

• The protection of American citizens abroad.

• The preservation and extension of universal values.

NATIONAL MILITARY OBJECTIVES

• Deter, deny, and defeat state adversaries.

• Disrupt, degrade, and defeat violent extremist organizations.

• Strengthen our global network of allies and partners.

From the enduring national interests, the U.S. military has derived National Security Interests (NSIs) to prioritize its missions. The NSIs are: the survival of the Nation; the prevention of catastrophic attack against U.S. territory; the security of the global economic system; the security, confidence, and reliability of our allies; the protection of American citizens abroad; and the preservation and extension of universal values. NSIs guide military leaders in providing recommendations on when and where our Nation should use military force, the type and degree of force to employ, and at what cost.

To secure these interests, this National Military Strategy provides an integrated approach composed of three National Military Objectives (NMO): to deter, deny, and defeat state adversaries; to disrupt, degrade, and defeat VEOs; and to strengthen our global network of allies and partners. The U.S. military pursues these objectives by conducting globally integrated operations, implementing institutional reforms at home, and sustaining the capabilities, capacity, and readiness required to prevail in conflicts that may differ significantly in scope, scale, and duration.

These NMOs support the force planning guidance prescribed in the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review. It states that our Nation requires a U.S. military with the capacity, capability, and readiness to simultaneously defend the homeland; conduct sustained, distributed counterterrorist operations; and, in multiple regions, deter aggression and assure allies through forward presence and engagement. If deterrence fails, at any given time, our military will be capable of defeating a regional adversary in a large-scale, multi-phased campaign while denying the objectives of — or imposing unacceptable costs on — another aggressor in a different region.


Figure 2. The Integrated Approach

Deter, Deny, and Defeat State Adversaries

The U.S. military is the world's preeminent Joint Force. It supports the Nation by providing a full range of options to protect the homeland and our interests while assuring the security of our allies. The U.S. military deters aggression by maintaining a credible nuclear capability that is safe, secure, and effective; conducting forward engagement and operations; and maintaining Active, National Guard, and Reserve forces prepared to deploy and conduct operations of sufficient scale and duration to accomplish their missions. Forward deployed, rotational, and globally responsive forces regularly demonstrate the capability and will to act. Should deterrence fail to prevent aggression, the U.S. military stands ready to project power to deny an adversary's objectives and decisively defeat any actor that threatens the U.S. homeland, our national interests, or our allies and partners.

Deterring a direct attack on the United States and our allies is a priority mission, requiring homeland and regional defenses tied to secure conventional and nuclear strike capabilities. Thus U.S. strategic forces remain always ready. U.S. military defenses are enhanced by our North American Aerospace Defense Command Agreement with Canada and close cooperation with the U.S. Department of Homeland Security. These homeland defense partnerships are complemented by growing investments in the cyber realm designed to protect vital networks and infrastructure.

In case of aggression, denying adversaries their goals will be an immediate objective. This places special emphasis on maintaining highly-ready forces forward, as well as well trained and equipped surge forces at home, resilient logistics and transportation infrastructures, networked intelligence, strong communications links, and interoperability with allies and partners. Timely interagency planning and coordination also will be leveraged to develop holistic options that serve to integrate all elements of national power.

Should any actor directly attack the United States or our interests, the U.S. military will take action to defend our Nation. We are prepared to project power across all domains to stop aggression and win our Nation's wars by decisively defeating adversaries. While we prefer to act in concert with others, we will act unilaterally if the situation demands. In the event of an attack, the U.S. military will respond by inflicting damage of such magnitude as to compel the adversary to cease hostilities or render it incapable of further aggression. War against a major adversary would require the full mobilization of all instruments of national power and, to do so, the United States sustains a full-spectrum military that includes strong Reserve and National Guard forces. They provide the force depth needed to achieve victory while simultaneously deterring other threats.

Disrupt, Degrade, and Defeat VEOs

Today, the United States is leading a broad coalition of nations to defeat VEOs in multiple regions by applying pressure across the full extent of their networks.

In concert with all elements of national power and international partnerships, these efforts aim to disrupt VEO planning and operations, degrade support structures, remove leadership, interdict finances, impede the flow of foreign fighters, counter malign influences, liberate captured territory, and ultimately defeat them. In support of these efforts, we are widely distributing U.S. military forces and leveraging globally integrated command and control processes to enable transregional operations.

Credible regional partners are vital to sustaining counter-VEO campaigns. The U.S. military contributes select combat forces, enabling technologies, and training in support of local partners that provide the majority of forces necessary to restore and secure their homelands. Timelines for these campaigns generally are long. Therefore, they must be conducted in a politically, financially, and militarily sustainable manner that optimizes the power of coalitions, as we are demonstrating in Afghanistan and Iraq.

In Afghanistan, the United States and our NATO partners are teaming with the National Unity Government to provide security by way of the Resolute Support mission, working toward establishing a long-term counterterrorism partnership. Similarly, in Iraq a broad coalition of over 60 nations is providing security assistance, training, airlift, and strike support in its struggle against ISIL.

Defeating VEOs also requires an appreciation of the nexus between such groups and transnational criminal organizations. A fuller understanding of that relationship will allow us to disrupt illicit funds, weapons, and fighters that are flowing into conflict-ridden regions. Such knowledge also will allow us to work with law enforcement officials to more effectively protect our homeland from terrorists.

Defeating VEOs ultimately requires providing security and economic opportunities to at-risk populations. Thus counter-VEO campaigns demand that our military, in close coordination with other U.S. agencies and international organizations, assist local governments   in addressing the root causes of conflict. As part of that effort, the U.S. military regularly contributes to humanitarian assistance and disaster relief endeavors aimed at alleviating suffering and restoring hope.

Strengthen Our Global Network of Allies and Partners

America's global network of allies and partners is a unique strength that provides the foundation for international security and stability. These partnerships also facilitate the growth of prosperity around the world, from which all nations benefit.

As we look to the future, the U.S. military and its allies and partners will continue to protect and promote shared interests. We will preserve our alliances, expand partnerships, maintain a global stabilizing presence, and conduct training, exercises, security cooperation activities, and military-to-military engagement. Such activities increase the capabilities and   capacity of partners, thereby enhancing our collective ability to deter aggression and defeat extremists.

The presence of U.S. military forces in key locations around the world underpins the international order and provides opportunities to engage with other countries while positioning forces to respond to crises. Therefore we will press forward with the rebalance to the Asia- Pacific region, placing our most advanced capabilities and greater capacity in that vital theater. We will strengthen our alliances with Australia, Japan, the Republic of Korea, the Philippines, and Thailand. We also will deepen our security relationship with India and build upon our partnerships with New Zealand, Singapore, Indonesia, Malaysia, Vietnam, and Bangladesh. Such efforts are essential to maintaining regional peace and building capabilities to provide for missile defense, cyber security, maritime security, and disaster relief.

In Europe, we remain steadfast in our commitment to our NATO allies. NATO provides vital collective security guarantees and is strategically important for deterring conflict, particularly in light of recent Russian aggression on its periphery. U.S. Operation ATLANTIC RESOLVE, our European Reassurance Initiative, NATO's Readiness Action Plan, and the many activities, exercises, and investments contained in them serve to underline our dedication to alliance solidarity, unity, and security. We also will continue to support our NATO partners to increase their interoperability with U.S. forces and to provide for their own defense.

In the Middle East, we remain fully committed to Israel's security and Qualitative Military Edge. We also are helping other vital partners in that region increase their defenses, including Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, UAE, Egypt, and Pakistan.

Additionally, we are working to strengthen institutions across Africa, aimed at fostering stability, building peacekeeping capacity, and countering transregional extremism. And the U.S. military is supporting interagency efforts with Latin American and Caribbean states to promote regional stability and counter transnational criminal organizations.

Combined training and exercises increase the readiness of our allies and partners while enhancing the interoperability and responsiveness of U.S. forces. With advanced partners like NATO, Australia, Japan, and Korea, our exercises emphasize sophisticated capabilities such as assuring access to contested environments and deterring and responding to hybrid conflicts. With other partners, training often focuses on improving skills in counterterrorism, peacekeeping, disaster relief, support to law enforcement, and search and rescue.

Security cooperation activities are at the heart of our efforts to provide a stabilizing presence in forward theaters. These build relationships that serve mutual security interests. They also develop partner military capabilities for self-defense and support to multinational operations. Through such activities, we coordinate with other U.S. agencies and mission partners to build cultural awareness and affirm relationships that increase regional stability.

Advance Globally Integrated Operations

The execution of integrated operations requires a Joint Force capable of swift and decisive force projection around the world. As detailed in the "Capstone Concept for Joint Operations: Joint Force 2020," globally integrated operations emphasize eight key components: employing mission command; seizing, retaining, and exploiting the initiative; leveraging global agility; partnering; demonstrating flexibility in establishing joint forces; improving cross- domain synergy; using flexible, low-signature capabilities; and being increasingly discriminate to minimize unintended consequences. Such operations rely upon a global logistics and transportation network, secure communications, and integrated joint and partner intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities.

In executing globally integrated operations, U.S. military forces work closely with international and interagency partners to generate strategic options for our Nation. In doing so, military commanders use the following prioritization of military missions to advise our national leaders:

Maintain a Secure and Effective Nuclear Deterrent. U.S. strategic forces are kept at the highest state of readiness, always prepared to respond to threats to the homeland and our vital interests. Accordingly, we are investing to sustain and modernize our nuclear enterprise. We continue to implement the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review and 2011 New START Treaty while ensuring our national defense needs are met. Concurrently, we are enhancing our command and control capabilities for strategic and regional nuclear forces.

Provide for Military Defense of the Homeland. Emerging state and non-state capabilities pose varied and direct threats to our homeland. Thus we are striving to interdict attack preparations abroad, defend against limited ballistic missile attacks, and protect cyber systems and physical infrastructure. Key homeland defense capabilities include resilient space-based and terrestrial indications and warning systems; an integrated intelligence collection, analysis, and dissemination architecture; a Ground-Based Interceptor force; a Cyber Mission Force; and, ready ground, air and naval forces. We also are leveraging domestic and regional partnerships to improve information sharing and unity of effort. These capabilities will better defend us against both high technology threats and terrorist dangers.

Defeat an Adversary. In the event of an attack against the United States or one of its allies, the U.S. military along with allies and partners will project power across multiple domains to decisively defeat the adversary by compelling it to cease hostilities or render its military incapable of further aggression.

Provide a Global, Stabilizing Presence. The presence of U.S. military forces in key locations around the world underpins the security of our allies and partners, provides stability to enhance economic growth and regional integration, and positions the Joint Force to execute emergency actions in response to a crisis.

Combat Terrorism. Terrorism is a tactic VEOs use to advance their interests. The best way to counter VEOs is by way of sustained pressure using local forces augmented by specialized U.S. and coalition military strengths such as ISR, precision strike, training, and logistical support. Counterterrorism operations also involve coordinated efforts with other U.S. agencies, working together to interdict and disrupt threats targeting the U.S. homeland.

JOINT FORCE PRIORITIZED MISSIONS

- **Maintain a secure and effective nuclear deterrent**

- **Provide for military defense of the homeland**

- **Defeat an adversary**

- **Provide a global, stabilizing presence**

- **Combat terrorism**

- **Counter weapons of mass destruction**

- **Deny an adversary's objectives**

- **Respond to crisis and conduct limited contingency operations**

- **Conduct military engagement and security cooperation**

- **Conduct stability and counterinsurgency operations**

- **Provide support to civil authorities**

- **Conduct humanitarian assistance and disaster response**

Counter Weapons of Mass Destruction. Nuclear, chemical, and biological agents pose uniquely destructive threats. They can empower a small group of actors with terrible destructive potential. Thus combatting WMD as far from our homeland as possible is a key mission for the U.S. military. Toward that end, we team with multinational and U.S. interagency partners to locate, track, interdict, and secure or destroy WMD, its components, and the means and facilities needed to make it, wherever possible.

Deny an Adversary's Objectives. Denying an adversary's goals or imposing unacceptable costs is central to achieving our objectives. This puts emphasis on maintaining highly-ready, forward-deployed forces, well trained and equipped surge forces at home, robust transportation infrastructure and assets, and reliable and resilient communications links with allies and partners. These capabilities provide the means to curtail crises before they can escalate.

Respond to Crisis and Conduct Limited Contingency Operations. Another form of power projection is teaming with partners to conduct limited contingency operations. Such operations may involve flowing additional U.S. forces and capabilities to a given region to strengthen deterrence, prevent escalation, and reassure allies. Additionally, the U.S. military sustains ready forces around the world to defend our citizens and protect diplomatic facilities.

Conduct Military Engagement and Security Cooperation. The U.S. military strengthens regional stability by conducting security cooperation activities with foreign defense establishments. Such activities support mutual security interests, develop partner capabilities for self-defense, and prepare for multinational operations. Strengthening partners is fundamental to our security, building strategic depth for our national defense.

Conduct Stability and Counterinsurgency Operations. The U.S. military also remains ready to conduct limited stability operations when required, working with interagency, coalition, and host-nation forces. Such efforts emphasize unique elements of our forces: civil- military affairs teams, building partner capacity, information support teams, and cultural outreach programs.

Provide Support to Civil Authorities. When man-made or natural disasters impact the United States, our military community offers support to civil authorities in concert with other U.S. agencies. As part of that effort, we integrate military and civil capabilities through FEMA's National Planning System and National Exercise Program. During domestic events, U.S. military forces — including National Guard and Reserve units — provide trained personnel, communications capabilities, lift, and logistical and planning support. They work alongside civilian first-responders to mitigate the impact of such incidents and keep our citizens safe.

Conduct Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Response. Over the years, U.S. Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines, and Coast Guardsmen have quickly and effectively delivered life-sustaining aid to desperate people all around the world. Such efforts sometimes last only a few weeks. At other times, they last much longer. In all cases, taking action to relieve suffering reflects our professional ethos and the values in which we believe.

Resourcing the Strategy

We will not realize the goals of this 2015 National Military Strategy without sufficient resources. Like those that came before it, this strategy assumes a commitment to projecting global influence, supporting allies and partners, and maintaining the All-Volunteer Force. To execute this strategy, the U.S. military requires a sufficient level of investment in capacity, capabilities, and readiness so that when our Nation calls, our military remains ready to deliver success.

Joint Force Initiatives

The U.S. Joint Force combines people, processes, and programs to execute globally integrated operations and achieve our National Military Objectives. This requires innovative leaders, optimized decision-making, and advanced military capabilities.

People and the Profession of Arms: Improving Upon Our Greatest Advantage

Our military and civilian professionals are our decisive advantage. They are the foundation of our operational excellence and our ability to successfully innovate. Therefore, we are dedicated to building creative, adaptive professionals skilled at leading organizational change while operating in complexity. To accomplish this, we are evolving our organizational culture and strengthening our leadership.

> **FOSTERING INNOVATION**
>
> - **Producing creative, adaptive leaders**
>
> - **Adopting efficient, dynamic processes**
>
> - **Developing flexible, interoperable capabilities**

As we look to future challenges, the U.S. military will remain ready to meet unanticipated demands. We must prepare our Service members to fight under conditions of complexity and persistent danger, conditions that demand courage, toughness, adaptability, and endurance as well as an abiding commitment to our Nation's values and professional military ethic.

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3. http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/1506 The National Consortium of the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, or START, at the University of Maryland.

USCENTCOM Area of Responsibility

Activity Statement:
- Deliver briefings and participate in discussions about various aspects of culture and US interests in the United States Central Command (USCENTCOM) Area of Responsibility (AOR).

Affective Lesson Objective:
- Respond to the importance of Air Force officers understanding US national security concerns in the AOR, regional cultural perspectives, and the Combatant Command's mission in the AOR.

Affective Samples of Behavior:
- Voluntarily discuss US national security concerns in the USCENTCOM AOR.

- Value that an understanding of regional cultural perspectives is key to relating and communicating with partners in the USCENTCOM AOR.

- Assert the importance of the Combatant Command's mission in light of US national security concerns in the USCENTCOM AOR.

OVERVIEW OF UNITED STATES CENTRAL COMMAND AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY

In recent history, the section of our world under the purview of US Central Command (USCENTCOM) has been a hotbed of activity. Whether it was the Egyptian-Israeli peace process and Iran Hostage Crisis in the 1970s, Islamist insurgency in Syria and attacks on US Marines in Lebanon in the '80s, the invasion of Kuwait and the threat to Saudi Arabia in the '90s, or operations in Afghanistan today, US policy concerns have compelled diplomatic, informational, military, and/or economic involvement in this region.

USCENTCOM was established 1 January 1983 to provide a stronger, more lasting solution to—as its name implies—the "central" area of the globe located between the European and Pacific Commands. The Iran-Iraq war clearly underlined the growing tensions in the region, and developments such as Iranian mining operations in the Persian Gulf led to USCENTCOM's first combat operations.

Currently, USCENTCOM is one of nine combatant commands in the US military. Six of these commands, including USCENTCOM, have an AOR or specific geographic region of the world where the combatant commanders may plan and conduct operations as defined under the Unified Command Plan. Headquartered at MacDill AFB FL the current USCENTCOM mission states: *With national and international partners, US Central Command promotes cooperation among nations, responds to crises, and deters or*

defeats state and non-state aggression, and supports development and, when necessary, reconstruction in order to establish the conditions for regional security, stability, and prosperity.

Territory

The territory covered by USCENTCOM includes much of the Middle East, as well as several nations of Central Asia that were part of the former Soviet Bloc. It should be noted that although it is geographically located in the same region as the USCENTCOM nations, Israel does not fall under this command's jurisdiction. Egypt does, however, though it is geographically located in the area now managed by USAFRICOM. In total, USCENTCOM is charged with oversight of the following countries in Asia and Africa:

Afghanistan	Oman
Bahrain	Pakistan
Egypt	Qatar
Iran	Saudi Arabia
Iraq	Syria
Jordan	Tajikistan
Kazakhstan	Turkmenistan
Kuwait	United Arab Emirates
Kyrgyzstan	Uzbekistan
Lebanon	Yemen

History and Myth

The nations included in USCENTCOM contain some of the richest and longest histories of any countries in the world. While many of the nations of the former Soviet Union trace their recent history and governments only to the fall of the Soviet Union, many of the Middle Eastern nations such as Egypt, Iran, and Iraq have thousands of years of history laying claim to the first written languages, the first written histories, and the bedrock of many of the major world religions. It is critical for military members actively engaged in the operations in USCENTCOM today to recognize that Middle Eastern cultures, in general, have a different concept of time.

Religion and Spirituality

The three major world religions—Judaism, Christianity, and Islam—are all deeply rooted in the nations of USCENTCOM. All three share a common history dating back to the birth of Abraham around 2000 BCE in what is now southern Iraq. There are shared sacred texts common to the three religions and they have coexisted for thousands of years. The city of Jerusalem is a holy city for all three religions; for Jews, it is the foundation of their faith and the location of their First and Second Temples; for Christians it is the location

of the crucifixion; and for Muslims it is the third-holiest city in Islam and the place where Mohammed ascended to Heaven prior to founding Islam. Current events in USCENTCOM are heavily influenced by the extensive and volatile history (both ancient and modern) of the region, which is linked, in no small measure, to these three major religions.

The vast majority of the population throughout the nations of USCENTCOM are Muslim. With the exceptions of Lebanon, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Oman, and Kuwait, the USCENTCOM nations are over 90 percent Muslim, with only a very small fraction of the population claiming some other religion, typically Christian. However, it is important to note that there is a not a single nation within USCENTCOM that does not have a clear Muslim majority, even in the most religiously diverse of the USCENTCOM nations, Lebanon. Therefore, it is not an exaggeration to refer to the USCENTCOM nations as a whole as Muslim nations. Additionally, for most of these nations, Islam is identified as the official state religion.

Within Muslim nations, Islam is split into primarily Sunni and Shi'a sects, though there is great variance between the USCENTCOM nations as to which sect predominates. This rift between the two primary sects of Islam has led to a great deal of conflict within the Muslim world. The Shi'a population as a whole is relatively small, forming 10-15 percent of the overall Muslim population; however, it is a significant force in the world generally and within USCENTCOM nations specifically. Nations that are primarily dominated by Shi'a Muslims include Iran, Yemen, Bahrain, and to a lesser extent Iraq. Most of the Muslim nations are predominantly Sunni Muslim, including Afghanistan, Egypt,and Jordan.

Family and Kinship

Across all tribal and ethnic boundaries, the family remains one of the single most important institutions in the region. A man's first loyalty is to his extended family, then to his tribe, then to his ethnic group, and finally to his nation. Extended families usually live near each other, sometimes all together in a large compound often resulting in little individual privacy. A single compound will sometimes house up to four generations of relatives.

The sexes are segregated at puberty. The concept of dating does not exist, and premarital and extramarital sexual relations are strictly forbidden and may be grounds for severe punishment, including death. Girls often marry as young as 14 or 15 years old. Families usually arrange the marriage of their children with the elder females often playing a prominent role in the decision. Marriage and engagement rituals are numerous, varied, and complex. Traditionally the wedding lasts three days, with some festivities at the bride's family home and some at the groom's. Most activities occur with the sexes segregated, but all gather for the contract signing and Qur'an recitation.

Within the family and at home, women carry significant responsibility and influence. The status and power of a girl increases as she moves from child to bride to mother to grandmother, with the eldest female typically wielding the most power. A successful marriage with many sons is the principal goal of many women in the region and wholeheartedly shared by the men.

Politics and Social Relations Systems

With the media focus on radical militant Islam, the general public may not realize that the vast majority of the governments in USCENTCOM nations are republican or even democratic in structure. Several, including Jordan and Bahrain, are considered constitutional monarchies—the same government structure as the United Kingdom. There are certainly some exceptions: the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Republic of Syria are the kinds of fundamentalist governments that most directly come into conflict with the United States. However, it is critical to recognize that there is great diversity among the governments of USCENTCOM nations; it would be a fallacy to assume all USCENTCOM nations are fundamentalist, authoritarian, or anti-Western in focus.

US Interests in the Region

Significant factors are currently shaping and changing the region. Traditional regimes that held power for decades have been swept aside or are under siege, adding to the regions uncertain future. According to former USCENTCOM Commander General James N. Mattis in his March 2013 Posture Statement, "three enduring factors will keep US attention anchored in this region: the US relationship with Israel and our partner nations; oil and energy resources that fuel the global economy; and the persistent threat from violent extremist organizations." The General goes on to say that when reposturing for the future, our enduring locations and projects support both a steady state and surge basing capacity, air-refueling, air operations, command and control, and special operations missions to preserve freedom of movement and strategic reach. Our presence also serves to demonstrate US commitment to our allies, partners and foes. Our partners, in turn, provide locations that support critical access for current and future contingency operations while improving their forces and building interoperability with USCENTCOM.

Conclusion

With our current involvement—and the level of involvement required for the foreseeable future—it's imperative that all Airmen become more cross-culturally competent. To achieve this, a good foundation of culture-specific information is necessary. This reading, along with the briefings and flight room discussions you will participate in, will help provide that foundation.

Hopefully this overview of USCENTCOM has piqued your interest to learn more about this area of the world. To help you do that, refer to the next section for links to Internet sources that provide more specific information about the countries included in this command's area of responsibility.

STUDENT ASSIGNMENTS

Students will select a specific country from the list provided and deliver a 5-9 minute prepared briefing addressing the topic. Use the framework below to develop the main points, but to ensure the topics are covered you must submit your list of preferred main points to your instructor for approval prior to beginning your research. To assist in your research, a list of Web sites is provided on the next page.

Additionally, you must prepare a ½ to 1-page bullet background paper on your subject. You should provide a copy of your paper to your instructor prior to your briefing. You can then use the paper to give your briefing. The bullet paper will follow the format in *The Tongue and Quill.* Pick a country and two domains from the lists below:

Countries: Afghanistan, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Syria

Domains: Family & Kinship, Religion & Spirituality, Sex & Gender, Politics & Social Relations, Economics & Resources, Time & Space, Language & Communication, Technology & Material, History & Myth, Sustenance & Health, Aesthetics & Recreation, Learning & Knowledge

Main Point 1 (choose one from the list of cultural domains)

Main Point 2 (choose a different domain for your 2nd main point)

RESEARCH SITES

- **Defense Language Institute** http://www.dliflc.edu/products.html

- **Field Support Modules** http://fieldsupport.dliflc.edu/index.aspx

- **Library of Congress** http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/profiles.html

- **Military Policy Awareness Links** http://merln.ndu.edu/index.cfm?type=page&pageID=3

- **Miller Center of Public Affairs** http://millercenter.org/scripps

- **NATO** http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/index.htm

- **The World Factbook** https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/index.html

- **United Nations** http://www.un.org/en/

- **US Department of State—Background Notes** http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/

- **US Department of State—Regional Bureaus** http://www.state.gov/p/index.htm

- **US Department of State—Terrorism Country Reports** http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/

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Cognitive Lesson Objective:
- Know the basic concepts of the US foreign policy process.

Cognitive Samples of Behavior:
- Define foreign policy.

- Define national security policy.

- Describe the three groups that form public opinion.

- Identify the main ideas of our foreign policies from 1776 to the present.

- Identify the main ideas of each of our deterrent strategies.

Affective Lesson Objective:
- Respond to the importance of knowing how US policy is developed.

Affective Sample of Behavior:
- Value that foreign countries, US internal attitudes, and different views within the US government directly impact strategies.

US Policy deals with the definitions and evolutions of foreign policy and national security policy. In addition, it covers the agencies and people that play a role in the formulation of our nation's policy. In a very practical sense, it is important to understand who in government is responsible for the various elements of our foreign policy. Though the President plays an important role in the formulation of our foreign policy, other agencies are also deeply involved, as are the American people. As an officer in the armed forces of this nation, helping to carry out our national security policies, you need to have a clear understanding of everyone's role in this endeavor.

FOREIGN POLICY

What is foreign policy? In its simplest terms, American foreign policy consists of "the goals and guidelines that shape the conduct of American relations with other nations of the world." Additionally, American foreign policy is concerned with the achievement of our national objectives and protecting our national interests through the use of the determinants and instruments of power. For example, foreign policy guides our actions with countries in the Middle East or Central America. What are US interests in these regions and what action is the United States willing to take to achieve these objectives? We look to foreign policy for the answers. Obviously, foreign policy changes as the world around us changes and as our needs or interests as a nation change. It's also important to note that there is always disagreement among the people of this nation on just exactly what our interests are and the best ways to achieve our objectives. So, as you might guess, foreign policy is always controversial and anything but constant.

Let's take a look at another very important term, national security policy. First, national security policy is really an aspect of foreign policy. You can hardly talk about one without talking about the other. National security policy includes concerns about the projection of national power, survival, and the well being of the state, as well as military capabilities. It's designed to protect the nation from external threats and to create an environment that enhances the United States' ability to achieve our national interests. "National security policy deals with the protection of the nation's people and territories against physical assault and protection of vital economic and political interests, the loss of which could threaten fundamental values and the vitality of the nation."

Now that we have covered the basic definitions of foreign and national security policy, it is important to realize that these policies are formulated by a number of different individuals and agencies. We'll continue our examination of policy by taking a look at the "actors" and their impact on US policy. Let's start with the Executive Branch of our government.

THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH

The President

Of all the individuals involved in the formulation of US policy, the President can be the most powerful. The President is the chief symbol of the American government and has stronger powers in relations between the US and foreign governments than in any other area of US policy. The President's role in foreign policy is a product of the US Constitution. According to the US Constitution, the President has the sole authority to negotiate treaties with foreign governments, and has the power to appoint and remove ambassadors and other officials. Additionally, the President decides which nations the United States will recognize diplomatically.

The State Department

The State Department works closely with the President when making and conducting foreign policy. The primary function of the State Department is to provide the President with the facts and advice necessary for determining foreign policy. The State Department is also responsible for implementing foreign policy, and enforcing laws of the United States relating to external affairs. The department is responsible for US embassies, consulates and their personnel, including ambassadors. Most US dealings with foreign governments are handled through embassies, and the Secretary of State is generally considered this nation's chief representative in foreign affairs. The Secretary ensures that the US position with regard to the United Nations is in line with the overall objectives of US foreign policy. The Secretary must also see to it that all Department of State agencies work together in their international programs in order to achieve a unified and effective approach to foreign policy objectives.

National Security Council (NSC)

The National Security Council is the President's principal forum for considering national security and foreign policy matters with his senior national security advisors and cabinet officials. Since its inception under President Truman, the function of the Council has been to advise and assist the President on national security and foreign policies. The Council also serves as the President's principal arm for coordinating these policies among various government agencies.

The National Security Council is chaired by the President. Its regular attendees (both statutory and non-statutory) are the Vice President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Defense, and the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is the statutory military advisor to the Council, and the Director of National Intelligence is the intelligence advisor.

THE LEGISLATIVE BRANCH

Separation of Powers

Before we discuss the role of the legislature in the creation of foreign and national security policy, we must examine the Constitutional Separation of Power between the Legislative and Executive Branch. Victor H. Krulak, Lieutenant General, USMC (Ret.), explains this important idea in his book, *Organization for National Security, A Study.*

"It was accepted by the framers of the Constitution that the Chief of State should command the armed forces of the nation. That was the pattern of the times, and had been so for centuries. British kings, from the beginnings of their history, functioned not only as the chiefs of state but as leaders of their armies in battle. While they were willing for the Chief Executive to take the field and go to war at the head of our military forces in the classic European style, they were not prepared, as was the case in Europe, to give him unlimited power.

It was in response to this general philosophy that the framers made a definitive division of authority, determining that the President should be:

"Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States" but that the Congress, for its part, should have the very substantial authority to...

- declare war

- raise and support Armies

- provide and maintain a Navy

- make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval forces

- make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers...."

This distribution of power, unique in the world at the time, reflected a determination that the people should have a strong voice, through the Congress, in decisions affecting the national security. In doing so the formula laid the foundation for continuing competition between the Legislative and Executive Branches.

So, as you have read, within the American system of checks and balances there is a constitutionally planned level of tension and competition between the Executive and Legislative branch of government. In summary, most of the power Congress has in foreign and national security policies is shared with the Executive Branch and vice versa, but what are the powers of Congress when it comes to national security?

US Congress

Dr. Donald M. Snow and Lt Col Dennis M. Drew from the Air Command and Staff College explain.

"First, declaring war is a formal duty of Congress. Until the post-World War II period, this was significant because a direct declaration of war preceded most major military actions. Since 1945, however, this limitation of presidential ability has been badly diluted because, for a variety of political and international legal reasons, wars are no longer declared.

Second, Congress is mandated to "raise and maintain" the military forces that the President commands. At the practical level, Congress, on executive recommendation, sets manpower ceilings that cannot legally be exceeded, and it sets limits on the amounts that can be obligated or actually spent for various military programs.

Third, Congress has the "power of the purse." This means that the executive branch can spend no monies not appropriated for specific purposes by Congress, and this congressional power acts as both a direct and an indirect limitation on presidential independence. A Presidential decision to ignore congressional will or to force an unacceptable policy on Congress can result in indirect retribution.

Fourth, no treaty negotiated by the President can be ratified without the "advice and consent" of two-thirds of the US Senate. Within this power, the Senate can amend a treaty or threaten to amend it, or it may simply reject a treaty outright, as was the fate of the Versailles Treaty ending World War I. The President can circumvent this process to some extent with executive agreements, but there are risks involved.

Finally, high-level presidential appointments are subject to Senate confirmation or rejection. The confirmation process applies to ambassadors, cabinet appointees, and subcabinet-level personnel (e.g., assistant secretaries)."

Let's take a look at the role of the American people in the formulation of foreign and national security policy. Specifically, we'll examine public opinion, special interest groups, and the press.

THE AMERICAN PEOPLE

Public Opinion

What is public opinion? V.O. Key, Jr., in his book, *Public Opinion and American Democracy*, defined public opinion as "those opinions by private persons which governments find it prudent to heed."

Many feel public opinion provides the final and ultimate restraint on government decision making. In other words, government decisions must be justified as promoting the public good. Additionally, the public must be willing to bear the burdens that policy decisions create. The willingness or unwillingness of the public to support policy decisions is an important consideration in the national security and foreign policy areas because of the potentially extraordinary burdens those decisions may impose (e.g., policies that may result in war).

Dr. Snow and Lt Col Drew tell us that political scientists are not as concerned about a public opinion as they are about the opinion of several publics. The first of these publics is the **uninformed public**. The uninformed public consists of more than three-quarters of the population. It doesn't regularly seek information about foreign affairs, and it does not form opinions consistently unless its own interest are directly affected by events (e.g., war), an event receives wide publicity (e.g., the Iranian hostage crisis), or efforts are made to mobilize it. Participation by the uninformed public trends to be sporadic and malleable; rather than shape foreign policy, its opinions are shaped by it.

The second largest public sector is the so-called **informed public**. The informed public consists of citizens who regularly keep up with, and form, opinions about foreign affairs and national security policy. The informed public represents about one-fifth of the population and the opinions of this group tend to be fairly generalized rather than specific (e.g., pro or anti-defense spending as opposed to being for or against a specific weapons deployment). The informed public's role in the policy process is more reactive than formative. Access to information for this group is generally limited to TV, newspaper and magazines. Most members of this group are professionals whose work does not directly involve them in foreign affairs. This group generally contains local opinion leaders (e.g., clergy and journalists) who transmit information to the uninformed public.

The most important influence on decision makers comes from the effective public. This segment comprises that part of the public that actively seeks to influence policy and makes up less than five percent of the general population. Members are the people who actively put forward and advocate various policy alternatives. Interest group representatives and national opinion leaders make up a large portion of this group, as do individuals whose lives and livelihoods are directly affected by foreign affairs. In the areas of foreign affairs and national security policy, a particularly influential segment is the expert community of defense intellectuals and retired military officers. These individuals seek to influence policy by advocating positions in scholarly and professional journals and testify before Congress.

Interest Groups

Roger Hilsman, in his book, *The Politics of Policy Making in Defense and Foreign Affairs,* defines interest groups as "a group of people with similar attitudes toward some areas of human activity, issue, or problem." It's important to note that special interest groups perform a number of important functions. First, members of Congress will tell you that interest groups provide thorough and expert research. They gather information and

develop arguments that support their point of view. For example, interest groups call attention to provisions in legislation they feel are based on ignorance or misinformation or that are simply hastily and badly considered. Members of Congress say that if they had to do the valuable and necessary work that interest groups do for nothing, they would have to have much larger and more specialized staffs.

Second, interest groups perform the role of an ombudsman. An ombudsman is "one who investigates reported complaints, reports findings and helps to achieve equitable settlements." Members of interest groups help handle grievances, aid in contacting the government agency having jurisdiction over a problem, and give advice on solving problems within the law. According to Roger Hilsman, "interest groups needle the bureaucracies into action when bureaucracies are overly zealous."

A third function of interest groups is the aggregation of interest between groups. In other words, interest groups bargain, compromise, and help build consensus between other interest groups with conflicting interests. For example, labor and business groups negotiate to develop agreements that the legislature can pass.

There are a number of techniques that interest groups can use to influence government. One of which is lobbying. The term comes from the early nineteenth century in New York where agents waited in the lobbies of the state legislature to speak to members of government. It's important to note that many foreign governments maintain lobbies designed to influence the US Government. Foreign embassies perform lobbying functions, representing their countries' interest not only with the executive branch, but also with the legislature, the press, and other interest groups. In some cases, foreign countries hire American lobbying firms to represent them and care for their interests. There are also cases where groups of Americans form a lobby to further their interest in a foreign country. Other techniques used by interest groups to influence officials to include the following: influence peddling, campaign contributions, massive publicity campaigns, vengeance at the polls, pressure by publicity, and protest demonstrations and violence.

The Press

Our Constitution is designed to guarantee freedom of the press. In America, freedom of the press means freedom to express opinions contrary to those of the government. One study of the press in ninety-four countries found that the American press was one of sixteen that enjoyed the most freedom.

Obviously, it's not within the scope of this study guide to argue the point, but as an officer you need to realize that the press plays a role in national security and foreign policy affairs. As a matter of fact, some believe this power is so strong that the press can actually be considered a "fourth branch of government." When the press turns the spotlight of publicity on a problem or issue, the government must deal with it. One author explains that "when the press shares a measure of agreement it has the power to move an issue to a spot near the top of the national agenda."

Another aspect of the press is the way it "plays" the news. The Vietnam War provides an excellent example of playing the news. During the offensive in 1968, the press tried to make the Viet Cong look 10 feet tall and stated that they could strike anywhere in the country at will. On the other hand, the Johnson administration tried to make the public believe the offensive was a "desperate last gasp of a defeated enemy." As we look back on this time in history we see that neither explanation was totally correct, but the fact remains that the press' interpretation prevailed despite the efforts of Johnson administration.

Now that we understand the policy process and the players, let's look into the evolution of US foreign policy.

EVOLUTION OF US FOREIGN POLICY

Since the founding of the Republic, the United States has embraced three fundamental and enduring goals: to maintain the sovereignty, political freedom, and independence of the United States, with its values, institutions, and territory intact; to protect the lives and personal safety of Americans, both at home and abroad; and to promote the well-being and prosperity of the nation and its people.

Historically, our country has believed in a foreign policy based on isolationism. In the shadow of World War II, however, changes began to affect US policy toward the world. The nation found itself thrust into a position of leadership by virtue of its military and economic strength. On the other side of the globe, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) was steadily expanding westward, intent on absorbing nation after nation in an effort to achieve its goal of worldwide communist domination. In the Cold War environment that ensued, our foreign policy became virtually synonymous with defense and national security policy. The military instrument seemed to be the only effective policy choice.

This emphasis on military forces and associated weaponry existed in both East and West. When the United States built the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) alliance, the USSR responded by forming the Warsaw Pact. Soviet achievement of its own nuclear capability prompted the United States to accelerate research programs to develop improved delivery systems.

AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICIES

American foreign relations began even before the United States existed as a "nation." Under the Continental Congress, a "Plan of 1776" was passed, appointing delegates to France to obtain a formal alliance. This eventually led to a treaty pledging "perpetual amity and commerce" between France and the American colonies. This first formal military

alliance signed by the United States was also the last until the Rio Pact was signed in 1947. Why did it take over 170 years to negotiate and sign another formal alliance? The answer is simple: isolationism.

Isolationism

Following the American Revolution, the American government was quick to establish a foreign policy of neutrality and nonentanglement, including a policy of freedom for commerce on the high seas. American interests were deeply tied to foreign trade. Since the United States did not have a large Navy to protect merchant marine shipping, the government relied upon a pronouncement of neutrality and the right to trade with belligerent states.

This basic doctrine of neutrality was broadened as the nation developed. Washington's "Farewell Address" in 1796 warned the American people to avoid political association with Europe. This was the official announcement of our first foreign policy.

President Monroe announced a corollary to American isolationism in 1823. Referred to as the "Monroe Doctrine," the announcement was a reaction to Spain's attempts to regain its lost possessions in Latin America. It declared that the American Continents were no longer to be considered objects for future colonization by European powers. It also said that any attempt to interfere with the governments of the Western Hemisphere that had declared their independence would be considered a threat to US security.

US expansion continued and, in the 50 years following the Louisiana Purchase of 1803 the nation acquired possession of all the lands lying between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, northward from the Rio Grande to the 49th parallel. After the Civil War, which created massive difficulties in the maintenance of any form of US foreign policy, the United States continued its expansionism with the purchase of Alaska from Russia in 1867.

Imperialism

The next era in the development of US foreign policy is often referred to as "American Imperialism." Its first activities were directed toward the Pacific. American settlers followed missionaries into the Hawaiian Islands, and in 1893, engineered a "native rebellion" which installed a provisional government that applied for annexation by the United States. After a short delay, Hawaii was formally annexed as a territorial possession in 1898. In 1899, the United States acquired sole possession of the Island of Samoa through agreements with Germany and England.

Latin America. While US expansion was taking place in the Pacific, American public sentiment began to focus on the Caribbean area where hundreds of Cuban revolutionaries were being slaughtered. The massacre occurred as a result of the Spanish colonial authorities determination to make examples of the revolutionaries. With the sinking of the

USS *Maine* in the Havana Harbor, the public cry for war with Spain became overwhelming. In April 1898, President McKinley reluctantly delivered his War Message to Congress. The war that followed was very short.

Spain's weakness and its distance from Cuba played an important part in the American victory. In 1899, a treaty with Spain gave the US possession of the Philippines, Guam, Puerto Rico, and almost complete control over the internal affairs of Cuba. With possessions in both the Atlantic and the Pacific, it became necessary for the United States to have easy access to go between both oceans. A canal across Central America was the answer.

American diplomats removed all obstacles to American construction of a canal, except the objections of the Columbian government, which controlled the Isthmus. Subsequently, the United States unofficially sponsored a Panamanian rebellion and gained an exclusive right-of-way across the Isthmus and a lease to the Canal Zone.

President Theodore Roosevelt justified American interference in Panama and other areas of Latin America under a concept referred to as the "Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine." This policy maintained that the United States had a moral right and obligation to intervene in Latin America at any time in order to restore order and protect American interests in the area.

World War I. In the midst of "Imperialism," America found itself involved in World War I, an encounter from which it emerged victorious, but disillusioned. The US failure to join the League of Nations represented the recurrence of its traditional doctrine of non-entanglement.

Pacifism

Most post-war historians and journalists felt that World War I had been a mistake. Some believed the United States had been "tricked" by British propaganda, crooked politicians, and the lobbying of arms manufacturers who had the most to gain from the conflict. As a result of this general disillusionment, the United States adopted a new policy— "Pacifism" (an attitude or policy of nonresistance). When the United States failed to secure disarmament by agreement, it moved to disarmament by example, attempting to demonstrate its good intentions.

Engaging in international idealism, the United States supported and signed the Kellogg Peace Pact, which pledged its signatories to outlaw war as a legitimate instrument of national policy. In the mid-1930s, in further attempts to keep the United States out of the entangling affairs of Europe, Congress passed a series of Neutrality Acts.

In the meantime, the Japanese were building their Navy and expanding their control in the Pacific. Consistent with public sentiment, the United States failed to exercise any sanctions against Japanese aggression. It chose instead to rely on the restraint and moderation of the opposition.

The actual stroke that precipitated the war, however, came from the Orient. American sympathies were on the side of the nationalist forces in China after the Japanese invasion in 1937. Loans were extended to Chiang Kai-shek and US-Japanese commercial treaties were nullified. Japan, in the meantime, slowly and cautiously joined forces with Italy and Germany. In September 1939, the Axis powers signed an alliance and Japan seized French Indo-China. In response to America's embargo of oil and steel, Japanese military strategists decided to attack Pearl Harbor. President Roosevelt asked Congress for a declaration of war, and the United States plunged into the second great conflict of the twentieth century.

The Allied attack on Normandy in the spring of 1944 was the start of the offensive which broke Hitler's Germany and Mussolini's Italy, and the war came to an abrupt close after atomic weapons were employed against Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

UN Cooperation

Following World War II, the United States emerged as the most powerful nation in the world. In addition to our monopoly on atomic weapons, the United States enjoyed the distinction of having an intact economic and industrial system; however, the war's end brought more difficulties. Russia, with whom our relations had been strained even during the war, now openly antagonized the United States and the weaknesses of the Free World placed the burden of leadership upon the United States. In 1947, US foreign policy changed to incorporate major power cooperation in the newly formed United Nations. Our hope was that this cooperation would prevent war in most areas of international disagreement. Unfortunately the Soviet Union saw opportunity, not cooperation, as the key to their future. This thrust a change in our foreign policy from United Nations' cooperation to a strategy of containment.

Containment

The goal of containment was to halt Soviet territorial expansion. By the end of 1950, expansion of Soviet communist doctrine spread through 14 countries, 722 million people, and 5 million square miles of territory. We also witnessed a communist uprising in the Philippines and Indochina. Furthermore, China was also emerging as a second great socialist power, and the North Koreans were invading the South.

The United States was the only country in the world that could halt communist expansion, and it tried to halt the Soviets by proving its resolve and not withdrawing as it had after World War I. Assuming the responsibility of leadership, the United States became the central figure in the NATO, which was formed in 1949.

The US policy of containment breaks down into a number of deterrent strategies. These strategies maintain the same basic theme of containing Soviet aggression, while using different methods to accomplish this goal.

Massive Retaliation Strategy. The great strength of the US nuclear arsenal would become the cornerstone of the first deterrent strategy—massive retaliation. Emphasis was placed on maintaining strategic superiority and a technological edge. With economic and political actions failing to bridle the Soviets, and our country unwilling to pay for a large conventional force, a nuclear umbrella was seen as the best way to defend the United States. Since we had a great advantage in nuclear weapons, our strategy was to use them "at a time and place of our choosing" to protect our national interests. There was a vast build-up in the Strategic Air Command, and the bottom line was "we'll nuke you if you don't behave."

Unfortunately, as we continued to build-up our nuclear weapons, we also reduced our defensive and conventional forces. This would soon come back to haunt the United States as things drastically changed in August 1957. At that time the USSR announced the successful launch of an Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM). The Soviets followed in October with the launch of Sputnik, the first satellite to orbit the earth. The United States lost claim to its technological edge, forcing the administration into a three-pronged program referred to as "Graduated Response."

Graduated Response Strategy. The United States gave up the idea of maintaining technical superiority over the Soviets and changed our emphasis from nuclear superiority to one of sufficiency. In this case, sufficiency states that if you can destroy the enemy, his capabilities are immaterial. Recognizing that massive retaliation was not a credible threat in a limited war situation, a new policy was formulated. We were still unwilling to fund a large conventional force, but now that the Soviets had some nuclear punch, we placed tactical nukes around the Sino-Soviet perimeter to counter a large conventional attack. The tactical nukes gave the United States a limited response option. We also expanded our alliances to include trade with Japan and Australia, and viewed Southeast Asia as the stopping point for communism.

Flexible Response Strategy. However, the United States still only had one option— nuclear weapons. In 1961, the United States experienced a change in leadership and strategic thinking. President Kennedy advanced a new strategic concept referred to as the "flexible response" strategy.

The Soviets had narrowed the missile gap and our conventional forces were falling farther behind. Flexible response meant the United States must be capable of responding to any level of conflict—from a nuclear engagement to a small crisis. The phrase "Mutual Assured Destruction" (MAD) conceded the Soviet's ability to deliver a devastating blow. The United States started to place more emphasis on its conventional and unconventional capabilities. As Vietnam was heating up, President Kennedy created the Green Berets and the US Navy SEALs for counterinsurgency operations, and began to reconstruct our airlift and sealift capabilities. Additionally, the dual basing concept was born—rotating US forces in and out of Europe. President Kennedy also saw a need to stand ready to fight simultaneously in Europe, at sea, and in another small crisis—the two and one-half War Theory.

Realistic Deterrence Strategy. By the end of the 1960s, many factors pressed the United States into another change in strategy. Soviet strategic strength was rapidly increasing. China had detonated its first nuclear weapon. The United States was saddled with the cost of Vietnam, and inflation was out of hand. The United States had a large standing army and nothing to justify it to the American public. Americans were sick of war and would no longer support military spending. Congress was nonsupportive of the defense establishment as a whole, and a new policy was developed "realistic deterrence."

This policy was heavily influenced by President Nixon's involvement in Vietnam and his decision to stop the war and withdraw with honor, which became known as the Nixon Doctrine. The United States widened its nuclear umbrella and offered assistance to those in need (Security Assistance Program). This time it was clear; the United States would not supply the majority of personnel if a conflict erupted. We would send hardware and economic aid, but not soldiers. We placed emphasis on our partnership with our allies, remaining strong militarily, and working with our adversaries to achieve peace. During this period, the strategic aspect of realistic deterrence was called "essential equivalence." This was a trade-off; the Soviets had more ICBMs and larger warheads, but we had greater accuracy and reliability.

Coupled with this idea was a concept called "Total Force." The Total Force concept considers all of the forces available to the United States: Active Duty, Reserves, and National Guard. By measuring our total force using the essential equivalence ratio, and comparing this with an adversary's total force, we arrive at a net assessment of the situation.

President Carter put a little more bite into this foreign policy on 23 January 1980. In response to troubles in the Persian Gulf, President Carter declared that America would take aggressive action, if necessary, to defend Western interests in the area—the Carter Doctrine.

Contemporary Containment Strategy. Following the Carter Administration, President Reagan came into office in 1981 determined to rebuild US military forces and put an end to inaction against the advances of communism. Our foreign policy of "Contemporary Containment," also dubbed the "Reagan Doctrine," proclaimed overt and unashamed American support for anti-Communist revolution. This policy established a new, firm foundation for such support by declaring worthy all armed resistance to communism, whether foreign or internally imposed. To prevent troubled Third World countries from turning to the Soviets for support, the United States became much more involved in the Security Assistance Program, helping these countries recover without Communist influence.

The Reagan Doctrine also stated that the United States would not only restore our military strength, but that our allies must do the same. In fact, President Reagan told our allies that they must start sharing more of the burden.

Post-Containment Era

The year 1989 saw the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact and is generally recognized as the year that the Cold War came to a close. By the end of 1991, the Soviet Union had officially dissolved and the US foreign policy of Containment was no longer appropriate; there was no immediate threat with which to contend. However, this period of time did not last very long. In August of 1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait, prompting a US response. The United States, with United Nations' support, led a coalition effort during Operation DESERT STORM to oust Iraq from Kuwait. The point that signaled how dramatically the world had changed in just a short period of time was the cooperation of Russia during the Gulf War.

Although the Cold War was over, the United States still faced significant military threats throughout the world. To meet the challenges and opportunities presented by this security environment, we developed a national security strategy in accordance with US global interests.

Indeed, the nature of the challenges the nation faced demanded cooperative, multinational approaches that distributed the burden of responsibility among like-minded states. For example, to effectively curb the proliferation of Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, High Yield Explosives (CBRNE) weapons, the United States attempted to garner the cooperation of other nations that shared its nonproliferation goals, as well as key suppliers and trans-shipment states. Therefore, it was imperative that the United States attempt to build close, cooperative relations with the world's most influential countries.

To do that, the United States pursued a forward-looking national security strategy for the new century. President Clinton's 2000 "National Security Strategy" report, submitted in accordance with Section 603 of the Goldwater-Nichols Reorganization Act of 1986, set forth that strategy. Its three core objectives were to:

- enhance America's security

- bolster America's economic prosperity

- promote democracy and human rights abroad

Pre-emptive Strike Era

While the Post-Containment strategy annunciated by President Clinton appeared poised to serve us well into this century, the events of 11 September 2001 dramatically changed the international landscape for the United States. Following the terrorist attacks against the American airline systems, the World Trade Center, and the Pentagon, the US government made major changes to our doctrine of engagement. President George W. Bush announced the new strategy of pre-emption in June 2002 at West Point.

This doctrine was formalized in the 2002 National Security Strategy (NSS) and was reaffirmed in the 2006 NSS. It stated that the first duty of the United States Government was to protect the American people and American interests. This duty obligates the government to anticipate and counter threats, using all elements of national power, before the threats can do grave damage.

It went on to say the United States would act preemptively in exercising our inherent right of self-defense, but that force would not be used in all cases to preempt emerging threats. No country should ever use preemption as a pretext for aggression, so our preference is that nonmilitary actions succeed. To achieve this goal, the United States worked to

- champion aspirations for human dignity;

- strengthen alliances to defeat global terrorism and work to prevent attacks against us and our friends;

- work with others to defuse regional conflicts;

- prevent our enemies from threatening us, our allies, and our friends, with weapons of mass destruction;

- ignite a new era of global economic growth through free markets and free trade;

- expand the circle of development by opening societies and building the infrastructure of democracy;

- develop agendas for cooperative action with other main centers of global power;

- transform America's national security institutions to meet the challenges and opportunities of the twenty-first century; and

- engage the opportunities and confront the challenges of globalization.

National Renewal and Global Leadership Era

In May 2010, President Obama published his initial NSS. In the introduction he stated, "We live in a time of sweeping change. The success of free nations, open markets, and social progress in recent decades has accelerated globalization on an unprecedented scale. This has opened doors of opportunity around the globe, extended democracy to hundreds of millions of people, and made peace possible among the major powers. Yet globalization has also intensified the dangers we face—from international terrorism and the spread of deadly technologies, to economic upheaval and a changing climate."

The strategy lays out four enduring national interests which must be the focus as the United States applies our strategic approach in pursuit of the world we seek. These interests are:

- Security: The security of the United States, its citizens, and US allies and partners.

- Prosperity: A strong, innovative, and growing US economy in an open international economic system that promotes opportunity and prosperity.

- Values: Respect for universal values at home and around the world.

- International Order: An international order advanced by US leadership that promotes peace, security, and opportunity through stronger cooperation to meet global challenges.

Each of these interests is inextricably linked to the others: no single interest can be pursued in isolation, but at the same time, positive action in one area will help advance all four. The initiatives described above do not encompass all of America's national security concerns. However, they represent areas of particular priority and areas where progress is critical to securing our country and renewing American leadership in the years to come.

Conclusion

From the birth of our liberty, America has had a faith in the future—a belief that where we're going is better that where we've been, even when the path ahead is uncertain. To fulfill that promise, generations of Americans have built upon the foundation of our forefathers—finding opportunity, fighting injustice, and forging a more perfect Union. We have also created webs of commerce, supported an international architecture of laws and institutions, and spilled American blood in foreign lands—not to build an empire, but to shape a world in which more individuals and nations could determine their own destiny, and live with the peace and dignity that they deserve.

America is hardened by wars, inspired by the servicemen and women who fight them. We are disciplined by a devastating economic crisis, and determined to see that its legacy is a new foundation for prosperity; and we are bound by creed that has guided us at home, and served as a beacon to the world. America's greatness is not assured—each generation's place in history is a question unanswered. But even as we are tested by new challenges, the question of our future is not one that will be answered for us, it is one that will be answered by us.

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Making Strategy

Cognitive Lesson Objective:
- Know the basic process of formulating a national strategy.

Cognitive Samples of Behavior:
- Define doctrine

- State a primary reason a commander may be forced to depart from doctrine

- State how a nation determines its national objectives

- List in order the five steps in the strategy process

- Identify external factors that influence the strategy process

Affective Lesson Objective:
- Respond to the impact the process of formulating a national strategy has on members of the US Armed Forces

Affective Samples of Behavior:
- Voluntarily discuss how the strategy process can be complicated by external factors

- Voluntarily discuss the connection between battlefield strategy and the vital national interests we've sworn to protect

MAKING STRATEGY: WHAT'S IT ALL ABOUT?

For a nation to remain sovereign it must be able to achieve its objectives. Military forces are often asked to play an important role in accomplishing this, but they are not the only tools available and are almost never the first choice. Countries also rely on economic and diplomatic power to ensure their security. According to Sun Tzu, "To conquer the enemy without resorting to war is the most desirable. The highest form of generalship is to conquer the enemy by strategy"; as future Air Force leaders, it's important that you understand the strategy process and the part you play in it.

The Relationship Between Policy, Strategy, And Doctrine

Policy, strategy, and doctrine are frequently used interchangeably when, in fact, they have different uses. Because each may impact or inform the others, it is important to understand their differences.

Policy is guidance that is directive or instructive, stating what is to be accomplished. It reflects a conscious choice to pursue certain avenues and not others. Thus, while doctrine is held to be relatively enduring, policy is more mutable. Policies may change due to changes in national leadership, political considerations, or for fiscal reasons. At the national level, policy may be expressed in such broad vehicles as the National Security Strategy or Presidential Executive Orders. Within military operations, policy may be expressed not only in terms of objectives, but also in rules of engagement (ROE)—what we may or may not strike or under what circumstances we may strike particular targets.

Strategy defines how operations should be conducted to accomplish national policy objectives. Strategy is the continuous process of matching ends, ways, and means to accomplish desired goals within acceptable levels of risk. Strategy originates in policy and addresses broad objectives, along with the designs and plans for achieving them.

Doctrine is defined as the fundamental principles by which the military forces or elements thereof guide their actions in support of national objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgment in application. Doctrine presents considerations on how to accomplish military goals and objectives. It is a storehouse of analyzed experience and wisdom. Military doctrine is authoritative, but unlike policy, it is not directive.

Strategy in Perspective

The fundamental requirements of an effective national security strategy—clear and realistic objectives, coordinated use of the various instruments of national power, appropriately equipped and trained military forces, well-orchestrated military campaigns, and effective battlefield tactics—have hardly changed throughout recorded history. Nor have the fundamental functions of military strategists—developing, deploying, and orchestrating the effective employment of military forces—changed. Although the fundamental requirements remain the same, this is not to say that the process of making strategy is

as simple, easy, or straightforward today as it once may have been. Strategists struggle to overcome the problems involved in marshaling and using military forces to achieve a desired national objective while coping with a myriad outside influences, many of which are beyond anyone's control.

Compared to earlier eras, modern military forces are generally larger, more lethal, more functionally specialized, and organizationally complex. They are more difficult and expensive to train, equip, and support, particularly for operations in four very different domains—land, sea, air, and space—each of which presents strategists with unique opportunities and restraints. Moreover, the potential difficulties presented by a fifth operating environment, cyberspace, are just now becoming appreciated. The requirement to operate on a worldwide basis also creates difficult problems for several major powers. These and a host of other factors have vastly complicated the process of making strategy.

The Strategy Process—An Overview

"Strategy" is a word often wrapped in a mysterious aura. It is a word that conjures up visions of history's great captains achieving victory against overwhelming odds through the application of their superior intellect and insights. Visions aside, the reality of strategy in its most fundamental sense is nothing more than a plan of action that organizes efforts to achieve an objective. Although this basic meaning of strategy is simple and clear-cut, our understanding has been hindered by the prolific application of the word "strategic." This adjectival derivative of the same Greek root word connotes "great importance" or the "highest level." The resulting confusion continues to this day even among those who should know better; military professionals often mistakenly associate strategy only with the highest levels of planning to achieve the highest level or most important national objectives.

During the era of warrior kings, such as Frederick the Great and Napoleon, one man often made the decisions required to produce strategy. Warrior kings could grasp and decide issues ranging from the broadest political direction of the state to the most detailed battlefield tactics. They controlled a large vertical slice of their national command structure since they were at once absolute chiefs of state and battlefield commanders. Although the warrior kings of the past have given way, the complexity of the modern politico-military context virtually eliminates the possibility of one person having the ability to grasp all facets of a situation. The result is that even in the most tightly organized state, strategy is now made by different people or groups at different levels of authority, with often very different perspectives on what can or should be done.

The broad and complex modern context within which strategists operate means that a simple definition of strategy, such as the one noted above, sheds little light on the factors that make strategy the most fundamental and most difficult of all military arts. In the modern era, it is much more accurate and descriptive to consider strategy as a complex decision-making process that connects the ends sought (national objectives) with the ways and means of achieving those ends. The modern strategy process (in both theory and successful practice) consists of at least five fundamental, interconnected, and

sequential decisions that define and shape strategy at each level of authority. They range from broad and occasionally abstract decisions about long-term national objectives to very narrow and concrete decisions concerning battlefield tactics. Between those two extremes are three other crucial decisions that we will refer to as grand strategy, military strategy, and operational strategy.

To fully comprehend this decision-making process, one must view it on two levels. The first level focuses on the macrocosm of national strategy, that is, very broad and long-term issues which transcend current events. For example, usually a state's most fundamental objective is to preserve its sovereignty. To do so and to achieve other fundamental long-term national objectives, the decisions in the strategy process must be effectively addressed. On the second or microcosm level, the process concerns time-sensitive contingencies. The same basic decisions must be effectively addressed to meet such contingencies but are generally addressed much more urgently. With that in mind we will examine each of the five fundamental steps in the strategy process: determining national security objectives, formulating grand national strategy, developing military strategy, composing operational strategy, and formulating battlefield strategy.

Historical National Security Objectives

Strategists' first task is to define the national security objectives that form the foundation of the strategy process. If the objectives are ill-defined, inconsistent, or unsupported by some degree of national consensus, then the strategists' function becomes exceedingly difficult. American objectives in World War II provide an excellent example of well-defined, consistent, and widely supported objectives. The United States and its allies sought the surrender of the Axis powers, explicitly total and unconditional surrender. Such an unambiguous objective formed a solid foundation on which to base strategy decisions.

In the post–World War II years, the advent of nuclear weapons, the Cold War standoff, and the fear of a nuclear confrontation with the Soviet Union meant the United States found it risky to pursue objectives like unconditional surrender in any conflict involving the Soviets, even indirectly. During the Cold War the broad national security objectives of the United States were clear. They revolved around containment of the Soviet Union—along with communism in general and its influence—and deterrence of war, particularly nuclear war with the Soviets. However, American objectives were often either inconsistent or unclear in other circumstances which led to unfortunate results, as demonstrated in both Korea and Vietnam.

The first test of post–World War II objectives came in the Korean Conflict. Unfortunately, micro-level objectives, driven by containment policy, rapidly changed with time and circumstance which resulted in considerable confusion. In the first months of that struggle, the objective was simply to throw the northern invaders out of South Korea. After the North Korean defeat following the Inchon landings, the objective expanded to include the liberation of North Korea and the unification of the Korean peninsula. As US and United Nations (UN) forces rolled toward China's border, the Chinese entered the fray and drove US and UN forces back south. With the change of battlefield fortunes came a reversion

to the original objective of repelling the now-Chinese invasion of South Korea. The war finally concluded in 1953 with a stalemate between the two Koreas at the 38th parallel and the general disenchantment of the American public. The objective in Korea was, at the very least, inconsistent over time.

In Vietnam, the stated objective was consistent but poorly explained. The objective in Vietnam was to maintain an independent, noncommunist South Vietnamese nation. This was poorly explained since many Americans were not convinced of its importance--how were US vital interests at stake in a former French colony 10,000 miles across the Pacific that few Americans had ever heard of before 1960? As a result, popular support for the war was not strong enough to withstand the pressures of a protracted conflict. There was also concern about lending American blood and treasure to a regime in Saigon that was clearly authoritarian and thoroughly corrupt. Even those who supported the stated objective were disappointed in the manner in which the war was prosecuted. They clamored for decisive military action, while the US government charted a course of graduated military pressure in an attempt to reach a negotiated settlement. The result was a decline in national will and military morale, ultimately expressed in an almost audible sigh of relief as the United States' Southeast Asian "crusade" came to an ignominious conclusion in the mid-1970s.

The end of the Cold War and the demise of the Soviet Union made the strategists' tasks concerning national objectives both more and less difficult. In the macro-sense, it was more difficult because there was no clear adversary upon which to focus. As a result, national objectives became better suited for academic discussion than for providing guidance to the strategy process. One only has to compare the explicit Cold War objective of containing the Soviet Union with the post–Cold War policy of engagement and enlargement promulgated by the Clinton administration in 1996. The former was much more actionable for strategists than the latter. In the micro-sense, strategists' tasks concerning post-Cold War national objectives became easier without the threat of nuclear escalation. In the first conflict with Iraq, the liberation of Kuwait remained a clear and constant objective even when the opportunity to pursue and destroy the fleeing Iraqi army presented itself. Twelve years later, another US-dominated coalition returned to Iraq for the specific goal of regime change, that is, to unseat Saddam Hussein and his Ba'ath Party cronies. The two Iraqi cases illustrate how clear and constant micro-level objectives could be in the post–Cold War period though it is worthwhile to ironically note that policy makers were criticized for being too focused on the stated objectives. In the 1990s, many later regretted not seizing the opportunity to quickly rid the Middle East of a bloody tyrant. In 2003, the focus on Saddam Hussein's disposal precluded sufficient planning for the situation in his absence. The point remains that determining national objectives at both the macro- and micro-levels is the first and most crucial step in the strategy process. Success without clear objectives amounts to little more than good fortune.

Determining National Security Objectives

There are three areas of interest taken into consideration when developing national objectives: vital national interests, major interests, and peripheral interests.

National objectives are an extension of vital national interests. The idea of a vital national interest is unique to international politics and is defined by two characteristics: first, a vital interest is an interest on which the nation is unwilling to compromise; second, a vital interest is one over which a nation would go to war. The highest vital interest for any country is its survival; however, this is not to say that survival is the only vital interest. For example, we view territorial integrity as a vital interest and would retaliate against any country that aggressively attacks American soil.

Below vital national interests, countries have major interests. Major interests are those that, when compromised, can result in serious harm to the nation. A country may take strong measures, including the use of force, to protect major interests, but in most cases the use of force is not necessary.

The third level of interest is peripheral. These are situations where some national interest is involved, but the nation as a whole is not particularly affected by any given outcome.

Formulating Grand National Strategy

After identifying and assessing national objectives, strategists must determine which instruments of national power are necessary to achieve the objectives and how those instruments are to be used. Grand national strategy (grand strategy) can be usefully defined as the art of coordinating the development and use of the instruments of national power to achieve national security objectives. Political scientists often refer to grand strategy as national policy. Although policy is an arguably broader term than this definition of grand strategy, the two terms are often used synonymously.

This definition of grand strategy includes both the development and use of all instruments of national power (e.g., economic, political, informational, military, etc.) and the coordination of these instruments in pursuit of an objective. In most cases, significant national objectives can be achieved only through the coordinated use of several (if not all) of the instruments of power. It is important to note that without coordination, the instruments of power can work at cross-purposes. For example, federal health officials have for years supported programs to discourage the use of tobacco because it is a health hazard. Paradoxically, several levels of government, particularly state and local levels, rely on the revenues produced by so-called sin taxes on tobacco products to finance, among other things, health programs. Obviously, to the degree that health officials succeeded in driving down tobacco use, state and local governments suffer from revenue declines. The final irony is that a third player, the US Department of Agriculture, paid subsidies to tobacco farmers.

Government policies working at cross-purposes may be mild and somewhat humorous, but in national security matters such conflicts are serious affairs. To prevent such friction, those charged with making grand strategy decisions must assign roles and missions to the various instruments of power, determine methods to make the roles and missions mutually supporting, and identify areas of potential conflict. Grand strategy is the highest-level connection and primary interface between nonmilitary instruments of power and the military establishment.

This is important for two reasons. First, grand strategy becomes the focal point for arguments about the use of military force in any international confrontation. This was particularly important during the Cold War, when the commitment of combat forces could escalate to an unintended confrontation. The utility of force remains important in the post-Cold War world because, for better or for worse, the United States has taken on a role as the world's only superpower. Yet even a superpower has limits on its available military forces. Military forces tend to remain where they are deployed long after the end of hostilities—the extreme cases being Germany and Korea, where US troops remained more than 50 years after the end of hostilities—which only exacerbates force limits. Thus, experience indicates that any commitment of forces has the long-term potential to make a commitment of forces to another contingency situation much more difficult.

The second reason a robust military-nonmilitary interface is important at the grand strategy level is the hydra-headed nature of international contingencies. It is nearly impossible to conceive of the military instrument of power being used in isolation to resolve an international dispute. In 1979, for example, after militant Iranian "students" had seized the American Embassy in Tehran, trapping a significant number of US personnel inside, virtually every instrument of US power was mobilized to resolve the situation and rescue the hostages. Allies and adversaries alike supported the US position thus isolating Iran politically; in addition, considerable Iranian assets in the United States were frozen and US trade with Iran was halted. The public was vaguely aware of these diplomatic and economic pressures but most only remember the failed rescue attempt that ended deep in Iran. Few realized that the military rescue attempt was part of a much larger and more complex effort. The press attention on military actions is often the case as military maneuvers make for better media than diplomatic maneuvers or the freezing of economic assets. As a result, the general public tends to be less informed about political and economic pressures which may be the decisive factors in favorably resolving a dispute.

Developing Military Strategy

After selecting the appropriate instruments of national power and assigning their roles and missions, the process becomes specialized as different governmental organizations focus on their specific strategies in support of the overall effort. Military strategy, which we define as the art and science of coordinating the development, deployment, and employment of military forces to achieve national security objectives, is the application of grand strategy to the military realm. As mentioned earlier, the decisions in the strategy process must be addressed for both long-term (macro) objectives and near-term (micro) contingencies.

For example, the United States develops and deploys military forces during peacetime in order to secure the grand strategy's long-term objective of preserving US sovereignty. At the same time, the United States also develops and deploys forces as needed to deal with specific contingencies and unexpected crises. In these cases, "develop" entails tailoring existing forces in terms of size, equipment, and armament and training them for a specific mission.

It is possible that the development and deployment of military forces will achieve their objectives without their actual employment. Such was the case with the carefully developed and permanently deployed nuclear deterrent forces of the Cold War which were thankfully never employed. Prudence requires broad long-term planning for the general employment of developed and deployed forces. At the military strategy level, employment plans might address whether a nation's forces should be employed as expeditionary forces or reserved only for homeland defense and whether they would be used for offensive or defensive operations. More specific employment plans are developed at lower levels of the strategy process.

Even when only considering long-term policy objectives, changes in the ways forces are developed and deployed can be large and frequent. Through the Cold War, the kinds of forces developed and deployed by the United States changed considerably. Beginning in the Eisenhower administration, enormous reliance was placed on the combination of nuclear weapons and long-range airpower (so-called atomic airpower) to deter all forms of war, or failing deterrence, to quickly end any war. Beginning in the 1960s, the United States sought more flexibility in its forces, invested more in modern conventional forces, and forward deployed many of these forces to vital areas overseas. Prepositioning had the great advantage of allowing the buildup of very heavy conventional forces to meet the Soviet threat in Western Europe. The end of the Cold War and the demise of the Soviet Union caused a major restructuring of the US Air Force, including the end of the Strategic Air Command which possessed most of the nuclear retaliatory power for four decades. The armor-heavy US Army did not reorganize to the same degree but later found forward deployment in Western Europe problematic as it was no longer threatened by the Soviets.

"Coordinating" is perhaps the most important word in the definition of military strategy. In the discussion of grand strategy, coordination concerns relationships between instruments of power. At the military strategy level, coordination refers to relationships within the military instrument of power, that is, the harmony between how and where developed forces are deployed and employed. Much to the chagrin of politico-military leaders, the military forces they develop and/or the places they deploy have been disastrously inappropriate for the employment eventually required. An example is found in the expensive construction of the static fortifications of the Maginot Line, the keystone of French defense along the Franco-German border prior to World War II. The complacency it fostered delayed modernization of the French military which ultimately led to the swift domination by highly mobile German units in 1940. The French failed to coordinate how they developed and deployed their forces with the type of employment eventually required. They did not recognize the mobility revolution wrought by the internal combustion engine, particularly in aircraft and armored vehicles. Consequently, the French were not prepared for the rapid maneuver waged by their German attackers. Military strategy sets the requirements to develop a military force structure (i.e., planning; procuring weapon systems and materiel; and recruiting, training, and sustaining personnel) and then deploys that force structure. These actions should be accomplished based on broad concepts of how these forces will be employed to fulfill the roles and missions assigned by grand strategy.

Composing Operational Strategy

While military strategy is broad in its scope, operational strategy is more narrow and specific. Operational strategy employs forces provided by military strategy and can be defined as the art and science of planning, orchestrating, and directing military campaigns within a theater of operations to achieve national security objectives.

The notion of the military campaign is key to understanding operational strategy. Campaigns consist of a series of closely related operations each involving a number of battles which summarily seek to achieve a particular objective. Perhaps the best known aerial campaign in the Vietnam War, Linebacker II, had a specific politico-military objective. The intense 11-day campaign consisted of discrete, daily operations which resulted in a number of battles involving enemy fighters, surface-to-air missiles, and antiaircraft artillery as they engaged waves of American bombers and supporting aircraft.

Wars are generally composed of a series of campaigns, however, more recent US military experiences in Iraq, Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan have been short and reduced. In each instance, the entire military confrontation was essentially one campaign finished in short order (when compared with World War II, Korea, and Vietnam).

The most important word used in the definition of operational strategy is "orchestrating," which is central to the concept of operational strategy. Orchestrating within a campaign implies that the capabilities of various forces combine harmoniously to achieve a synergistic relationship. On a macro-level, orchestration requires the harmonious combination of separate campaigns to achieve objectives sought in the larger war. Fundamental to operational strategy is the development of campaigns appropriate to the situation at hand and the nature of national objectives. An appropriate operational strategy is not always synonymous with traditional notions of victory. Vietcong and North Vietnamese forces rarely achieved victory on the battlefield but ultimately prevailed in their war against the United States. Their strategy of prolonged struggle—using time as a weapon, avoiding catastrophic defeats, and inflicting mounting casualties on US forces—led to the US withdrawal from the war and proved to be the appropriate strategy which for victory.

Formulating Battlefield Strategy (Tactics)

In spite of clear and attainable national objectives, a well-coordinated grand strategy, an appropriate military strategy, and a well-composed operational strategy, a country can still lose on the battlefield. The last basic step of the strategy process is to formulate and execute battlefield strategy, most commonly known as tactics. Battlefield strategy is the art and science of employing forces on the battlefield to achieve national security objectives. The classic differentiation between tactics and higher levels of strategy I is that tactics govern the use of forces on the battlefield while grand strategy, military strategy, and operational strategy bring forces to the battlefield. Tactics are concerned with "doing the job right," and higher levels of strategy are concerned with "doing the right job."

Given that the term "tactics" is so widely recognized, our use of the term "battlefield strategy" may puzzle some; however, battlefield strategy emphasizes the connection between decisions made in the halls of government and the chaos of the battlefield. Decisions made at the highest strategy levels cascade down and eventually result in actions on the battlefield but the reverse is also true. The consequences in battle either confirm or demand revisions of previous decisions. Seemingly innocuous events on the battlefield can have consequences that can only be described as strategic. Such was the case in 1968 when, after a firefight, a platoon of US soldiers began burning the huts in a Vietnamese village formerly occupied by enemy soldiers. When asked by a television newsman why he was setting fire to the huts, the lieutenant was captured on film replying, "We are burning the village in order to save it." Later broadcast on the evening news in the United States, this small incident gained great notoriety as a representation of what many believed to be the absurdity of the war. That single incident was a small but contributing factor in the gradual loss of American public support in Vietnam.

The broader point to be made in connecting battlefield strategy to higher decision levels is that the strategy process is iterative, both between levels within the process and the process as a whole. Multiple iterations between levels may be required to find a satisfactory match of requirements and capabilities. Results on the battlefield flow back to all decision levels and may radically alter the entire process by changing the ultimate objective sought.

Influences on the Strategy Process

Numerous external factors complicate the straight-line flow of decisions that range from national objectives to battlefield strategy. These external influences, most beyond the control of strategists, includes such factors as the nature of the threat, domestic and international politics, economics, technology, physical environment and geography, cultural heritage, and military doctrine. Figure 1 portrays the strategy process and the outside influences on the process which form the parameters in which strategists operate. The importance of any particular influence is situational. For example, economic considerations are highly significant at the grand-strategy step because budget allocations accompany the assignment of roles and missions. In the same manner, economic factors have a heavy impact on military strategy because of the costs involved in developing forces. However, the economic influence on battlefield strategy is only indirect.

NATIONAL OBJECTIVES (step 1)
Grand Strategy (step 2)

Political Strategy

Military Strategy (step 3)

Economic Strategy

Operational Strategy (step 4)

Threat
Domestic Politics
Physical Environment
Economics
Technology

Leadership
Culture/Society
International Politics
Geography
Doctrine
Fog, Friction, Chance

Battlefield Strategy (tactics) (step 5)

RESULTS

**The Strategy Process,
Figure 1.**

Doctrine and the Strategy Process

Doctrine evolves from military experience and theory and addresses how best to use military power. In practice, as leaders develop strategies for particular contingencies, political, economic, or social considerations may dictate strategic and operational approaches that modify or depart from accepted doctrine. If policy seriously affects the application of doctrine, military commanders should describe for political leaders the military consequences of those adaptations. However, because war is "an instrument of policy," military commanders must tailor their operations to ensure the employment of military power aligns with governing policy.

It must be emphasized that doctrine development is never complete. Any given doctrine is a snapshot in time—a reflection of the thinking at the time of its creation. Innovation has always been a key part of sound doctrinal development and must continue to play a central role. Doctrine will evolve as new experiences and advances in technology point the way to the operations of the future.

Conclusion

As mentioned previously, strategy is often wrapped in an aura of great mystery. This reading attempts to remove much of the mystery by describing strategy as a complex, multilevel, iterative, decision-making process, influenced by outside factors, which links broad political ends with specific battlefield ends and means. Two other factors further complicate the process. The seemingly neat and compartmentalized steps of the process are, in reality, neither neat nor compartmentalized. They tend to blend and flow between national objectives to tactics. Some writers utilize intermediate terms as grand tactics, low-level strategy, and high-level tactics to provide precise descriptions of certain situations but one should bear in mind that the strategy process is a series of interrelated decisions rather than a group of loosely related planning events. The second factor that complicates the process revolves around the questions of where and who makes decisions within the process. Who determines macro or micro national objectives? Who determines grand strategy? What role does the Congress play in those decisions, particularly given its role in providing funding? How is military strategy determined? How do the military services, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff fit into the process? The same sorts of questions can be asked at the operational strategy level, particularly in relation to joint operations and the integration of allied forces. The strategy process copes with the complex context of the modern age and accomplishes the same function as that performed almost intuitively by the warrior kings of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.

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Principles of War and Tenets of Airpower

Read Chapters 4 and 5 of Air Force Basic Doctrine Volume I

Cognitive Lesson Objective:
- Know how the principles of war and tenets of airpower contribute to warfare.

Cognitive Samples of Behavior:
- State what the principles of war provide to Airmen.

- Define each principle of war.

- List the tenets of airpower.

- State how the tenets of air power complement the principles of war.

Affective Lesson Objective:
- Respond to the importance of the principles of war to members of the US Armed Forces.

Affective Sample of Behavior:
- Voluntarily participate in classroom discussion.

Read Chapters 4 and 5 of AF Doctrine Volume 1. These Doctrine volumes can be accessed at: https://doctrine.af.mil/.

Bibliography:
Air Force Basic Doctrine Volume I, February 2015.

The Department of Defense

Cognitive Lesson Objective:
- Know the critical organizations and personnel in the Department of Defense (DOD).

Cognitive Samples of Behavior:
- Identify the role of the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

- State the role of the Armed Forces Policy Council.

- Define unified command.

- List the primary missions of the six geographically based unified combatant commands.

- List the primary missions of the three functionally based unified commands.

Affective Lesson Objective:
- Respond to the critical role of the Department of Defense in ensuring US national security.

Affective Sample of Behavior:
- Actively participate in classroom discussion.

THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

"We are war fighters first, and as war fighters we have no match. With the same dedication and patriotism that makes us the world's finest fighting force, we are proud to perform other important missions for the American people and our allies. Whether we're saving lives, protecting property or keeping the peace, the US military stands ready to keep America strong and free. We have never—and will never—compromise on the quality of our most important resource. It is not tanks, planes or ships, but people. People who have chosen to serve you and serve the nation. They are your sons and daughters, brothers and sisters, husbands and wives, people of whom you can be very proud. They are America's best. Everything we do supports our primary mission—to provide the military forces needed to deter war and protect the security of the United States. Nothing less is acceptable to us, or to the American people. This is our bottom line."

Excerpt from "DOD 101"

With our military units tracing their roots to pre-Revolutionary times, you might say that the DOD is America's oldest company. And, if you look at it in business terms, many would say we're not only America's largest company, but also its busiest and most successful.

No other company in the world can take a group of new employees, from a wide variety of backgrounds, and in less than three months make them part of a cohesive, organized, and productive work team. They will be well trained, highly motivated, and very fit. They will treat others with dignity and respect and will willingly obey their leaders.

Our military services are older than our country. The Army lays claim as the oldest, formed in June 1775. The Navy soon followed four months later in October, and the Marine Corps in November. The War Department, which encompassed all three services, was formed in 1789. Nine years later the Navy formed its own department to manage Naval and Marine Corps affairs, with the Army remaining under the War Department. That's the way it remained until the end of World War II. However, experiences during that conflict proved that unified control of the military at the national and major command levels was critical to national defense.

The United States Constitution establishes the basic principle that the Armed Forces must be under civilian control. By giving the President the position of Commander in Chief (CINC), the Constitution provides the basic framework for military organization. This lesson discusses the structure of the DOD and the role of the President and Secretary of Defense. It briefly discusses the roles of the military departments and the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), as well as unified and specified commands. Directions for military operations emanate from the President and the Secretary of Defense.

The Commander In Chief

Our CINC is the President of the United States. The President, along with the National Security Council (NSC), determines the security needs of the nation and then takes courses of action to ensure that those are met. The NSC is chaired by the President. Its regular attendees (both statutory and non-statutory) are the Vice President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Defense, and the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) is the statutory military advisor to the Council, and the Director of National Intelligence is the intelligence advisor. The Chief of Staff to the President, Counsel to the President, and the Assistant to the President for Economic Policy are invited to attend any NSC meeting. The Attorney General and the Director of the Office of Management and Budget are invited to attend meetings pertaining to their responsibilities. The heads of other executive departments and agencies, as well as other senior officials, are invited to attend meetings of the NSC when appropriate.

The President, in his constitutional role as CINC of the Armed Forces, is the senior military authority in the nation and as such is ultimately responsible for the protection of the United States from all enemies, foreign and domestic.

As part of the Constitution's system of checks and balances, our budget must be approved by the US Congress, which acts as our board of directors. We accomplish this by working with various committees of both houses, primarily those dealing with funding, military operations and intelligence. Their decisions affect our well-being and range from setting civilian pay raises to funding major troop deployments. Following World War II, an increasing need to integrate military policy with national policy compelled the President to assume a more active role as the CINC of the Armed Forces. In this position, the President has the final word of command authority; however, as head of the executive branch, the CINC is subject to the "checks and balances" system of the legislative and judicial branches.

Nevertheless, the heavy demands of domestic and foreign duties require the President to delegate authority broadly, but wisely. The President, as CINC of the Armed Forces, is the ultimate authority. The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) carries out the President's policies by tasking the military departments, the CJCS, and the unified commands. The military departments train and equip their forces. The unified commands conduct operations.

The Department of Defense

In 1947 Congress passed the National Security Act to establish a civilian Secretary of Defense. The Secretary was in charge of a new overarching department called the National Military Establishment. The act also created a new service, the Air Force, as its own department, while converting the War Department to the Department of the Army. Then, in 1949, Congress created the DoD, consolidating the three services under

the Secretary's direct control, and making the Secretary of Defense the only military representative on the President's cabinet. This National Security structure has remained, for the most part, intact for nearly 60 years.

The DOD is the nation's largest employer. Its all-volunteer force includes over 1.4 million men and women on active duty, 718,000 civilians and another 1.1 million serving in the National Guard and Reserve. The DOD also supports 2 million retirees and families who receive benefits. [Whether on land or at sea, no other company can match its size with employees located at over 5000 fixed facilities covering 30 million acres of land.]

Today, DOD employees are located in more than 146 countries with more than 450,000 troops and civilians overseas both afloat and ashore. They operate in every time zone and in every climate and are busier than the majority of the nation's largest companies. Compared to some of the world's largest companies, the DOD has a larger budget, more employees and more bases of operation. Its headquarters, the Pentagon, is the nation's largest office building under one roof. Completed in January 1943, it took only 16 months and $83 million to build. A recognized symbol around the world, the Pentagon has 17 1/2 miles of corridors, 29 acres inside the building, 67 acres for parking, and 23,000 people working there daily.

Although the end of the Cold War implied a less dangerous world, this has not been the case. Despite the demise of the Soviet Union, and the downsizing of the US military, American operational commitments since 1990 have made us busier than ever.

The Office of the Secretary of Defense

The President appoints the Secretary of Defense with the advice and consent of the Senate. The Secretary of Defense is the principal defense policy advisor to the President and is responsible for the formulation of general defense policy and policy related to all matters of direct and primary concern to the DOD, and for the execution of approved policy. Under the direction of the President, the Secretary exercises authority, direction, and control over the DOD.

As the civilian head of the DOD, the Secretary of Defense reports directly to the President. The functions of the DOD, as prescribed by the National Security Act of 1947 and its amendments, are to:

- Support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic;

- Ensure, by timely and effective military action, the security of the United States, its possessions, and areas vital to its interest; and

- Uphold and advance the national policies and interests of the United States.

The operational chain of command runs from the President and the Secretary of Defense, to the Unified Commander and down to the various component commanders. (Note: Operational chain of command is the one in which those involved, have executive authority to actually direct actions of those at lower echelons.) DOD Directive 5100.1 places the CJCS in the communications chain of command such that communications between the President and the Secretary of Defense and the combatant commanders pass through the CJCS. (Note: This means that the JCS can only advise actions for consideration, they have no executive authority.) Furthermore, the CJCS can be assigned oversight responsibilities for the Secretary's control and coordination of the combatant commanders. That is, the CJCS provides feedback to the Secretary about the Secretary's control of the combatant commanders. The JCS are not in the operational chain of command.

The Secretary, like the President, must also delegate authority. The Secretary of Defense assigns the military administration missions (organize, train, and equip) to the military departments and the military operational missions (war fighting) to the unified and specified commands.

The Secretary of Defense's demanding duties require the help of many assistants, chief of whom is the Deputy Secretary of Defense. A number of advisory bodies and individual advisors also assist the Secretary of Defense in considering matters requiring a long-range view, and in formulating broad defense policy. In addition, the Secretary receives staff assistance through a number of special agencies. These included the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), Defense Investigative Service Agency (DISA), and Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), and the Defense Mapping Agency (DMA). These agencies, as well as others, provide special skills, expertise, and advice to the Secretary of Defense.

Finally, the most important policy advisory body working directly with the Secretary of Defense is the Armed Forces Policy Council. The Armed Forces Policy Council not only advises the Secretary of Defense on matters of broad policy relating to the Armed Forces, but also considers and reports on any other matters that, in the opinion of the Secretary, need attention. The Council consists of the Secretary of Defense (Chairman); the Deputy Secretary of Defense; Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force; the CJCS; the Under Secretaries of Defense; the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition; the Army and Air Force Chiefs of Staff; the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO); and the Commandant of the Marine Corps. Officials of the DOD and other departments and agencies in the executive branch may be invited to attend appropriate meetings of the council.

One other group involved in national defense is the NSC, which was established by the National Security Act of 1947 as the principal forum to consider national security issues that require presidential decision. It has four statutory members: the President, Vice President, Secretary of State, and Secretary of Defense. The CJCS and the Director of Central Intelligence serve as statutory advisors to the NSC.

The Military Departments

The military departments consist of the Army, the Navy (including the Marine Corps), and the Air Force. Although operational command rests with the DOD, the military departments exist as separate agencies. Except in operational matters, the Secretary of Defense issues orders to a service through its secretary. While the service secretaries aren't accountable for military operations, they are responsible for the economy and efficiency with which their departments operate. Service secretaries also assist the Secretary of Defense in managing the administrative, training, and logistic functions of the military departments. Each service develops and trains its forces to perform the primary functions that support the efforts of other services. By carrying out their primary functions, the forces help to accomplish overall military objectives.

Joint Chiefs of Staff

Subject to the authority, direction, and control of the President and the Secretary of Defense, members of the JCS serve as the communications chain of command and military staff to the unified and specified commanders. The JCS prepares strategic plans and provides for the strategic direction of the Armed Forces. It reviews the plans and programs of unified and specified commands, considers major personnel and logistic requirements of the Armed Forces, and establishes unified doctrine. The JCS is also responsible for the assignment of logistic responsibilities to the military services, the formulation of policies for joint training, and the coordination of military education.

The members of the JCS consist of the CJCS; Chief of Staff, US Army; CNO; Chief of Staff, US Air Force; the Commandant of the Marine Corps; and the Chief, National Guard Bureau. The CJCS not only serves as a member of and presides over the JCS, but also furnishes the recommendations and views of the JCS to the President, the NSC, or the Secretary of Defense. Other members of the JCS may also provide advice to these bodies, when requested. If a JCS member submits advice that differs from the Chairman's view, then the CJCS must present that advice to the appropriate body along with his or her own. When the CJCS isn't present, the Vice-Chairman of the JCS serves in his or her place. Though not originally included as a member of the JCS, the National Defense Authorization Act of 1993 vested the Vice-Chairman as a full voting member.

Joint Staff

Consisting of more than 1,500 military and civilian personnel, the Joint Staff is the primary support for the JCS. The staff is composed of a relatively even number of officers from the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force. By law, the direction of the Joint Staff rests exclusively with the CJCS.

National Military Command and Control

The National Military Command System provides our command authorities with all the information they need to make decisions and the means to transmit these decisions to subordinate levels. At the top of the communications system is the National Military Command Center (NMCC). The NMCC receives data from various command and control centers of the unified and specified commands. It also receives data from such defense agencies as the National Security Agency and the DIA. Members of the Joint Staff analyze and process this information and pass pertinent messages on through the State Department Operations Center and the National Indications Center of the Central Intelligence Agency to the Situation Room in the White House.

Unified Commands

Having a broad continuing mission, a unified command comprises forces from two or more military services and falls under one commander. Once forces come under a unified command, only the authority of the Secretary of Defense can transfer them. Moreover, the capability of the unified commander can expand through the formation of either a subordinate unified command or a Joint Task Force (JTF). Each consists of joint forces under one commander. The primary difference between the two lies in the scope of the operation. The subordinate unified command has a continuing mission and command arrangement. A JTF is a temporary organization that is limited by a specific time, place, and mission.

The President, with the advice and assistance of the CJCS, establishes unified commands for the performance of military missions e.g., war fighting. To form these commands, forces are acquired through the Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force. Then, a commander is assigned to each unified command for the purpose of deploying, directing, controlling, and coordinating the actions of the command's forces. In addition, the commander conducts joint training exercises and controls certain support functions. Not surprisingly, the unified commanders are responsible to both the Secretary of Defense and the President. Normally organized on a geographical basis, the number of unified combatant commands is not fixed by law or regulation and may vary from time to time.

Currently, there are nine unified commands; six are geographically based and three are functionally based. The geographical or theater commands are the US Central Command (USCENTCOM), the US European Command (USEUCOM), the US Pacific Command (USPACOM), US Northern Command (USNORTHCOM), US Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM), and US Africa Command (USAFRICOM). **(NOTE: In addition to the following reading, the geographic combatant commands will have a separate reader as part of the cross-cultural competence curriculum.)**

The functional commands are US Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), US Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM), and US Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM). A brief description of these commands is provided in this reading. Each military department has a component commander who exercises operational command for that branch of

service. Essentially, a component commander brings land, sea, air, or other specialized competencies and forces for employment under the operational authority of commanders of combatant commands. Under the component commander are those individuals, organizations, or installations of the military (normally a MAJCOM or Numbered Air Force, etc.) command assigned to the unified command.

United States European Command

Mission: USEUCOM conducts military operations, international military engagements, and interagency partnering to enhance transatlantic security and defend the United States forward. **USEUCOM does this by establishing an agile security organization able to conduct full spectrum activities as part of whole of government solutions to secure enduring stability in Europe and Eurasia.**

The USEUCOM is one of the United States' two forward-deployed Geographical Combatant Commands, whose area of focus covers almost one-fifth of the planet, including all of Europe, large portions of Asia, parts of the Middle East and the Arctic and Atlantic Oceans. The command is responsible for US military relations with NATO and 51 countries on two continents with a total population of close to a billion people. From its state-of-the-art plans and operations center, the command directs the operation of more than 100 thousand military and civilian personnel operations across 10.7 million square miles or 27.7 million square kilometers of land and 13 million square miles or 33.6 million square kilometers of ocean. The command is also responsible for maintaining the quality of life, including health care and schools, for almost 130 thousand military family members living in Europe. Headquartered in Stuttgart, Germany, USEUCOM is a joint forces community of approximately 1,000 US soldiers, sailors, Airmen, Marines and government civilians, who work and live at four different locations around the city. USEUCOM is comprised of components from all of America's military services who provide ready forces to provide regional security:

US Army Europe trains, equips, deploys and provides command and control of forward-deployed land forces, able to support and conduct the full spectrum of joint, and combined multi-national operations, and engagement activities. US Naval Forces Europe is prepared for future challenges and mission requirements by operating, training, maintaining and sustaining combat-ready naval forces. US Marine Corps Forces Europe taps pre-positioned assets to rapidly deploy expeditionary forces and equipment and conduct a wide array of operations. US Air Forces in Europe delivers its well-respected air power to support command missions due to impressive technology and a meticulous attention to logistics. Special Operations Command Europe provides tremendous flexibility throughout a full range of military operations including combat, special operations, humanitarian assistance, non-combatant evacuations and joint-combined military operations.

United States Pacific Command

Mission: USPACOM protects and defends, in concert with other US Government agencies, the territory of the United States, its people, and its interests. With allies and partners, USPACOM is committed to enhancing stability in the Asia-Pacific region by promoting security cooperation, encouraging peaceful development, responding to contingencies, deterring aggression, and, when necessary, fighting to win.

The USPACOM Area of Responsibility (AOR) encompasses about half the earth's surface, stretching from the waters off the west coast of the US to the western border of India, and from Antarctica to the North Pole. There are few regions as culturally, socially, economically, and geo-politically diverse as the Asia-Pacific. The 36 nations that comprise the Asia-Pacific region are home to more than 50% of the world's population, three thousand different languages, several of the world's largest militaries, and five nations allied with the US through mutual defense treaties. Two of the three largest economies are located in the Asia-Pacific along with ten of the fourteen smallest. The AOR includes the most populous nation in the world, the largest democracy, and the largest Muslim-majority nation. More than one third of Asia-Pacific nations are smaller, island nations that include the smallest republic in the world and the smallest nation in Asia. USPACOM is one of six geographic Unified Combatant Commands of the United States Armed Forces. Commander, US Pacific Command (CDRUSPACOM) is the senior US military authority in the Pacific Command AOR. CDRUSPACOM reports to the President of the United States through the Secretary of Defense and is supported by four component commands: US Pacific Fleet, US Pacific Air Forces, US Army Pacific, and US Marine Forces, Pacific. These commands are headquartered in Hawai'i and have forces stationed and deployed throughout the region. US military and civilian personnel assigned to USPACOM number approximately 325,000, or about one-fifth of total US military strength. US Pacific Fleet includes six aircraft carrier strike groups, approximately 180 ships, 1,500 aircraft and 100,000 personnel. Marine Corps Forces, Pacific possesses about two-thirds of US Marine Corps combat strength, includes two Marine Expeditionary Forces and about 85,000 personnel assigned. US Pacific Air Forces is comprised of approximately 40,000 airmen and more than 300 aircraft, with about 100 additional aircraft deployed to Guam. US Army Pacific has more than 60,000 personnel assigned, including five Stryker brigades. Of note, component command personnel numbers include more than 1,200 Special Operations personnel. Department of Defense Civilians and Contractors in the Pacific Command AOR number about 40,000. Additionally, the US Coast Guard, which frequently supports US military forces in the region, has approximately 27,000 personnel in its Pacific Area.

United States Central Command

Mission: With national and international partners, USCENTCOM promotes cooperation among nations, responds to crises, and deters or defeats state and nonstate aggression, and supports development and, when necessary, reconstruction in order to establish the conditions for regional security, stability, and prosperity.

Located between the European and Pacific combatant commands, USCENTCOM's AOR covers the "central" area of the globe and consists of 20 countries --Afghanistan, Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lebanon, Oman, Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, United Arab Emirates, Uzbekistan, and Yemen. There are also 62 coalition countries contributing to the war against terrorism.

United States Southern Command

Mission: Ready to conduct joint and combined full-spectrum military operations and support whole-of-government efforts to enhance regional security and cooperation.

USSOUTHCOM's AOR includes the land mass of Latin America south of Mexico, waters adjacent to Central and South America, the Caribbean Sea, and a portion of the Atlantic Ocean. Encompassing approximately one-sixth of the land mass of the world, it includes the following 31 countries and 15 areas of special sovereignty. The Command's headquarters is located in Miami, FL. Its component commands are the US Army South, US Air Forces South, US Marine Forces South, US Navy South, Joint Interagency Task Force-East (JIATF-E), the Joint Southern Surveillance Reconnaissance Operations Center, and JTF Bravo. USSOUTHCOM also has a subunified command, Special Operations Command South. Interagency operations and activities form an important part of USSOUTHCOM's mission, including exercises with host nations, information sharing, and efforts to halt the flow of illegal drugs both at the source of production and in the transit zone. JIATF-E is responsible for conducting detection, monitoring, and handoff to appropriate law enforcement agencies of suspected drug trafficking events and coordinating support to counterdrug efforts in the region. Some examples of the successful counterdrug activities include; Operations CENTRAL SKIES and CAPER FOCUS in which coordinated efforts by DOD assets, US Coast Guard, US Customs, Drug Enforcement Administration assets, and host nation forces resulted in significant disruption of illegal drug movements in the eastern Pacific, Caribbean, and Central America transit zone regions.

United States Northern Command

Mission: USNORTHCOM partners to conduct Homeland Defense and Civil Support operations within the assigned area of responsibility to defend, protect, and secure the United States and its interests.

USNORTHCOM's AOR is America's homefront. USNORTHCOM partners to conduct homeland defense, civil support and security cooperation to defend and secure the United States and its interests. USNORTHCOM's AOR includes air, land and sea approaches and encompasses the continental United States, Alaska, Canada, Mexico and the surrounding water out to approximately 500 nautical miles. It also includes the Gulf of Mexico, the Straits of Florida, portions of the Caribbean region to include The Bahamas, Puerto Rico, and the US Virgin Islands. The commander of USNORTHCOM is responsible for theater security cooperation with Canada, Mexico, and The Bahamas. USNORTHCOM consolidates under a single unified command existing missions that were previously executed by other DOD organizations. This provides unity of command, which is critical to mission accomplishment. USNORTHCOM plans, organizes and executes homeland defense and civil support missions, but has few permanently assigned forces. The command is assigned forces whenever necessary to execute missions, as ordered by the president or secretary of defense. Civil service employees and uniformed members representing all service branches work at USNORTHCOM's headquarters located at Peterson Air Force Base in Colorado Springs, CO. The commander of USNORTHCOM also commands the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD), a bi-national command responsible for aerospace warning, aerospace control, and maritime warning for Canada, Alaska and the continental United States. USNORTHCOM's civil support mission includes domestic disaster relief operations that occur during fires, hurricanes, floods and earthquakes. Support also includes counter-drug operations and managing the consequences of a terrorist event employing a weapon of mass destruction. The command provides assistance to a Primary Agency when tasked by DOD. In providing civil support, USNORTHCOM generally operates through established JTFs subordinate to the command. An emergency must exceed the capabilities of local, state and federal agencies before USNORTHCOM becomes involved. In most cases, support will be limited, localized and specific. When the scope of the disaster is reduced to the point that the Primary Agency can again assume full control and management without military assistance, USNORTHCOM will exit, leaving the on-scene experts to finish the job.

United States Africa Command

Mission: USAFRICOM protects and defends the national security interests of the United States by strengthening the defense capabilities of African states and regional organizations and, when directed, conducts military operations, in order to deter and defeat transnational threats and to provide a security environment conducive to good governance and development.

This newest unified command allows a more integrated approach to operations in the area than existed under the outdated cold war arrangement where responsibility was divided between three combatant commands: USEUCOM, USCENTCOM, and USPACOM. During its first year of operation, it was designated as a sub-unified command under European Command.

United States Special Operations Command

The Commander of USSOCOM has over 46,000 active and reserve special operations forces (SOF) personnel organized into four component commands and one subordinate command: Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC), US Army Special Operations Command (USASOC), Naval Special Warfare Command (NAVSPECWARCOM), Marine Corps Special Operations Command and Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC).

Mission: Provide fully capable SOF to defend the United States and its interests. Synchronize planning of global operations against terrorist networks.

To fulfill its global mission, USSOCOM provides full spectrum SOF that are ready and capable of successfully conducting global special operations throughout the tactical and strategic operational continuum in support of the President and Secretary of Defense, geographic Unified Combatant Commanders, US Ambassadors, and other government agencies. In support of the national military strategy, SOF currently organize and train with three area priorities: Deter, Disrupt, and Defeat Terrorist Threats, Develop and Support People and Families, and Sustain and Modernize the Force.

The Nunn-Cohen Amendment created USSOCOM in 1987 and gave the USSOC Commander the authority to direct and control the majority of the fiscal resources necessary to pay, train, equip, and deploy SOF through the establishment of a separate major force program. The USSOC Commander can also exercise authority to function as a head of agency to develop and acquire SOF-peculiar equipment, materiel, supplies, and services. USSOCOM's mission effectiveness requires the support of the Services to provide quality personnel, common equipment, base operations support, logistical sustainment, and core skills training. This support allows the USSOC Commander to focus on providing a trained and ready SOF and to exercise command of selected special operations missions as directed by the President and Secretary of Defense.

United States Strategic Command

Mission: To conduct global operations in coordination with other Combatant Commands, Services, and appropriate U.S. Government agencies to deter and detect strategic attacks against the U.S., its allies, and partners and is prepared to defend the Nation as directed.

As part of the ongoing initiative to transform the US military into a twenty-first century fighting force, the DOD merged US Space Command into USSTRATCOM on 1 October 2002. The merger improved combat effectiveness and sped up information collection and assessment needed for strategic decision making. The merged command is responsible for both early warning of and defense against missile attack as well as long-range strategic attacks.

The commander, USSTRATCOM, serves as the senior commander of unified military forces from all four branches of the military assigned to the command. The commander of USSTRATCOM is the leader, steward, and advocate of the nation's strategic capabilities. The command has worldwide functional responsibilities not bound by any single area of operations. The command's scope of responsibilities includes the interrelated areas of space operations, information operations, computer network operations, and strategic defense and attack. Tying these areas together is a globally focused command and control, communications and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance network (C3ISR). Associated responsibilities include the following:

- Deterring conflict by posturing forces to conduct operations in response to the threat of a major military attack on the United States.

- Employing forces as directed by the DoD and the President.

- Coordinating directly with other combatant commanders and supporting other commanders with assigned forces as directed by the DoD and the President.

- Conducting integrated strategic operational planning.

- Conducting worldwide strategic reconnaissance when appropriate.

- Coordinating with service component commanders and supporting combatant commanders on issues relating to the organizing, training, equipping and support of forces for USSTRATCOM missions.

- Providing a voice on all matters related to strategic policies, force structure, and modernization, as well as implications of arms control initiatives on that structure.

USSTRATCOM exercises combatant command and control of various task forces and service components that support the command's mission. During daily operations, service component commanders retain primary responsibility for maintaining the readiness of USSTRATCOM forces and performing their assigned functions. USCYBERCOM is a subunified command under USSTRATCOM.

United States Transportation Command

Mission: Develop and direct the Joint Deployment and Distribution Enterprise to globally project strategic national security capabilities; accurately sense the operating environment; provide end-to-end distribution process visibility; and responsive support of joint, US government and Secretary of Defense-approved multinational and non-governmental logistical requirements.

As America's single defense transportation system manager responsible for coordinating strategic transportation assets and personnel necessary to project and sustain US forces. USTRANSCOM supports worldwide military operations across the spectrum of conflict from exercises to humanitarian assistance, peacekeeping, to deterrence, and combat operations.

Today's national military strategy increases our reliance on our ability to project our forces when and where needed. Strategic mobility is the instrument that allows the United States to play upon the world stage at whatever level is chosen by our national leadership. With fewer and fewer US forces permanently stationed overseas, we must increase our capability to project military power abroad. When coupled with our overseas presence, credible power projection serves as a deterrent to potential adversaries, and gives national leaders additional time and increased flexibility when responding to a crisis. Our ability to rapidly project power worldwide depends on increased airlift capability, additional prepositioning of heavy equipment afloat and ashore, increased surge sealift capacity, and improved readiness and responsiveness of the Ready Reserve Force. Although many changes have occurred, the requirement remains for an integrated, balanced force of air, land, and sea assets.

Conclusion

The Unified Combatant Commanders ensure that US military forces actively shape the international environment and respond as needed across the full spectrum of crises. These commanders conduct operations around the world, from peace enforcement operations in Bosnia, to humanitarian relief operations throughout Africa, from counterdrug operations in Latin America and the Caribbean, to combat operations in the Middle East to counter terrorism operations worldwide. Finally, the Unified Combatant Commanders—both geographical and functional—remain fully prepared to conduct, support, and prevail in major theater warfare in the event that deterrence does not succeed. Working as a team with the geographic commands, the functional commands provide essential support for virtually all of these operations.

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Citizen Airmen: The Total Force

Study Assignment:
- In addition to this reader please read AU-24, Concepts for Air Force Leadership, "The Air National Guard Yesterday and Today: the Citizen-Soldier."

Cognitive Lesson Objective:
- Know how the unique roles of the Air Force Reserve and the Air National Guard contribute to our Total Force Policy.

Cognitive Samples of Behavior:
- Define each Reserve category.
- Identify the categories that make up the Ready Reserves.
- State how the Air National Guard differs constitutionally from the USAF.
- State the chains of command for the Air Force Reserve Command and the Air National Guard.
- Identify the four categories of Reserve accessibility.

Affective Lesson Objective:
- Respond to the importance of how the Air Force Reserve and the Air National Guard contribute to our Total Force Policy.

Affective Samples of Behavior:
- Read the assigned information before attending the lecture.
- Voluntarily participate in classroom discussion.

TOTAL FORCE

The Total Force Policy, implemented in 1973, continues to guide decisions about how manpower resources available to the Department of Defense (DOD)—active, reserve, retired military, federal civilian, contractor, and allied support personnel—are structured to execute the National Military Strategy and to protect the nation's interests. The integrated capabilities of the Total Force are essential for the US defense strategy to succeed. Because reserve components (RC) can provide substantial capability within a smaller defense budget, they have been called upon increasingly to contribute within the Total Force. These elements of the Total Force must be seamlessly integrated with their active component (AC) counterparts to achieve the new levels of readiness required to successfully conduct joint and combined operations—now and in the future.

There are three Reserve categories: Ready Reserve, Standby Reserve, and Retired Reserve. The Ready Reserve consists of units and individuals subject to be ordered to active duty to augment the Active Forces in time of war or national emergency. The Air Force's Ready Reserve is further composed of three subgroups: the Selected Reserve, Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) and the Inactive National Guard. The inactive guard is small but important. Let's look closer at the other two of these.

The Selected Reserve is composed of units and individuals designated by the Air Force and the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), as essential to wartime missions. They are deployable within 72 hours of notice. They have priority over other Reserve elements. The IRR is a manpower pool of pretrained individuals who have already served in active component units or in the Selected Reserve and have some part of their Military Service Obligation (MSO) remaining. IRR members are liable for involuntary active duty and fulfillment of mobilization requirements. It is also important to note that all members of the Air National Guard (ANG) are considered members of the Ready Reserve.

The second main category is Standby Reserve. This includes personnel who have completed all obligated or required service or have been removed from the Ready Reserve due to circumstances or civilian employment, ineligibility for mobilization, temporary hardship, or disability.

The final category is Retired Reserve. This is composed of personnel who receive retired pay or personnel placed in a retired status based on completion of 20 or more qualifying years of individual or combined Reserve and Active component service but have not reached age sixty.

Chains of Command

The critical difference between the Air Force Reserve (AFR) and the ANG is their respective chains of command. The Reserve Forces work with and for the Active duty forces. Since the Air Force Reserve Command is a USAF MAJCOM, their chain of command goes directly through the Secretary of the Air Force and up to the President. The ANG, on the

other hand, has both a state and federal mission. Each state's ANG is a military force under the command of the respective state or territorial governor, as well as a part of the Federal Reserve components. Therefore, each member has dual status as a member of the ANG of his or her state, and as a member of the Reserve component of the ANG. This dual state and federal mission comes from the US Constitution and the US Code of Laws. Thus, in a federalized status, the chain of command is: the unit, the State Adjutant General, the Chief of Staff, and ultimately the President. In a non-federalized status, the State Adjutant General reports to the state governor.

THE IMPERATIVE FOR TOTAL FORCE INTEGRATION

Vision and Challenge

Achieving a seamless Total Force requires command emphasis on supporting the principles of Total Force integration. Progress toward improved integration of Reserve and Active components depends on key military and civilian leaders creating an environment that eliminates all residual barriers, structural and cultural, for effective joint integration within the Total Force. To achieve effective force integration, the Secretary of Defense has directed that the following basic principles be applied consistently throughout the Services:

- Clearly understood responsibility for and ownership of the Total Force by senior leaders.

- Clear, mutual understanding of the mission for each unit—Active, Guard, and Reserve—in Service and joint/combined operations, during peace and war.

- Commitment to provide the resources needed to accomplish assigned missions.

- Leadership by senior commanders—Active, Guard, and Reserve—to ensure the readiness of the Total Force.

Total Force and the National Military Strategy

Since the Cold War, the National Guard and Reserve have become a larger percentage of the Total Force and are essential partners in the wide range of military operations, from smaller-scale contingencies to major theater wars. Today, Reserve Forces are included in all war plans, and no major military operation can be successful without them.

ACHIEVEMENTS AND INITIATIVES

Active/Reserve Components and Joint Operations

Each Service routinely provides mission-essential Reserve Forces to accomplish a multiplicity of global missions. Reserve components were essential in Operation JOINT FORCE, the Bosnia peacekeeping force. Over 18,500 Guardsmen and Reservists served in this effort. Over 5,200 Guardsmen and Reservists were called up for Operation ALLIED FORCE, where they were indispensable in air operations conducted during May and June 1999. Many transitioned from that tasking to providing support similar to that in Bosnia. Army Reserve forces provided vital augmentation to include Apache and Blackhawk rotary wing aviation and air traffic control. The Air Force recalled significant numbers of Guard and Reserve assets, including A-10 close air support aircraft, for Operation ALLIED FORCE/NOBLE ANVIL in Kosovo.

In response to the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, and the resulting War on Terrorism in places like Afghanistan and Iraq over 300,000 Guard and Reserve personnel mobilized. In fact, bombs fell over Afghanistan from the first reserve plane as early as 7 October 2001. These forces supported Total Force missions across the entire spectrum of military operations. Many of these Guard and Reserve members were mobilized for extended periods of up to 2 years. This exceeds the level of support provided during the peak of the Gulf War, when more than 250,000 Reservists served on active duty for an average of six months. In addition to involuntary call-ups, a significant number of Guard and Reserve service members volunteer daily to support ongoing operations. Overall, more than 40,000 Guardsmen and Reservists volunteered to support Operations ENDURING FREEDOM and IRAQI FREEDOM. In addition to the combat operations underway at the beginning of 2004, Guard and Reserve forces also continue to provide humanitarian aide when called upon. Following The Iranian earthquake in December 2003 and the Asian Tsunami, Air Force and Navy Reservists as well as National Guardsmen responded by airlifting disaster relief supplies to the region.

Reserve Personnel in the Total Force

The Reserve components are a valuable resource within the Total Force and are a cost-effective way of maintaining the capability to rapidly expand the force. The findings of several force structure reviews have resulted in more capabilities being placed in the Reserve components, with these capabilities increasingly being called upon to support current defense missions and requirements. As the role of the Reserve components within the Total Force has expanded, the size of the Reserve force has however declined over the last decade.

Full-Time Support Programs

The full-time support force is key to ensuring that Reserve component members are ready and capable of responding to the wide range of operations. The full-time support force, enhanced by ongoing integration initiatives and supported by recent changes in law, is now better positioned to ensure Guard and Reserve members are smoothly integrated into new or ongoing missions and operations. Recent legislation expanded the duties that active Guard and Reserve personnel may perform, helping to further integrate the reserve components into the planning and decision making processes throughout the DOD. Effective management of the military technician force was greatly enhanced by legislation that placed particular emphasis on the dual status nature of the technician force, enhancing readiness and ensuring a robust technician force. The increased use of the Reserve components in the wide range of operations has brought into focus the authorized level of full-time support positions. To maintain the level of readiness required, the Reserve components must be resourced at full-time support levels to allow execution of their expanded role.

Accessibility

The four categories of reserve accessibility are **1.) Presidential Selected Recall (PSRC), 2.) Partial Mobilization, 3.) Full Mobilization, and 4.) Volunteers.**

	PSRC	Partial Mobilization	Full Mobilization
Authority	10 USC 12304 (Presidential)	10 USC 12302 (Presidential)	10 USC 12301(a) Congressional
Number Subject To Involuntary Call-up	200,000	1,000,000	Unlimited
Category Subject To Call-up	Selected Reserve	Selected Reserve/ IRR	Total Reserve
Length of Call-up	270 days	24 Months	Duration of War or emergency plus 6 months

Note: Service Secretaries may involuntarily call up retirees at any time under the provision of 10 USC 688.

RESERVE COMPONENT READINESS AND

TRAINING PROGRAMS

Force Planning

DOD has reviewed and modified force-planning processes to provide the President and Secretary of Defense greater flexibility in the use of Reserve component units. Policy changes recently implemented require that Reserve component capabilities be tied to war and contingency plans across the total spectrum of national military requirements. These changes provide the Services and the regional unified combatant commanders greater efficiency and flexibility in accomplishing missions and help improve active and Reserve component integration.

The Air Force Expeditionary Air and Space Force (EAF) organizational construct allows greater integration of active, guard, and reserve units to meet contingency taskings and provides optimal use of Reserve forces due to long-term forecasting of deployments. This greatly improved schedule forecasting will help minimize reservist/employer conflicts.

Military Assistance to Civil Authorities

As the events of 11 September 2001 illustrated, the United States is vulnerable to terrorist attacks involving weapons of mass destruction (WMD) at home. This fact has necessitated the development of a strong defense against domestic terrorism. At the direction of the President, and in partnership with Congress, new plans, policies, and laws have been developed to increase the nation's ability to counter asymmetric threats, and to prepare to manage the consequences of WMD attacks against US citizens and/or infrastructure. In support of this initiative, the DOD is leveraging existing military capabilities to support civil authorities in partnership with other federal agencies. The National Guard and Reserve components will be increasingly called upon to apply their expertise and capabilities to this mission. The National Guard and Reserve are uniquely suited for this mission because they are a highly effective workforce spanning nearly 4,000 communities across the country with well-established links to the civilian first responder community of police, firefighters, and medical service personnel of communities, counties, and states. During FY 2000, the DOD took major steps to establish reserve components as critical partners in supporting response to incidents involving WMD. Ten WMD Civil Support Teams (formerly called Rapid Assessment and Initial Detection teams), each consisting of 22 full-time Army and Air National Guard members, were formed with one in each of the ten federal regions. These teams are available to provide immediate support and expert technical assistance to local first responders following a WMD incident. This effort is part of the long-term goal of expanding WMD response training and equipment into several existing Reserve component functional areas.

Reserve Component Facilities

Joint use of facilities, consolidating reserve units, and co-locating units on existing military installations continue to be major initiatives in meeting Reserve component facilities requirements. Development of Reserve component facility requirements has changed as a result of this effort. For example, at Scott AFB, Illinois, an active component base, ANG units relocating from Chicago's O'Hare International Airport now occupy new facilities. The benefits of joint use go beyond economics. When the units live and work together, they learn about each other's capabilities, supply and maintenance programs, training systems, and culture. These experiences help to break down cultural barriers and facilitate Total Force integration. The DOD's emphasis on joint use facilities and the reserve components' many successes are catalysts for future joint projects. The components continue to review their facility requirements with an eye toward consolidating similar needs. The DOD's ability to provide needed facilities in the future will depend, in part, on how well joint use opportunities are developed.

Reserve Component Equipment

Reserve forces are vital to the Total Force, as they provide significant support for operational missions and additional combat power to augment Active units. Success as a force multiplier requires that active and reserve equipment be compatible and interoperable. The Reserve components receive their equipment from two sources—new acquisitions and redistribution from the Active component. Congress traditionally adds funds for guard and reserve equipment in the form of a separate National Guard and Reserve Equipment Appropriation, as well as making additions to active component procurement accounts for reserve equipment.

Conclusion

Maintaining the integrated capabilities of the Total Force is pivotal to successfully achieving the goals of shaping, preparing, and responding to the challenges and opportunities confronting the nation. Only a well-balanced, seamlessly integrated military force is capable of dominating opponents across the full range of military operations. Employing the concepts and principles of the National Military Strategy, the Concept for Future Joint Operations, and the Total Force Policy, the DOD will continue to meet the challenges of restructuring, streamlining, and modernizing its Total Force to ensure efficient and effective operational capability. An additional portion of the true total force is fulfilled by DOD civilians. You will learn more on that segment during your lesson on "Civilian Personnel."

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Air Force Functions

Reading assignments are attached to last page of this document.

Cognitive Lesson Objective:
- Know the different levels of Air and Space Doctrine and each Air Force Function to include selected operations within those Functions.

Cognitive Samples of Behavior:
- Describe each Air Force Function.

- Define the three levels of Air Force doctrine.

- Identify the operations associated with the Functions of Counterland and Air Mobility.

Affective Lesson Objective:
- Respond to the importance of the levels of Doctrine and the Air Force Functions.

Affective Samples of Behavior:
- Read the assigned information before attending lecture.

- Receive information on the importance of Air Force Functions.

Read References as indicated below from AF DOCTRINE VOLs I, IV, and v. These volumes can be accessed at: https://doctrine.af.mil/.

- **Levels of Doctrine Vol I**

- **Nuclear Operations Vol IV,CH 3**

- **Counterair Vol IV,CH 3**

- **Counterland Vol IV,CH 3**

- **Space Operations Vol IV,CH 3**

- **CyberSpace Operations Vol IV,CH 3**

- **Command and Control Vol IV,CH 2**

- **Global Integrated ISR Vol IV,CH 3**

- **Strategic Attack Vol IV,CH 3**

- **Air Mobility Vol IV,CH 3**

- **Personnel Recovery Vol IV,CH 3**

- **Combat Support Vol V,CH 7**

- **Special Operations Vol IV,CH 3**

Bibliography:
DoDDI 5001.01
Air Force Doctrine Vol I, Vol IV, Vol V and Air Force Doctrine annexes

Air and Space Systems Capabilities

Affective Lesson Objective:

- Respond to a discussion on the descriptions of air and space systems.

Affective Sample of Behavior:

- Respond with interest to the descriptions and characteristics of current air and space systems.

AIR AND SPACE

SYSTEMS CAPABILITIES

The Air Force was created for a specific purpose: the exploitation of a technology that had come of age—the manned combat aircraft—as a means of delivering weapons. Today, the US Air Force stands as the most powerful air force in the world. It has roughly 3,700 operational aircraft of all types, including bombers, cargo transports, ground-attack-fighter interceptors, and trainer aircraft. The Air Force also has a substantial number of helicopters for various missions such as search and rescue, cargo transport, and special operations.

It is important, regardless of your career field or Air Force Specialty Code, to understand the basics of these aircraft, their missions and their characteristics, in order to effectively operate and support them, as well as to procure their future replacements. Furthermore, in order for you to plan and execute an air campaign in preparation for the Air Force Employment Exercise (AFEX), you need to understand airpower systems and capabilities, missions and functions, and force packaging.

This article provides an outline of twenty-seven air and space systems to include variants. These systems are used directly or indirectly in the AFEX wargame. As you survey each system, focus first on the mission of the air and space system and then several characteristics that distinguish the system from other weapon systems.

Global Positioning System (GPS)

Mission: Constellation of orbiting satellites that provides positioning, navigation, timing and velocity information to military and civilian users worldwide

Characteristics:

- Satellites orbit the earth every 12 hours, emitting continuous navigation signals.

- Can detect nuclear detonations.

- Limitations: GPS receivers can be jammed.

- During Operation Iraqi Freedom, the GPS satellite constellation allowed the delivery of 5,500 GPS-guided Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAM) with pinpoint precision (to about 10 feet) and with minimal collateral damage.

Defense Meteorological Satellite Program (DMSP)

Mission: Collects weather data for US military operations.

Characteristics:

- Utilizes Operational Linescan System which provides continuous visual and infrared imagery of cloud cover over an area of 1,600 nautical miles.

- Global coverage is accomplished every 14 hours.

- Also measures space environmental parameters to monitor auroral activity and predict the effects of space environment on satellite operations.

- Tracking stations in New Hampshire, Greenland, Alaska, and Hawaii receive DMSP data and electronically transfer them to the Air Force Weather Agency at Offutt AFB Nebraska.

U-2S "Dragon Lady"

Mission: Provides high-altitude, all-weather surveillance and reconnaissance, day or night.

Characteristics:

- Routinely flies at extremely high altitudes (70,000+ feet).

- Capable of gathering a variety of imagery, including multi-spectral electro-optic, infrared, and synthetic aperture radar products which can be stored or sent to ground exploitation centers.

- Can fly unrefueled for over 14 hours – range of over 7,000 miles.

- In October 1962, the U-2 photographed the buildup of Soviet offensive nuclear missiles in Cuba, touching off the Cuban Missile Crisis. In more recent times, the U-2 has provided intelligence during operations in Korea, the Balkans, Afghanistan, and Iraq.

RC-135 "Rivet Joint", "Combat Sent", Cobra Ball"

Mission: Reconnaissance, surveillance and electronic warfare support.

Characteristics:

- Rivet Joint" can work with E-3 AWACS during combat to provide direct, near real time electronic warfare support and reconnaissance data to theater commanders and combat forces.

- "Combat Sent" can measure and analyze foreign electronic and infrared equipment.

- "Cobra Ball" self-contained Measurement and Signature (MASINT) intelligence collection platform. Has distinctive black wing.

- The RC-135 fleet has participated in every sizable armed conflict involving US assets during its tenure.

RQ-4A "Global Hawk"

Mission: High altitude reconnaissance, long endurance, unmanned aerial system (UAS).

Characteristics:

- Provides near-real-time high resolution imagery of large geographical areas all day and night in all types of weather.

- Can fly autonomously from takeoff to landing – missions are pre-programmed – can fly 1,200 miles and remain on station for 24 hours.

- Maximum altitude: 60,000 feet; payload: 3,000 lbs; wingspan: 130.9 feet.

- In 2001, became the first unmanned, powered aircraft to cross the world's largest ocean when it landed in Australia after a 23-hour, 20 minute trip.

MQ-9 "Reaper"

Mission: Medium to high altitude, long endurance remotely piloted aircraft system that provides intelligence collection and strike against high-value and time-sensitive targets.

Characteristics:

- Integrates an infrared sensor, color/monochrome daylight TV camera, image-intensified TV camera, laser designator, and laser illuminator.

- Can employ four laser-guided missiles, Air-to-Ground Missile-114 Hellfire, which possess highly accurate, low-collateral damage, anti-armor and anti-personnel engagement capabilities.

- Maximum altitude: 50,000 feet; payload: 3,750 lbs; wingspan: 66 feet.

C-130 "Hercules"

Mission: Provides tactical and intra-theater airlift.

Characteristics:

- Can use short, rough runways.

- Up to 45,000 lbs cargo or 92 passengers or 74 litters.

- Compared to early models, the C-130J climbs faster and higher, flies farther at a higher cruise speed, and takes off and lands in a shorter distance.

- More than 40 variants.

MC-130P "Combat Shadow"

Mission: Provides air refueling and rescue.

Characteristics:

- Extended range Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR) variant – can stay aloft up to 18 hours and air refuel CSAR helicopters.

- Can deploy Special Operations Forces to a survivor, escort helicopter to a survivor, or airdrop survival equipment to a survivor.

- Also conducts leaflet drops in support of psychological operations.

- Flies night low-level, air refueling and formation operations using night vision goggles.

- Employment tactics incorporate no external lighting and no communications to avoid radar and weapons detection.

MC-130 E/H "Combat Talon"

Mission: Provide infiltration, exfiltration, and resupply of special operations forces and equipment in hostile or denied territory.

Characteristics:

- Equipped with terrain following and terrain avoidance radar.

- The primary difference between the MC-130E and MC-130H involves the degree of integration of the mission computers and avionics suite.

- Also, the MC-130E can carry 53 troops or 26 paratroopers and the MC-130H can carry 77 troops, 52 paratroopers, or 57 litter patients.

- In 2001, MC-130Hs were employed to seize an airfield in southern Afghanistan delivering U.S. Army Rangers to commence ground operations in Operation Enduring Freedom and later in 2003, the MC-130H was the first US aircraft to land at Bagdad International to initiate missions supporting Operation Iraqi Freedom.

HH-60 "Pave Hawk"

Mission: Infiltration, exfiltration and resupply of special operations forces in day, night or marginal weather conditions.

Characteristics:

- Highly modified version of the Army Black Hawk helicopter

- Features an upgraded communications and navigation suite that includes integrated inertial navigation/global positioning/ Doppler navigation systems, satellite communications, and secure voice.

- Follows terrain contours and avoids obstacles by using forward looking infrared sensor, along with night vision goggles and cockpit displays.

- Two machine guns – either 7.62mm or .50 caliber.

- Can lift up to 8,000 lbs with external cargo hook.

- Can transport 11-14 troops or 6 litters.

CV-22 "Osprey"

Mission: Conduct long-range infiltration, exfiltration and resupply missions for special operations forces.

Characteristics:

- Tiltrotor combines the vertical takeoff, hover, and vertical landing qualities of a helicopter with the long range, fuel efficiency and speed characteristics of a turboprop aircraft.

- Versatile, self-deployable aircraft offers increased speed and range over other rotary wing aircraft, enabling USAF Special Operations Command aircrews to execute long range special operations missions.

- Can perform missions that normally would require both fixed wing and rotary wing aircraft.

- Has a range of 2,100 nautical miles with internal auxiliary fuel tanks or unlimited range with aerial refueling – the CV22 has a cruise speed of 230 knots.

- Can carry a maximum of 32 troops or 10,000 lbs internally – it has 2 pilots and 2 flight engineers.

E-3 "Sentry"

Mission: The Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) provides airborne surveillance, command, control and communications.

Characteristics:

- Airframe based on Boeing 707.

- Can perform airborne surveillance, early warning, target identification and tracking, weapons control, air battle management, and communications functions for a wide area.

- The aircraft provides an accurate, real-time picture of the battlespace to the Joint Air Operations Center.

- Can stay aloft for 8 hours, unrefueled.

- The large rotating radar dome on top is 30 feet (9.1 meters) in diameter, six feet (1.8 meters) thick, and is held 11 feet (3.33 meters) above the fuselage by two struts.

EC-130J "Commando Solo"

Mission: Military Information Support Operation (MISO), Psychological Operations, and civil affairs broadcasts in AM, FM, HF, TV, and military communications bands.

Characteristics:

- Flown by the Air National Guard out of Middletown PA.

- Broadcasted messages to the local Afghan population and Taliban soldiers during Operation ENDURING FREEDOM.

- Broadcasts aided in the transition from military rule to democracy in Haiti and helped prevent ethnic cleansing and assisted in the expulsion of Serbs in Kosovo.

EC-130H "Compass Call"

Mission: Conducts electronic warfare against enemy command and control networks and limits adversary coordination essential for enemy force management. .

Characteristics:

- Primarily supports tactical air operations but also can provide jamming support to ground force operations.

- Part of a triad of jamming capability that includes the EA-6 Prowler and F-16CJ Fighting Falcon.

EA-6B "Prowler"

Mission: Supports all electronic countermeasures and jamming missions DoD-wide after the Air Force removed the EF-111 from service (The Prowler is operated by the US Navy).

Characteristics:

- Crew of 4 can consist of USAF, Navy, and/or Marine officers: pilot and 3 Electronic Countermeasures (ECM) operators who manually operate jammers.

- Specially fitted to deploy High Speed Anti-radiation Missiles (HARM).

- Can provide zone ECM to suppress enemy air defenses, providing protection for strike aircraft, ground troops, and ships by jamming enemy radar, electronic data links, and communications.

F-16 "Falcon"

Mission: Multi-role fighter; air to air and air to ground.

Characteristics:

- One vertical stabilizer (tail).

- One engine with mouth shaped inlet.

- F-16C has one crew member and the F-16D may have one or two crew members.

- In the Persian Gulf in 1991, flew more sorties than with any other aircraft - used to attack airfields, military production facilities, Scud missiles sites and a variety of other targets.

- Both F-16C and F-16CJ use LANTIRN for low altitude night attacks in bad weather.

- F-16CJ is specially fitted to deploy HARM to attack enemy surface to air missile (SAM) sites; HARM homes in on SAM site's radar emissions.

- Limitations: If the enemy turns off the ground radar, HARM loses a key input into its guidance calculations (and can miss the target).

- Limitation: Comparatively short range and endurance.

F-15 "Eagle"

Mission: All-weather tactical fighter.

Characteristics:

- 2 parallel vertical "tails" perpendicular to wings.

- F-15C has one seat and F15E has two seats.

- F-15C carries air-to-air missiles.

- F-15E carries air-to-surface weapons – almost all weapons in the inventory.

- F-15E uses Low Altitude Navigation and Targeting Infrared for Night (LANTIRN) for low altitude night attacks in bad weather.

- Limitation: when carrying a heavy load of bombs, F15E loses some of its maneuverability.

- Limitation: Enemy radar can detect F-15s easier than it can detect other fighters, due to F-15's size and shape.

F-22 "Raptor"

Mission: First look/first shot/first kill in all environments: contains a sophisticated sensor suite that allows the pilot to track, identify, shoot, and kill the threat before it detects the F-22.

Characteristics:

- In the air to ground configuration the aircraft can carry two 1,000 pound Guided Bomb Unit (GBU) 32 Joint Direct Attack Munitions internally and will use on board avionics for navigation and weapons delivery support. The Raptor will also carry two Airborne Intercept Missiles (AIM) 120s and two AIM-9s in the air to ground configuration.

- Engines produce more thrust than any current fighter engine – can efficiently cruise at supersonic airspeeds without an afterburner – characteristic known as super-cruise.

- Improved reliability and maintainability – F-22 squadrons will require less than half as much airlift as an F-15 squadron to deploy.

- Increased lethality and survivability: combination of stealth, integrated avionics, and super-cruise feature drastically shrinks SAM engagement envelopes and minimizes enemy capabilities to track and engage the F-22.

AC-130H "Spectre"

Mission: Provide Close Air Support (CAS), Air Interdiction, and Armed Reconnaissance.

Characteristics:

- Can destroy targets with 40mm and 105mm cannons visually or electronically with television sensor, infrared sensor, and radar.

- Can attack two targets simultaneously.

- Also carries a 25mm Gatling Gun.

- Has a crew of 14 – five officers (pilot, co-pilot, navigator, fire control officer, electronic warfare officer); nine enlisted (flight engineer, loadmaster, low-light TV operator, infrared detection set operator, five aerial gunners).

- AC-130 gunships have played a pivotal role in the recent uprisings in the Middle East. Gunships provide armed reconnaissance, interdiction and direct support of ground troops engaged with enemy forces.

A-10 "Thunderbolt II"

Mission: Close air support – forward air control.

Characteristics:

- Can loiter over target up to 2 hours unrefueled.

- One 30mm Aircraft Gun Unit (AGU) 8/A seven barrel Gatling gun; can fire a max of 3,900 armor piercing rounds per minute.

- Can carry heat seeking air to air missiles.

- Can survive heavy ground fire; has self-sealing fuel tanks.

B-52 "Stratofortress"

Mission: Heavy bomber – eight engines – wide wingspan, swept back wings.

Characteristics:

- Longer unrefueled range – up to 8,800 miles unrefueled.

- Can perform strategic attack, close-air support, air interdiction, offensive counter-air and maritime operations.

- Can carry weapons both internally and externally (on wing pylons) – can launch cruise missiles from these pylons at high altitudes, then descend and drop bombs at low altitudes.

- Limitation: size and shape are easy for radar to detect.

- Limitation: requires a longer runway than B-1 and B-2.

B-1 "Lancer"

Mission: Long range, supersonic multi role heavy bomber.

Characteristics:

- Our only supersonic heavy bomber – top speed of 900 plus mph.

- It can carry more 2,400 lb JDAMs (24) than any other bomber.

- Carries heavier weapons load than B-2 or B-52.

- Automatic terrain following radar system.

- Forward wing settings are used for takeoff, landings, air refueling and in some high-altitude weapons employment scenarios. Aft wing sweep settings - the main combat configuration -- are typically used during high subsonic and supersonic flight.

- Limitation: history of very poor reliability and maintainability

B-2 "Spirit"

Mission: Multi role heavy bomber

Characteristics:

- Current principal weapon is the 2,000 lb JDAM, GBU-31

- Requires fewer crewmembers (2 pilots total) than B-1 (4 total) and B-52 (5 total)

- Low observability derived from a combination of reduced infrared, acoustic, electromagnetic, visual and radar signatures.

- The combat effectiveness of the B-2 was proven in Operation Allied Force, where it was responsible for destroying 33 percent of all Serbian targets in the first eight weeks, by flying nonstop to Kosovo and back.

C-5 "Galaxy"

Mission: Move outsized cargo (largest DoD aircraft)

Characteristics:

- Entire nose section hinges open.

- Can load and off-load simultaneously – nose and aft doors open to width/height of cargo area.

- Can carry every piece of Army equipment – 36 standard pallet positions.

- Up to 291,000 lbs cargo or max of 340 passengers (note: C-5 does not usually carry passengers in the cargo compartment – there are 73 seats available in the upper deck for passengers).

- Can air drop up to 42,000 lbs of cargo.

- Limitation: long runway requirements – fully loaded takes off within 8,300 feet and lands within 4,900 feet.

C-17 "Globemaster III"

Mission: Cargo and personnel transport

Characteristics:

- Advanced avionics – CONUS to battlefield – extremely versatile.

- Can taxi in reverse.

- Uses short, narrow fields.

- Up to 170,900 lbs of cargo – up to 18 standard pallet positions (2 rail systems).

- Up to 48 litters and 54 ambulatory patients and medical personnel.

- Can air-drop up to 60,000 lbs or 102 paratroopers w/equipment.

- Limitation: can't carry the heaviest outsized items the C-5 can carry.

KC-135 "Stratotanker"

Mission: Boom or drogue refueling (unless wing pods are installed – then both are possible).

Characteristics:

- Based on Boeing 707 airframe.

- Up to 83,000 pounds cargo or up to 57 passengers.

- Refueling boom on underside of aft fuselage.

- Can refuel Navy, Marine, NATO and Allied aircraft that use the drogue system, and in the same mission Air Force aircraft with the boom system (but only if fitted with wing hose and drogue pods).

KC-10 "Extender"

Mission: – dual role tanker and cargo boom and drogue refueling

Characteristics:

- Based on DC-10 airframe.

- Fitted with both drogue and boom.

- Carries twice as much fuel as the KC-135.

- Up to 170,000 pounds cargo and up to 75 passengers.

- Cannot refuel helicopters.

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Air Force Fact Sheets   http://www.af.mil/AboutUs/FactSheets.aspx (accessed May 2014)

JEANNE M. HOLM CENTER

Force Packaging

Activity Statement:
- Students will participate in a group exercise.

Affective Lesson Objective:
- Respond to a discussion on the intricacies of assembling an effective force package to achieve the objectives of air and space operations.

Affective Sample of Behavior:
- Value the synergy involved in force packaging.

Group #1: Counterair Operations Handout

Your group's goal is to develop package(s) to attack the enemy airfield and gain air superiority for the pilot rescue operation.

Here is a map of the area to aid with your planning:

Group #2: Counterland Operations Handout

Your group's goal is to develop package(s) to attack enemy ground forces so that they are drawn away from the area where the pilot is located, and to support our own ground forces.

Here is a map of the area to aid you with your planning:

Group #3: Combat Search and Rescue Handout

Your group's goal is to develop package(s) to rescue the downed pilot.

Here is a map of the area to aid with your planning:

USAF Major Commands

Cognitive Lesson Objective:
- Know the mission and organization of Air Combat Command (ACC), Air Mobility Command (AMC), Air Force Space Command (AFSPC), Air Education and Training Command (AETC), Air Force Materiel Command (AFMC), Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC), Air Force Reserve Command (AFRC), Pacific Air Force (PACAF), United States Air Forces in Europe-Air Forces Africa (USAFE-AFAFRICA), and Air Force Global Strike Command (AFGSC).

Cognitive Sample of Behavior:
- State the mission of ACC, AMC, AFSPC, AETC, AFMC, AFSOC, AFRC, PACAF, USAFE, and AFGSC.

Affective Lesson Objective:
- Respond to the importance of ACC, AMC, AFSPC, AETC, AFMC, AFSOC, AFRC, PACAF, USAFE, and AFGSC to achieving US national objectives.

Affective Sample of Behavior:
- Willingly read the assigned text.

USAF MAJOR COMMANDS

Our National military policy is based primarily on deterrence. In the event deterrence fails, we must execute the war swiftly and decisively. The United States must be prepared to fight conflicts across all spectrums and in all arenas. The Air Force, through Air Combat Command (ACC), is prepared to provide combat aircraft for these conflicts. ACC doesn't act alone. Throughout the post-Cold War era, airlift has been at the center of military operations ranging from the massive airlift during DESERT SHIELD to airlift support for OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM and IRAQI FREEDOM. Air Mobility Command (AMC) lies at the heart of the Air Force's airlift capability and is critical to our national security. Both ACC and AMC rely heavily on another command, Air Force Space Command (AFSPC), to accomplish their mission. AFSPC is responsible for all US Air Force space operations, including providing ballistic missile warning, space control, spacelift, and satellite command and control. AFGSC is also responsible for ballistic missile operations including maintaining the intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) force. While ACC, AMC, and AFSPC provide certain unique aspects of global reach and global power, they do not provide it all. There are several other major commands that accomplish other critical parts of the Air Force mission. It takes all of the major commands, numbered Air Forces and wings working together for the USAF to successfully defend the United States.

AIR COMBAT COMMAND

Mission: Air Combat Command is the primary force provider of combat airpower to America's warfighting commands. To support global implementation of national security strategy, ACC operates fighter, bomber, reconnaissance, battle-management, and electronic-combat aircraft. It also provides command, control, communications and intelligence systems, and conducts global information operations.

The Air Combat Command, with headquarters at Joint Base Langley-Eustis VA, is a major command created 1 June 1992, by combining its predecessors Strategic Air Command and Tactical Air Command. ACC is the primary provider of air combat forces to America's warfighting commanders.

As a force provider, ACC organizes, trains, equips and maintains combat-ready forces for rapid deployment and employment while ensuring strategic air defense forces are ready to meet the challenges of peacetime air sovereignty and wartime air defense ACC numbered air forces provide the air component to U.S. Central, Southern and Northern Commands, with Headquarters ACC serving as the air component to Joint Forces Commands. ACC also augments forces to US European, Pacific and Strategic Command.

Personnel and Resources

More than 83,000 active-duty members and civilians make up ACC's work force. When mobilized, more than 51,000 members of the Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve, along with about 700 aircraft, are assigned to ACC. In total, ACC and ACC-gained units fly more than 1,300 aircraft.

Organization

ACC's forces are organized under a direct reporting unit, three numbered air forces and one Air Force Reserve numbered air force. The command operates 14 major bases, including tenant units on 13 non-ACC bases throughout the United States. ACC also has responsibility for inland search and rescue in the 48 contiguous states. The ACC commander is the component commander of US Air Forces - US Strategic Command.

Numbered Air Forces

First Air Force, or Air Forces Northern, with headquarters at Tyndall AFB FL, has responsibility for ensuring the air sovereignty and air defense of the continental United States, US Virgin Islands and Puerto Rico. As the continental United States Region, or CONR, for the North American Aerospace Defense Command, or NORAD, 1 AF (AFNORTH) provides air defense in the form of airspace surveillance and airspace control. First AF is also the designated air component for US Northern Command.

AFNORTH rapidly responds to non-military threats under the Defense Support to Civil Authorities, or DSCA, mission. The organization assists civilian agencies before and during emergencies, natural or man-made disasters, and other DOD-approved activities. Operating with the 601st Air and Space Operations Center, the Air Force Rescue Coordination Center serves as the US inland search and rescue coordinator and is the single agency responsible for coordinating on-land federal searches. These search and rescue operations can be conducted anywhere in the 48 states, Mexico and Canada. The Civil Air Patrol is a significant partner in search and rescue and other DSCA missions.

Other First Air Force (AFNORTH) units include the 601st Air and Space Operations Center, the 702d Computer Support Squadron and the Air Force Rescue Coordination Center at Tyndall AFB, the Northeast Air Defense Sector in Rome, NY; the Western Air Defense Sector at Joint Base Lewis-McChord WA; Det. 1, 1 AF, Winnipeg, Manitoba, Canada, and 722d Air Defense Squadron, North Bay, Canada.

Ninth Air Force, with headquarters at Shaw AFB SC, is dedicated to organizing, training, and equipping Air Combat Command fighter forces based throughout the Southeastern United States. Ninth Air Force comprises eight active-duty wings and two direct reporting units with more than 480 aircraft and 28,000 active-duty and civilian personnel. Ninth Air Force is also responsible for the operational readiness of 14 Air Reserve Component wings.

Other Ninth Air Force units include: 93d Air Ground Operations Wing, Moody AFB GA; 33rd Fighter Wing (F-15C/D), Eglin AFB FL; 18th Air Support Operations Group, Pope Field, NC; 823d RED HORSE Squadron, Hurlburt Field, FL; and the 5th Combat Communications Group, Robins AFB GA.

Tenth Air Force, located at Naval Air Station Joint Reserve Base Fort Worth, TX, directs the activities of more than 13,300 reservists and 900 civilians located at 28 installations throughout the United States.

The mission of the Tenth Air Force is to exercise command supervision of its assigned Reserve units to ensure they maintain the highest combat capability to augment active forces in support of national objectives. Tenth Air Force currently commands Air Force Reserve Command units gained by five other major commands, including Air Combat Command. ACC-gained units consist of six fighter wings, three air rescue units, one bomber squadron, one combat operations squadron, and one airborne warning and control group when mobilized.

Twelfth Air Force, with headquarters at Davis-Monthan AFB AZ, controls ACC's conventional fighter and bomber forces based in the western United States and has the warfighting responsibility for US Southern Command as well as the US Southern Air Forces.

Other 12th Air Force units include: 388th Fighter Wing (F-16C/D), Hill AFB UT; 1st Air Support Operations Group, Joint Base Lewis-McChord WA; 3rd Combat Communications Group, Tinker AFB OK; and 820th RED HORSE Squadron, Nellis AFB NV.

US Air Forces Central Command (AFCENT)

US Air Forces Central Command is the air component of US Central Command, a regional unified command. USAFCENT is responsible for air operations (either unilaterally or in concert with coalition partners) and developing contingency plans in support of national objectives for USCENTCOM's 20-nation area of responsibility in Southwest Asia. Additionally, USAFCENT manages an extensive supply and equipment prepositioning program at several area of responsibility sites.

Direct Reporting Unit

US Air Force Warfare Center, at Nellis AFB NV, conducts the Air Force's advanced weapons and tactics training, manages advanced pilot training and is responsible for the operational test and evaluation of ACC's combat weapons systems.

Under the Air Warfare Center is the 57th Wing (A-10, F-15C/D/E, F-16C/D, HH-60G and RQ-1 Predator and RQ-4 Global Hawk unmanned aircraft systems); 99th Air Base Wing, 98th Range Wing, US Air Force Air-Ground Operations School, US Air Force Weapons School, US Air Force Air Demonstration Squadron (the Thunderbirds) and the 414th Combat Training Squadron (Red Flag).

The 53rd Wing at Eglin AFB FL. is also assigned to the Air Warfare Center. The 53rd Wing's subordinate units include the 53rd Test and Evaluation Group (A-10, F-15A/C/E, F-16C/D, F-22, B-1, B-2, B-52, HH-60G, RQ-1 Predator and RQ-4 Global Hawk) at Nellis, the 53rd Electronic Warfare Group at Eglin, and the 53rd Weapons Evaluation Group (E-9) at Tyndall AFB FL. The 53rd Test Management Group at Eglin coordinates the wing's test process, directing resources and priorities within the wing nationwide.

Another Air Warfare Center organization is the 505th Command and Control Wing at Hurlburt Field, FL. The 505th CCW's subordinate units include the 505th Training Group at Hurlburt Field and 505th Test and Evaluation Group at Nellis. The wing has 13 operating locations from which it provides training and development of tactics, techniques and procedures for Component Numbered Air Force headquarters; testing and training of key command and control and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance systems; and operational and tactical-level live, virtual and constructive exercises for joint and coalition forces. The wing annual trains more than 85,000 Soldiers, Sailors, Marines, Airmen and coalition forces.

AIR MOBILITY COMMAND

Mission: Air Mobility Command's mission is to provide global air mobility ... right effects, right place, right time.

Air Mobility Command, activated on June 1, 1992, is a major command headquartered at Scott AFB IL. AMC provides worldwide cargo and passenger delivery, air refueling and aeromedical evacuation. The command also transports humanitarian supplies to hurricane, flood and earthquake victims both at home and around the world.

Personnel and Resources

Nearly 136,000 active-duty, Air National Guard, Air Force Reserve and DOD civilians make the command's rapid global mobility operations possible.

Organization

AMC has one numbered air force, 16 wings, two airlift groups and smaller specialized units.

18th Air Force -- Also headquartered at Scott AFB, 18 AF's mission is tasking and executing all air mobility missions. Units reporting to 18 AF include 11 airlift, air mobility and air refueling wings; one airlift group, two expeditionary mobility task forces (EMTF) and the tanker airlift control center.

Wings flying airlift, air mobility and air refueling missions are located at Joint Base Andrews, MD; Joint Base Charleston, SC; Dover AFB DE; Fairchild AFB WA; Little Rock AFB AR; MacDill AFB FL; Joint Base Lewis-McChord WA; McConnell AFB KS; Joint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst (MDL) NJ; Scott AFB IL and Travis AFB CA. The airlift group is at Dyess AFB TX.

There are two expeditionary mobility task forces, which include contingency response wings, at Travis AFB and Joint Base MDL. EMTFs serve as lead agencies for conducting mobility operations worldwide and provide expeditionary mobility support. The 18th Air Force also leads two air mobility operations wings in Germany and Hawaii.

The last organization reporting to 18 AF is the 618th Air and Space Operations Center (TACC). Located at Scott AFB, the TACC is AMC's execution arm for providing America's global reach. It plans, schedules and directs mobility aircraft in support of combat delivery and strategic airlift, air refueling and aeromedical evacuation operations around the world.

US Air Force Expeditionary Center (USAF EC) -- AMC has one major direct reporting unit, the US Air Force Expeditionary Center located at Joint Base MDL. The center serves as the Air Force's premier organization for expeditionary innovation, education, training and exercises.

Reporting to the USAF EC are three air base wings located at Joint Base Charleston, Grand Forks AFB ND, and Joint Base MDL. Also reporting to the USAF EC is an air base group located at Joint Base Lewis-McChord and an airlift group at Pope Field, NC. They all provide installation support to the myriad organizations on their bases and provide mission-ready expeditionary service members to combatant commanders in support of joint and combined operations.

Capabilities

Airlifters provide the capability to deploy American armed forces anywhere in the world and keep them supplied. Air refuelers are the lifeline of global reach, increasing range, payloads and flexibility. Air Force tankers can also refuel Navy, Marine and NATO aircraft and have an inherent cargo-carrying capability. Aeromedical evacuation missions transport wounded and injured service members to critical care hospitals far away from the battle space.

History

Air Mobility Command began on 1 June 1992, when the Military Airlift Command and Strategic Air Command were inactivated. Elements of those two organizations, MAC's worldwide airlift system and SAC's KC-10 and KC-135 tanker force, combined to form AMC. Three tanker bases also joined AMC. They were Grand Forks AFB, McConnell AFB and Fairchild AFB.

AMC has undergone considerable change since its establishment. Focusing on the core mission of strategic air mobility, the command divested itself of infrastructure and forces not directly related to global reach. The Air Rescue Service, intratheater aeromedical airlift forces based overseas and much of the operational support airlift fleet transferred to other commands.

On 1 October. 2003, AMC underwent a major restructuring by reactivating 18th Air Force and re-designating its two former numbered air forces as the 15th and 21st EMTFs.

AIR FORCE SPACE COMMAND

Mission: Provide Resilient and Cost-Effective Space and Cyberspace Capabilities for the Joint Force and the Nation

The People: Approximately 41,000 professionals, assigned to 85 locations worldwide and deployed to an additional 35 global locations, perform AFSPC missions.

Organization: Fourteenth Air Force is located at Vandenberg AFB CA, and provides space capabilities for the joint fight through the operational missions of spacelift; position, navigation and timing; satellite communications; missile warning and space control. Twenty-Fourth Air Force is located at Joint Base San Antonio-Lackland TX, and its mission is to provide combatant commanders with trained and ready cyber forces which plan and conduct cyberspace operations. The command extends, operates, maintains and defends its assigned portions of the Department of Defense network to provide capabilities in, through and from cyberspace.The Space and Missile Systems Center (SMC) at Los Angeles AFB CA, designs and acquires all Air Force and most Department of Defense space systems. It oversees launches, completes on-orbit checkouts and then turns systems over to user agencies. It supports the Program Executive Office for Space on the Global Positioning, Defense Satellite Communications and MILSTAR systems. SMC also supports the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle, Defense Meteorological Satellite and Defense Support programs and the Space-Based Infrared System.The Space Innovation and Development Center at Schriever AFB CO, is responsible for integrating space systems into the operational Air Force. The mission is to advance full-spectrum warfare through rapid innovation, integration, training, testing and experimentation. The Air Force Network Integration Center (AFNIL) at Scott AFB IL, is the Air Force focal point for shaping, providing, sustaining and integrating the Enterprise Network and enabling assured core cyber capabilities to achieve warfighting advantage. AFNIC's vision is to integrate the evolving Enterprise Network environment at the speed of need to achieve information dominance and peerless cyberspace warfighting capabilities. The Air Force Spectrum Management Office, located in Alexandria, VA, is responsible for planning, providing and preserving access to the electromagnetic spectrum for the Air Force and selected DoD activities in support of national policy objectives, systems development and global operations.

Space Capabilities: Spacelift operations at the east and west coast launch bases provide services, facilities and range safety control for the conduct of DOD, NASA and commercial launches. Through the command and control of all DOD satellites, satellite operators provide force-multiplying effects -- continuous global coverage, low vulnerability and autonomous operations. Satellites provide essential in-theater secure communications, weather and navigational data for ground, air and fleet operations and threat warning. Ground-based radar, Space-Based Infrared System and Defense Support Program satellites monitor ballistic missile launches around the world to guard against a surprise missile attack on North America. Space surveillance radars provide vital information on the location of satellites and space debris for the nation and the world. Maintaining space superiority is an emerging capability required to protect U.S. space assets.

Cyberspace Capabilities: The Air Force's overall goal in cyberspace operations is to assure the mission - finding and using the best tools, skills, and capabilities to ensure the ability to fly, fight, and win in air, space and cyberspace. More than 5,400 men and women conduct or support 24-hour cyberspace operations for 24th Air Force units. In addition, more than 10,000 Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve personnel directly support the AFSPC cyberspace mission.

AIR EDUCATION AND TRAINING COMMAND

Mission: Recruit, train and educate Airmen to deliver airpower for America.

Air Education and Training Command (AETC), with headquarters at Joint Base San Antonio-Randolph, TX was established 1 July 1993, with the realignment of Air Training Command and Air University (AU). After receiving basic training and prior to placement in Air Force jobs, all personnel are trained in a technical skill. More than 2,200 technical courses in approximately 300 different career specialties offer a wide variety of job skills for new recruits. During his or her career in the Air Force, every officer and enlisted person receives training provided by this command. Over the years, more than 25 million students have graduated from AETC training and education programs.

Organization

To accomplish the mission, the command's structure includes a major direct reporting unit and two numbered air forces. Also, Air Force recruiting and a variety of important training missions report to AETC.

Air University

AU, located at Maxwell AFB AL, is the educational arm of AETC and provides career-relevant education to officers, enlisted personnel, and civilian employees of the Department of the DoD. It is responsible for awarding associate, graduate, and postgraduate degrees. In addition, AU conducts professional military education and continuing education, while also operating the Air Force Officer Training School (OTS) and Air Force Reserve Officer Training Corps (AFROTC).

Enlisted PME

The Barnes Center for Enlisted Education develops curriculum and oversees operations at all schools and academies associated with enlisted professional military education. It includes Airman Leadership School (ALS), Noncommissioned Officer Academy (NCOA), and the Senior Noncommissioned Officer Academy (SNCOA).

Officer Commissioning Education

AU educates those seeking to become Air Force officers through the AFROTC and OTS commissioning programs, which are both administered by the Holm Center for Officer Accessions and Citizen Development. AFROTC is the primary source of Air Force commissioned officers, and has units located at 145 college and university campuses across the nation providing a multi-year educational program. OTS is the flexible partner in the commissioning process, increasing and decreasing production to meet active duty and Air Force Reserve officer requirements through its eight-week basic officer-training course. In addition, OTS maintains operational control over the commissioning program for Air National Guard line officers and also conducts commissioned officer training courses for newly commissioned active duty, Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve medical personnel, lawyers, and chaplains.

Officer PME

PME for officers is provided through three AU schools: Air Command and Staff College, Air War College, and the Squadron Officer College which runs the Squadron Officer School. Officers attend these schools at appropriate career points. The curriculum at all three schools stress leadership, communication skills, and issues appropriate to the career point of attendees.

Graduate and Continuing Education

Dedicated to meeting Air Force job related educational needs, AU oversees a number of additional organizations. These organizations include: Air Force Institute of Technology (AFIT); LeMay Center for Doctrine Development and Education; Eaker College for Professional Development (CPD); Community College of the Air Force (CCAF); School of Advanced Air and Space Studies (SAASS); and Headquarters Civil Air Patrol (CAP)-USAF.

Second Air Force

The Second Air Force (2 AF), headquartered at Keesler AFB MS, was activated 1 July 1993, and manages all operational aspects of basic and technical training for AETC. Four training wings and one training center report to 2 AF.

Basic Military Training. An 8-week basic military training course for all new enlistees in the regular Air Force, the Air Force Reserve and the ANG is conducted at Joint Base San Antonio-Lackland TX.

Technical Training. Technical training in more than 245 technical specialties is provided to men and women throughout their careers. Each year approximately 235,000 students graduate from more than 2,200 formal training courses.

Courses are taught at five training wings—Keesler AFB MS; Goodfellow, Sheppard and Joint Base San Antonio-Lackland TX; Vandenberg AFB CA; and a network of field training units around the world. Technical training courses range from supply services, personnel, medical services, missile and aircraft system operations and maintenance to communications, computer operations and space systems maintenance.

Flying Training Units

AETC is responsible for managing flying training at 12 active duty units and three ANG units. AETC provides undergraduate and specialized pilot and navigator training, initial fighter fundamental training, specific initial skills training, upgrade and requalification aircraft training for combat crews and advanced training for helicopter pilots.

AIR FORCE MATERIEL COMMAND

Mission: Equip the Air Force for World-Dominant Airpower.

It is the Air Force's largest command in terms of employees with some 80,000 military and civilain employees and funding. AFMC supports other US military forces and allies, and handles major air and space responsibilities for the DoD. This includes research, development, testing, and evaluation of satellites, boosters, space probes, and associated systems needed to support specific NASA projects.

Air Force Materiel Command (AFMC), with headquarters at Wright-Patterson AFB OH, was created 1 July 1992. The command conducts research, development, test and evaluation, and provides acquisition management services and logistics support necessary to keep Air Force weapon systems ready for war. AFMC delivers war-winning expeditionary capabilities to the warfighter through development and transition of technology, professional acquisition management, exacting test and evaluation, and

world-class sustainment of all Air Force weapon systems. From cradle-to-grave, AFMC provides the work force and infrastructure necessary to ensure the United States remains the world's most respected Air and Space Force.

Organization

The AFMC headquarters is a major unit located at Wright-Patterson AFB OH. There are nine AFMC host bases. In addition, the command operates associate units on several non-AFMC bases. AFMC fulfills its mission of equipping the Air Force with the best weapons systems through an Aerospace Maintenance and Regeneration Group (AMARG) desert storage facility on Davis-Monthan AFB AZ. It's largely structured around five Centers.

Science and Technology

Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL) Wright-Patterson AFB OH

AFRL is the Air Force's only organization wholly dedicated to leading the discovery, development and integration of warfighting technologies for air, space and cyberspace forces. With a technically diverse workforce of more than 10,200 employees, distributed across nine technical directorates and 40 other operating locations worldwide, AFRL leverages a diverse science and technology portfolio that ranges from fundamental and advanced research to advanced technology development. The lab also provides a wide range of technical services to joint acquisition, logistics, aerospace medicine and operational warfighting communities.AFRL's headquarters, 711th Human Performance Wing, Aerospace Systems, Materials and Manufacturing and Sensors Directorates are located at Wright-Patterson AFB.Kirtland AFB, N.M., is home to the Directed Energy and Space Vehicles Directorates.AFRL's Munitions Directorate is located at Eglin AFB, Fla., and advanced cyber technology research takes place at the Information Directorate in Rome, N.Y.The Air Force Office of Scientific Research at Arlington, Va., manages the Air Force basic research program within AFRL, as well as cooperatively with industry and universities around the world.

Life Cycle Management

Air Force Life Cycle Management Center (AFLCMC) Wright-Patterson AFB OH

The AFLCMC mission is to deliver affordable and sustainable war-winning capabilities to US and international partners, on time, on cost, anywhere, anytime from cradle to grave. AFLCMC is the single center responsible for total life cycle management of all aircraft, engines, munitions, and electronic systems. AFLCMC's workforce of nearly 26,000 is located at 75 locations across the globe -- from Peterson AFB CO., to Oslo, Norway. AFLCMC's portfolio includes Information Technology systems and networks; Command, Control, Communications, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance systems; armaments; strategic systems; aerial platforms; and, various specialized or supporting systems such as simulators or personal equipment. AFLCMC also executes sales of aircraft and other defense-related equipment, while building security assistance

relationships with foreign partner nation air forces. AFLCMC is headquartered at Wright-Patterson, where Program Executive Officers oversee life cycle management of fighters, bombers, mobility, and tanker aircraft; Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance and Special Operations Forces weapon systems; as well as agile combat support systems, such as training aircraft and simulators. The Air Force Security Assistance and Cooperation Directorate conducts the foreign military sales mission. AFLCMC directorates at Wright-Patterson AFB provide intelligence, engineering, budget estimation, contracting and other operational support. Wright-Patterson is also home to the 88th Air Base Wing. Program Office personnel located at the Hill AFB UT, Robins AFB GA, and Tinker AFB OK, air logistics complexes provide weapons system product support and report to respective AFLCMC PEOs. Tinker is also host to AFLCMC's Propulsion Directorate which directs engine product support. AFLCMC's Armament Directorate located at Eglin AFB FL, manages aerial delivered weapons and armaments. Nuclear weapons life cycle management is accomplished by AFLCMC's Strategic Systems Directorate at Kirtland AFB NM AFLCMC's Battle Management and C3I/Networks Directorates and supporting 66th Air Base Group are located at Hanscom AFB MA Operational support information technology systems management is accomplished by AFLCMC's Business Enterprise Systems Directorate at Maxwell AFB-Gunter Annex AL.

Test and Evaluation

Air Force Test Center (AFTC) Edwards AFB CA

The AFTC mission is to conduct developmental test and evaluation of air, space and cyber systems, and provide timely, objective and accurate information to decision makers. The AFTC directs the developmental test and evaluation of air, space and cyber systems for military services, other US government agencies and international partners, in addition to operating the US Air Force Test Pilot School.

Arnold Engineering Development Complex, located at Arnold AFB TN, is home to the most advanced and largest complex of flight simulation test facilities in the world. The 96th Test Wing, located at Eglin AFB FL, and Holloman AFB NM, leads the Air Force's test and evaluation of air-delivered weapons, navigation and guidance systems, command and control systems, and Air Force Special Operations Command systems. The 412th Test Wing, located at Edwards AFB, performs developmental testing of airframe, avionics, propulsion and electronic warfare systems of manned and unmanned aircraft for the Air Force, other US military services and government agencies, and international partners. Current and recent systems tested by the wing include the B-2, F-22A, F-35, Airborne Laser, and Global Hawk. The wing's expertise in flying operations, maintenance and engineering ensures the successful test and evaluation of a fleet of more than 90 highly modified aircraft.

Sustainment

Air Force Sustainment Center (AFSC) Tinker AFB OK

The mission of the Air Force Sustainment Center is to sustain weapon system readiness to generate airpower for America. The center provides war-winning expeditionary capabilities to the warfighter through world-class depot maintenance, supply chain management and installation support. Through its headquarters staff, three air logistics complexes, three air base wings and two supply chain wings, the AFSC provides critical sustainment for the Air Force's most sophisticated weapon systems, including: A-10 Thunderbolt II, AC-130, B-1 Lancer, B-52 Stratofortress, C-5 Galaxy, C-17 Globemaster III, C-130 Hercules, E-3 Sentry, E-6 Mercury, E-8 Joint STARS, EC-130, F-15 Eagle, F-16 Falcon, F-22 Raptor, HC-130, HH-60 Pave Hawk, ICBM, KC-135 Stratotanker, MC-130, MH-53 Pave Low, RQ-4 Global Hawk, U-2 Dragon Lady, and UH-1 Iroquois aircraft, as well as a wide range of aircraft engines and component parts. The Air Force Sustainment Center consists of more than 32,000 military and civilian personnel. AFSC provides installation support to more than 141 associate units with more than 75,000 personnel. The three logistics complexes are experts in world-class, comprehensive sustainment of air and space systems -- from circuit cards to aircraft - and provide support to other Defense Department services and allied-nation aircraft. Tinker AFB, is home to the AFSC headquarters, Oklahoma City Air Logistics Complex, 72d Air Base Wing, and 448th Supply Chain Management Wing. Hill AFB UT, is home to the Ogden Air Logistics Complex and 75th Air Base Wing. Robins AFB GA, is home to the Warner Robins Air Logistics Complex and the 78th Air Base Wing. The 635th Supply Chain Operations Wing is located at Scott AFB IL.

Nuclear Support

Air Force Nuclear Weapons Center (AFNWC) Kirtland AFB NM

The center's mission is to ensure safe, secure and effective nuclear capability for the warfighter; providing on-time, on-target nuclear solutions. The Air Force Nuclear Weapons Center's location facilitates synergy with Defense Threat Reduction Agency, Air Force Inspection Agency, Air Force Safety Center, National Nuclear Security Administration, Sandia National Laboratories, and Los Alamos National Laboratory - highlighting its position as one of the nation's Nuclear Centers of Excellence. AFNWC's strategic goals include sustaining nuclear surety across AFMC's Nuclear Enterprise; leading engagement and advocacy for the Nuclear Enterprise; delivering mission-ready weapons to the warfighter; fixing today's problems and looking at ways to mitigate future threats and problems; developing and caring for our Airmen; planning, assessing, developing and sustaining effective and efficient integrated life cycle management; ensuring resource stewardship; and, supporting nuclear enterprise accountability and readiness. The center is responsible for the entire scope of nuclear weapons support functions for two-thirds of the Nuclear Triad and is composed of one wing and two wing-equivalent directorates. The 377th Air Base Wing is Kirtland's host wing, with the primary mission of conducting nuclear operations, as well as providing support to 100-plus mission partners. The Nuclear

Capabilities Directorate, the service logistics agent for all Air Force nuclear weapons, also comprises the Missile Sustainment Division at Tinker AFB OK, and has additional engineering, logistics support, and maintenance functions split between Joint Base San Antonio-Lackland, TX, and Ramstein Air Base, Germany. The Intercontinental Ballistic Missile Systems Directorate maintains Technical Engineering Operations Locations at Vandenberg AFB CA; Malmstrom AFB MT; Minot AFB ND, and F.E. Warren AFB WY Specialized Centers.

AIR FORCE SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND

Mission: "Present Combat Ready Air Force Special Operations Forces to Conduct and Support Global Special Operations Missions"

Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC) was established 22 May 1990, with headquarters at Hurlburt Field, FL. AFSOC is one of ten major Air Force commands, and the Air Force component of US Special Operations Command, a unified command located at MacDill AFB FL. AFSOC provides Air Force special operations forces (SOF) for worldwide deployment and assignment to regional unified commands. The command's SOF are composed of highly trained, rapidly deployable Airmen, conducting global special operations missions ranging from precision application of firepower, to infiltration, exfiltration, resupply and refueling of SOF operational elements. AFSOC's unique capabilities include airborne radio and television broadcast for psychological operations, as well as aviation foreign internal defense instructors to provide other governments military expertise for their internal development. The command's special tactics squadrons combine combat controllers, special operations weathermen and pararescuemen with other service SOF to form versatile joint special operations teams. The command's core missions include battlefield air operations; agile combat support; aviation foreign internal defense; information operations; precision aerospace fires; psychological operations; specialized air mobility; specialized refueling; and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance.

Personnel and Resources

AFSOC has more than 19,000 active-duty, Air Force Reserve, Air National Guard and civilian personnel. The command's active duty and reserve component flying units operate fixed and rotary-wing aircraft, including the CV-22B, AC-130, C-130, EC-130, MC-130, MQ-1, MQ-9, U-28A, C-145A, C-146A and PC-12.

Organization

The command's forces are organized under two active-duty wings, one reserve wing, one National Guard wing, two overseas groups, and several direct reporting units.

1st Special Operations Wing, at Hurlburt Field, and the 27th Special Operations Wing, at Cannon AFB NM, are composed of specialized aircraft to support special operations worldwide. The 24th Special Operations Wing, at Hurlburt Field, provides special tactics forces for rapid global employment to enable airpower success.

352nd Special Operations Group, at Royal Air Force Mildenhall, England, is the Air Force component for Special Operations Command Europe.

353rd Special Operations Group, at Kadena Air Base, Japan, is the Air Force component for Special Operations Command Pacific.

720th Special Tactics Group, at Hurlburt Field, FL. and the 724th Special Tactics Group, at Pope Field, NC, train, organize, and equip more than 800 combat controllers, special operations weathermen, and pararescuemen for assignment to special tactics squadrons.

919th Special Operations Wing, at Duke Field, Fla., is the only special operations wing in the Air Force Reserve. and provides operations and maintenance personnel to support the aviation foreign internal defense and combat aviation advisor programs for the Air Force Special Operations Command through the use of the C-145A aircraft. The wing conducts U-28 and C-145A formal training unit flight instruction through a classic association with the AFSOAWC. The Wing's 2nd Special Operations Squadron (SOS), located at Nellis AFB, NV, employs the MQ-1 Predator. The 2 SOS will transition to the MQ-9 Reaper and move to Hurlburt Field, FL in summer 2014.

193rd Special Operations Wing at Harrisburg International Airport, PA, provides the only airborne psychological operations platform in the Department of Defense with the EC-130 Commando Solo. 123rd Special Tactics Squadron at Standiford Field, KY and the 125th Special Tactics Squadron at Portland International Airport, OR, provide combat controllers and pararescuemen for worldwide operational needs. 209th Civil Engineer Squadron located at Gulfport, MS, is AFSOC's only Guard civil engineer squadron supporting the command's transportable collective protection system mission. 150th Special Operations Flight at Joint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst NJ, provides modified C-32B aircraft supporting worldwide airlift operations. 280th Combat Communications Squadron at Dothan, AL, is AFSOC's only Guard communications squadron. 107th Weather Flight at Selfridge ANGB MI; 146th Weather Flight at GTR Pittsburgh Air Guard Station; PA and the 181st Weather Flight at Naval Air Station Joint Reserve Base, Forth Worth, TX are the command's three National Guard weather units.

AIR FORCE RESERVE COMMAND

Mission: "The mission of the Air Force Reserve Command is to fly, fight and win … in air, space and cyberspace."

Air Force Reserve Command (AFRC), with headquarters at Robins AFB GA was established 17 February 1997. AFRC was formed under a major command title to streamline the communications process from the Chief of Staff to reserve personnel.

AFRC maintains a constant state of readiness for all US Air Force Reserve (USAFR) units, individuals, and the systems and services required to perform their assigned mission in support of US national objectives. The command helps us maintain our readiness and operational capabilities at a lower cost.

Air Force Reserve Command provides the U.S. Air Force about 14 percent of its capability with only about four percent of the total Air Force budget. The Reserve performs two missions no one else does in the DoD - fixed-wing aerial spray missions to kill mosquitoes in the aftermath of natural disasters and the Hurricane Hunters who monitor hurricanes for the National Weather Service.

Air Force Reserve Command also supports space, flight test, special operations, aerial port operations, civil engineer, security forces, intelligence, military training, communications, mobility support, transportation and services missions. The command is also administratively responsible for all the Air Force's individual mobilization augmentees.

Organization

The command is made up of three numbered air forces and one DRU. The three NAFs are the 4 AF at March ARB CA; the 10 AF at Naval Air Station Joint Reserve Base Forth Worth, TX; and the 22 AF at Dobbins ARB GA. The DRU is the Air Reserve Personnel Center, at Denver, CO: The ARPC ensures a "Warrior Bank" of mission-ready guard members and reservists for mobilization and Air Force augmentation by providing personnel management and services for more than 1.2 million members. The center maintains master personnel records for Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve members not on extended active duty.

The force composition is made up of Reserve-owned aircraft called Equipped and Active Duty owned aircraft called Associate where the Reserve shares the responsibility for flying and maintenance. There are 35 Flying Wings, 128 Groups consisting of Logistics, Medical, Operations, Support, Regional Support, Air Refueling, and Airborne Air Control, and 399 Squadrons all throughout the world.

PACIFIC AIR FORCES

Mission: "to provide US Pacific Command integrated expeditionary Air Force capabilities to defend the Homeland, promote stability, dissuade/deter aggression, and swiftly defeat enemies. "

Pacific Air Forces' (PACAF's) area of responsibility is far-reaching—more than half the Earth's surface from the west coast of the Americas to the East Coast of Africa, and from the Arctic to the Antarctic. The area is home for some 2 billion people in 35 nations.

As an Air Force major command, PACAF is responsible for most Air Force units, bases, and facilities in the Pacific. In that role, the command ensures that flying resources in the region are properly trained, equipped, and organized to conduct tactical air operations.

Organization

The command has nine major locations and numerous smaller facilities, primarily in Hawaii, Alaska, Japan, Guam, and South Korea.

PACAF's major units are 5 AF, Yokota AB, Japan; 7 AF, Osan AB, South Korea; and 11 AF, Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson AK. Major units also include 673d Air Base Wing, Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson AK; 8th Fighter Wing, Kunsan AB, South Korea; 15th Wing, Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam HI; 18th Wing, Kadena AB, Japan (Okinawa); 51st Fighter Wing, Osan AB; South Korea; 354th Fighter Wing, Eielson AFB AK; 35th Fighter Wing, Misawa AB, Japan; 374th Airlift Wing, Yokota AB, Japan; and the 36th Wing, Andersen AFB Guam.

In Japan, US air operations are controlled by 5 AF; for the Northern Pacific, by 11 AF; and in South Korea, by 7 AF.

The 15th Wing at Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam HI operates and maintains Air Force installations, provides information management and logistics support to Headquarters PACAF, and supports many small Air Force activities in the Pacific. Aligned under the 15th Wing, the 10th Air Defense Squadron directs the air defense of Hawaii and the 10-million-square-mile Pacific Islands Defense Region, including Wake, Midway, Guam, Johnston, Christmas, Marshall and Mariana Islands.

(NOTE: While Alaska falls under USNORTHCOM's area of responsibility, the units located there come from under PACAF's operational control.)

UNITED STATES AIR FORCES IN EUROPE-

AIR FORCES AFRICA

Mission: "As the air component for both USEUCOM and USAFRICOM, USAFE-AFAFRICA executes the Air Force, USEUCOM and USAFRICOM missions with forward-based airpower and infrastructure to conduct and enable theater and global operations. USAFE-AFAFRICA directs air operations in a theater spanning three continents, covering more than 15 million square miles, containing 104 independent states, and possessing more than one-fifth of the world's population and more than a quarter of the world's gross domestic product. "

US Air Forces in Europe - Air Forces Africa (USAFE-AFAFRICA), with headquarters at Ramstein Air Base, Germany, is a major command of the US Air Force. It is the air component for two Department of Defense unified commands - US European Command (USEUCOM), and US Africa Command (USAFRICOM). During most of the Cold War, USAFE-AFAFRICA was a fight-in-place force postured for a large-scale conflict. Since the fall of the Soviet Union, it has transitioned to an Air Expeditionary Force with a mobile and deployable mix of people and resources that can simultaneously operate in multiple locations. Its role includes war-fighting as well as humanitarian and peacekeeping operations, and other non-traditional contingencies throughout its area of responsibility. In peacetime, USAFE-AFAFRICA trains and equips Air Force units pledged to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and to the peace and stability of African states. In fulfilling its NATO responsibilities, USAFE-AFAFRICA maintains combat-ready wings based from the United Kingdom to Turkey. USAFE-AFAFRICA plans, conducts, controls, coordinates and supports air and space operations in Europe and Africa to achieve US national and NATO objectives based on taskings by the USEUCOM and USAFRICOM commanders. USAFE-AFAFRICA assets stand ready to perform close air support, air interdiction, air defense, in-flight refueling, long-range transport and support of maritime operations. It maintains a formidable force despite a rapid drawdown that saw its main operating bases cut by 67 percent following the end of the Cold War. USAFE-AFAFRICA remains a highly responsive and capable combat force, as witnessed in the command's support of contingency and humanitarian operations throughout Europe and Africa.

Personnel and Resources

More than 35,000 active-duty, Reserve, Air National Guard and civilian employees are assigned to USAFE-AFAFRICA. Equipment assets include about 217 fighter, attack, rotary wing, tanker, and transport aircraft, and a full complement of conventional weapons.

Organization

USAFE-AFAFRICA consists of one Numbered Air Force, seven main operating bases and 114 geographically separated locations. Third Air Force supports USEUCOM and USAFRICOM as the Component Numbered Air Force responsible for maintaining continuous theater-wide situational awareness and providing the commander of Air Force forces here the capability to command and control assigned and attached Airmen. The USAFE-AFAFRICA main operating bases are: RAF Lakenheath and RAF Mildenhall in the United Kingdom; Ramstein and Spangdahlem Air Bases in Germany; Aviano Air Base, Italy; Lajes Field in the Azores; and Incirlik Air Base, Turkey. These bases report to Third Air Force for day-to-day and contingency operations.

AIR FORCE GLOBAL STRIKE COMMAND

Mission: Develop and provide combat-ready forces for nuclear deterrence and global strike operations ... safe – secure – effective … to support the President of the United States and combatant commanders.

Air Force Global Strike Command (AFGSC), activated 7 August 2009, is a major command headquartered at Barksdale AFB LA. AFGSC is responsible for the Nation's three intercontinental ballistic missile wings, the two B-52 wings and the only B-2 wing. Approximately 25,000 professionals are assigned to six wings, two geographically-separated squadrons and one detachment in the continental United States and deployed to locations around the globe. Major units and bases include: 20th Air Force at F.E. Warren AFB WY, and the three ICBM wings under 20th Air Force -- the 90th Missile Wing at F.E. Warren AFB WY; the 341st Missile Wing at Malmstrom AFB MT; and the 91st Missile Wing at Minot AFB ND; 8th Air Force at Barksdale AFB LA and the three bomber wings under 8th Air Force -- the 509th Bomb Wing at Whiteman AFB MO; the 2d Bomb Wing at Barksdale AFB LA; and the 5th Bomb Wing at Minot AFB ND. In addition, two squadrons, the 576th Flight Test Squadron at Vandenberg AFB CA, and the 625th Strategic Operations Squadron at Offutt AFB NE, fall under the command, as well an Air Operations Group at Otis Air National Guard Base MA, and a detachment at Joint Base Langley-Eustis VA. Eighth Air Force is also headquartered at Barksdale AFB and is designated as US Strategic Command's Task Force 204, providing on-alert, combat-ready forces to the President. The mission of "The Mighty Eighth" is to safeguard America's interests through strategic deterrence and global combat power. Eighth Air Force controls long-range nuclear-capable bomber assets throughout the US and overseas locations. Its flexible, conventional and nuclear deterrence mission provides the capability to deploy forces and engage enemy threats from home station or forward positioned, anywhere, any time. The Eighth Air Force motto is "Deterrence through strength, global strike on demand." Twentieth Air Force, headquartered at F.E. Warren AFB WY, also supports United States Strategic Command. A NAF for AFGSC, Twentieth Air Force is responsible for maintaining and operating the Air Force's ICBM force. Designated as STRATCOM's Task Force 214, 20th Air Force provides on-alert, combat-ready ICBMs to the President.   ICBM Capabilities: America's alert ICBMs are ready to launch on any given day, and America's ICBM team plays a critical role in maintaining global stability and ensuring the Nation's safety and security. 450 Minuteman III missiles provide a critical component of America's on-alert strategic forces. As the Nation's "silent sentinels," ICBMs, and the people who operate them, have remained on continuous, around-the-clock alert since 1959. AFGSC is the Air Force's lead command for and largest operator of UH-1N Huey helicopters. The UH-1N supports ICBM operations in missile fields controlled by F.E. Warren AFB, Malmstrom AFB and Minot AFB. Bomber Capabilities: The B-2 Spirit is a long-range nuclear and conventional stealthy bomber. The bomber can fly at high subsonic speeds at altitudes that can reach 50,000 feet. Its unrefueled range is at least 6,000 nautical miles. The B-2 brings massive firepower, in a short time, anywhere on the globe through the most challenging defenses. The B-52 Stratofortress is a long-range, nuclear and conventional heavy bomber that can perform a variety of missions. The bomber can fly at high subsonic speeds at altitudes reaching 50,000 feet. It has an unrefueled combat range in excess of 8,800 miles. It can carry precision-guided ordnance with worldwide precision navigation.

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JEANNE M. HOLM CENTER

USPACOM Area of Responsibility

Activity Statement:
- Deliver briefings and participate in discussions about various aspects of culture and US interests in the US Pacific Command (USPACOM) area of responsibility (AOR).

Affective Lesson Objective:
- Respond to the importance of Air Force officers understanding US national security concerns in the AOR, regional cultural perspectives, and the Combatant Command's mission in the AOR.

Affective Samples of Behavior:
- Voluntarily discuss US national security concerns in the USPACOM AOR.

- Value that an understanding of regional cultural perspectives is key to relating and communicating with partners in the USPACOM AOR.

- Assert the importance of the Combatant Command's mission in light of US national security concerns in the USPACOM AOR.

UNITED STATES PACIFIC COMMAND

- 36 NATIONS ENCOMPASSING ABOUT HALF THE EARTH'S SURFACE
- HOME TO MORE THAN 50% OF THE WORLD'S POPULATION
- WORLD'S SIX LARGEST ARMED FORCES (CHINA, RUSSIA, U.S., INDIA, NORTH KOREA, SOUTH KOREA)
- WORLD'S THREE LARGEST ECONOMIES (U.S., JAPAN, CHINA)
- FIVE NATIONS ALLIED WITH THE U.S. THROUGH MUTUAL DEFENSE TREATIES (AUSTRALIA, JAPAN, PHILIPPINES, SOUTH KOREA, THAILAND)
- SOURCE OF ABOUT ONE-THIRD OF U.S. TRADE
- DISTANCE AND DIVERSITY (15 TIME ZONES AND 3,000 LANGUAGES)

PARTNERSHIP · READINESS · PRESENCE

OVERVIEW OF UNITED STATES PACIFIC COMMAND AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY

The United States Pacific Command (USPACOM) is the oldest and largest of the established United States unified commands. Established on January 1, 1947, the area now covered by USPACOM includes territory that was originally assigned to the Far East Command and Alaskan Command. Following the events of September 11, 2001 and the establishment of United States Northern Command (USNORTHCOM), Alaska and the West Coast of North America were reassigned to USNORTHCOM and USPACOM assumed responsibility for Antarctica.

Since its inception, USPACOM has played a critical role in ensuring a secure environment in the Asia-Pacific region that allows the regional countries to focus on developing their economies and creating strong governments. The USPACOM region plays host to five of the "Top Ten" trading partners of the United States. Most of the nations within the region actively contribute to the security of the region and willingly seek to advance their alliances, partnerships, and friendships with the United States.

Territory

The territory covered by USPACOM covers approximately half the surface of the earth and is one of the most diverse regions of the world, stretching from the waters off the US Pacific Coast to the western border of India, and from the North Pole to Antarctica. USPACOM is responsible for 36 nations that are home to more than 50% of the world population. Over 3,000 languages are spoken in the region. Two of the three largest economies in the world, two of the three most populous nations in the world (China and India), the largest democratic Muslim-majority nation in the world (Indonesia), and the smallest republic in the world (Nauru) are all part of USPACOM.

Australia	Bangladesh
Bhutan	Brunei
Burma	Cambodia
China	Fiji
India	Indonesia
Japan	Kiribati
Laos	Malaysia
Maldives	Marshall Islands
Micronesia	Mongolia
Nauru	Nepal
New Zealand	North Korea
Palau	Papua New Guinea
Philippines	Samoa
Singapore	Solomon Islands
South Korea	Sri Lanka
Thailand	Timor-Leste
Tonga	Tuvalu
Vanuatu	Vietnam

History

The history of the USPACOM region is ancient and rich. For centuries, China was the dominant influence in the history of the Asia-Pacific region, while two major religions emerging out of India made a significant impact. China developed into settled agricultural communities and was producing silk and pottery in notable forms by 4000 BCE and possibly as early as 12000 BCE. Around 2000 BCE, the Aryan people settled in the Indian subcontinent, mingled with the local people, and composed the Vedas, the founding philosophy of Hinduism. In 560 BCE, Lord Gautam Buddha was born in India, and the second major religion of India, Buddhism, was founded. Buddhism, in particular, rapidly spread from the Indian subcontinent across the Pacific, where it was one of the primary religions in China, and remains one of the dominant religions in Japan.

Western Imperialism

Western Imperialism in the nineteenth century greatly influenced the Asian-Pacific region. In a period of approximately 100 years, China's position in the world rapidly altered from one of the leading civilizations in the world to a subjected and divided nation due to a combination of internal struggles and the inability of the Chinese military to compete with the military power of the West.

As a result of the terms of the treaties following the Opium War of 1839, China was subjected to foreign control of tariffs, ports, and trade, as well as an influx of Christian missionaries from a series of foreign powers competing for influence in the East. Ultimately, foreign activity and internal strains led to the Chinese Revolution of 1911 which overthrew the unpopular Qing dynasty, widely seen as a "foreign" dynasty under Western control.

In response to the foreign influence in China, Japan abandoned their isolationist policies that had been in place since 1600 and made a deliberate effort to adapt to the opening of its ports to the West in the mid-nineteenth century. Japan's ability to adapt to Western imperialism allowed the country to establish itself as a competitor for colonial rights in Asia. They defeated China in a war over Korea in 1894-1945, which reversed the traditional balance of power in East Asia, and went on to defeat Russia in 1905-06 over rights in Manchuria and Korea.

The first recorded European contact with the continent of Australia was by Dutch explorers in 1606, though European influence in Australia did not truly begin until James Cook claimed the territory for Britain in 1770. Britain initially used Australia as a penal colony, and it remained a territory of Britain until 1901 when the Commonwealth of Australia was formed. Discriminatory practices against the native population and highly restrictive immigration laws that limited immigration to those of European decent (ended after WWII) developed Australia into the most European of all of the Pacific countries.

France and Britain had impact in other parts of the area as well. France took control of Vietnam in 1862 and divided it into three separate countries: Tonkin, Annam, and Cochin-China. Colonial rule of Vietnam lasted until Japan invaded during WWII. In India, the British and French East India companies, which were corporations that maintained their own troops and mercenaries, competed with various Indian regional powers for control of the country after the Mughal Empire declined in the eighteenth century. Britain emerged supreme and the British government gradually took over the entire subcontinent of South Asia. British officials were placed at the top of the political and social spectrum. Following WWI, a mass movement toward independence from Britain began under the nonviolent leadership of Mahatma Gandhi, though it would be another 30+ years before independence was granted.

World War II (WWII) in the Pacific

An unofficial war between Japan and China began in 1937 when Japan invaded Manchuria. When Germany defeated France and the Netherlands in Europe, Japan saw an opportunity to gain valuable natural resources in European-controlled territory in the Pacific. When Japan allied itself with Italy and Germany in September 1940 and seized Indochina, tensions with the United States increased considerably. Though negotiations continued between Japan and the United States, both countries believed war was inevitable. Japan massed troops near Malaysia, but it was the bombing of Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, on December 7, 1941 which led to the official declaration of war and brought WWII to the Pacific.

Of all of the Allied powers, the United States was the only one with the resources to fight Japan in the Pacific. Japan carried the momentum of battle in the first 6 months. The Battle of Midway in June, 1942 was a turning point in the war for the Allies. Approximately 1 year later, the United States began an "island-hopping" strategy that proved successful in a series of assaults on Japanese-held islands in the Pacific.

The war between China and Japan continued with a formal, and long overdue, declaration of war by China in 1941. Japan eventually controlled territory within China that was roughly equivalent in size to the entire territory controlled by the Axis powers in Europe. When Japan took control of Burma in 1942, China was virtually cut off from the rest of the world. Overpopulation, famine, disease, and civil unrest, in addition to constant Japanese air and ground assaults, took a heavy toll on the country. Nevertheless, China served as a critical launching point for US attacks on Japan.

In India, famine was a problem throughout WWII and the economy was overburdened by the strain of supporting the Allied military authorities. The Philippines were occupied by Japan for nearly 3 years during the war, and the American reconquest of the islands in 1944-45 took a great toll on the territory.

From 1868, Hiroshima was the military center of Japan. The heavy casualties in the campaigns at Iwo Jima and Okinawa in early 1945, and fears of even heavier casualties expected in a land invasion of Japan, led President Truman to authorize the atomic bombing of the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945. The bombing of Hiroshima destroyed 90 percent of the city and immediately killed approximately 80,000 people, with a far greater of number of deaths over the years from radiation. Three days later, the bombing of Nagasaki killed an estimated 40,000. Japan signed a surrender aboard the USS *Missouri* in Tokyo Bay on September 2, 1945, and a second surrender with China a week later, formally ending WWII in the Pacific. Following the war, Hiroshima became a center for the peace movement for the banning of nuclear weapons.

Political Systems

The political systems found in the USPACOM region are highly diverse, which is to be expected in a territory that covers 50 percent of the Earth's surface. Even so, despite the finer details, the vast majority of countries in the USPACOM region are a form of parliamentary or representative government, whether it is a constitutional monarchy, republic, or democracy. The country of Nauru, with a total population of around 10,000, is both the 14th smallest nation in the world in terms of population and the world's smallest independent republic. China, meanwhile, has both the largest population in the world at 1.35 billion people and is one of two communist governments in the region (the other being Vietnam.) North Korea, an ally of China, is the only dictatorship in the region, while Burma remains under the political control of a military regime.

Though there are 36 nations in USPACOM, China and North Korea demand a great deal of attention from the United States. Their governmental systems and large standing armies combined with their possession of nuclear weapons makes these two nations a major concern to the national security of the United States. The vast majority of nations in USPACOM are allies or partners of the United States in some form. Five of the seven mutual defense treaties the United States is party to are with nations in USPACOM.

Religion & Spirituality

There is an enormous diversity of religious traditions in the USPACOM territory. Buddhism and Hinduism were both founded in the region. Other traditions arrived in the area through imperialism, war, and other means. A handful of nations have an official or state religion, but most are religiously diverse with the "dominant" tradition claiming as much as 98% of the population in Timor-Leste (Roman Catholic) or as little as 13.8% of the population in New Zealand (Anglican.)

As nineteenth century imperialism spread throughout the USPACOM region, the nations most heavily influenced by the West were also heavily influenced by Christian missionaries who arrived in the Pacific during the same period. Approximately half of all USPACOM nations claim some form of Christianity as their dominant religious tradition. Most notably, the smaller island nations embraced Christianity at a much higher rate than the larger, more internationally influential USPACOM nations.

A handful of USPACOM nations claim Islam as their dominant religious tradition, including Bangladesh, Malaysia, and Brunei, and while Islam is not the dominant religion in USPACOM as a whole, USPACOM does play host to the largest democratic Muslim majority nation in the world—Indonesia. Buddhism is the most dominant religious practice in most nations, including Thailand, Burma, and Cambodia. Approximately 71.4% of the population of Japan claims Buddhism as their primary religion; however, 83.9% of the population also claim Shintoism, demonstrating that one particular form of belief is not preferred even among individuals. Buddhism was also the state religion of China until

the Chinese government declared China officially atheist. In South Korea and Vietnam the largest religious preference is no religion at all (49.3% and 80.8% of the populations, respectively.)

Art (Aesthetics & Recreation)

The history of art in Asia-Pacific culture is ancient. For thousands of years, China was the dominant influence on art of all types throughout East Asia despite the efforts of nations to maintain their own identities; for example, Chinese influence has been found in Japanese art even during the height of Japan's isolationist period. Art forms found throughout Asian culture, heavily influenced by China, include narrative painting, wood-block prints, decorative clay pottery, and calligraphy. When Buddhism was adopted in China as the state religion in the fifth century CE, the influence of Buddhism on all Asian art was profound.

Dance and theater also play a large role in Asian culture. Unlike in the West where music, theater, and dance are a separate art form, known as performing arts, in East Asia these artistic expressions intermingle with each other and with the visual arts. Poems are written to be sung, songs are danced, and dances enact stories. Dramatic dialogue without music is rare; puppets, masks, highly stylized makeup and costumes are common. The influence of Buddhism, particularly Zen Buddhism, is largely responsible for the Japanese tea ceremony, ink painting, and rock-and-sand gardens. In Hindu tradition, the world was created by the Cosmic Dance of Lord Shiva; consequently, dance is a part of all Hindu rituals. Dance is seen and felt in everyday life in South Asia: farmers dance for a good harvest; festivals, marriages, and births are celebrated by community dancing; and rarely is an Indian film made without half a dozen dances. Beginning in India and spreading throughout East Asia, dance became highly stylized with conventional movements proscribed for every part of the body and with the eyes and hands being the most important. The 32 movements of feet, 24 single-hand gestures, 13 movements of the head, and 36 movements of the eyes, for example, all mean different things in combination and those meanings are understood not only in the dance, but are recognized in paintings, wood blocks, and other visual art forms.

Asia-Pacific music is distinguishable by the use of tones and pitches not commonly heard in Western scales. Additionally, Asian music in general lacks a concern for harmony. All instruments generally play the same basic melody. Unlike in the West, where the goal of an orchestra is to merge different instruments into one harmonious musical whole, East Asian instruments are meant to be heard individually. In keeping with the wholistic concept of art in Asian culture, East Asian music is rarely written without some form of musical or spoken word accompaniment.

USPACOM Mission and Current Posture

The official mission of USPACOM, headquartered in Honolulu, Hawaii, is to protect and defend the United States, its territories, Allies, and interests; to promote regional security and deter aggression alongside Allies and partners; and, if deterrence fails, to respond to the full spectrum of military contingencies to restore Asia-Pacific stability and security. USPACOM strategic guidance specifies that the major focus areas of USPACOM are as follows:

- Strengthen and advance alliances and partnerships

- Mature the US-China military-to-military relationship

- Develop the US-India strategic partnership

- Remain prepared to respond to Korean Peninsula contingencies

- Counter transnational threats

The USPACOM commander is the senior US military authority in the Pacific Area of Responsibility (AOR). He reports to the President of the United States through the Secretary of Defense and is supported by four component commands: US Pacific Fleet, US Pacific Air Forces, US Army Pacific, and US Marine Forces Pacific. These commands are headquartered in Hawaii and have forces stationed and deployed throughout the region. USPACOM military and civilian personnel number approximately 330,000, or about one-fifth of total US military strength. US Navy and Marine forces are numerically the largest elements in the AOR. US Pacific Fleet includes five aircraft carrier strike groups and US Marine Corps Pacific possesses about two-thirds of US Marine Corps combat strength. US Air Forces Pacific comprises approximately 39,000 Airmen and 350 aircraft; and US Army, Pacific has about 50,000 personnel, including four Stryker brigades. USPACOM also has more than 1,200 Special Operations personnel. Finally, there are more than 13,000 US Coast Guard personnel available to support U.S. military forces in the region.

Today the United States remains the preeminent power in the Asia-Pacific. US presence in the region is both welcomed and desired by the countries in the region; however, it is clear that the United States cannot afford to take our level of influence for granted. Many countries, such as China, see strategic opportunities in increasing their own influence in the region. It is critical that the United States maintains open channels of communication with China while working to build military cooperation with their armed forces. India—the largest democracy in the region—with its rapidly increasing economic power and global influence, also warrants particular consideration when examining the posture and influence of USPACOM.

Conclusion

USPACOM is characterized—above all else—by its geographic, political, and cultural diversity. Some of the closest partners and allies of the United States reside within its territory; likewise, some of the nations of greatest interest to US national security are found in this region. It is critical to examine these nations in detail to gain a better understanding of the strategic role of USPACOM and the capabilities and challenges inherent in this diverse region. Hopefully this overview has piqued your interest to learn more about this area of the world. To help you do that, refer to the next section for links to Internet sources that provide more specific information about the countries included in this command's area of responsibility.

STUDENT ASSIGNMENTS

Students will select a specific country from the list provided and deliver a 5-9-minute prepared briefing addressing the topic. Use the framework below to develop the main points, but to ensure the topics are covered you must submit your list of preferred main points to your instructor for approval prior to beginning your research. To assist in your research, a list of Web sites is provided on the next page.

Additionally, you must prepare a ½ to 1-page bullet background paper on your subject. You should provide a copy of your paper to your instructor prior to your briefing. You can then use the paper to give your briefing. The bullet paper will follow the format in *The Tongue and Quill*. Pick a country and two domains from the lists below:

Countries: China, India,North Korea, South Korea, Vietnam

Domains: Family & Kinship, Religion & Spirituality, Sex & Gender, Politics & Social Relations, Economics & Resources, Time & Space, Language & Communication, Technology & Material, History & Myth, Sustenance & Health, Aesthetics & Recreation, Learning & Knowledge

Main Point 1 (choose one from the list of cultural domains)

Main Point 2 (choose a different domain for your 2nd main point)

RESEARCH SITES

- **Defense Language Institute** http://www.dliflc.edu/products.html

- **Field Support Modules** http://fieldsupport.lingnet.org/index.html

- **Library of Congress** http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/profiles.html

- **Military Policy Awareness Links** http://merln.ndu.edu/index.cfm?type=page&pageID=3

- **Miller Center of Public Affairs** http://millercenter.org/scripps

- **NATO** http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/index.htm

- **The World Factbook** https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/index.html

- **United Nations** http://www.un.org/en/

- U**S Department of State—Background Notes** http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/

- **US Department of State—Regional Bureaus** http://www.state.gov/p/index.htm

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Joint Operations

Cognitive Lesson Objective:
- Know the concept of joint operations.

Cognitive Samples of Behavior:
- Describe joint operations.

- Describe the joint functions.

- State the range of military operations

- Outline the operational joint chain of command from the President to the individual components.

- Identify the joint warfare values.

Affective Lesson Objectives:
- Respond to the need for American military forces to conduct joint operations to accomplish US national objectives.

- Respond, during class discussion, to the value of the chain of command from the President and Secretary of Defense to the unified commands and joint warfare values.

Affective Sample of Behavior:
- Actively participate in classroom discussion.

JOINT OPERATIONS

Given the nature of modern warfare, the United States has little choice but to train for and conduct joint operations. The Services continue to downsize, but our operational requirements remain the same. If the United States is to maintain itself as the world's true superpower, then it must be able to defeat any enemy at any time. At some point in the future, the US military may face an enemy that's larger in numbers and equal in terms of technology. The success of the war will hinge upon training and execution. A successful joint campaign enables a smaller force to defeat a larger foe by capitalizing on the strengths of each service. This is why we must conduct joint operations.

Fundamental Concepts

War is socially sanctioned violence to achieve a political purpose. In its essence, war is a violent clash of wills, a complex, human undertaking that does not respond to deterministic rules. Clausewitz described it as "the continuation of politics by other means." It is characterized by the shifting interplay of a trinity of forces (rational, non-rational, and irrational) connected by principal actors that comprise a social trinity of the people, military forces, and government. He noted that the conduct of war combines obstacles such as friction, chance, and uncertainty. The cumulative effect of these obstacles is often described as "the fog of war."

These observations remain true today, and place a burden on the commander to remain responsive, versatile, and adaptive in real time to seize opportunities and reduce vulnerabilities. This is the art of war. As a nation, the United States wages war employing all instruments of national power—diplomatic, informational, military, and economic. The President employs the Armed Forces of the United States to achieve national strategic objectives. Decisive unified action ensures unity of effort focused on those objectives and leads to the conclusion of operations on terms favorable to the United States.

In the traditional paradigm, nation-states wage war for reasons as broad and varied as the array of national interests. By contrast, the context of irregular warfare (IW) is marked by a violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant population. Irregular warfare favors indirect and asymmetric approaches, though it may employ the full range of military and other capacities in order to erode an adversary's power, influence, and will. Our enemies may be loosely organized networks or entities with no discernible hierarchical structure. Nevertheless, they have critical vulnerabilities to be exploited within their interconnected political, military, economic, social, informational, and infrastructure systems. These actors often wage protracted conflicts in an attempt to break the will of the nation-state. Military operations alone rarely resolve such conflicts. This publication will address all the instruments of national power.

Nation-states have sovereign rights and a social contract with their inhabitants; therefore, they have sovereign responsibilities to combat these irregular threats. The Armed Forces of the United States conduct military operations as a joint force. "Joint" connotes activities, operations, and organizations in which elements of two or more military departments participate. Joint warfare is team warfare. The synergy that results from the operations of joint forces maximizes the capability of the force. The advantage of a joint team extends beyond the battlefield and across the range of military operations. A joint operation does not require that all forces participate in a particular operation merely because they are available. The joint force commander (JFC) has the authority and responsibility to tailor forces for the mission at hand, selecting those that most effectively and efficiently ensure success.

Conducting joint operations generally involves 12 broad principles, collectively known as the "principles of joint operations". These principles guide warfighting at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war. They combine the nine historical principles of war (present in joint doctrine since its inception) with three additional principles born out of experience across the range of military operations: restraint, perseverance, and legitimacy. Together these three with the traditional nine principles of war make up the 12 principles of joint operations.

The Joint Force

Over two decades after the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense (DOD) Reorganization Act of 1986 directed actions to remove the institutional barriers to jointness, the Armed Forces of the United States is a joint team. All Service components contribute their distinct capabilities to the joint campaign; however, their interdependence is critical to overall joint effectiveness. Joint interdependence is the purposeful reliance by one Service on another Service's capabilities to maximize complementary and reinforcing effects of both; the degree of interdependence varying with specific circumstances. US military service is based on values that US military experience has proven to be vital for operational success. These values adhere to the most idealistic societal norms, are common to all the Services, and represent the essence of military professionalism.

The Strategic Security Environment

The security environment is extremely fluid, with continually changing coalitions, alliances, partnerships, and new national and transnational threats constantly appearing, disappearing, or in remission. The US military is well positioned to conduct operations but must also be prepared to address emerging peer competitors and irregular, catastrophic, and disruptive challenges. These challenges include irregular warfare, catastrophic terrorism employing weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and disruptive threats to US ability to maintain its qualitative edge and to project power.

Joint operations increasingly occur in urban terrain and the information environment. The operational area often contains humanitarian crisis conditions requiring foreign humanitarian assistance. In addition to military forces and noncombatants, there may be a large number of other government agencies (OGAs), intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), regional organizations, and elements of the private sector in the operational area. Each agency and/or organization has an agenda that may complement or compete with the activities of the other's and the overall joint operation. Political and military leaders must consider the employment of military force in operations characterized by a complex, interconnected, and global operational environment -- the composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander.

Traditional war is characterized as a confrontation between nation-states or coalitions/alliances of nation-states. This confrontation typically involves small-scale to large-scale, force-on-force military operations in which adversaries employ a variety of conventional military capabilities against each other in the air, land, maritime, and space physical domains and the information environment (which includes cyberspace). The objective is to defeat an adversary's armed forces, destroy an adversary's war-making capacity, or seize or retain territory in order to force a change in an adversary's government or policies. Military operations in traditional war normally focus on an adversary's armed forces to ultimately influence the adversary's government.

Hostile states and non-state actors in possession of WMD represent significant security challenges. Some states, including supporters of terrorism, already possess WMD and are seeking even greater capabilities, as tools of coercion and intimidation. The US homeland and other US interests are potential targets for direct and indirect attack. Rather than directly confronting US military operations, adversary attacks may focus on political and public institutions. Lines of communications, ports, airports, staging areas, civilian populations, economic centers, and regional allies and friends are likely targets. The US continues to become more dependent on cyberspace. Private, public, global, and regional information systems in cyberspace are tempting targets. Advances in information technology increase the tempo, lethality, and depth of warfare. It is imperative that we safeguard the inherent vulnerabilities of current and developing systems.

Maintaining national security and managing the inevitable changes are continuous processes that often preclude simple solutions. It requires well planned and executed joint campaigns and operations in conjunction with ad hoc partners. Additionally, joint operations are increasingly being conducted simultaneously (i.e., where offensive, defensive, and stability operations are ongoing in the same operational area). US joint forces have global reach and are capable of engaging threats, influencing potential adversaries, assuring friends, and promoting peace and stability with a variety of capabilities.

Joint Functions

Joint functions are related capabilities and activities grouped together to help the Joint Force Commander (JFC) integrate, synchronize, and direct joint operations. The six functions that are common to joint operations at all levels of war are Command and Control (C2), Intelligence, Fires, Movement and Maneuver, Protection, and Sustainment. Some functions, such as C2 and Intelligence, apply to all operations. Others, such as Fires, apply as required by the JFC's mission. A number of subordinate tasks and related capabilities help define each function.

Command and Control (C2)

C2 encompasses the exercise of authority and direction by a JFC commander over assigned and attached joint and multinational forces in the accomplishment of the mission. The JFC provides operational vision, guidance, and direction to the joint force.

Intelligence

Understanding the operational environment is one of the fundamentals of joint warfare. Intelligence provides this understanding to JFCs. Intelligence tells JFCs what their adversaries or potential adversaries are doing, what they are capable of doing, and what they may do in the future. The intelligence process also attempts to identify what the adversary is able to discern about friendly forces. This function assists JFCs and their staffs in visualizing the battlespace operational environment and in achieving information superiority. Intelligence also contributes to information superiority by attempting to discern the adversary's probable intent.

During deployment, employment, and redeployment, the operational environment generates threats to joint forces that likely will produce combat-related battle injuries (BIs) and/or disease and non-battle injury casualties (DNBIs). Intelligence provides information that assists decisionmakers with devising force protection measures to mitigate these threats. Consequently, a complete intelligence picture, to include medical information, is required. Intelligence is critical in all joint operations. In military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence activities, intelligence operations seek to provide the national leadership with the information needed to realize national goals and objectives, while providing military leadership with the information needed to accomplish missions and implement the National Security Strategy. During major operations and campaigns, intelligence identifies the adversary's capabilities and centers of gravity (COG), projects probable courses of action (COAs), and assists in planning friendly force employment. During crisis response contingencies or contingency operations, intelligence provides assessments that help the JFC decide which forces to deploy; when, how, and where to deploy them; and how to employ them in a manner that accomplishes the mission at the lowest human and political cost. Intelligence also provides information on the existing occupational and environmental hazards and their associated risks to include toxic industrial chemical storage/use sights, epidemic and endemic diseases, environmental

contamination locations, and other items. Surveillance and reconnaissance are important elements of the intelligence function that support the collection of information across the levels of war and range of military operations.

Fires

To employ fires is to use available lethal and nonlethal weapons against an enemy or adversary. Policy, guidance, and planning for the employment of operational and strategic fires is primarily a joint function. Joint fires are produced during the employment of forces from two or more components in coordinated action to achieve desired results in support of and toward a common objective. Fires typically provide destructive force, but some ways and means (such as offensive information operations) can be employed with little or no associated physical destruction. This function uses a wide variety of lethal and nonlethal capabilities.

Movement and Maneuver

This function encompasses disposing joint forces to conduct campaigns, major operations, and other contingencies by securing positional advantages before combat operations commence and by exploiting tactical success to achieve operational and strategic objectives and effects. This function includes moving or deploying forces into an operational area and conducting maneuver to operational depths for offensive and defensive purposes. It also includes enhancing and assuring the mobility of friendly forces.

Protection

The protection function focuses on conserving the joint force's fighting potential in four primary ways—(1) active offensive and defensive measures (such as air defense) that protect the joint force, its information, its bases, and necessary infrastructure from an adversary's attack; (2) passive measures (such as concealment) that make friendly forces, systems, and facilities difficult to locate, strike, and destroy; (3) applying technology and procedures to reduce the risk of fratricide. As the JFC's mission requires, the protection function also extends beyond force protection to encompass protection of US noncombatants; the forces, systems, and civil infrastructure of friendly nations; and other governmental and non-governmental agencies; and (4) emergency response and management.

Sustainment

Sustainment is the provision of personnel (to include legal and religious support), logistics, and other support required to maintain and prolong operations until successful mission accomplishment. JFCs should begin building sustainment capabilities during the earliest phases of a campaign or operation. Sustainment should be a priority consideration when

the timed-phased force and deployment data list is built. As with achieving full-spectrum superiority, sustainment provides JFCs with flexibility to develop any required branches and sequels and to refocus joint force efforts as required.

The fundamentals of joint warfare are: unity of effort, concentration, initiative, agility, extension, freedom of action, sustainment, clarity, knowledge of self, and knowledge of the enemy. These principles and fundamentals should be applied broadly in peace, crisis, or conflict, avoiding literal or dogmatic interpretations, across the range of military operations. Military operations typically represent only one dimension of US action and require integration with the other instruments of national power.

The Armed Forces of the United States must be prepared to conduct a complex set of military operations simultaneously across and within theaters. A combat operation to contain a conflict in one part of the world may be taking place alongside a number of supporting and independent operations to reinforce peace, provide foreign humanitarian assistance, and assist civil authorities. The military power of the United States must be prepared to fulfill both its fundamental purpose of winning the Nation's wars and provide unconditional service in support of other broad national objectives.

Conclusion

Today's military actions require all services to capitalize on the strengths of each other for synergy. Gone are the days of inter-service rivalry. The security environment now often requires the U.S. forces to be able to funtion as one military to achieve a common objective. You can read further about joint warfare at: http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine.

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Department of the Army

Cognitive Lesson Objective:
- Know the basic mission and organization of the Department of the Army.

Cognitive Samples of Behavior:
- State the Army mission.

- List the major components of the Department of the Army.

- Know the definition of landpower.

- List the strategic roles of the Army.

Affective Lesson Objective:
- Respond to the importance of the US Army's role in the national security process and develop an appreciation for the other services within our military.

Affective Sample of Behavior:
- Voluntarily participate in classroom discussions.

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

Our Service

During the first year of the American Revolution, on 14 June 1775, the Second Continental Congress established "the American Continental Army." The United States Army is the senior Service of the Armed Forces. As one of the oldest American institutions, it predates the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution. For almost two and a half centuries, Army forces have protected the Nation. The Army flag is adorned with over 180 campaign and battle streamers, each one signifying great sacrifices on behalf of the Nation. Because of the Army, the United States is an independent and undivided nation. The Army explored the Louisiana Purchase, ended slavery on the battlefields of the Civil War, helped build the Panama Canal, played a major part in winning two world wars, stood watch throughout the Cold War, deposed Saddam Hussein, and took the fight to Al Qaeda.

No major conflict has ever been won without boots on the ground. Strategic change rarely stems from a single, rapid strike, and swift and victorious campaigns have been the exception in history. Often conflicts last months or years and become something quite different from the original plan. Campaigns require steady pressure exerted by US military forces and those of partner nations, while working closely with civilian agencies. Soldiers not only seize, occupy, and defend land areas, they can also remain in the region until they secure the Nation's long-term strategic objectives. Indeed, inserting ground troops is the most tangible and durable measure of America's commitment to defend American interests, signaling the Nation's intent to protect friends and deny aggression.

US forces operate in the air, land, maritime, space, and cyberspace domains. The land domain is the most complex of the domains, because it addresses humanity—its cultures, ethnicities, religions, and politics. War begins and ends based upon how it affects the land domain. The Army provides the United States with the landpower to prevent, shape, and win conflicts in the land domain. US law, Department of Defense directives, and the nature of landpower mold the Army's mission.

Mission

The Army derives their mission from the intent of Congress and through the laws governing the Armed Forces. The Constitution of the United States gives Congress the authority to determine the size and organization of the Army, and gives the President overall command of the Armed Forces. Title 10, United States Code (USC), regulates the Armed Forces and states that the Army includes land combat and service forces, and such aviation and water transport as may be organic therein. Title 10 also states that Army forces are to be organized, trained, and equipped primarily for prompt and sustained combat incident

to operations on land. "Prompt" requires the Army to be able to provide combat-ready forces immediately; "sustained" requires the Army to maintain forces in the fight until the President says otherwise.

The Army mission is refined based on Department of Defense Directive 5100.01. This directive assigns specific responsibilities to the Armed Forces. In common with all of the Services, the Army provides "conventional, strategic, and special operations forces to conduct the range of operations as defined by the President and the Secretary of Defense." Yet, unique to the Army is the responsibility of preparing the land forces necessary to effectively prosecute war except as otherwise assigned. It is also responsible, in accordance with integrated joint mobilization plans, for its expansion to meet the needs of war. Based on Title 10, USC, and Department of Defense Directive 5100.01, the Army's mission becomes:

> **The mission of the United States Army is to fight and win the Nation's wars through prompt and sustained land combat, as part of the joint force.**

This mission is accomplished by—

- Organizing, equipping, and training Army forces for prompt and sustained combat incident to operations on land;

- Integrating our capabilities with those of the other Armed Services;

- Accomplishing all missions assigned by the President, Secretary of Defense, and combatant commanders;

- Remaining ready while preparing for the future.

ORGANIZATION OF THE US ARMY

Components

The Army, as one of the three military departments (Army, Navy, and Air Force) reporting to the Department of Defense, is composed of two distinct and equally important components: the active component, which is the Regular Army, and the reserve component, which is made up of the United States Army Reserve and the Army National Guard.

Regular Army. The Regular Army is a federal force consisting of full-time Soldiers and Army civilians. Both are assigned to the operational and institutional organizations engaged in the day-to-day Army missions. Congress annually determines the number of Soldiers the Army can maintain in the Regular Army.

Army Reserve. The Army Reserve is the Army's primary federal reserve force. It is a complementary force consisting of highly trained Soldiers and units able to perform a vast range of missions worldwide. Their primary role is to provide the specialized units, capabilities, and resources needed to deploy and sustain Army forces at home and overseas. The Army Reserve is also the Army's major source of trained individual Soldiers for augmenting headquarters staffs and filling vacancies in Regular Army units. The Army Reserve provides a wide range of specialized skills required for consequence management, foreign army training, and stability and reconstruction operations. Many of its Soldiers are civilian professionals.

Army National Guard. The Army National Guard has a dual mission that includes federal and state roles. In its federal role, the National Guard provides trained units able to mobilize quickly for war, national emergencies, and other missions. In its state role, it prepares for domestic emergencies and other missions as required by state law. National Guard Soldiers serve as the first military responders within states during emergencies. National Guard units are commanded by their state executive (usually the governor) unless they are mobilized for a federal mission. Members of the National Guard exemplify the state militia traditions of citizens answering the call to duty. Their selfless service reflects America's values and inspires others to the noble calling that serves freedom.

Missions

Regardless of component, the Army conducts both operational and institutional missions. Soldiers and Army civilians serve in two functionally discrete entities known as the institutional Army and the operational Army.

Institutional Army. The institutional Army supports the operational Army. Institutional organizations provide the infrastructure necessary to raise, train, equip, deploy, and ensure the readiness of all Army forces. The training base provides military skills and professional education to every Soldier—as well as members of sister services and allied forces. It also allows the Army to expand rapidly in times of war. The industrial base provides world-class equipment and logistics for the Army. Army installations provide the power-projection platforms required to deploy land forces promptly to support combatant commanders. Once those forces are deployed, the institutional Army provides the logistics needed to support them.

Without the institutional Army, the operational Army cannot function. Without the operational Army, the institutional Army has no purpose.

Operational Army. The operational Army consists of numbered armies, corps, divisions, brigades, and battalions that conduct full spectrum operations around the world.

- **Numbered Armies (Field Army).** The Field Army is the largest formation of land forces, usually consisting of two or more corps with supporting arms and services.

- **Corps. 20,000 To 40,000 Soldiers.** The Corps is the deployable level of command required to synchronize and sustain combat operations. It also provides the framework for multinational operations. The Corps provides command, control and logistical support of two to five divisions. The Corps is commanded by a Lieutenant General (O-9) who is assisted by a Command Sergeant Major (E-9) and an extensive staff.

- **Division. 10,000 To 16,000 Soldiers.** The Division performs major tactical operations and can conduct sustained battles and engagements. Divisions are numbered (e.g., 1st Armored Division, 82nd Airborne Division) and are categorized by one of five types: Light Infantry, Mechanized Infantry, Armor, Airborne, or Air Assault. The Division is commanded by a Major General (O-8) who is assisted by two principal Brigadier Generals (O-7) who perform duties as Assistant Division Commanders – one for Maneuver and one for Support. The Command Sergeant Major (E-9) is the principal non-commissioned officer assistant. Divisions are comprised of three tactical maneuver (Infantry and/or Armor) Brigades and a Division base of combat support and combat service support elements.

- **Brigade/Group/Regiment. 1,500 To 3,200 Soldiers.** A brigade is a significantly large unit that can be employed on independent or semi-independent operations. The Brigade is normally commanded by a Colonel (O-6) although in some cases a Brigadier General (O-7) may assume command. The Command Sergeant Major (E-9) is the principal non-commissioned officer assistant. During combat operations, Infantry, Armor, and Cavalry Brigades normally have a field artillery battalion, engineer battalion, and combat service support branches (e.g., Engineer Brigade, Signal Brigade). Armored Cavalry units of this size are referred to as Regiments (e.g., 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment). Ranger and Special Forces units of this size are referred to as Groups.

- **Battalion. 300 To 1,000 Soldiers.** The Battalion is a unit that is both tactically and administratively self-sufficient. In war fighting, Battalions are capable of independent operations of limited duration and scope. The Battalion is typically composed of four to six companies, and is commanded by a Lieutenant Colonel (O-5) with a Command Sergeant Major (E-9) as the primary non-commissioned officer assistant. The Commander has a Battalion Staff of officers and non-commissioned officers to oversee missions, training, administration, and logistics. A Battalion Task-Force is a Battalion-size unit with additional companies attached in direct support to enhance mission capability. An armored or air cavalry unit of equivalent size is referred to as a squadron.

- **Company/Troop/Battery. 60 To 200 Soldiers.** The Company is a cohesive tactical sized unit that can perform a battlefield function on its own. It is capable of receiving and controlling additional combat, combat support or combat service support elements to enhance its mission capability. The Company has a small headquarters element to assist the Commander. Typically, three to five platoons form a Company, with between 15-25 vehicles. The Company is normally

commanded by a Captain (O-3). A First Sergeant (E-8) is the commander's principal non-commissioned officer assistant. Depending on the type of unit, a Company may be called a Troop or Battery. Ground or Air Cavalry units (armor and aviation units specifically trained for reconnaissance missions) refer to these elements as Troops. Field Artillery and Air Defense Artillery units refer to these elements as Batteries.

- **Platoon. 16 To 44 Soldiers.** The Platoon is the basic combat unit capable of maneuvering in the conduct of combat operations and is led by a Lieutenant (O-1/O-2) who is assisted by a Platoon Sergeant who is a Sergeant First Class (E-7). A platoon consists of two to four squads/sections depending on the type of unit.

- **Squad. Eight To 16 Soldiers.** Typically led by a Sergeant (E-5) or Staff Sergeant (E-6), the squad is the smallest element in the Army organizational structure. Its size is dependent on its function. In some units, two squads may compose a section led by a Staff Sergeant. In a light infantry (non-mechanized) squad, there are normally nine soldiers and a squad leader. In a mechanized infantry squad, there are up to 15 soldiers, organized into two teams. Each team is assigned to a tactical vehicle.

LANDPOWER FOR THE NATION

The Army gives the United States landpower. According to the US Army Doctrine Publication 3-0, **landpower is the ability—by threat, force, or occupation—to gain, sustain, and exploit control over land, resources, and people.**

Landpower includes the ability to—

- Impose the Nation's will on an enemy, by force if necessary.

- Engage to influence, shape, prevent, and deter in any operational environment.

- Establish and maintain a stable environment that sets the conditions for political and economic development.

- Address the consequences of catastrophic events—both natural and man-made— to restore infrastructure and reestablish basic civil services.

- Secure and support bases from which joint forces can influence and dominate the air, land, and maritime domains of an operational environment.

The Land Domain

The distinguishing characteristic of the land domain is the presence of humans in large numbers. Humans live on the land and affect almost every aspect of land operations. Soldiers operate among populations, not adjacent to them or above them. They accomplish missions face-to-face with people, in the midst of environmental, societal, religious, and political tumult. Winning battles and engagements is important but alone is usually insufficient to produce lasting change in the conditions that spawned conflict. The Army's effectiveness depends just as much on their ability to manage populations and civilian authorities as it does on technical competence and employing equipment. Managing populations before, during, and after all phases of the campaign normally determines its success or failure. Soldiers often cooperate, shape, influence, assist, and coerce according to the situation, varying their actions to make permanent the otherwise temporary gains achieved through combat.

The influence Soldiers exert before and after campaigns—shaping—is more important than ever. Shaping is best understood as altering conditions that, if left unchanged, can precipitate international crisis or war. Geographic combatant commanders shape their regions through many cooperative actions with partner nations.

The equipment, training, and financial assistance the United States provides to partner nations improve their abilities to secure themselves. This assistance often improves access to key regions. Security cooperation also communicates our position to potential adversaries in that region. If necessary, combat-ready Army units can deploy to threatened areas, reinforcing host-nation forces, complementing American air and sea power, and communicating unmistakable American intent to partner and adversary alike. These are the tangible effects of the Army's role in security cooperation and assistance. Other benefits are less tangible, and are developed through face-to-face training involving our Soldiers and those of our partners. Working together develops trust between military partners. The impression we make upon multinational forces, local leaders, and other government agencies can produce lasting benefits.

Land Operations

Land combat against an armed adversary is an intense, lethal human activity. Its conditions include complexity, chaos, fear, violence, fatigue, and uncertainty. The battlefield often teems with noncombatants and is crowded with infrastructure. In any conflict, Soldiers potentially face regular, irregular, or paramilitary enemy forces that possess advanced weapons and rapidly communicate using cellular devices. Our enemies will employ terror, criminal activity, and every means of messaging to further complicate our tasks. To an ever-increasing degree, activities in cyberspace and the information environment are inseparable from ground operations. Successful land combat requires protected friendly networks (wired and wireless) while exploiting or degrading the enemy's networks. The information environment, our use of it, and inform and influence activities continues to

increase. Because the land environment is so complex, the potential for unintended consequences remains quite high. In the end, it is not the quality of weapons, but the quality of Soldiers employing them that determines mission success.

Any mission can rapidly become a combination of combat, governance, and civil security. Most of the Army missions require combinations of lethal and nonlethal actions. This is inherent in the nature of land operations, usually conducted in the midst of noncombatants. When called upon, Soldiers accomplish nonlethal missions such as disaster relief and humanitarian assistance quickly and effectively. Regardless, their combat capability often underwrites their ability to provide assistance. Nobody in or outside the military profession should mistake the Army for anything other than a force organized, equipped, and trained for winning the Nation's wars.

Unified Land Operations is the title of the Army's basic operational doctrine, ADP 3-0. It emphasizes the necessity of synchronizing our capabilities with the other Services (joint), other government agencies (interagency), other international government partners (intergovernmental), and military forces from partner nations (multinational). The basic premise of unified land operations is that Army forces combine offensive tasks, defensive tasks, stability tasks, and defense support of civil authorities (DSCA) in concert with joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational partners. Army operations conducted overseas combine offensive, defensive, and stability tasks. Within the United States, the Army supports civil authorities through DSCA. If hostile powers threaten the homeland, the Army combines defensive and offensive tasks with DSCA. The effort accorded to each task is proportional to the mission and varies with the situation. These combinations are labeled as decisive action because of their necessity in any campaign.

Civilian agencies of the United States Government are indispensable partners with landpower. These agencies operate on land and depend on landpower to create secure conditions in regions of conflict. Secure land areas allow them to work directly with local leaders to address the causes of conflict. The enemy often perceives the Army's constructive actions in concert with these agencies as a significant threat, since we help isolate the enemy from popular support. In turn, the Army needs civilian agencies to provide expertise and resources needed to reconstruct facilities within war-torn regions and relieve Soldiers of the responsibility of administering to noncombatants.

STRATEGIC ROLES OF THE ARMY

The Army Vision states that, "The Army is globally engaged and regionally responsive; it is an indispensible partner and provider of a full range of capabilities to Combatant Commanders in a Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Multi-national (JIIM) environment. As part of the Joint Force and as America's Army, in all that we offer, we guarantee the agility, versatility and depth to Prevent, Shape, and Win."

The Army Vision captures the three strategic roles of the Army: prevent, shape, and win. Their roles are derived from the National Military Strategy and Department of Defense directives, and they clarify the enduring reasons for which the Army is manned, trained, and equipped.

Prevent. First, the Army must prevent conflict. Prevention requires a credible force. Friends and adversaries must believe that the Army is credible in order to prevent conflicts. Credibility equates to capability and is built upon combat-ready forces that can be tailored and deployed rapidly. Credible Army forces convince potential opponents that, committed as part of our joint force, the US Army is unbeatable. Partner nations under external threat need to understand that introducing US forces alters the regional military balance in their favor and bolsters their resolve to resist aggression.

Credible Army forces also reduce the risk of miscalculation by an adversary. The United States cannot depend upon our military reputation alone to dissuade adversaries. Our enemies must understand what we can do today and tomorrow, in a way that leaves no room for miscalculation. To convince any potential adversary, all military services need rigorous and realistic training, expert leaders, modern equipment, and quality personnel. Given that, the Army's landpower becomes more than credible; combined with the Nation's air, sea, and space-based power, it becomes preeminent.

Shape. Second, the Army must help shape the international environment to enable our coalition partners and contain our enemies. The Army accomplishes that by engaging with partners, fostering mutual understanding through military-to-military contacts, and helping partners build the capacity to defend themselves. Shaping the strategic security environment improves the chance for peace around the world. It diminishes regional tensions and is therefore vital to American security interests. Each geographic combatant commander develops programs to improve regional stability and promote peace through security cooperation. American military capabilities can reassure allies, while dissuading adversaries. Shaping by itself cannot prevent conflict, but it nudges global regions away from military confrontation and increases the effect of diplomatic, informational, and economic instruments of national power.

Soldiers are particularly important in this effort, since all nations have land security elements, even if lacking credible air and naval forces. To the degree that other nations see the US as the best army in the world, they gravitate to us to help them achieve the same high standards of military performance, or tie their security to the world's most capable army. Soldiers deploy around the world to train with security forces of other

nations. Army special operations forces carry out a significant part of this effort; however, conventional units frequently train with foreign counterparts. Concurrently, Army Soldiers and Civilians train foreign military personnel at Army bases. This unobtrusive use of landpower quietly builds multinational partnerships that may be critical in war. It increases our partners' capacities to provide for their own defense and is vital to ensuring we have access to regional bases should Army forces have to deploy to their region.

Win. Finally, the Army must be ready to win, and win decisively; to be able to attack and defend successfully against enemy ground forces. Joint force commanders require Army units that can destroy an enemy with all types of combat power. Land combat remains chaotic, lethal, and intensely human. The ability to prevail in ground combat becomes a decisive factor in breaking the enemy's will. If the enemy cannot be defeated from a distance using Army and joint capabilities, then Soldiers close with and destroy the enemy—room to room, face to face. This requires skilled use of combined arms, the ability to fight using all available combat power in complementary ways. Combined arms multiply the effectiveness of Army units exponentially. If Army units cannot find, fix, close with, and destroy armed opponents in any terrain; exploit success; shatter opponents' coherence; and break the enemy's will to continue the fight, then neither the Army, nor the joint force, will be decisive. But lethality, by itself, is not enough. If Army forces do not address the requirements of noncombatants in the joint operational area before, during, and after battle, then the tactical victories achieved by firepower only lead to strategic failure and world condemnation.

For the Army, winning is especially important because historically, they commit the greatest number of personnel to the combat area and suffer the highest casualties. With so much at stake, the American people expect commanders to advise political leaders candidly on the military implications of any potential conflict beforehand. If US forces fight, the Nation expects our military to inflict a defeat of sufficient magnitude that will cause the enemy to abandon his objectives and agree to peace on our terms. In other words, Americans expect the Army to dominate and win decisively.

Conclusion

Prevent, shape, and win summarizes the Army's roles as part of the joint force. Their roles depend upon their capabilities, depth, experience, and professionalism. Preventing and shaping are not episodic. The Army fulfills these roles continuously, based upon the requirements of combatant commanders. When the Army is committed, winning is their non-negotiable obligation to the Nation. As the Army adapts to future strategic challenges, they continue to be the force of decisive action.

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Cognitive Lesson Objective:
- Know the basic mission and organization of the Department of the Navy.

Cognitive Samples of Behavior:
- State the Navy's mission.

- Know the principal components of the Department of the Navy.

- State the aspects of naval doctrine.

Affective Lesson Objective:
- Respond to the role played by the US Navy in US power projection.

Affective Sample of Behavior:
- Read the assigned student text.

For centuries, sea power has played a vital role in determining and supporting national strategies. We have progressed from sail to steam to nuclear power; from guns to missiles; from biplanes to supersonic aircraft to the space age. Still, sea power remains a fundamental factor in world strategy. Because of its great dependence on overseas sources for raw materials and because of its overseas allies, the United States must maintain naval forces capable of controlling the sea lines of communication and projecting its sea power across the oceans.

US national security cannot be assured without a balance of maritime superiority in favor of the United States and its allies. The United States Navy is the principle force to achieve and maintain the maritime superiority this nation requires.

MISSION AND ORGANIZATION OF THE US NAVY

The U.S. Navy was founded on 13 October 1775, and the Department of the Navy was established on 30 April 1798. The Department of the Navy has three principal components: The Navy Department, the operating forces, including the Marine Corps, the reserve components, and, in time of war, the U.S. Coast Guard (in peace, a component of the Department of Homeland Security); and the shore establishment.

Mission

The mission of the Navy is to maintain, train and equip combat-ready Naval forces capable of winning wars, deterring aggression, and maintaining freedom of the seas.

Navy Department

The Navy Department consists of executive offices mostly located in Washington, D.C.. Some of the offices include the Secretary of the Navy, Chief of Naval Operations, Naval Inspector General, and the Judge Advocate General of the Navy.

- **The Secretary of the Navy (SECNAV)**
  SECNAV is responsible for, and has the authority under Title 10 of the United States Code, to conduct all the affairs of the Department of the Navy, including recruiting, organizing, supplying, equipping, training, mobilizing, and demobilizing. The Secretary also oversees the construction, outfitting, and repair of naval ships, equipment, and facilities.

SECNAV is responsible for the formulation and implementation of policies and programs that are consistent with the national security policies and objectives established by the President and the Secretary of Defense. The Department of the Navy consists of two uniformed Services: the United States Navy and the United States Marine Corps.

- **The Chief of Naval Operations (CNO).** The Chief of Naval Operations is the senior military officer in the Navy. The CNO is a four-star admiral and is responsible to the Secretary of the Navy for the command, utilization of resources, and operating efficiency of the operating forces of the Navy and of the Navy shore activities assigned by the Secretary.

A member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the CNO is the principal naval advisor to the President and to the Secretary of the Navy on the conduct of war, and is the principal advisor and naval executive to the Secretary on the conduct of naval activities of the Department of the Navy. Assistants are the Vice Chief of Naval Operations (VCNO), the Deputy Chiefs of Naval Operations (DCNOs) and a number of other ranking officers. These officers and their staffs are collectively known as the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (OpNav).

The Shore Establishment

The shore establishment provides support to the operating forces (known as "the fleet") in the form of facilities for the repair of machinery and electronics; communications centers; training areas and simulators; ship and aircraft repair; intelligence and meteorological support; storage areas for repair parts, fuel, and munitions; medical and dental facilities; and air bases.

The Operating Forces

The operating forces commanders and fleet commanders have a dual chain of command. Administratively, they report to the CNO and provide, train, and equip naval forces. Operationally, they provide naval forces and report to the appropriate Unified Combatant Commanders. As units of the Navy enter the area of responsibility for a particular Navy area commander, they are operationally assigned to the appropriate numbered fleet. All Navy units also have an administrative chain of command with the various ships reporting to the appropriate Type Commander. The Operating Forces include:

- US Fleet Forces Command (formerly Atlantic Fleet)—In collaboration with US Pacific Fleet, US Fleet Forces Command organizes, trains, maintains, and equips Navy forces, develops and submits budgets, and executes readiness and personnel accounts to develop both required and sustainable levels of Fleet readiness. Additionally, the command serves as the unified voice for Fleet training requirements and policies to generate combat-ready Navy forces per the Fleet Response Plan using the Fleet Training Continuum (FTC).

- The Pacific Fleet—Protects and defends the collective maritime interests of the United States and its allies and partners in the Asia-Pacific region. In support of US Pacific Command and with allies and partners, US Pacific Fleet enhances stability, promotes maritime security and freedom of the seas, deters aggression, and when necessary, fights to win.

- Military Sealift Command—Supports the United States by delivering supplies and conducting specialized missions across the world's oceans.

- Naval Special Warfare Command—Characterized by the use of small units with unique ability to conduct military actions that are beyond the capability of conventional military forces. Mission areas include unconventional warfare, direct action, combating terrorism, special reconnaissance, foreign internal defense, information warfare, security assistance, counter-drug operations, personnel recovery and hydrographic reconnaissance. Units utilize a combination of specialized training, equipment, and tactics in completion of missions worldwide.

- US Naval Forces Europe/Africa— Area of responsibility covers approximately half of the Atlantic Ocean, from the North Pole to Antarctica; as well as the Adriatic, Baltic, Barents, Black, Caspian, Mediterranean, and North Seas. It encompasses 105 countries with a combined population of more than one billion people and includes a landmass extending more than 14 million square miles.

- Naval Network Warfare Command—Directs the operations and security of the Navy's portion of the Global Information Grid (GIG). Delivers reliable and secure Net-centric and Space warfighting capabilities in support of strategic, operational, and tactical missions across the Navy.

- US Naval Forces Central Command—Conducts persistent maritime operations to forward US interests, deter and counter disruptive countries, defeat violent extremism and strengthen partner nations' maritime capabilities in order to promote a secure maritime environment in the USCENTCOM area of responsibility.

- US Naval Forces Southern Command—Supports US Southern Command joint and combined full-spectrum military operations by providing a sea-based, forward presence to ensure freedom of maneuver in the maritime domain, to foster and sustain cooperative relationships with partners, and to fully exploit the sea to enhance regional security and cooperation.

- Naval Reserve Forces—Provide mission-capable units and individuals to the Navy/ Marine Corps Team throughout the full range of operations from peace to war. The Navy Reserve represents 20 percent of the Navy's total assets and is a significant force multiplier the fleet must have to meet its growing global commitments.

- Operational Test and Evaluation Forces—Conducts operational test and evaluation in a realistic operational environment and advises the Chief of Naval Operations on the operational effectiveness and suitability of new and improved warfighting systems, capabilities, tactics, and procedures.

DOCTRINE OF THE US NAVY

The art of naval warfare is to employ surface, submarine, and air forces in such a manner as to exploit the strengths and minimize the weaknesses of each. Naval Warfare doctrine serves as a guide in this endeavor. The special advantages and broad options of naval forces make them valuable to the national command authorities. Naval forces can respond to contingencies or crisis situations worldwide with the precise type and magnitude of force necessary. In achieving any objective, coordination is required between the various warfare specialties. The following paragraphs describe US Navy doctrine associated with each specialty.

Surface Warfare

Surface warfare (SUW) is the destruction or neutralization of enemy surface combatants and merchant vessels. Its aim is to deny the enemy the effective use of his surface warships and cargo carrying capability.

Surface warfare has evolved over the years but is still central to exercising sea control. Prior to World War I, enemy surface ships were sought out and engaged by other surface ships. They had numerous heavy guns that could effectively neutralize enemy shipping as well as his base support areas. With the advent of aircraft carrier warfare in World War II, the role of the surface ship changed to support fast carrier attack operations. The carrier and assigned aircraft, along with the submarine, assumed responsibilities of neutralizing enemy targets at great distances from the battle force. The Navy no longer concentrates its readiness resources to support a fixed deployment window. Instead, readiness is built and preserved throughout a Fleet unit's operational cycle. This approach has provided a higher degree of agility and ability to generate readiness more efficiently.

Air Warfare

Air warfare involves the destruction of enemy air platforms and airborne weapons, whether launched from air, surface, subsurface, or land platforms. It comprises all the measures that are employed in achieving air superiority. The US Navy provides carrier-based, command and control (C2), and tactical aircraft; surface combatants; and land-based aircraft that are capable of integrating with the air defense (AD) systems in other services to defend those assets prescribed by the Joint Task Force (JTF) Commander.

The employment of air warfare measures must be coordinated and controlled to detect and defeat the enemy air threat. The Navy conducts a "layered" defense, in which enemy forces would be attacked in a series of engagements by different types of weapons systems. This maximizes the protection afforded to our forces, and makes it difficult for an enemy to overcome any one element of our defensive screen. Thus, while longer-range, outer-zone defenses provide a high degree of leverage to our air warfare effort; the Navy must also rely on strong local defenses in the immediate vicinity of naval task forces to protect against "leakers" that might penetrate our other defenses. As in all naval operations, the commanding officer remains responsible for the defense of his ship against attack from the air.

Undersea Warfare

Undersea Warfare (USW) is the destruction or neutralization of enemy submarines. The aim of USW warfare is to deny the enemy the effective use of submarines. USW operations include offensive and defensive anti-submarine warfare (ASW) and mine warfare (MIW) and are conducted to establish battlespace dominance in the underwater environment.

Having undersea superiority permits US and allied forces to accomplish the full range of their required missions and denies opposing forces the effective use of their underwater systems and weapons. Littorals provide challenging environment due to short detection ranges. A hostile submarine is one of the greatest threats to a surface ship. The prosecution of a submarine contact is a complex operation that involves many watch stations.

Amphibious Warfare

An amphibious operation is typically a joint service operation that is launched from the sea by an amphibious task force (ATF) embarked on Naval ships or craft. The primary purpose of the operation is to introduce a landing force (LF) ashore with sufficient air support and Naval gunfire to establish a lodgment with the assault echelon and then drive follow-on assault forces ashore to accomplish the assigned mission.

Amphibious operations can be designed for the following purposes:

- Achieving campaign objectives in one swift stroke by capitalizing on surprise and simultaneous execution of supporting operations. These operations are intended to strike directly at the enemy's critical vulnerabilities and decisive points to defeat its operational or tactical centers of gravity.

- Serving as the initial phase of a campaign or major operation where the objective is to establish a military lodgment (beachhead) to support subsequent phases.

- Serving as supporting operations in a campaign to either fix enemy forces or deny the use of an area or facilities to the enemy in support of other combat operations.

- Supporting military operations other than war to accomplish the following: war deterence, conflict resolution, promotion of peace and stability, and support for civil authorities in response to domestic crises.

The success of the operation depends upon the closest cooperation and detailed coordination among all participating forces. They must be trained together, and they must have a clear understanding of the mutual obligations and the special capabilities and problems of each component. The requirements in preparing for an amphibious operation tend to create problems that are more extensive than for other types of military operations.

Mine Warfare

Mine warfare is the use of mines and mine countermeasures to control or deny the use of sea or harbor areas through the laying of minefields and countering enemy mine warfare through the destruction or neutralization of hostile minefields. Using the not-so-glamorous, but highly effective method of mine warfare, enemy naval forces and merchant ships can be denied entry or exit from ports; passage through strategic chokepoints can be stopped or delayed; and amphibious warfare capabilities can be neutralized. Unless US naval forces maintain a highly sophisticated mine countermeasure capability, potential enemies can inflict these same limitations on American merchant and naval surface or submarine forces. Successful mine warfare operations require local air superiority and sea control to be achieved, and mine clearance is a time-consuming operation.

There are three branches of the mine warfare triad, but by combining the three branches the Navy is able to minimize the limitations and maximize the strengths of each platform.

- Air: MH-53E helicopters provide speed, flexibility, and mine location capability.

- Surface: Provides endurance, mine location, identification, and neutralization capabilities.

- Undersea: Provides accuracy in reacquisition and target identification/neutralization.

Strike Warfare

Strike warfare involves the destruction or neutralization of enemy targets ashore, destruction of enemy air and ground forces ashore, and interdiction of communication and transportation over a broad area via aircraft, submarines, and surface ships.

The aircraft carrier and its associated strike group continue to be the centerpiece for Navy forward presence. The Carrier Strike Group, or CSG, is composed of an aircraft carrier and its embarked air wing, surface combatants, submarines, and combat logistic ships. It operates as a contained, self-sustaining force, with little dependence on shore based support, able to operate for long periods of time in international waters and airspace.

Carrier Groups are trained and ready upon arrival in theater, and can perform the full spectrum of their warfare capabilities concurrently-from projecting power ashore, to providing missile protection to friendly forces and areas, to exercising control of the sea and airspace.

US MERCHANT MARINE

"[Mariners] have written one of its most brilliant chapters. They have delivered the goods when and where needed in every theater of operations and across every ocean in the biggest, the most difficult and dangerous job ever undertaken. As time goes on, there will be greater public understanding of our merchant's fleet record during this war [World War II]."

President Franklin D. Roosevelt

Note: The following is excerpted from the US Merchant Marine Academy Web site

Although not part of the Department of the Navy, in time of war or national emergency, the US merchant marine becomes vital to national security as a "fourth arm of defense." Our merchant ships bear the brunt of delivering military supplies overseas to our forces and allies. The stark lessons of twentieth century conflict prove that a strong merchant marine is an essential part of American seapower.

A glimpse at a map of the United States shows us that we are a maritime nation. To the east is the Atlantic Ocean; to the west, the Pacific; off our southern border, the Gulf of Mexico; in the north, the Great Lakes; and crisscrossing our states, great rivers like the Mississippi and other inland waterways.

Every hour of every day, ships of all types ply the waters in and around our nation. They leave our ports laden with US goods bound for foreign markets, or arrive in our harbors with merchandise and materials for American consumers.

There are tankers traveling along the west coast with raw petroleum for our refineries; Great Lakes vessels loaded with iron ore, coal or other minerals for America's industry; huge containerships in Eastern ports, their box-like containers filled with manufactured goods; general cargo ships in the Gulf unloading pallets of coffee and crates of fruit; tugboats pushing and pulling barges carrying the Midwest's grain.

These kinds of vessels, owned by US companies, registered and operated under the American flag, comprise the US merchant marine. This fleet of highly productive ships is a major part of our system of commerce, helping guarantee our access to foreign markets for sale of our manufactured goods.

The nation's economic and security needs met by the US merchant marine are compelling. Today, the United States imports approximately 85 percent of some 77 strategic commodities critical to America's industry and defense. Although we, as a nation, account for only six percent of the world population, we purchase nearly a third of the world's output of raw materials. Ninety-nine percent of these materials are transported by merchant vessels.

A ship at sea does not operate in a vacuum. It depends on a framework of shoreside activities for its operations. This industry includes companies which own and manage the vessels; ports and terminals where cargo is handled; yards for ship repair; services like marine insurance underwriters, ship chartering firms, admiralty lawyers, engineering and research companies; and increasingly today, intermodal systems of trucks and railroads to distribute goods around the country. But the most important element in a productive merchant fleet and a strong transportation industry is people—men and women who are intelligent, dedicated, well-educated, and competent. Consequently, the purpose of the US Merchant Marine Academy is to ensure that such people are available to the nation as shipboard officers and as leaders in the transportation field who will meet the challenges of the present and the future.

Conclusion

Every branch of the US military plays a vital part in our national security, and the Navy has a long and storied history in the annals of US History. Without its contributions the nation could not have come into existence, defeated the fascist regimes in World War II, or taken the battle to the Taliban. Although this reader was not designed to cover the history of the Navy, it is hoped that by reading about its role you will be interested enough to take your study of this sister service to the next level.

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Cognitive Lesson Objective:
- Know the organization and mission of the US Marine Corps.

Cognitive Samples of Behavior:
- List the missions of the Marines.

- Describe the Marines' operational concepts of maneuver and combined arms.

- Identify the primary missions of Marine aviation.

Affective Lesson Objective:
- Respond to the important role played by the US Marine Corps in US national policy decisions.

Affective Sample of Behavior:
- Voluntarily participate in classroom discussion.

THE US MARINE CORPS

In a training environment, we stress the importance of readiness. The Marine Corps' design and purpose embody the concept of readiness. Everything the Marines do is centered on this goal. Since the founding of the Marines in 1775, they have played a significant role in US military and diplomatic affairs. They may serve in purely "land" campaigns, but they are organized primarily as a naval expeditionary force. Perhaps former President Reagan said it best, "When trouble arises, the nation looks to her Marines." In this lesson we'll look at the Marines' basic missions, structure, and operations.

A Short History of the United States Marine Corps

On 10 November 1775, the Continental Congress meeting in Philadelphia passed a resolution directing, "two battalions of Marines be raised" for service as landing forces with the fleet. This resolution, sponsored by John Adams, established the Continental Marines and marked the birth date of the United States Marine Corps. Serving on land and at sea, these first Marines distinguished themselves in a number of important operations, including their first amphibious raid into the Bahamas in March 1776, under the command of Captain (later Major) Samuel Nicholas. Nicholas, the first commissioned officer in the Continental Marines, remained the senior Marine officer throughout the American Revolution, and is considered to be the first Marine Commandant. The Treaty of Paris in April 1783 brought an end to the Revolutionary War and as the last of the Navy's ships were sold, the Continental Navy and Marines ceased to exist.

Following the Revolutionary War and the formal reestablishment of the Marine Corps on 11 July 1798, Marines saw action in the quasi-war with France (1798-1800), landed in Santo Domingo (1800), and took part in many operations against the Barbary pirates along the "Shores of Tripoli" (1801-1815).

Marines participated in numerous naval operations during the War of 1812, participated in the defense of Washington at Bladensburg, Maryland (1814), and fought alongside Andrew Jackson in the defeat of the British at New Orleans (1815). The decades following the War of 1812 saw the Marines protecting American interests around the world, in the Caribbean (1821-1822), at the Falkland Islands (1832), Sumatra (1831-1832), and off the coast of West Africa (1820-61), and also close to home in the operations against the Seminole Indians in Florida (1836-1842).

During the Mexican War (1846-1848), Marines seized enemy seaports on both the Gulf and Pacific coasts. While landing parties of Marines and sailors were seizing enemy ports along the coast, a battalion of Marines joined General Scott's army at Pueblo and marched and fought all the way to the "Halls of Montezuma," Mexico City.

Marines served ashore and afloat in the Civil War (1861-1865). Although most service was with the Navy, a battalion fought at Bull Run and other units saw action with the blockading squadrons and at Cape Hatteras, New Orleans, Charleston, and Fort Fisher. The last third of the nineteenth century saw Marines making numerous landings throughout the world, especially in the Orient and in the Caribbean.

Following the Spanish-American War (1898) in which Marines performed with valor in Cuba, Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Philippines, the Corps entered an era of expansion and professional development. It saw active service in the Philippine Insurrection (1899-1902), the Boxer Rebellion in China (1900), and in numerous other nations, including Nicaragua (1899, 1909-1910, 1912-1913), Panama (1901-1902, 1903-1904), Dominican Republic (1903-1904, 1916-1924), Cuba (1906-1909, 1912, 1917), Mexico (1914), and Haiti (1915-1934).

In World War I, the Marine Corps distinguished itself on the battlefields of France as the 4th Marine Brigade earned the title "Devil Dogs" for heroic action at Belleau Wood, Soissons, St. Michiel, Blanc Mont, and in the final Meuse-Argonne offensive (1918). Marine aviation, which dates from the summer of 1912 when First Lieutenant Alfred A. Cunningham began aviation training, also played a part in the war effort, flying day bomber missions over France and Belgium. More than 30,000 Marines served in France in WWI; more than a third were killed or wounded in 6 months of intense fighting.

During the two decades before World War II, the Marine Corps began to develop in earnest the doctrine and organization needed for amphibious warfare. The success of this effort was proven first on Guadalcanal, then on Bougainville, Tarawa, New Britain, Kwajalein, Eniwetok, Saipan, Guam, Tinian, Peleliu, Iwo Jima, and Okinawa. By the end of the war in 1945, the Marine Corps had grown to include six divisions, five air wings, and supporting troops. Its strength in World War II peaked at 485,113. The war had cost the Marines nearly 87,000 dead and wounded, with 82 Marines earning the Medal of Honor.

While Marine units were taking part in the post-war occupation of Japan and North China, studies were being undertaken at Quantico, Virginia, which concentrated on attaining a "vertical envelopment" capability for the Corps through the use of helicopters. Landing at Inchon, Korea in September 1950, Marines proved that the doctrine of amphibious assault was still viable and necessary. After the recapture of Seoul, the Marines advanced to the Chosin Reservoir only to see the Chinese Communists enter the war. After years of offensives, counteroffensives, seemingly endless trench warfare and occupation duty, the last Marine ground troops were withdrawn in March 1955. More than 25,000 Marines had been killed or wounded during the Korean War.

In July 1958, a brigade-size force landed in Lebanon to restore order there. During the Cuban Missile Crisis in October 1962, a large amphibious force was marshaled, but not landed. In April 1965, a brigade of Marines landed in the Dominican Republic to protect Americans and evacuate those who wished to leave.

The landing of the 9th Marine Expeditionary Brigade at Da Nang in 1965 marked the beginning of large-scale Marine involvement in Vietnam. By summer 1968, after the enemy's Tet Offensive, Marine Corps strength in Vietnam rose to a peak of approximately 85,000. The Marine withdrawal began in 1969 as the South Vietnamese began to assume a larger role in the fighting; the last ground forces were out of Vietnam by June 1971. The Vietnam War, the longest in the history of the Marine Corps, exacted a high cost, as well, with over 13,000 Marines killed and more than 88,000 wounded.

In July 1974, Marines aided in the evacuation of US citizens and foreign nationals during the unrest on Cyprus. The following year saw Marines evacuating embassy staffs, American citizens, and refugees in Phnom Penh, Cambodia, and Saigon, Republic of Vietnam. Later, in May 1975, Marines played an integral role in the attempted rescue of the crew of the SS *Mayaguez* captured off the coast of Cambodia.

The mid-1970s saw the Marine Corps assume an increasingly significant role in defending NATO's northern flank, as amphibious units of the 2d Marine Division participated in exercises throughout northern Europe. The Marine Corps also played a key role in the development of the Rapid Deployment Force, a multi-service organization created to insure a flexible, timely military response around the world when needed. The Maritime Prepositioning Ships (MPS) concept was developed to enhance this capability by prestaging equipment needed for combat in the vicinity of the designated area of operations, and reducing response time as Marines travel by air to linkup with MPS assets.

The 1980s brought an increasing number of terrorist attacks on US embassies around the world. Marine security guards, under the direction of the State Department, continued to serve with distinction in the face of this challenge. In August 1982, Marine units landed at Beirut, Lebanon, as part of the multinational peacekeeping force. For the next 19 months these units faced the hazards of their mission with courage and professionalism. In October 1983, Marines took part in the highly successful, short-notice intervention in Grenada.

As the decade of the 1980s came to a close, Marines were summoned to respond to instability in Central America. Operation JUST CAUSE was launched in Panama in December 1989 to protect American lives and restore the democratic process in that nation.

Less than a year later, in August 1990, the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait set in motion events that would lead to the largest movement of Marine Corps forces since World War II. Between August 1990 and January 1991 some 24 infantry battalions, 40 squadrons, and more than 92,000 Marines deployed to the Persian Gulf as part of Operation DESERT SHIELD. Operation DESERT STORM was launched 16 January 1991, the day the air campaign began. The main attack came overland beginning on 24 February when the 1st and 2d Marine Divisions breached the Iraqi defense lines and stormed into occupied Kuwait. Meanwhile, the threat from the sea in the form of two Marine expeditionary brigades held in check some 50,000 Iraqis along the Kuwait coast. By the morning of 28 February, 100

hours after the ground war began, almost the entire Iraqi Army in the Kuwaiti theater of operations had been encircled, with 4,000 tanks destroyed and 42 divisions destroyed or rendered ineffective.

Overshadowed by the events in the Persian Gulf during 1990-91 were a number of other significant Marine deployments demonstrating the Corps' flexible and rapid response. Included among these were noncombatant evacuation operations in Liberia and Somalia to rescue civilians and diplomats, and humanitarian lifesaving operations in Bangladesh, the Philippines, and northern Iraq.

In December 1992, Marines landed in Somalia, marking the beginning of a 2-year humanitarian relief operation in that famine-stricken and strife-torn nation. In another part of the world, land and carrier-based Marine Corps fighter-attack squadrons and electronic warfare aircraft supported Operation DENY FLIGHT in the no-fly zone over Bosnia-Herzegovina. During April 1994, Marines once again demonstrated their ability to protect American citizens in remote parts of the world when a Marine task force evacuated 142 US citizens from Rwanda in response to civil unrest in that country.

Closer to home, Marines went ashore in September 1994 at Cape Haitian, Haiti, as part of the US force participating in the restoration of democracy in that country. During this same period Marines were actively engaged in providing assistance to the Nation's counter-drug effort, assisting in battling wild fires in the western United States, and aiding in flood and hurricane relief operations.

In 2003, Marines were an integral part of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. The very next year 2000 Marines were called into action to step up the hunt for al-Qaeda and Taliban leaders in support of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM.

Today's Marine Corps stands ready to continue in the proud tradition of those who so valiantly fought and died at Belleau Wood, Iwo Jima, Chosin Reservoir, and Khe Sanh. As stated by the Corps' 31st Commandant, General Charles C. Krulak:

> "Our war-fighting legacy is one of duty, strength, sacrifice, discipline, and determination. These themes are cornerstones of the individual Marine and of our Corps. Indeed, they are woven into the very fabric of our battle color. However, while we reflect on our past, let us also rededicate ourselves to a future of improvement. For, as good as we are now, we must be better tomorrow. The challenges of today are the opportunities of the twenty-first century. Both will demand much of us all."

Combining a long and proud heritage of faithful service with the leadership and resolve to face tomorrow's challenges will keep the Marine Corps the "best of the best."

THE MARINE CORPS TODAY

Organization

The United States Marine Corps is a separate armed service that falls under the Secretary of the Navy. There is no Secretary of the Marine Corps, The Secretary of the Navy acts in this capacity. The focus of the Secretary is on nonoperational plans, programs, and procedures, and other areas that will provide the Commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC) with the needed manning and materials to fulfill the Marines' mission. The Commandant fills a role similar to the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, in that he is focused on the operations of the Marines. The Commandant provides advice to the Secretary of the Navy on the administration, discipline, training, internal organization, requirements, and readiness of the Marine Corps. He is also in charge of other Marine activities as the Secretary may direct.

Because the Marines are considered a naval force and work in conjunction with the Navy, the CMC and Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) have a very close working relationship. There are times when Marine elements are assigned under the Operating Forces of the Navy. There are also cases in which members or organizations of the Navy are assigned to the Marine Corps. When this occurs, the marine and naval commanders will find themselves in charge of troops from both services. The CMC is also a permanent member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, a co-equal with the other chiefs. In this capacity, he informs the Secretary of the Navy of all matters pertaining to the Joint Staff, and acts as an advisor to the Secretary of Defense and President. Today it's apparent that the Marine Corps is a separate service, as the Marines are continuously assigned tasks not associated with naval campaigns.

The Marines are broken down into three broad areas: **Headquarters Marine Corps, Supporting Establishment, and Operating Forces.** We'll take a look at each of these major subdivisions, focusing mainly on the operational forces.

Headquarters Marine Corps

Headquarters Marine Corps (HQMC), is in the executive branch of the Department of the Navy. It furnishes professional assistance to the Secretary of the Navy, accomplishes all military support duties that deal with the Marine Corps, coordinates actions of Marine Corps organizations, prepares instructions for execution of approved plans, and investigates and reports efficiency of the Marine Corps in support of combatant commands. During war, the CMC works with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the communications chain of command between the Secretary of Defense, and the combatant commanders. The combatant commanders are those individuals who are in charge of US unified commands, such as US Transportation Command or US Central Command.

Supporting Establishment

The Supporting Establishment has about 28,000 personnel; it runs the training schools, Marine Corps Recruiting Command, the Marine Corps Combat Development Command, Marine Corps Systems Command, and Headquarters. Its contributions are vital to the readiness of the Corps.

Missions

The Marines' missions are to:

Organize, train, and equip to provide Fleet Marine Forces (FMF) of combined arms, together with supporting air components, for service with the fleet in the seizure or defense of advanced naval bases, and for the conduct of such land operations as may be essential to the prosecution of a naval campaign;

- Furnish security detachments and organizations for service on naval vessels of the Navy;

- Furnish security detachments for protection of naval property at naval stations and bases;

- Perform other duties as the President may direct; and

- Develop in coordination with the Army and Air Force, those phases of amphibious operations that pertain to the tactics, techniques, and equipment used by landing forces.

Marine Corps Doctrine

The way in which the Marine Corps fights its wars is based on two operational concepts: maneuver and combined arms.

Maneuver warfare is defined in Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 1 as a warfighting philosophy that seeks to shatter the enemy's cohesion through a series of rapid, violent, and unexpected actions which create a turbulent and rapidly deteriorating situation with which he cannot cope. This concept recognizes that we will probably have lower numbers in force, strive for limited casualties, and have limited external support to draw from. These factors necessitate that we attempt to create the situation described above, in space and time, to achieve a quick victory. Maneuver warfare stresses the attempt to circumvent a problem and attack it from a position of advantage, rather than straight on. The goal is to apply the Marines' strengths to enemy weaknesses through the mastery of spatial relationships, and a faster relative tempo.

In space (meaning the area friendly forces occupy relative to the enemy forces), the Marines attempt to gain an advantage in positioning. An example would be if we were able to pin an enemy with the rear of their force against an impenetrable gap, while maintaining a position of higher elevation to fire upon them from. At the same time, friendly forces may have the only possible escape route for the enemy blocked off. Many films on warfare have depicted situations in which an enemy attacked their foe when he was in a river canyon, or some physical area of weakness. Taking advantage of relative positions to the enemy is part of maneuver warfare.

Tempo is a powerful tool and vital to the success of maneuver. Basically, tempo is the rate at which operations may be carried out. It attacks the enemy's physical strength as well as its morale. It targets the enemy's cohesion, organization, and psychological balance. To effectively use tempo, one must possess a great ability to read the tactical situation quickly and act decisively. While the enemy may react in a certain way to one form of attack, he may be making himself vulnerable to another. Quick recognition and action are needed to gain the edge. Through mastery of space and tempo, an inferior force may gain decisive superiority at the necessary time and place.

Use of the combined arms concept is what makes maneuver warfare effective. Marine employment of forces, and even their organization, is based upon their coordination together to produce a situation with which the enemy cannot cope. Combined arms is defined as the full integration of arms in such a way that in order to counteract one attack, the enemy must make themselves more vulnerable to another. In effect, we again give the enemy a no-win situation.

Here is an example: We use assault support (tactical airlift) to quickly concentrate superior forces for a breakthrough. We use artillery and close air support to support the infantry penetration, and deep air support to interdict enemy reinforcements. Targets that cannot be effectively suppressed by artillery are engaged by close air support. In order to defend against the infantry attack, the enemy must make themselves vulnerable to the supporting arms. If they seek cover from the supporting arms (meaning air support), our infantry can maneuver against them. In order to block our penetration, the enemy must reinforce quickly with their reserve. But in order to avoid our deep air support, they must stay off the roads, and thus can only move slowly. If they move slowly, they cannot reinforce in time to prevent our breakthrough. We have put them in a no-win dilemma. Combined arms are used in each aspect of the Marine Corps' operations. It is especially critical in the organization of the operating forces, as it allows each Arm of the force to enhance the other with great effectiveness.

Operating Forces

The operating forces are considered the heart of the Marine Corps. They provide capability to maintain a forward presence and respond to crisis, and fighting power to the combatant commanders. The major elements of these forces include: the Fleet Marine Forces (FMFs); Marine Corps Security Forces at installations and onboard ships; and the Marine Security Guard Battalion, with its detachments at embassies and consulates worldwide. These forces make up roughly 70 percent of all active duty Marines.

FMFs are an integral part of the two US Navy fleets, the Atlantic Fleet and Pacific Fleet. The responsibility for their readiness and performance is with the CMC. The CMC also retains administrative control over these units. When deployed, the FMFs are operationally under the authority of the fleet commander (a Navy person). The fleet commander also acts as the Marine forces component commander for geographic combatant commanders.

The FMFs are expeditionary in nature. This means that they are designed to be able to accomplish specific objectives in foreign countries. Thus, an expeditionary force describes the unit's capability, not its structure. The FMFs are organized in a way that will give them the best chance for victory. This organization is known as a Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF).

Marine Air-Ground Task Force

One of the missions of the Marines as mentioned previously, is to "provide forces of combined arms... for service with the fleet." The MAGTF is designed to do just that. As an expeditionary force, the objective is to provide commanders with an effective means of dealing with the uncertainties of future threats, providing as it does forward deployed units that are inherently balanced, sustainable, flexible, responsive, expandable, and credible. MAGTFs (pronounced "mag-taffs") operate forward from the sea as task-organized, combined arms components of naval expeditionary forces, and are equipped and trained to conduct forward presence and crisis response missions while operating in the littoral areas of the world.

A MAGTF is not an echelon of command such as a major command in the Air Force; rather, it is an organizational concept. MAGTF organization is based on the requirements for amphibious warfare, naval political reinforcement operations, interoperability and mutual support with other units of the fleet, and the principles of naval operational organization of which it is a part. It is a building block concept; the fleet/joint force commander's operational requirement or task is analyzed, and type units are drawn from a Marine division, aircraft wing, and force service support group into an air-ground-logistics team under one commander to meet the task. The resulting MAGTF may be of any size; the relative percentage and composition of its component elements may vary, depending on the mission, and in conflict, the enemy situation.

To exploit the advantages of a closely integrated air and ground force, deployment must be under the command of a single commander. MAGTFs have a built in capability to be deployed and use their own supplies for preplanned periods usually 60 to 90 days. They also take advantage of maritime prepositioning forces, which are strategically located, pre-loaded ships. These assets are vital to the first series of operations in the objective area. Massive amounts of supplies are needed to support Marine activities. Airlift gets the most time critical cargo in position, but there are also other supplies that must arrive relatively quickly. Prepositioning allows the United States to overcome the slow response time of sealift. Lastly, the Marines also have equipment prepositioned in Norway to significantly reduce reaction time to emergencies.

In a time of expected crisis, MAGTFs embarked aboard amphibious ships, provide decision makers with the capabilities to:

- Move forces into crisis areas without revealing their exact destinations or intentions

- Provide continuous presence in international waters

- Provide immediate national response in support of humanitarian and natural disaster relief operations

- Provide credible but nonprovocative combat power just over the horizon of a potential adversary, for rapid employment as the initial response to a crisis

- Support diplomatic processes for peaceful crisis resolution, before employing immediately responsive combat forces

- Project measured degrees of combat power ashore, if required

- Introduce additional forces sequentially into a theater of operations

- Operate independent of established airfields, basing agreements, and overflight rights

- Conduct combat operations ashore, using inherent combat service support brought into the area of operations

- Enable the introduction of follow-on Army and Air Force units by securing staging areas ashore

- Withdraw rapidly at the conclusion of operations, or remain to help restore stability to the affected area

- Plan and commence execution of a mission within 6 to 48 hours of receiving a warning order (dependent on size)

In light of this, it's easy to understand why MAGTFs are so desirable to have. Regardless of size, all MAGTFs have the following capabilities:

- Operate as a component of a joint task force

- Enter a battle area at night

- Operate under adverse weather conditions

- Operate from over the horizon, without electronic emissions, by surface or air

- Locate the enemy and stabilize the situation

- Engage, kill, or capture the enemy in a rural or urban environment

- Operate in hostile nuclear, biological, and chemical environments

- Provide sea-based sustainment

Whatever the scenario, MAGTFs will include four major elements:

- Command Element: This is MAGTF headquarters. It provides the command, control, and coordination essential for effective execution of operations.

- Ground Combat Element: This element conducts and coordinates combat ground operations. Basically set up as an infantry, it works with artillery, reconnaissance, armor, and combat engineers.

- Aviation Combat Element: This element conducts and coordinates combat aviation operations.

- Combat Service Support Element: This element provides a full range of combat service support functions to the MAGTF.

Again, MAGTFs are considered expeditionary forces regardless of their size. The Marines have developed different sized MAGTFs that can be deployed worldwide on short notice. To provide a frame of reference for our purposes, MAGTFs can be categorized into four types:

- Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF)

- Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB)

- Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU)

- Special-Purpose MAGTF (SPMAGTF)

Marine Expeditionary Force

The MEF is the principle war-fighting organization in the Marines. Normally commanded by a Lieutenant General and designed to handle a large crisis or contingency, MEFs deploy with a 60-day supply of materials. Their size can range from one to several infantry divisions (similar to Army infantry divisions), aircraft wings, and support groups. A MEF command element is capable of the mission of a joint task force headquarters, if needed. MEFs are the primary standing units of the Marines. There are only three MEFs in the whole active duty Marine Corps.

Marine Expeditionary Brigade

The MEB is a task organized MAGTF commanded by a Brigadier General and deploys with a 30-day supply of materials for operations. It's normally composed of a reinforced infantry regiment, composite Marine Aircraft Group (MAG), and a brigade service support group.

These expeditionary brigades are capable of rapid deployment and employment via amphibious shipping, by strategic air or sealift, through marriage with prepositioned material, or any combination of the three.

Marine Expeditionary Unit

The MEU is commanded by a Colonel and deploys with a 15-day supply of materials for operations. It's normally composed of a reinforced infantry battalion, composite helicopter squadron with AV-8B aircraft, and a combat support element.

Forward-deployed MEU embarked aboard Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) shipping operate continuously in the areas of responsibility of numerous unified commanders. These units are deployed as an immediately responsive, sea-based MAGTF to meet forward presence and limited power projection requirements.

Special Purpose MAGTF

The SPMAGTF is task-organized to accomplish specific missions for which the MEF or MEU would be inappropriate or too large to employ. SPMSGTFs can be organized, trained, and equipped to conduct a wide variety of expeditionary operations in response to a crisis or a peacetime mission. They are designated as SPMAGTF with a location: e.g., SPMAGTF (Liberia), SPMAGTF (Philippines), or SPMAGTF (Somalia). Their duties cover the spectrum from noncombatant evacuation to disaster relief and humanitarian missions.

Marine Division

Included in the FMFs are several subdivisions, which can be identified by the type of warfare they specialize in. These units make up the MAGTFs. The Marine division is the basic ground organization, or ground component. A division commander would be known as a type (type of unit) commander with respect to the MAGTF. They have sustained combat capability, and are assigned to execute amphibious assault operations and other actions as directed. Marine divisions consist of headquarters battalion, three infantry regiments, an artillery regiment, separate tank, reconnaissance, engineer, amphibious assault battalions, and a light armored infantry battalion. Divisions are employed in conjunction with Marine Aircraft Wings (MAW) as an integral part of a Marine Expeditionary force (MEF). When operations are sustained ashore, the division gets support from a force service support group (FSSG).

Marine Aircraft Wing

MAWs deploy in support of Marine divisions. They are task-organized, or tailored to specific types of missions. Marine Air Groups contain two or more tactical (operational) squadrons, a logistics, and an air base squadron. Squadrons are the basic unit of the MAW. Depending upon the type of aircraft assigned, a squadron may contain 12 to 24 airframes. (Marine fixed wing aircraft include:) AV-8B Harrier, F/A-18 Hornet, EA-6B Prowler, and KC-130 Hercules. Rotary wing aircraft include: AH-1W Super Cobra, UH-1N Huey, CH-46E Sea Knight, CH-53D Sea Stallion, CH-53E Super Stallion. All pilots are trained to serve aboard carriers in support of FMFs.

Marine aviation has two primary missions:

- Participate as the supporting air component of FMFs in the seizure and defense of advanced naval bases, and

- Conduct land operations essential to the prosecution of the naval campaign

A collateral mission of Marine aviation is to participate as an integral component of naval aviation in the execution of other Navy functions as the fleet commander directs.

On a broad scale, the purpose of Marine aviation is to support Marine Air-Ground Task Force operations. To accomplish this, the Marines fly six types of missions, similar to the missions the Air Force flies under the roles of air and space control, force application, and force enhancement.

- Offensive air support includes different types of close air support/interdiction.

- Antiair warfare missions include actions against enemy aircraft or missiles, their supporting forces, and their operating bases. In short, the aim is air superiority. This again falls in line with our role of air and space control.

- Assault support includes airlift support in area of operations. This includes rotary and fixed wing operations, refueling, air evacuation, logistical support, and battlefield illumination. This is similar to force enhancement.

- Aerial reconnaissance includes visual and electronic means of data collection. Again, similar to the force enhancement role.

- Electronic warfare involves using electromagnetic energy to determine, exploit, reduce, or prevent hostile use of the electromagnetic spectrum. Again, similar to the Air Force mission with the same objective.

- Aircraft and missile control comprises the capability of Marine aviation to exercise authority and direction of air support elements during operations.

Force Service Support Group

The Force Service Support Group (FSSG) is a composite grouping of functional components that provides combat support service (above the organic capability of supported units) to all elements of the MEF. The most significant attribute of the FSSG is that it is a permanently organized command charged with the responsibility to provide all major support functions for the MEF.

Security Forces

In addition to combat forces, the Marines provide security forces in a variety of scenarios. Currently, about 5,500 Marines are used to protect key naval installations and ships around the world. Fleet Antiterrorism Security Teams (FAST Teams) are used to deploy into high-threat areas, provide security for nuclear asset environments, and respond to other contingencies as needed. Lastly, Marines provide the Department of State with embassy security in 129 countries around the world.

Future Trends

The classic concept of amphibious assault is changing. The Marines and Navy have developed an over-the-horizon assault capability. Assaults may initiate beyond the horizon and quickly transit to shore before enemy forces can fire upon friendly forces. The use of tilt-rotor aircraft, air cushion landing craft, and advanced amphibian assault vehicle technology gives the needed speed and range to make this possible. Another advantage of an over-the-horizon assault is flexibility. A MAGTF 400 nautical miles off Norfolk, Virginia could land at any point on the coastline between New York and Florida. This ability to quickly attack such a wide area forces the enemy to spread out his defenses across that area, robbing him of the ability to mass his forces. It also allows our forces to have tactical surprise, and buys enough time for the critical consolidations of friendly forces, once ashore.

Conclusion

Their high level of preparedness and flexibility has made the Marines the force of choice in times of crisis. Indeed, they have been called "America's 911 Force." Swift to respond with a wide range of combat capabilities, Marines have routinely provided the nation's first answer to natural as well as man-made crises, from earthquakes and powerful storms to full scale hostile aggression across international boundaries. The Marine Corps' unique blend of readiness, integrated air-ground-logistic structure, and versatility in expeditionary roles has been designed for the supremely challenging initial response to crisis. The Corps is ready to respond to any situation to maintain our national security. When deterrence fails, the mission of the Marine Corps is to put, and hold their fingers in the dike until other forces of the Army and Air Force can arrive and sustain operations.

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The US Coast Guard

Cognitive Lesson Objective:

- Know the core missions of the United States Coast Guard (USCG).

Cognitive Sample of Behavior:

- State the USCG's three core missions.

Affective Lesson Objective:

- Respond to the role played by the USCG.

Affective Sample of Behavior:

- Voluntarily read the assigned text.

THE UNITED STATES COAST GUARD

The United States Coast Guard is a military, multi-mission, maritime service within the Department of Homeland Security and one of the nation's five armed services. Its core tenets are to protect the US maritime economy and environment, defend US maritime borders, and save individuals in peril. These roles are executed in all maritime regions over which the US has jurisdiction, including international waters where an agreement with foreign governments or international agencies has been reached.

The Coast Guard provides unique benefits to the nation because of its distinctive blend of military, humanitarian, and civilian law-enforcement capabilities. In order to execute these capabilities, the Coast Guard carries out 11 specific missions, covered by 3 core missions: Maritime Safety, Maritime Security, and Maritime Stewardship.

Maritime Safety: enforcing safe, secure, and environmentally sound operations of US flagged vessels throughout the world and foreign vessels operating in US waters, issuing licenses and documents to qualified mariners, conducting inspections of US and foreign vessels, and developing and monitoring vessel construction and performance.

A fundamental responsibility of the US government is to safeguard the lives and safety of its citizens. In the maritime realm, this duty falls mainly to the Coast Guard. In partnership with other federal agencies, state, local, and tribal governments, marine industries, and individual mariners, the Coast Guard improves safety at sea through complementary programs of mishap prevention, search and rescue, and accident investigation. Prevention activities include the development of standards and regulations, various types of plan review and compliance inspections, and a variety of safety programs designed to protect mariners.

Nearly all Coast Guard prevention activities are designed to protect mariners. For example, its commercial fishing vessel safety programs are designed to safeguard commercial fishermen, many of whom earn their living performing some of the most dangerous work in the world. The Coast Guard operates the International Ice Patrol to protect ships transiting the North Atlantic shipping lanes, documents and admeasures US flag vessels, and licenses commercial mariners.

However, the maritime domain is large and complex, and despite the Coast Guard's best efforts, mariners sometimes find themselves in harm's way. When they do, the Coast Guard has a long heritage and proud tradition of immediate response to save lives and property in peril. As the lead agency for maritime search and rescue (SAR) in US waters, they coordinate the SAR efforts of afloat and airborne Coast Guard units with those of other federal, state, and local responders. The Coast Guard also partners with the world's merchant fleet to rescue mariners in distress around the globe through the Automated Mutual-assistance Vessel Rescue (AMVER) system. Using its Captain of the Port (COTP) authorities and responsibilities, the Coast Guard also coordinates response efforts on waterways after an incident or disaster. In addition to responding to a variety of maritime

accidents and emergencies, the Coast Guard investigates their causes; determining whether applicable laws have been violated, or whether changes should be made to improve safety through prevention programs. This work is often done in coordination with the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB).

Coast Guard activities in support of maritime safety are often inseparable from those performed to protect the marine environment or secure the US Marine Transportation System (MTS). A routine inspection for safety compliance may uncover a serious risk to the environment. Coast Guard vessel traffic services not only reduce the risk of vessel collisions, but also provide maritime domain awareness, thereby improving security. A buoy tender working an aid to navigation may immediately divert to a search and rescue case. The integration of all Coast Guard missions has saved many thousands of lives, helped secure our citizens, and contributed to our national economic and environmental well-being.

In addition to commercial vessels, more than 76 million recreational boaters use our US waterways. As National Recreational Boating Safety Coordinator, the Coast Guard is focused on minimizing the loss of life, personal injury, property damage, and environmental harm associated with this activity. The Coast Guard Auxiliary, the civilian volunteer arm of the Coast Guard, is a key contributor to these boating safety efforts and has augmented our missions for over 60 years. The Coast Guard Auxiliary provides free boating safety courses, courtesy marine examinations for recreational boaters, verification for aids to navigation, and inspections of commercial facilities.

The Coast Guard is also America's voice in the International Maritime Organization (IMO), which promulgates measures to improve shipping safety, pollution prevention, mariner training, and certification standards. They develop and enforce vessel construction standards as well as domestic shipping and navigation regulations. To ensure compliance, the Coast Guard reviews and approves plans for ship construction, repair, and alteration. The Coast Guard inspects vessels, mobile offshore drilling units, and marine facilities for safety. Its Port State Control program, aimed at eliminating substandard vessels from US ports and waterways, is a key element since the majority of the passenger and cargo ships operating in US waters are foreign flagged.

As the lead US representative to the International Maritime Organization, a specialized agency of the United Nations, the Coast Guard is the driving force behind the implementation of international safety and pollution standards. However, not every country enforces these standards. With the increase in so-called flags of convenience, has come an increase in the number of substandard vessels. The Coast Guard has developed a comprehensive US strategy to promote and improve the Port State Control program, an international effort to bring substandard ships into compliance with applicable international standards or remove them from the sea.

Maritime Security: suppressing violations of US drug, immigration, and fisheries law, as well as securing the nation from terrorist threats.

Maritime law enforcement and border control are the oldest of the Coast Guard's numerous responsibilities. They date back to our founding as the Revenue Marine in 1790. The First Congress established the Revenue Marine specifically to patrol our coasts and seaports to frustrate smuggling and enforce the customs laws of the fledgling Republic. Over two centuries later, that early challenge has evolved into a global obligation for the maritime security of our nation. Our maritime law enforcement and border control duties require the interdiction of ships at sea. This core capability provides the foundation upon which today's broader and more complex maritime security mission set has been built.

Because the Coast Guard has law-enforcement authority, it can apprehend foreign fishing vessels engaged in poaching, interdict vessels carrying illegal drugs and undocumented migrants, and stop unsafe boaters. Today, US national-security interests can no longer be defined solely in terms of direct military threats to America and its allies. Working under the necessarily broader current definition of national security, the Coast Guard is seeking to reduce the risk from terrorism to US passengers at foreign and domestic ports and in designated waterfront facilities, but it faces the extremely difficult challenge of enforcing increasingly complex laws against highly sophisticated adversaries. Coast Guard boarding teams deal continuously with violations of multinational fisheries agreements and foil high-tech attempts to smuggle drugs into the United States.

The Coast Guard is the designated lead agency for maritime drug interdiction under the National Drug Control Strategy and the co-lead agency for air interdiction operations with US Customs and Border Protection. As such, the Coast Guard defends America's seaward frontier against a torrent of illegal drugs. For more than three decades, our cutters and aircraft have forward deployed off South America and in the drug transit zone. This six-million-square-mile area, roughly the size of the continental United States itself, includes the Caribbean, the Gulf of Mexico, and the Eastern Pacific. They have intercepted thousands of tons of cocaine, marijuana, and other illegal drugs from this zone that otherwise would have found their way to America's streets.

Coast Guard undocumented migrant interdiction operations are law enforcement missions with an important humanitarian dimension. Migrants often take great risks and endure significant hardships in their attempts to flee their countries and enter the US. In many cases, migrant vessels interdicted at sea are overloaded and unseaworthy, lack basic safety equipment, and are operated by inexperienced mariners. Many of the undocumented migrant cases they handle actually begin as search and rescue incidents. Once again, this illustrates the interweaving of roles and missions. Between 1982 and 2007, the Coast Guard interdicted over 225,000 migrants, mostly from Cuba, the Dominican Republic, and Haiti.

Throughout its history, the Coast Guard has served with the US Navy to defend our nation. This began with the Quasi-War with France in 1798, and continued through the Civil War, the World Wars, Vietnam, the Persian Gulf War, and Operation Iraqi Freedom. Today, as a critical component of the US National Fleet, the Coast Guard maintains a high state of

readiness to operate as a specialized service alongside the Navy and Marine Corps. The close relationship among services has evolved over two centuries of cooperation. This enduring relationship is captured in the May 2008 agreement between the Secretaries of Defense and Homeland Security.

The agreement formalizes the use of Coast Guard competencies and resources in support of the National Military Strategy and other national-level defense and security strategies. It lists the following Coast Guard national defense capabilities: maritime interception and interdiction; military environmental response; port operations, security, and defense; theater security cooperation; coastal sea control; rotary wing air intercept; combating terrorism; and Maritime Operational Threat Response support. These support the unified combatant commanders and require the Coast Guard to execute essential military operations in peacetime, crisis, and war.

The Coast Guard's domestic civil law enforcement and port security expertise are uniquely valuable today as combatant commanders work to build foreign nation capacity for security and governance. In recent years, combatant commanders have requested Coast Guard forces to conduct at-sea interception and antipiracy operations, foreign liaison, and other supporting warfare tasks in all key theaters. The Coast Guard has been responsible for the security of the ports and waterways of the US during times of war since the enactment of the Espionage Act of 1917. After World War II, the Magnuson Act of 1950 assigned the Coast Guard an ongoing mission to safeguard US ports, harbors, vessels, and waterfront facilities from accidents, sabotage, or other subversive acts.

Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, these authorities took on grave new importance. This includes denying terrorists the use of the US maritime domain and the US Marine Transportation System (MTS) to mount attacks on our territory, population, or critical infrastructure. The Coast Guard's authorities were further strengthened with the passage of the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002. This designated Coast Guard Captains of the Port as the Federal Maritime Security Coordinators. The Coast Guard thus became the lead agency for coordinating all maritime security planning and operations in US ports and waterways. These activities encompass all efforts to prevent or respond to attacks.

Maritime security is a continuing theme running throughout the Coast Guard's proud history of service to America. It requires a breadth of experience and skills—seamanship, diplomacy, legal expertise, and combat readiness. The Coast Guard has honed these skills for more than two centuries. No other federal agency offers this combination of law enforcement and military capabilities, together with the legal authorities to carry them out.

Maritime Stewardship: enforcement of US fisheries law and marine protected species regulations; stopping unauthorized hazardous materials dumping and responding to any hazardous materials incidents; protecting marine mammals; regulating introduction of invasive species to waterways; developing environmental regulations; aiding navigation services and maintaining safe passageways through US waters; and enforcing foreign vessel laws and regulations.

Our nation's waters are vital to its well-being and economy. The marine environment of the US is one of the most valuable natural resources on Earth. It contains one-fifth of the world's fishery resources. It is also a region of extraordinary recreation, energy and mineral resources, and transportation activities. Finally, it is an inseparable part of our national heritage and daily fabric of life in our coastal communities. The Coast Guard's role in protecting natural resources dates to the 1820s when Congress tasked the Revenue Marine to protect federal stocks of Florida live oak trees. These trees were deemed critical to the security of our young nation because they provided the best wood for shipbuilding.

As the exploitation of the Nation's valuable marine resources—whales, fur bearing animals, and fish—increased, the Coast Guard was given the duty to protect those resources as well. Today, US waters support commercial and recreational fisheries worth more than $30 billion annually, and the Coast Guard serves as the primary agency for at-sea fisheries enforcement. The Coast Guard, in coordination with other federal and state agencies, enforces marine resource management and protection regimes to preserve healthy stocks of fish and other living marine resources.

In 1976, Congress passed what is now known as the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act, creating the US Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). This legislation extended our exclusive rights out to 200 nautical miles for fisheries and other natural resources. The Coast Guard patrols these areas to uphold US sovereignty and protect precious resources. Today, international fisheries agreements have extended US jurisdiction to waters beyond the EEZ.

The Coast Guard's stewardship role has expanded to include enforcing laws intended to protect the environment for the common good. As a result, they safeguard sensitive marine habitats, mammals, and endangered species. The Coast Guard also enforces laws protecting our waters from the discharge of oil, hazardous substances, and non-indigenous invasive species. To do all this, the Coast Guard conducts a wide range of activities. These include education and prevention; law enforcement; emergency response and containment; and disaster recovery. They also provide mission critical command and control support for forces responding to environmental disasters in the maritime domain.

Under the National Contingency Plan, Coast Guard Captains of the Port (COTP) are the pre-designated Federal On-Scene Coordinators (FOSC) for oil and hazardous substance incidents in all coastal and some inland areas. The FOSC is the President's designated on-scene representative and, as such, is responsible for coordinating effective response operations among a diverse group of government and commercial entities in emotion-charged and often dangerous emergency situations.

While the health of our nation's waters and marine resources is vital to our economy, our waterways are also an economic highway essential to the nation's access to several billion tons of foreign and domestic freight annually. Waterborne trade generates tens of millions of jobs and contributes hundreds of billions of dollars to the US gross national product each year. The US Marine Transportation System (MTS) and its intermodal links support US economic prosperity, military strength, and national security. This complex system includes international and domestic passenger services, commercial and recreational fisheries, and recreational boating.

The Coast Guard also carries out numerous port and waterways management tasks. They are responsible for providing a safe, efficient, and navigable waterway system to support domestic commerce, international trade, and military sealift requirements for national defense. The Coast Guard provides long and short-range aids to navigation; navigation schemes and standards; support for mapping and charting; tide, current, and pilotage information; vessel traffic services; domestic ice breaking to facilitate commerce; and technical assistance and advice.

Finally, the Coast Guard operates the nation's only Polar icebreakers. This enables projection of US presence and protects national interests in the Arctic and Antarctic regions. These Polar vessels are key components in re-supplying US Antarctic facilities. They support the research requirements of the National Science Foundation, and protect or advance other US interests in the Polar Regions.

Outside of US coastal waters, the Coast Guard assists foreign naval and maritime forces through training and joint operations. Many of the world's maritime nations have forces that operate principally in the littoral seas and conduct missions that resemble those of the Coast Guard. The Coast Guard, due to its varied mix of assets and missions, is a powerful role model that is in ever-increasing demand abroad. The service's close working relationship with other nations not only improve mutual cooperation during specific joint operations in which the Coast Guard is involved, but also support US diplomatic efforts in general: promoting democracy, economic prosperity, and trust between nations.

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USAFRICOM Area of Responsibility

Activity Statement:

- Deliver briefings and participate in discussions about various aspects of culture and US interests in the US Africa Command (USAFRICOM) area of responsibility (AOR).

Affective Lesson Objective:

- Respond to the importance of Air Force officers understanding US national security concerns in the AOR, regional cultural perspectives, and the Combatant Command's mission in the AOR.

Affective Samples of Behavior:

- Voluntarily discuss US national security concerns in the USAFRICOM AOR.

- Value that an understanding of regional cultural perspectives is key to relating and communicating with partners in the USAFRICOM AOR.

- Assert the importance of the Combatant Command's mission in light of US national security concerns in the USAFRICOM AOR.

OVERVIEW OF UNITED STATES AFRICA COMMAND

AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY

I n 2008 the Department of Defense established USAFRICOM. This event subsequently redrew the Commander's Areas of Responsibility map, resulting in a geographical theater that included almost every African country. Prior to the establishment of AFRICOM, the continent was geographically divided between US European Command (EUCOM), US Central Command (CENTCOM), and US Pacific Command (PACOM). The purpose of this realignment was to "provide a strategic, holistic DoD approach to security on the African continent."

Africa is the second largest continent in the world and accounts for one-fifth of the earth's land-surface. The current population of Africa is over one billion people, with a projected population of two billion people by 2050. In addition to its abundant human resource base, the continent also contains high levels of natural resources: gold, uranium, oil, natural gas, and other precious metals, minerals, and gems. Combine all of these factors with a rising level of poverty, the legacy of colonialism, constant conflict, and terrorist group incursions, and Africa is a hotbed of contention on the current world scene.

History & Myth

Pre-Colonial Africa

Pre-colonial Africa constituted diverse societies ranging from nomadic clans to highly developed, complex political and economic civilizations. The political boundaries now recognized in present day Africa scarcely resemble the continent prior to European involvement.

Colonial Africa

European involvement in Africa began with trade and exploration in the fifteenth century. The African slave trade significantly increased European interest on the continent and resulted in a trans-Atlantic slave trade, which lasted for 400 years. Throughout the second half of the nineteenth century, European nations officially banned slavery; however, that did not end European presence on the continent. The growing industrialization of European economies called for cheap raw materials and new markets for manufactured goods. In 1884 European powers held the Berlin conference to establish a more permanent means to maintain influence on the continent. The purpose of the conference was to divide Africa into European spheres of influence, or colonies. Unfortunately, European powers drew boundaries without regards to existing societies, cultural ties, or long-

standing migration routes. These arbitrary political boundaries remained principally intact through decolonization. Indiscriminate political borders, years of exploitation, and social destruction have contributed to the conflict prevalent in Africa today.

Present Day Africa

Present day Africa looks very similar to colonial Africa. The post-WWII decolonization of European African colonies resulted in former colonial territories becoming officially recognized international states. Over the years, civil war and political conflict have brought about new names, new nations and contested regions.

Territory

Politically, Africa is divided into 54 internationally recognized countries, listed in the table below. USAFRICOM oversees operations in 53 of these countries while US Central Command (USCENTCOM) maintains its traditional oversight of Egypt.

Algeria	Gambia	Rwanda
Angola	Ghana	Sao Tome and Principe
Benin	Guinea	Senegal
Botswana	Guinea-Bissau	Seychelles
Burkina Faso	Ivory Coast	Sierra Leone
Burundi	Kenya	Somalia
Cameroon	Lesotho	South Africa
Cape Verde	Liberia	South Sudan
Central African Republic	Libya	Sudan
Chad	Madagascar	Swaziland
Comoros	Malawi	Tanzania
Democratic Republic of the Congo	Mali	Togo
Republic of the Congo	Mauritania	Tunisia
Djibouti	Mauritius	Uganda
Egypt	Morocco	Zambia
Equatorial Guinea	Mozambique	Zimbabwe
Eritrea	Namibia	
Ethiopia	Niger	
Gabon	Nigeria	

However, internationally recognized nations do not always translate into consolidated countries. Almost every African country possesses an area, border or geographical landmark that is in question. Three such significant areas of concern that have resulted in substantial conflict, and in some cases international intervention, are Western Sahara, Somaliland, and Sudan.

The legal status of Western Sahara and the issue of sovereignty remain unresolved. Western Sahara is contested by Morocco and the Polisario Front (Popular Front for the Liberation of the Saguia el Hamra and Rio de Oro). The Polisario Front, composed largely of the indigenous nomadic inhabitants of the Western Sahara region, has been fighting for control of the region since independence from Spain in 1976. The territory was originally partitioned between Morocco and Mauritania, with Morocco acquiring the northern two-thirds. In February 1976 the Polisario Front formally proclaimed a government-in-exile. Mauritania, under pressure from Polisario guerrillas, abandoned all claims to its portion in August 1979. Morocco continues to maintain control of the majority of the region. Presently a UN ceasefire, the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO), is in place while the legal status of Western Sahara remains unresolved.

Somaliland is a self-declared autonomous region of Somalia. Though the present borders of Somalia include Somaliland, during colonialism Somaliland was a protectorate under British rule while Somalia was an Italian colony. When Somaliland gained independence in 1960 it entered into a union with Somalia until civil war broke out in the 1980's. In 1991 the government of the Republic of Somalia collapsed, at which time Somaliland withdrew from the union with Somalia and declared Somaliland a sovereign state. Somaliland has a republican form of government with an elected President and legislative assembly. The United States has worked with the Somaliland administration but does not officially recognize it as an independent nation.

Sudan is a prime example of a country divided culturally and economically. Northern and Southern Sudan are considered very different regions in terms of religion, culture, and economic development. Northern Sudan is often characterized as Muslim, Arab and economically developed while South Sudan is considered Christian, Black and underdeveloped. During colonial rule, Sudan was administered as a single colony under Anglo-Egyptian rule. Sudan's colonial rulers exploited the cultural differences between the north and south, which resulted in inequality and resentment between northern and southern Sudan. At the time of independence in 1956, a civil war between the north and south was already underway. The conflict lasted from 1955 to 1972. A second civil war broke out in 1983 and lasted until 2005 when both sides signed a Peace Agreement that enabled South Sudan to vote for independence. In July 2011 South Sudan was recognized as Africa's newest nation, however clashes along the north-south border continue as the majority of Sudan's oil resides in South Sudan and along the north-south border.

Family & Kinship

"The African family is the most authentic social institution in the post-colonial era. In a continent steeped in artificiality, the African family is more real than many of our countries which were colonially made...more real than our economies most of which are mere shadows."

- Ali Mazrui, African Studies Scholar

African cultures place great pride and precedence on the family unit. Unlike many western cultures, African families are the core of an individual's identity, and represent the most important unit of society. These ties encompass immediate family, extended family, clan, and ethnic group, in that order of priority. All members of a family are expected to undertake specific roles and resonsibilities, as well as share any resources they may have. Since much of Africa lacks formalized old age, illness, or orphan care plans, family networks often provide the only source of security.

The role of marriage within these societies is most often to bring two families together, in the sense of a political or resource based alliance. Children of these unions are a highly prized asset for the continuation of the flow of life, physical representation of the bond between two families, and for their value as potential laborers. Within these marriages women are usually expected to perform the majority of the domestic tasks, including taking care of the children and elderly. However, as access to education, jobs, and health care continues to spread, more women are starting to break away from traditional roles and take a more active part in determining their future.

Religion & Spirituality

African religious practices vary by region. Generally speaking, northern and eastern African countries practice Islam, while Christianity and indigenous religious practices are more prevalent in Sub-Saharan Africa. Islam was introduced into North Africa around 640 AD and Christianity was first introduced into Eastern Africa, present day Ethiopia, around the 1st century AD. Christianity spread during the Roman Empire and was later reinforced by European missionaries and traders. While many categorized African nations as Christian or Muslim, many religious practices and beliefs are blended with traditional beliefs in spirits and rituals.

Politics & Social Relations

Prior to colonization most African societies existed without boundaries, unique and independent from each other. Each of these societies operated on whatever form of political governance best suited their culture and social norms. After colonization African ethnic groups and societies found themselves bound to artificial borders, none of which took in to account long-standing enmities or alliances.

While traditional boundaries and societal structures no longer exist, ethnic and cultural structures are still prevalent throughout Africa. For example, the Taureg nomads in North African still maintain a caste structure and class-based slavery is still practiced in some regions. Colonial and post-colonial structures continue to shape African nations. Colonial systems of rule often exacerbated existing ethnic clashes or created new ones. Some groups, such as the Somali people, found themselves scattered to four different countries. Other states, like Nigeria,found themselves with opposing ethnic groups forced to coexist.

European powers ruled through divide and conquer or assimilation methods. One prominent example of a manufactured structure of rule was South African apartheid. In an effort to maintain power during the era of African independence, Afrikaners (descendants of 17th century European settlers), established the Population Registration Act in 1950. This act required all South Africans to be racially classified and then geographically segregated. This classification system subsequently revoked many black South African's rights. After much resistance and international pressure, in 1992 the South African constitution was re-written and Apartheid was abolished.

The political systems and infrastructure created by the Europeans were a drastic change from most governmental systems practiced by traditional African societies. Instead of including the local people in these systems, the European authorities did not share technical or leadership skills with the African people which would have enabled them to utilize these systems after the colonial powers departed. Instead, they actively prevented Africans from taking part in the government of colonial states. This legacy can still be seen in the strife and corruption prevalent in many African governments today, as the people attempting to gain control of an area use whatever means necessary to secure their power.

In an effort to advance cooperation, peace, and security within the continent, the Organization for African Unity was formed in 1963. This organization has since been renamed the African Union (AU) in 2002, and its primary mission is "to become an efficient and value-adding institution driving the African integration and development process in close collaboration with African Union Member States, the Regional Economic Communities, and African citizens." In order to achieve this mission the AU has sent peacekeepers to Somalia and Darfur, the latter in a joint peacekeeping operation with the United Nations. The AU also meets and counsels with African Union member state

leadership in order to help eradicate communication gaps and promote peace within the continent. In August 2006, the United States became the first non-African country to establish a separate diplomatic mission to the AU.

African political alliances with external non-African countries are always in flux. During the Cold War the United States and the Soviet Union were at constant odds trying to vie for influence on the continent. More recently natural resources and economic opportunities have sparked interest by world powers such as China. European powers however, will remain highly influential on the continent. Historically, former colonial powers have maintained close ties to their former colonies. This relationship is based on political ties as well as economic interests. Africa is geographically close to Europe, provides needed commodities to European nations, provides a young labor pool to draw from. Finally, the European Union views Africa as a potential global example for good governance and will therefore continue to promote and support stability and good governance on the continent.

Economics & Resources

Africa is a continent with vast potential wealth in terms of its people and its natural resources. Yet Africa is the most underdeveloped region of the world. Seventy percent of the people live in rural areas and small villages. Most are farmers working by hand on small plots of land.

Despite the relatively small Gross Domestic Product of African nations, in The Africa Competitiveness Report, the World Bank and African Development bank (AfDB) note that in response to the global economic crisis "Africa has staged a quick and strong comeback." According to WB and AfDB analysis, between 2001 and 2010, African GDP growth averaged 5.2 percent annually, higher than the global average of 4.2 percent projected by the International Monetary Fund (IMF). However, regardless of the increase in GDP, the African people remain some of the poorest in the world with half the population living on $1.25 a day.

While the number of people living on less than $1.25 a day is declining, the percentage remains significant. Africa has the highest extreme poverty rates compared to other developing regions at forty-six percent. Africa is also one of the developing regions with a significant youth bulge. sixty percent of the African population is younger than 30 years old and among youth eligible to work, sixty percent are unemployed. These figures represent a need for more attention on human capital development to attract more foreign investment and jobs into the region. Despite the bleak numbers, African economies and middle-classes are growing and it is estimated that by 2020 African consumer spending will reach $1.4 trillion.

As Africa continues its efforts to climb out of the economic troubles they are currently experiencing, they are still faced with several challenges to success. Many African nations are burdened with extensive debt to banks, other countries, and/or international monetary institutions. The World Bank has identified thirty-three African nations as Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) that qualify for debt relief assistance. Also, due to the commodity

based incomes of several countries, relying primarily on oil or other natural resource exports, the economy is highly vulnerable to external shocks. Sixteen African countries rely solely on one export and fluctuations in global demand or restrictions on movement of these exports could result in disaster for these areas. In addition, factors such as poor governance, lack of technical training, rule of law, and protectionist economic policies all contribute to a challenging economic environment that does not attract foreign investment.

USAFRICOM Mission and Current Posture

US Africa Command's mission is to work in concert with interagency and international partners, build defense capabilities, respond to crises, and deter and defeat transnational threats in order to advance US national security interests and promote regional security, stability, and prosperity.

This mission is overseen by the commander of USAFRICOM whose chain of command goes directly to the US Secretary of Defense and the President of the United States. Additionally, this mission is aided by US Ambassadors who serve as the President's personal representatives in diplomatic relations with individual nations.

USAFRICOM is headquartered at Kelley Barracks in Stuttgart-Moehringen, Germany, and currently has approximately 2,000 personnel assigned, including military, civilian, and contractor employees. About 1,500 personnel work at the command's headquarters in Stuttgart, Germany. Others are assigned to AFRICOM units at MacDill Air Force Base, Florida, and RAF Molesworth, England. The command's programs in Africa are coordinated through Offices of Security Cooperation and Defense Attache Offices in approximately 38 nations. The command also has liaison officers at key African posts, including the African Union, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), and the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping and Training Centre in Ghana.

USAFRICOM's subordinate commands set the conditions for success of US security programs and activities on the continent. They perform detailed planning, provide essential command and control, establish and sustain relationships with partners, and provide timely assessments. These commands are:

- US Army Africa (USARAF), located in Vincenza, Italy, conducts sustained security engagement with African land forces to promote security, stability, and peace.

- US Naval Forces Africa (NAVAF), located in Naples, Italy, improves the maritime security capability and capacity of African partners. Personnel in this unit are shared with US Naval Forces Europe.

- US Air Forces Africa (USAFAF), located in Ramstein, Germany, conducts sustained security engagemetn and operations to promote air safety, security, and development in Africa.

- US Marine Corps Forces Africa (MARFORAF), located in Stuttgart, Germany, conducts operations, exercises, training, and security cooperation activities throughout the African Continent. MARFORAF's staff is shared by US Marine Forces Europe.

- Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA), located at Camp Lemonnier in Djibouti, is the organization that conducts operations in the region to enhance partner nation capacity, promotes regional security and stability, dissuades conflict, and protects US and coalition interests. CJTF-HOA is critical to USAFRICOM's efforts to build partner capacity to counter violent extremists and address other regional security partnerships.

- US Special Operations Command Africa (SOCAFRICA), is colocated with USAFRICOM at Kelley Barracks in Stuttgart, Germany, and aims to build operational capacity, strengthen regional security and capacity initiatives, implement effective communication strategies in suppot of strategic objectives, and eradicate violent extremist organizations.

To accomplish the mission in the current operational environment, USAFRICOM has established four "Cornerstones", which include the following:

- Deter and Defeat Transnational Threats

- Prevent Future Conflicts

- Support Humanitarian and Disaster Relief

- Protect U.S. Security Interests

USAFRICOM's posture statement further states that USAFRICOM protects and advances vital US national security interests in Africa, including protecting the security of the global economic system, preventing catastrophic attacks on the homeland, developing secure and reliable partners, protecting American citizens abroad, and protecting and advancing universal values. Additionally, USAFRICOM seeks to help its partners in building capacities to counter transnational threats from violent extremist organizations; to stem illicit trafficking in humans, narcotics, and weapons; to support peacekeeping operations; and to address the consequences of humanitarian disasters—whether man-made or natural—that cause loss of life and displace populations. These efforts are aimed at helping our African partners assume an ever-increasing role in addressing the security concerns of the continent and its island states. By focusing on long-term capacity building, the command is implementing a preventative strategy that serves the interests of the United States, its African partners, and allies.

Conclusion

Africa is a vast, diverse, and complex area of our planet. With our current involvement in Africa, it's imperative that all Airmen first develop a proper understanding of the role USAFRICOM plays in our national security, and then that they become cross-culturally competent as it relates to this area of the world. A good foundation of culture-specific information is necessary to achieve this and this reading, along with the briefings and discussions that will follow, should help you build that foundation.

Hopefully this overview of USAFRICOM has piqued your interest to learn more about this area of the world. To help you do that, refer to the next section for links to Internet sources that provide more specific information about the countries included in this command's area of responsibility.

STUDENT ASSIGNMENTS

Students will select a specific country from the list provided and deliver a 5-9 minute prepared briefing addressing the topic. Use the framework below to develop the main points, but to ensure the topics are covered you must submit your list of preferred main points to your instructor for approval **prior** to beginning your research. To assist in your research, a list of Web sites is provided on the next page.

Additionally, you must prepare a ½ to 1-page bullet background paper on your subject. You should provide a copy of your paper to your instructor prior to your briefing. You can then use the paper to give your briefing. The bullet paper will follow the format in *The Tongue and Quill*. Pick a country and two domains from the lists below:

Countries: Algeria, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Somalia, South Africa, Sudan, Tunisia

Domains: Family & Kinship, Religion & Spirituality, Sex & Gender, Politics & Social Relations, Economics & Resources, Time & Space, Language & Communication, Technology & Material, History & Myth, Sustenance & Health, Aesthetics & Recreation, Learning & Knowledge

Main Point 1 (choose one from the list of cultural domains)

Main Point 2 (choose a different domain for your 2nd main point)

RESEARCH SITES

- **Defense Language Institute** http://www.dliflc.edu/products.html

- **Field Support Modules** http://fieldsupport.dliflc.edu/index.aspx

- **Library of Congress** http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/profiles.html

- **Military Policy Awareness Links** http://merln.ndu.edu/index.cfm?type=page&pageID=3

- **Miller Center of Public Affairs** http://millercenter.org/scripps

- **NATO** http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/index.htm

- **The World Factbook** https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/index.html

- **United Nations** http://www.un.org/en/

- **US Department of State—Background Notes** http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/

- **US Department of State—Regional Bureaus** http://www.state.gov/p/index.htm

- **US Department of State—Terrorism Country Reports** http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/

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The Inspector General System

Cognitive Lesson Objective:
- Know the Inspector General (IG) system and the IG programs.

Cognitive Samples of Behavior:
- Identify the goal of the Air Force Complaints Resolution Program (CRP).

- State the rights of a complainant in the Complaints Resolution Program (CRP).

- Identify the goal of the Fraud, Waste, and Abuse (FWA) program.

- Identify who is responsible for reporting Fraud, Waste, and Abuse (FWA).

- Describe the purpose of the Air Force Inspection System (AFIS).

Affective Lesson Objective:
- Value the importance of the Inspector General and the IG programs.

Affective Samples of Behavior:
- Follow the principles of the Air Force Inspection System (AFIS) in daily activities.

- Respond to the importance of preventing Fraud, Waste, and Abuse (FWA).

THE INSPECTOR GENERAL

Establishment of the Inspector General

History buffs point to German-born Baron Frederick von Steuben, a former captain in the Prussian Army, as the first effective Inspector General (IG) of the American Army. Upon recommendation by George Washington, Congress established the Inspector General position in 1777. Von Steuben accepted his appointment in May of 1778. At that time, it was envisioned that the IG would superintend the training of the entire Army in order to ensure troop proficiency in common tactics as well as account for military investments through inspections and record keeping. Von Steuben is also remembered for the well-read book of military drill he authored, *Regulations for the Order and Discipline of the Troops of the United States*, early in his tenure as the American Army Inspector General.

Quickly fast-forwarding 236 or so years to the present day, the US Air Force Policy Directive 90-3 implements the United States Code, Title 10 (10 USC 8020) requirement for "an Inspector General of the Air Force who shall be detailed to such position by the Secretary of the Air Force from the general officers of the Air Force." The roles and responsibilities of the office of the IG are found in two Air Force Instructions (AFI): AFI 90-201 *The Air Force Inspection System* and AFI 90-301 *Inspector General Complaints Resolution*. By policy, all Major Commands (MAJCOM), Field Operating Agencies (FOA), Direct Reporting Units (DRU), Numbered Air Forces (NAF), centers, and wings are authorized to have IG positions. Wherever you are assigned, there is likely an IG office nearby and there is an IG available to you.

INSPECTOR GENERAL PROGRAMS

The Complaints Resolution Program

The IG system used throughout the total force is based on the concept that IGs serve as an extension of their commander by acting as his/her eyes and ears to be alert to issues affecting the organization. IGs primarily serve their commanders and their assigned organizations both by executing the complaint resolution process and by proactively training all members of the organization about IG processes and fraud, waste, and abuse (FWA) issues. A successful complaint resolution program is designed to enhance the organization's discipline, readiness, and warfighting capability.

Although IGs primarily serve their commanders, each IG maintains a clear distinction between being an extension of the commander and their duty to serve as fair, impartial, and objective fact-finders and problem solvers. They act with independence so those complainants requesting IG help will continue to do so, even when they feel the commander may be the problem. For the complaints resolution program to be credible in the eyes of the unit members, commanders need to support this clear distinction. The concept of appointing a separate, full-time IG was implemented to remove any perceived conflict of

interest, lack of independence, or apprehension by Air Force personnel as a result of the previous practice of assigning vice commanders IG duties. This issue was identified in Committee Report H.R. 4301 of the 1995 National Defense Authorization Act. In fact, this independence, both real and perceived, is so vital to an IG's effectiveness that AFI 90-301 specifies that, "IG offices should be located in areas that foster open and unfettered access to everyone and which are *not* in proximity to the commander's office."

The specific goals of the Air Force Complaints Resolution Program (CRP) are to create an atmosphere of trust in which issues can be objectively and fully resolved without retaliation or the fear of reprisal, identify where commander involvement is needed to correct systemic, programmatic, or procedural weaknesses, resolve issues affecting the Air Force mission promptly and objectively, and ensure resources are used effectively and efficiently. A responsive Complaints Resolution Program (CRP) naturally builds trust and confidence in Air Force leadership and, ultimately, helps all involved in or affected by a complaint return their focus to mission accomplishment.

Air Force military and civilian employees have a duty to promptly report fraud, waste, and abuse or gross mismanagement; a violation of law, policy, procedures, instructions, or regulations; an injustice; abuse of authority, inappropriate conduct, or misconduct; and a deficiency or like condition, through appropriate supervisory channels, to an IG or other appropriate inspector, or through an established grievance channel. Complainants should attempt to resolve complaints at the lowest possible level (appropriate for the circumstances) using supervisory channels before addressing them to higher-level command channels or the IG. Experience has shown that commanders and supervisors are the people best equipped to resolve complaints. Therefore, members are encouraged, but not required, to discuss problems with their supervisor or commander before going to the IG.

Complainant Rights, Protections, and Responsibilities

To begin with, what is a complaint under the Complaints Resolution Program (CRP)? AFI 90-301 defines a complaint as, "A formal assertion concerning a wrong; or violation of law, regulation, instruction, policy, procedure or rule; or report of conditions detrimental to the operation, mission, or reputation of the Air Force." The best supported complaints contain explanations of the who, what, when, and where of the circumstances and cite, from authoritative source documents, the standard that was violated.

Complainants have the right to do the following:

- File an IG complaint at any level without going through their supervisory channel

- File a complaint with an IG without fear of reprisal

- Request withdrawal of their IG complaint in writing; however, IGs may still examine the issues at their discretion and treat it as a third-party complaint.

- Request the next higher-level IG review their complaint within 90 days of receiving the IG response; however, simply disagreeing with the action taken will not justify additional IG review.

- Submit complaints anonymously

- Submit a complaint even if the complainant is not the wronged party

- Request whistle blower protection under 10 USC 1034 if they believe they have been reprised against for reporting a wrongdoing

Complainants have the responsibility to do the following:

- Submit IG complaints within one year of learning of the alleged wrong; however, the earlier the report, the easier it is to resolve the complaint

- Prepare, sign, and submit an AF Form 102 *Inspector General Personal and Fraud, Waste & Abuse Complaint Registration*. However, IGs will accept complaints in other formats if extenuating circumstances prevent completion of the form.

- Provide truthful information. Complainants remain subject to punitive action (or adverse administrative action) for knowingly making false statements and for submitting other unlawful communications.

The Complaint Resolution Process

Although IGs intake *all* complaints, most are not resolved within IG channels. In fact, Department of Defense and Air Force policy mandates the use of specialized investigative agencies or grievance procedures for complaints where applicable. In these cases, the IG assists the complainant in contacting the appropriate agency. A member must be able to allege the appeal process was improperly or prejudicially handled and has no other means of redress before resorting to IG channels. Mere dissatisfaction with the outcome of an appeal is not sufficient basis for an IG inquiry. Lastly, the IG Complaints Resolution Program does not cover matters concerning employment conditions for civilian employees.

IGs will always retain responsibility to resolve allegations of reprisal, restriction, and improper mental health evaluation (IMHE) referrals. Due to the complexity of medical issues and lack of IG training in this highly specialized area, dedicated IG resolution of IMHE complaints is diminishing. The paragraph on reprisal in 10 USC 1034 reads, "No person may take (or threaten to take) an unfavorable personnel action, or withhold (or threaten to withhold) a favorable personnel action, as a reprisal against a member of the armed forces for making, or preparing, or being perceived as making or preparing…" a protected communication. The paragraph on restriction reads, "No person may restrict a member of the armed forces in communicating with a Member of Congress or an Inspector General." Reprisal and restriction complaints tend to be the most complicated and extensive complaints processed by the IG. Remember, it is against the law to restrict or reprise against a member of the Armed Forces.

No matter what the complaint pertains to, the IG will always conduct a thorough complaint analysis to determine the appropriate complaint resolution strategy. Within 29 days (as a goal), this process ends in one of the following five determinations:

- Transfer to another IG

- Assistance

- Referral to another resolution authority

- Dismissal

- Investigation by the IG

Transfers, referrals, and, certainly, investigations can then take a significant amount of time thereafter. If an IG dismisses a complaint, he/she will notify the complainant in writing with rationale for the dismissal. Members have the right to appeal a dismissal to the next higher-level IG and the Air Force Board for Correction of Military Records. The desire to conduct and document a rigorous complaint analysis, as well as competing IG office workload, can sometimes make the complaint analysis phase seem long. Again, the thorough analysis is done to help, as quickly as possible, all involved return their focus to mission accomplishment.

We conclude this section with a few authorities the IG has and does not have. First, if delegated "appointing authority," the IG is authorized to direct an IG investigation. Second, IGs, IG staff members, and investigating officers are authorized access to all documents and all other evidentiary materials needed to discharge their duties to the extent allowed by law. No Air Force, Air Force Reserve, or Air National Guard member or employee may deny an IG, an IG staff member, or a properly appointed investigating officer such access. On the other hand, IGs cannot delay command and personnel actions regarding a complainant based on the filing of an IG complaint or the initiation of an IG investigation. Lastly, IGs do not have the authority to place individuals on administrative hold or other delay or exemption.

The Fraud, Waste, and Abuse Program

Every year the Air Force loses millions of dollars in monies and resources due to individuals committing acts of fraud, wasting precious resources, and abusing the system. The collective harm grows even more alarming at the Department of Defense (DoD) level. During the period of 1 October 2010 through 31 March 2011, the Department of Defense IG identified $193 million in waste and investigations led to 140 convictions, 87 suspensions, and 99 debarments. Criminal convictions, as well as civil and administrative settlements, resulted in the return of $1.4 billion to the US government. An active fraud, waste, and abuse (FWA) program can prevent this waste. The benefits are two-fold: it can prevent fraud, waste, and abuse (FWA) and, therefore, save valuable resources by identifying illegal, inefficient and wasteful practices; it also makes funds available for other, better uses.

Having established the magnitude of what fraud, waste, and abuse (FWA) can fleece at the highest level, let's look at potential causes at the lowest level. A good example of fraud is when a contractor knowingly sells the Air Force parts that don't meet the specifications of the contract. You certainly wouldn't want to be in a plane in which the propeller was a substandard part from a contractor. Waste of resources can be anything from throwing away usable items to ordering a $1,000 part when a $50 part does the job. If a captain goes on a temporary duty (TDY) for two weeks at government expense, but surprisingly finishes the job in just one week and spends the second week enjoying the local beach, did the captain abuse the system? Did the captain commit fraud? Yes, to both, by clearly using government time and funds for personal benefit. Misuse of grade is normally considered another form of abuse. Consider this example: a senior noncommissioned officer (SNCO) in vehicle maintenance orders two junior enlisted to fix his personal vehicle during duty hours. The junior members follow orders because the SNCO is the boss. In this example, there is no doubt that the SNCO wrongly used his leadership position for personal gain.

So, who is responsible for preventing such misuses of American taxpayer dollars? Is it the commander because the prevention of FWA and gross mismanagement is inherently a command responsibility? Is it the IG who is responsible for implementing an active Fraud, Waste, and Abuse (FWA) prevention program? Yes and no. The success of the FWA program lies with each *individual* within the Air Force. At the grass roots level, the strength of the program depends on personal integrity and members policing each other. The Air Force policy is to use all available means to prevent, detect, and correct instances of FWA; to appropriately discipline perpetrators involved in FWA activities; and to recoup, if possible, losses of cash, property, and services resulting from FWA. The primary elements of a FWA prevention and detection program exist within the Air Force in the audit, inspection, investigation, legal, and security areas.

Remember, Air Force military and civilian employees have a duty to promptly report fraud, waste, and abuse or gross mismanagement. Members should try to resolve FWA issues in supervisory or command channels before elevating them to a higher level, as with personal complaints. That said, anyone may report FWA to any IG, the Air Force Audit Agency, Air Force Office of Special Investigations (AFOSI), security forces, or other proper authority. Promptly advise the AFOSI of suspected criminal misconduct or fraud. The AFOSI investigates criminal allegations.

You may request confidentiality or submit the complaint anonymously. The identity of individuals granted confidentiality may be revealed only to Air Force or DoD officials who establish an official need for the information with the express approval of the appointing authority. In making a disclosure, the individual is responsible for providing factual, unbiased, and specific information. Information contained in a disclosure or complaint is privileged. The release of records relating to FWA and complaint inquiries and investigations outside the Air Force, or to a person who does not have an official need to know, is prohibited without the approval of IG or the designated representative. Remember, you are afforded whistle blower protections (i.e. protection against reprisal).

Without full support from both military and civilian personnel, the Air Force can't succeed in the fight against FWA. Any individual aware of FWA or lack of controls that could permit resources to be wasted or diverted must report the situation through appropriate channels. Thank you for doing your part.

THE AIR FORCE INSPECTION SYSTEM

With the publication of the revised AFI 90-201 *The Air Force Inspection System* in August of 2013, the Air Force established a new compliance paradigm in which continuous self-assessment by all units is the dominant compliance activity. This is a shift from previous times when the primary method for inspection was external inspections done by a large headquarters IG team. This approach should make the folktales of Airmen painting grass green just before the arrival of the IG ancient history. It will renew our efforts to maintain a culture of continuous compliance and focus on risks of undetected non-compliance. Inspection preparation is inherently wasteful if not directly aligned with mission readiness. Units will be inspection ready when commanders focus on mission readiness and on building a culture of disciplined compliance in which every Airman does his or her job right the first time and when no one is looking. The intent of the IG is to continuously improve the Air Force Inspection System (AFIS) so there is an ever-shrinking difference—both real and perceived—between mission readiness and inspection readiness.

Those with a few years of service under their belt can attest that this is, indeed, a new inspection paradigm by comparing past practices to the following from the *Inspection Deficiencies* section of AFI 90-201: "Ratings should be positively influenced if the unit accurately identifies and reports the issue through the Self-Assessment Program—even more so if it is apparent the unit does this on a regular basis as part of their daily battle rhythm." You mean letting the IG see your problems is actually good?! Yes, a hollow "clean-and-green" compliance dashboard that sends a message that everything is perfect will score worse than a living compliance dashboard that shows battle scars of routine self-assessment and correction of deficiencies. The Air Force Inspection System (AFIS) is focused on assessing and reporting on a unit's readiness, economy, efficiency, effectiveness, and state of discipline to execute assigned missions. The AFIS gives the Secretary of the Air Force (SECAF), Air Force Chief of Staff (CSAF), and commanders at all levels an independent assessment of the following:

- A unit's compliance with established directives and ability to execute its assigned mission, leadership effectiveness, management performance, and aspects of unit culture and command climate

- A unit's ability to find, analyze, report and fix deficiencies

- A unit's ability to prevent fraud and minimize waste and abuse

All this emphasis on self-assessment is not to say that classic inspections have gone away. Inspections remain the responsibility of commanders at all levels, to include internal and external inspections. Internal Inspections are the foundation of the AFIS, promoting responsibility and accountability within the unit and allowing commanders to control the depth, scope and frequency of inspections. External inspections provide an independent, transparent and accountable assessment of readiness, economy, efficiency and state of discipline, as well as validate and verify the internal inspections process. External inspections mean having an outside come into an organization and inspect all aspects of mission accomplishment.

The Air Force Inspection System (AFIS) consists of three synergistic inspections designed to evaluate different levels of command in the Air Force. At the primary level, the Commander's Inspection Program (CCIP) focuses on detecting non-compliance with all applicable governing directives and on unit effectiveness. Inspections conducted as part of the Commander's Inspection Program (CCIP) are considered internal inspections. At the secondary level, the Unit Effectiveness Inspections (UEI) focuses on identifying areas where the risks from undetected non-compliance are greatest—helping the wing commander identify blind spots and areas that are being overlooked in the inspection system process. The Unit Effectiveness Inspection (UEI) is not focused on detecting shop-level non-compliance or discrepancies. At the tertiary level, the Management Inspection (MI) is conducted above the wing level and will normally be accomplished by the Air Force Inspection Agency (AFIA). The Management Inspection (MI) assesses the efficiency, effectiveness, economy, and discipline of organizations, activities, or programs based on the fundamental principles of well-managed organizations.

Commander's Inspection Program

A validated and trusted Commander's Inspection Program (CCIP) is the cornerstone of the Air Force Inspection System (AFIS). It has been deemed so important that if the higher headquarter's IG scores the wing's Commander's Inspection Program (CCIP) as *ineffective*, regardless of performance in other areas, the overall Unit Effectiveness Inspection (UEI) rating will also be *ineffective*. The Commander's Inspection Program (CCIP) should give the wing commander, subordinate commanders, and wing Airmen the right information at the right time to assess risk, identify areas of improvement, determine root cause, and precisely focus limited resources—all aligned with the commander's priorities and on the commander's timeline. Commanders determine the appropriate scope, scale, timing, and methodology to most effectively accomplish the objectives of the Commander's Inspection Program (CCIP). Two key components of a CCIP are the following:

- Wing inspection program, executed by the Wing IG, which inspects wing-wide performance, programs, and organizations below the wing-level

- Self-Assessment Program (SAP), using the Management Internal Control Toolset (MICT) that reports compliance with requirements listed in self-assessment checklists to the chain of command and appropriate staffs

Wing commanders must establish and maintain a Self-Assessment Program (SAP) and ensure subordinate organizations (e.g., group, squadron) establish and maintain a supporting Self-Assessment Program (SAP). Management Internal Control Toolset (MICT) is an online-based program that facilitates the Self-Assessment Program (SAP). Management Internal Control Toolset (MICT) is an Air Force program of record used by Airmen to complete self-assessment checklists, which are based on standards set in higher headquarters directives. Management Internal Control Toolset (MICT) provides the supervisor and change of command—from everyone from the squadron commander to the SECAF—tiered visibility into user-selected compliance reports and program status. MICT also allows Functional Area Managers the ability to monitor units' performance and status. At the lowest level, it is a web-based application by which unit members can run self-assessment checklists. Self-assessment checklists are created by functional experts to help Airmen understand what's most important and to provide an efficient means of communicating compliance or non-compliance up the chain of command and appropriate staffs. Self-assessment checklists are not inspection checklists. Overall, MICT should serve as a near real-time dashboard showing unit compliance, or non-compliance, for the chain of command. If you have not yet had occasion to work with MICT in your duties, that opportunity will likely come soon.

The Wing IG is responsible for overall management and administration of the Commander's Inspection Program (CCIP), as well as administration and oversight of the Self-Assessment Program (SAP) and Management Internal Control Toolset (MICT). Therefore, if you have any questions about the new Air Force Inspection System or want to learn more, you might stop first at your local IG's office.

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6. Steuben Society of America Webpage, accessed 11 April 2014, http://www.steubensociety.org/VonSteuben.htm
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Substance Abuse Control Program

Cognitive Lesson Objective:
- Know the Air Force Substance Abuse Control Program.

Cognitive Samples of Behavior:
- State the Department of Defense (DOD) policy on substance abuse.

- State the steps a supervisor should take when a subordinate's duty performance reveals a possible substance abuse problem.

- State the five methods for identifying substance abusers.

- Identify how the results of the four methods of urinalysis testing may or may not be used.

- Describe the Alcohol/Drug Abuse Prevention and Treatment (ADAPT) program.

Affective Lesson Objective:
- Respond positively to the importance of the Air Force Substance Abuse program.

Affective Sample of Behavior:
- Voluntarily complete reading on Substance Abuse Control Program.

SUBSTANCE ABUSE CONTROL PROGRAM

Since the Air Force is a microcosm of the nation as a whole, it should come as no surprise that the Air Force, like the rest of the country, has its share of drug and alcohol abusers. The Air Force's programs and policies for substance abuse control are described in multiple Department of Defense (DOD) and Air Force instructions including Department of Defense Directive 1010.4, *Drug and Alcohol Abuse by DoD Personnel*, Air Force Instruction (AFI) 44-121, *Alcohol/Drug Abuse Prevention and Treatment Program,* AFI 44-121, *Alcohol and Drug Abuse Prevention and Treatment (ADAPT) Program*, and AFI 34-219, *Alcohol Beverage Program*. In 2005, the CSAF approved the integration of the Army and Air National Guard substance abuse prevention programs for the Air National Guard. The new joint Substance Abuse Program has responsibility over all aspects of the National Guard's substance abuse prevention efforts to include anti-drug education and drug testing, in coordination with Air Force Instructions.

The Air Force substance abuse control program is administered by the Mental Health clinic at the base hospital. The substance abuse control program in the Air National Guard may be maintained by the base clinic, Military Equal Opportunity Office, or the Counterdrug Office, depending on the state. However, primary responsibility for substance abuse control program across the Total Force remains with the commander.

Substance Abuse Control Program

Substance abuse control policies and programs are thoroughly integrated into every facet of Air Force quality force management. The policies have been in place for over two decades and have evolved to meet changing conditions within the Air Force. The policy is clear: substance abuse is absolutely incompatible with Air Force standards. Our members are held to high standards of discipline and accountability. Those who require treatment will receive it, but all will face the consequences of their actions. The goal is maximum substance abuse deterrence and firm, swift action if abuse occurs.

Policy on Substance Abuse

The Department of Defense (DOD) policy on substance abuse is very clear: It is DOD policy to prevent and eliminate drug and alcohol abuse and dependence from the DOD. Specifically, the policy is to: deter and identify drug and alcohol abuse and dependence that exist on installations and facilities under DOD control; not access military personnel or hire civilian employees who are drug dependent or active drug abusers; periodically assess the extent of drug and alcohol abuse in the DOD; provide education and training on DOD policies for drug and alcohol abuse and/or dependency; prohibit DOD personnel from possessing, selling, or using drugs or alcohol other than in accordance with laws, regulations, and policy; prohibit military members and DOD civilian from possessing, selling, or using drug abuse paraphernalia; and prohibit the possession or sale of drug abuse paraphernalia on DOD installations.

Alcohol

The Air Force recognizes alcoholism as a progressive, preventable, and treatable noncompensable disease that affects the entire family. It's Air Force policy to prevent alcohol abuse and alcoholism among its people and their family members. Air Force members must always maintain Air Force standards of behavior, performance, and discipline. Failure to meet these standards must be based on demonstrated unacceptable performance and conduct, rather than solely on the use of alcohol. Commanders must respond to unacceptable behavior or performance with appropriate corrective actions. If individuals cannot or will not maintain Air Force standards, then the Air Force will ensure humane management and administrative disposition of these people.

Installation commanders are responsible for implementing a base-wide alcohol deglamorization program. Though alcohol is a legal substance, "drink responsibly" is critical. It is each Airman's responsibility to exercise judgment in the use of alcohol when not otherwise restricted by public law or military directive. Commanders and supervisors have the ability to limit alcohol consumption further if it is necessary for the mission. The Air Force only investigates drinking habits that affect public behavior, duty performance, or physical and mental health.

Commanders must base recommendations for discharge on documentation that reflects failure to meet Air Force standards, not on the use of alcohol. (Failure to complete the Alcohol/Drug Abuse Prevention and Treatment (ADAPT) Program cannot be based solely upon failure to maintain abstinence if abstinence has been established as a regiment goal or requirement.) Depending on the behavior in each case, the specific reason should be cited (unsuitability, misconduct, or substandard performance, etc.). Nothing prevents a commander from taking separation action for misconduct when required.

If a worker with an alcohol problem refuses to take part in the ADAPT Program or civilian program, or fails to complete treatment successfully, discharge is appropriate. Initial verbal refusals to cooperate in treatment or a hostile attitude on the part of an individual isn't unusual. You and appropriate referral personnel must determine whether refusal to take part in treatment reflected a behavioral pattern or was an isolated incident.

Problem drinking (especially binge drinking) is a national health crisis. It can start as early as age nine. As military officers, we represent our society, so it should be no surprise that this national problem comes into our gates with our new accessions. In a recent survey conducted jointly by The National Research Council and the Institute of Medicine, nearly fifty percent of all high school seniors admitted to drinking within the last thirty days. Shockingly, twenty-percent of all eighth graders also reported recent alcohol use. This means some Air Force members enter our service with years of routine under aged drinking that was condoned, if not encouraged, during their teen years. Nationwide, alcohol is a major factor in crimes of all types—suicide, sexual assault, domestic violence, simple assaults, accidents, etc. Binge drinking exponentially increases the likelihood of committing (or being a victim of) these crimes. Like the rest of our society, the USAF is at a critical crossroad when it comes to solving the problem of irresponsible drinking.

The Air Force has an opportunity to lead on this issue of national importance. Two recent studies have significantly advanced our understanding of what works when it comes combating alcohol problems in America. The first study, "A Call to Action: Changing the Culture of Drinking in US Colleges," was completed by the National Institute of Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism, while the second study, "Reducing Underage Drinking: A Collective Responsibility," comes from the Institute of Medicine. These studies promise to make the biggest impact on drinking habits and patterns since the Reagan-era. During that period, the largest study conducted on drinking was chartered by Dr. C. Everett Koop, the US Surgeon General. The focus of that study was drinking and driving and it led to sweeping changes in education, policies and laws (such as drinking ages, designated drivers, etc.). The blueprint for successful change in these studies, when applied to an Air Force base, would use three simultaneous areas for focus: individual, base, and community.

Driving While Intoxicated

Intoxicated driving is incompatible with the maintenance of high standards of performance, discipline, safety, public image, personnel reliability, and readiness of military units and supporting activities. It is Air Force policy to significantly reduce the incidence of intoxicated driving and driving under the influence of alcohol within the Air Force through a coordinated program of education, identification, law enforcement, and treatment.

Drugs

The Air Force expects everyone to maintain standards of behavior, performance, and discipline consistent with the UCMJ, public law, and Air Force publications. Illegal or improper use of drugs by an Air Force member is a serious breach of discipline, is incompatible with serving in the Air Force, and automatically places the member's continued service in jeopardy. Because the Air Force does not tolerate such conduct, drug abuse can lead to criminal prosecution and discharge under other than honorable conditions. Illegal or improper use of drugs can also seriously damage physical health, impair judgment, cause psychological injury, and jeopardize the user's safety and the safety of others. It is Air Force policy to prevent drug abuse among its personnel. Failing this, the Air Force is responsible for identifying and treating drug abusers and disciplining or discharging those who use or promote illegal or improper use of drugs.

Air Force military members must not use, possess, manufacture, distribute, or introduce into a military unit, base, station, post, ship, or aircraft any illicit drugs (including nonnarcotic drugs). Violations of these prohibitions are chargeable under the UCMJ. These prohibitions do not apply:

- To any act performed within the proper scope of official duties

- To using, possessing, or introducing legally prescribed drugs on an Air Force installation

- When a drug or substance within the United States is obtained by an over-the-counter, nonprescription purchase from a retail establishment maintained according to local laws

- When legal purchases are made from an exchange, ship's store, or other merchandising facility operated by the federal government or any of its agencies

Quite simply, drug abuse is not compatible with Air Force standards. The Air Force won't tolerate drug abuse among its members; therefore, it automatically jeopardizes their potential for continued service. Failure to meet standards of conduct and impaired duty performance are grounds for discharge. When immediate discharge is necessary, the ADAPT Program must not delay it. However, the commander must ensure the member either shows no sign of being drug dependent or denies drug dependency before discharge. If a member is drug dependent, the commander may postpone the execution of discharge to accommodate the requirement for detoxification and initial medical treatment.

Failure to complete the ADAPT Program successfully due to inability, refusal to participate, or unwillingness to cooperate as determined by the commander is also a basis for discharge. Individuals who previously participated in the ADAPT Program and are again substantiated as drug abusers should be processed for discharge.

Commanders, board members, and discharge authorities involved in drug abuse discharge actions must be familiar with the Air Force policy on drug abuse. Policies include limitations on identification methods, detoxification requirements, and referral to the Veterans' Affairs if eligible. These considerations may affect the characterization of service that the discharge authorities recommend or approve.

Steroid Abuse

"The illegal use of anabolic/androgenic steroids by otherwise healthy active duty personnel is prohibited." Therefore, Air Force members involved in the illegal use of steroids will be subject to separation. Steroids are derived from male hormones. The primary medical use of anabolic steroids is to help build body tissues and prevent the breakdown of tissue that occurs in debilitating diseases. The dangers of misuse are increased when the steroids are taken without the supervision of a physician. There are only a few approved anabolic steroids on the market, and the Food and Drug Administration has been narrowing the approved uses of anabolic steroids. Abusers of these potent prescription drugs risk congestive heart failure, strokes, lung cancer, and cardiovascular system impairment which is considered to be the most hazardous of all side effects.

Hemp Seed and Hemp Seed Oil

AFI 44-121 makes special mention of hemp seed and hemp seed oil use by Air Force personnel. Because hemp seed contains varying amounts of THC, the chemical found in marijuana, the ingestion of hemp seed or hemp seed oil may cause military members to test positive on a random drug test and is prohibited by Article 92 of the Uniform Code of

Military Justice (UCMJ). Though Air National Guard members in Title 32 status do not fall under the UCMJ, most states have similar local policies on hemp seed and hemp seed oil use which do apply to Air National Guard members. All Air Force members should be aware that some over-the-counter nutritional supplements contain hemp seed and hemp seed oil; always read the label!

Officer's Role

Your role when handling substance abuse issues is entirely consistent with your other responsibilities as an officer and represents an affirmative step in your efforts to show genuine, personal concern for the welfare of the individual. It is important to note that as an officer, you are not a substance abuse counselor; you are not responsible for diagnosing or treating substance abuse among your personnel. You are, however, charged to document and confront unacceptable performance or behavior, whatever the cause. On this basis, you need to take immediate and appropriate corrective actions when faced with potential or actual substance abuse issues in your organization.

SUPERVISOR RESPONSIBILITIES

As a supervisor, there are steps you can take when a subordinate's duty performance reveals a possible substance abuse problem. Note that these steps are not a checklist; each case must be considered individually. These steps are counseling, referral, reprimand, and discharge; all four require active and consistent documentation. Documentation should be specific and describe the type of behavior, how it violates standards, and how it differs from an individual's "normal" behavior. Supervisory records of performance discrepancies, unacceptable behaviors, interviews or counseling, and actions taken will serve as the basic elements of any counseling. Documentation will also serve as a summary for higher supervisory levels, consultants (MEO, medical, chaplains, etc.) or the commander. It is important to note that lack of prior documentation *does not* excuse a supervisor or commander from taking action if they have reason to suspect a member of substance abuse. In other words, never hesitate to take action just because no prior documentation exists.

Counseling

Counseling in the case of substance abuse can be particularly challenging. A member who is actively abusing or using illegal or illicit substances may be in denial that they even have a problem. Keep in mind that your role as a supervisor is to provide *leadership* counseling, not substance abuse counseling. Stick to the facts as they relate to work performance and seek to avoid emotional involvement. Maintain objectivity. However unpleasant the counseling session may be, it is important to take action as soon as substance abuse is suspected. Failure to take action is a failure of leadership and can endanger the lives and welfare of your Airmen and place the mission in jeopardy.

Referral

Referral is the process of directing the member to the resource agency best suited to handle the problem. Airmen who are abusing illegal or illicit substances may be referred to the base clinic/ADAPT program, chaplains, legal, or even civilian resources. Have a list of resources available for your particular base and do not hesitate to coordinate with these agencies and/or the First Sergeant, who is required to have a list of resources, if you need guidance. Referral is not a sign of failure and should never be used in place of effective leadership; it is a decision based on mature judgment, to ensure an Airman receives the best possible care. Referrals should include a history of suspected problems, efforts to date, and actions you plan to take if a member does not resolve his or her difficulties.

Since substance abuse is typically a symptom of other personal issues, the chart below is included to provide guidance regarding common referral agencies and the areas with which they can best assist.

REFERRAL AGENCIES	PROBLEM
Chaplain Services Branch	Some areas they provide counseling in are religious, marital, academic, and personal problems.
Medical Services	The base hospital provides counseling in areas such as physical and mental health. They also offer assistance in the prevention and treatment of drug and alcohol abuse.
Air Force Aid Society	Can provide financial assistance for a wide range of emergencies and other needs.
Legal Office	This office can provide assistance by giving advice on legal matters.
EO Office	This office offers assistance in resolving discrimination and harassment complaints.
American Red Cross (ARC) Office	Some of the services they provide include personal and family counseling, emergency financial assistance and assistance with communications between service members and their families.
Airmen and Family Readiness Center (A&FRC)	Some of the services provided by this agency include personal and family counseling crisis intervention, and financial counseling.

Reprimand

Reprimand may be necessary in some cases for chronic alcohol or drug abusers. Before providing any kind of reprimand, consult with the base legal office to ensure you are within your authority or if you need to refer the situation up the chain-of-command. Reprimand may not be used in all cases of substance abuse; some situations will warrant more severe action, while others may end with counseling and/or referral.

Discharge

Discharge is the responsibility of the commander and will vary depending on the individual, the circumstances, and the offense. If the substance abuse pertains to illegal drug use, immediate discharge may be warranted. In the Air National Guard, commanders must initiate discharge action against any member under their command who has engaged in some form of drug abuse unless a waiver of discharge is appropriate and granted IAW AFI 36-3209. While the commander will approve or disapprove the discharge action, supervisors are responsible for making a discharge recommendation when warranted. Typically, the character of discharge will be Under Other Than Honorable Conditions (UOTHC), however this is often at the discretion of the commander and will be managed on a case-by-case basis. Depending on the method used to identify the substance abuser, the recommendation on the character of discharge may be limited.

Personnel Actions

Supervisors are responsible for immediately administering certain personnel actions in the event of substance abuse by a member in their chain-of-command. These functions include the following:

- **Line of Duty (LOD) Determinations.** If a member's illness, injury, or disease is found during an LOD investigation to have occurred while a member was absent for duty or due to a member's own misconduct (including the illegal or illicit use of drugs or alcohol), the determination may impact disability, retirement, and severance pay, result in forfeiture of pay, and the member's period of enlistment may be adjusted to make up lost time due to absence or misconduct.

- **Security Clearance.** Members diagnosed with alcohol abuse or alcohol dependence are not generally granted access to classified information or unescorted entry into restricted areas while in treatment. Security clearance or access authorization following treatment is not automatic and requires a recommendation from decision committee members to the unit commander.

- **Personnel Reliability Program (PRP).** Refer to AFMAN *10-3902* for factors determining PRP decertification and reinstatement.

- **Review of Duty Assignment.** Commanders must review the duty assignments of military members identified as substance abusers to determine if they can continue in their current duties. Individuals in treatment for alcohol abuse should continue in their primary duty unless prohibited by directives. If prohibited, they should never be assigned to duties inappropriate or demeaning to their rank. Following treatment, where appropriate, every effort should be made to return members to their primary duties.

IDENTIFYING SUBSTANCE ABUSERS

For the Air Force to have an effective substance abuse control program, we must have a means of identifying substance abusers. Supervisors play the most critical role in identifying airmen with substance abuse problems. Long before a member is identified as a substance abuser, supervisors should already have begun the documentation process by providing a written record of any unacceptable behavior by the members under their supervision, along with any counseling or action taken. A periodic review of this documentation will ensure the effective management of resources and also uncover trends in unacceptable behavior or "signs" that a member may be using or abusing illegal or illicit substances.

As an officer and supervisor, it is your responsibility to know the signs and symptoms of substance abuse and to identify subordinates with problems early and motivate them to seek and accept help. The presence of these signs, though common indicators of substance abuse, does not always substantiate a substance abuse problem. It is not your role as a supervisor to diagnose your subordinates. However, if you witness any of these signs, it may suggest a potential problem. Talk with the member and explain your concern, document, and discuss specific instances of unusual behavior. Do not hesitate to refer subordinates to medical professionals for further assessment.

Checklist of Physical and Psychological Symptoms

- Moodiness
- Depression
- Detached Attitude
- Nervousness
- Euphoria-increase energy
- Inconsistent actions
- Talkative
- Large mood swings

- Sleepiness

- Unsteady gait

- Tremors

- Constant runny nose

- Slurred speech

- Trouble sitting still

- Personal grooming deterioration

- Frequent illness

- Increased physical injuries

- Bruises

- Impaired short term memory

- Impaired logical thinking

- Poor muscle control

- Bloodshot eyes

- Dull eyes

- Dilated pupils

Checklist of Work-Related Performance Indicators

Repeated or continuous patterns of performance deterioration (e.g. documented job related issues), in a number of the following areas may that intervention is needed. NOTE: Frequency and duration should also be considered before assuming these behaviors are substance abuse related.

1.   **Absenteeism**
   - Unauthorized leave

   - Monday absence/Friday absence

   - Repeated absence of 2-3 days

   - Repeated absence of 1-2 weeks

   - Excessive tardiness

   - Leaving work early

- Peculiar or increasingly improbable excuses for absences

- Higher rates of absenteeism than other employees for colds, flu, gastritis, etc.

- Frequent, unscheduled short-term absences

2. **On-the-Job Absenteeism**

- Away from job more than job requires

- Frequent trips to water fountain, bathroom, or for coffee

- Long coffee breaks

- Physical illness on the job

3. **High Accident Rate**

- Accidents on the job

- Frequent trips to medical facilities

- Accidents off the job, but affecting work performance

- Accidents to equipment

4. **Lowered Job Efficiency**

- Misses deadlines

- Makes mistakes or bad decisions due to inattention or impaired judgment

- Wastes materials

- Lowered output

- Overly dependent on others

- Carelessness

- Improbable excuses for poor job performance

5. **Difficulties in Concentration/Confusion**

- Work requires great effort

- Job takes more time

- Hand tremors when concentrating

- Frequent day dreaming

- Details often neglected

- Undependable

- Difficulty in recalling instructions clearly

- Increasing difficulty in handling complex assignments

- Difficulty in recalling own mistakes

- Forgetful

- Reduced awareness of what's going on

- Unable to keep current

6. **Communication**
   - Less communicative than in the past

   - Unclear or imprecise communication

   - Argumentative with co-workers and supervisors

7. **Sporadic Work Patterns**
   - Alternating periods of very high & very low productivity

   - Work produced differs in quality from time-to-time

8. **Initiative**
   - Unwillingness to change work responsibilities

   - Unwillingness to change ways of doing job

   - Needs constant supervision or extra help

9. **Interpersonal Skills**
   - Overreacts to real or imagined criticism

   - Wide swings in morale

   - Borrows money from co-workers

   - Avoids old friends or colleagues

   - Constant complaints to associates and supervisors

   - Avoids supervisor, especially after lunch and breaks

   - Avoids making eye-contact with others

   - Overly critical of others

   - Makes unreliable or untrue statements

10.   Abnormal Behavior

- Coming to or returning to work in an obviously abnormal condition

- Obviously bizarre or abnormal actions on the job

Identification Methods

There are five categories in the Air Force for how substance abuse is identified and managed. Each method of identification dictates how a commander must best proceed in managing an Airman's substance abuse.

Arrest, Apprehension, or Investigation. An individual involved in driving under the influence, public intoxication, or an incident in which drug use or alcohol abuse is a contributing factor must be referred to Life Skills for evaluation.

Incident to Medical Care. Medical personnel must notify the commander if a member receives treatment and is suspected, identified or observed to be under the influence of alcohol or drugs or if a member is admitted as a patient for alcohol or drug detoxification. A patient under treatment for reason other than substance abuse may be found to be under the influence of drugs or alcohol, or the injury under treatment may be a result of substance abuse. Under these circumstances, medical personnel must notify the unit commander and the Mental Health Clinic so the patient can be evaluated.

Commander Referral. A unit commander shall refer all service members for assessment when substance use is suspected to be a contributing factor in any incident, e.g., DUI, public intoxication, drunk and disorderly conduct, spouse/child abuse and maltreatment, under-aged drinking, positive drug test, or when notified by medical personnel. A referral may be completed by the commander or first sergeant simply by contacting the Mental Health Clinic and setting an appointment date and time. When there's no prior legal or medical basis, unit commanders can identify people for evaluation and treatment if necessary. As a supervisor, you should consider the behavioral signs of substance abuse we discussed earlier (deteriorating duty performance, frequent errors in judgment, excessive tardiness, or absenteeism, etc.). If you think a problem exists, see your immediate supervisor, or commander to begin necessary action.

Drug Testing. The Air Force uses urine testing of personnel for detection of drug abuse according to AFI 44-120, *Military Demand Reduction Program*. Urinalysis is most effective as a deterrent if it has the potential to reach each Air Force military member; thus, all military personnel are subject to testing. The method which best achieves this deterrent goal is inspection testing. Commanders must have the flexibility to select the most appropriate testing procedure, but inspection testing should be the primary method, with probable cause and command-directed examination as supplements. Military members who fail to comply with an order to provide a urine sample are subject to punitive action under the UCMJ. Commanders must refer individuals identified positive as a result of

urine testing for drug abuse to Mental Health personnel. Military members may receive an order or voluntarily consent to provide urine samples at any time. Methods to obtain urinalysis samples may include the following:

- *Inspection Under Military Rule of Evidence*, UCMJ. Commanders may conduct inspections in the form of unit sweeps or randomly on segments of a squadron, unit, duty section, or dormitory. Commanders must avoid singling out specific individuals or small groups, as these cases most often fall under command-directed testing provisions. Commanders should consult with their staff judge advocate (SJA), Life Skills, and the medical urine test program monitor before conducting inspection testing. Commanders may use the positive result of a urine sample to refer a member to Life Skills, as evidence to support disciplinary action under the UCMJ or administrative discharge action, and as a consideration on the issue of characterization of discharge in separation proceedings.

- *Probable Cause Search and Seizure Under the UCMJ*. Commanders can order a urine test when there's probable cause to believe that the military member has ingested drugs, is drug intoxicated, or has committed a drug-related offense. Commanders should consult with their SJA, as well as follow appropriate procedures, to establish probable cause. They may use the results to refer a member to Life Skills, to support and use as evidence in disciplinary action under the UCMJ or administrative discharge action, and as a consideration on the issue of characterization of discharge in separation proceedings.

- *Command-Directed Examination*. Commanders can refer a military member for urine testing when there's a reasonable suspicion of drug abuse. They can also order a test when it's conducted as an examination of a specified member in conjunction with the member's participation in a DoD drug treatment program. A command-directed examination may be conducted to determine a member's competency for duty and the need for counseling or other medical treatment. Commanders usually direct urine testing in all circumstances of abnormal, bizarre, or unlawful behavior in which probable cause doesn't exist but there's a reasonable suspicion of drug abuse. Such circumstances may include unauthorized absences, violations of safety requirements, disobedience of direct orders, apprehension or investigation for drug offenses or intoxicated driving, involvement in violent crimes, or other incidents involving repeated or serious breaches of discipline. Commanders should refer individuals for a urine test as soon as possible after a behavioral incident. In addition, apathy, a defective attitude, or a personality change may, when examined in conjunction with other circumstances, lead to a reasonable suspicion of drug abuse and form the basis for command-directed urine testing. Commanders may use results obtained from command-directed testing to refer a member for evaluation by Life Skills and in an administrative discharge action. **Commanders may not use results against a member in any disciplinary action under the UCMJ or on the issue of characterization of discharge in separation proceedings.**

- *Medical Purposes*. Results of any examination conducted for a valid medical purpose including emergency medical treatment, periodic physical examination, and other such examinations necessary for diagnostic or treatment purposes may be used to identify drug abusers. Results may be used to refer a member to Life Skills, as evidence to support disciplinary action under the UCMJ, or administrative discharge action; these results may also be considered on the issue of characterization of discharge in separation proceedings.

Self-identification. The Air Force encourages personnel with substance abuse problems to seek assistance. Members may self-identify to the unit commander, first sergeant, substance abuse counselor, or medical authority. In regards to alcohol, commanders must provide sufficient incentive to encourage members to seek help without fear of negative consequences. Self-identification is reserved for members who are not currently under investigation or pending action as a result of an incident. Regarding drugs, commanders grant limited protection to members who reveal this information with the intention of seeking treatment. Information disclosed voluntarily may not be used in UCMJ action or in weighing characterization of discharge. This limited protection is not applicable to members who have been apprehended for substance abuse involvement, are under investigation by Security Forces or the Air Force Office of Special Investigations (OSI), or has been ordered to provide a urine sample. This protection also does not apply to those who are currently in a treatment program or have been advised of administrative discharge for substance abuse.

NOTE: In addition to the previously indicated methods, you, as an officer, should help ensure the identification of substance abusers by encouraging people known to have an existing or potential drug or alcohol problem to seek assistance. When abuse exists, you must notify your supervisor or commander at once so he or she can take proper action. Report all incidents of drug abuse to your immediate supervisor and unit commander, servicing security police agency, and the local office of the AFOSI.

URINALYSIS: INCONVENIENT,

UNDIGNIFIED, AND INVALUABLE

Major General William Moorman, Former Air Force Judge Advocate General

The drug MDMA or "Ecstasy" has been getting a lot of publicity lately. Since our urinalysis program has adjusted to respond to increased Ecstasy use, including a renewed emphasis on weekend testing, it's a good time to review why the program exists.

Almost Perfect. When I am about to step aboard an Air Force aircraft, I have an extremely high degree of confidence that its crew and maintainers are not drug abusers. Moreover, when any of us are about to receive a service or product from any Air Force member, there is a high probability that he or she is not a drug abuser. Why? One reason is that

the Air Force recruits and retains great people who consider illegal drug use unwise and unhealthy. But we're a huge organization and we can't expect that all members will be so steadfast in their attitudes regarding drugs. That's why we have a urinalysis program.

A Deterrence Program. We need to remember that urinalysis is a deterrence program, and not simply a way to "catch" drug abusers. Think of it as being similar to preventive maintenance. We don't wait for mishaps or component failures to perform maintenance on aircraft. Instead, the Air Force expends considerable amounts of time, effort, and money to inspect, repair, and replace parts before they fail. By doing so, we save aircraft and, more importantly, lives. Urinalysis seeks to prevent "failures of willpower" that might lead our fellow Airmen into illegal drug use. It saves careers and lives. Keeping people out of trouble and on the job is good for them and for the Air Force.

To Put It Another Way. To use another analogy, the urinalysis program is similar to the airport security devices we all are familiar with. While they are inconvenient and can result in some indignity, they serve an important purpose. Even though the large majority of us would never bring a weapon onboard an aircraft, we are willing to go through the process because those devices, by deterring others from bringing weapons onboard, enhance our safety. A greater goal, in this case, safety, causes us to support a program that otherwise infringes on our time and privacy.

It Takes All Of Us. To work effectively, a urinalysis program must be random, unpredictable, and all-inclusive. Therefore, all of us must participate, whether as administrators, monitors, or subjects. And as we do, we are contributing to the success of the program by helping deter others who might be inclined to use drugs if the program did not exist. Our participation also reflects our commitment to a drug-free Air Force.

In his 29 March 2000 memorandum, *Support for the Air Force Drug Abuse Testing Program*, the Vice Chief of Staff stated that active commander support and involvement is essential to maintaining program effectiveness. I urge you to work with commanders and first sergeants to help them ensure that everyone understands why we have a urinalysis program.

ALCOHOL/DRUG ABUSE PREVENTION AND TREATMENT (ADAPT) PROGRAM

The primary objective of the Alcohol/Drug Abuse Prevention and Treatment (ADAPT) Program is to promote readiness and health and wellness through the prevention and treatment of substance abuse; to minimize the negative consequences of substance abuse to the individual, family, and organization; to provide comprehensive education and treatment to individuals who experience problems attributed to substance abuse; and to return identified substance abusers to unrestricted duty status or to assist them in their transition to civilian life, as appropriate. Be advised that this does not restrict the

responsibility of commanders to manage illegal substance abuse within their organization; the Air Force makes a clear distinction between treatment and discipline. The Air Force maintains a zero tolerance policy on illegal drug use; the ADAPT program will provide substance abuse counseling and transition to civilian life in this case, but commanders are still responsible for appropriate administrative actions including discharge in cases of illegal drug use.

NOTE: The ADAPT program applies *only* to active duty Air Force members, and Air Force Reserve Command (AFRC) and Air National Guard (ANG) members when activated longer than 30 days. The AFRC and ANG do not provide treatment to substance abusers. Air National Guard commanders will refer drill status (Title 32) Guardsmen, technicians and state employees suspected of substance abuse to their civilian provider for assessment and referral for treatment. Commanders may not place someone on orders or extend active duty orders to anyone for the purpose of rehabilitation. Civilian providers must be a licensed mental health professional or a certified substance abuse counselor. Any cost associated with treatment is incumbent on the member and is at no cost to the AFRC or ANG.

Treatment Team Meeting

The purpose of the treatment team meeting (TTM) is to determine the proper course of action for the member. This team will consist of the Commander, First Sergeant, Supervisor, Substance Abuse Counselor, Medical Consultant, as needed, ADAPT Program Manager, Flight Surgeon (if the patient is on flying status), and the member. There are several factors that determine what level of treatment is necessary to help the patient. These will most often be discussed at length at the TTM. Treatment services available include the following:

Non-Clinical Services. Members who do not meet the diagnostic criteria for alcohol/drug abuse or dependence will be provided a minimum of six hours of education. Additional counseling to address issues identified in the biopsychosocial assessment may also be considered. The length of involvement in treatment will be determined by the members presenting problems and agreed upon.

Clinical Services. Members meeting the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM) V criteria for alcohol/drug abuse or dependence will be entered into treatment with the level and intensity determined by American Society of Addiction Medicine (ASAM) criteria. Variable lengths of stay/duration shall be provided within a variety of treatment settings tailored to meet the needs of the individual member. This may include inpatient care or intensive outpatient treatment. Detoxification may be necessary prior to treatment.

Program Encouragement

Family involvement is highly encouraged. Abstinence is required during the treatment phase, and encouraged during the aftercare phase. Self-help group attendance is encouraged. PCS/TDYs are restricted for the first 6 months of aftercare and based upon the member's progress.

Transitional Counseling

Helps members make the transition to civilian life. Members may refuse assistance by signing a written statement.

Completing the Program

The member may complete the program once they meet DSM V requirements for early remission. The TTM determines completion based on progress towards agreed upon goals stated in the treatment plan.

Failing the Program

Self-identification members are held to the same standards as other members entering the program. If the member violates the program regimen, they will be considered a program failure. Members fail by not maintaining Air Force standards. Drinking, by itself, is not grounds for failure. Members who refuse to take part in or fail to satisfactorily complete the ADAPT program should be separated.

Administrative Issues Associated with the ADAPT Program

Leave Authorization. Ordinary leave is not usually granted during the evaluation process or the treatment phase of the ADAPT program.

Line of Duty Determination. The purpose of a line-of-duty determination is to decide how much pay will be forfeited, if any, during absence from duty due to injury or disease resulting from substance abuse while a member is on active duty. A line of duty determination may also determine eligibility for physical, disability, or retirement pay. The Air Force may require an individual to make up any lost time before separation. A line of duty determination must be made in cases of injury or death as a result of substance abuse while the member is on active duty.

Personnel Reliability Program (PRP) Decertification. Members who are diagnosed as alcohol abusers may be reconsidered for PRP duties 1 year after successful completion of the aftercare program. For those diagnosed as alcohol dependent, the decertification is permanent.

Promotion Eligibility. Promotions are solely the decision of the promotion authority.

Reassignment Eligibility. Members with an abuse/dependence diagnosis will be placed in a medical profile preventing PCS for 6 months.

Reenlistment Eligibility. Enlisted members whose terms of service expire during treatment and who are otherwise eligible to reenlist may extend their enlistment for the number of months required to complete treatment successfully. Individuals who self-identified to the Program, however, may not be denied reenlistment solely on that basis.

First-term Airmen who successfully complete treatment and are selected for reenlistment by their unit commanders under the Selective Reenlistment Program and are otherwise eligible for promotion may acquire retainability to process and receive a response to an initial career job reservation application.

Security Clearance. A history of alcoholism in itself doesn't permanently disqualify a member from a security clearance, access to classified information, or unescorted entry into restricted areas. Members diagnosed as alcoholics aren't generally granted access to classified information or unescorted entry into restricted areas while in treatment. Unit commanders must obtain a recommendation from other intervention committee members regarding security clearance or access authorization after the individual completes treatment. The committee uses such recommendations, with the member's demonstrated duty performance, to determine whether a security clearance or access authorization should be granted, denied, or revoked. AFI 31-501, *USAF Personnel Security Program Management*, provides guidance on people involved in substance abuse.

Temporary Duty (TDY). TDY restriction decisions based upon progress and current status.

Unfavorable Information File (UIF). UIF and control roster action should be based on a members unacceptable behavior and not solely on entry in the ADAPT Program.

Separation. Drug and Alcohol abuse affects military and social performance and individuals can be separated for inability to meet military performance standards.

Personal Considerations for the Member

Substance abuse is a highly sensitive issue with dramatic consequences to the individual and their family. Substance abusers often have a very difficult time admitting to their problem. Be sensitive to the individual and their family, and respect the privacy of the member when dealing with family and co-workers.

CONCLUSION

Through your awareness and concerted actions, you can recognize substance abuse problems and greatly reduce the scope of their impact. The Air Force substance abuse program is one of prevention and control, only achieved through commitment and action on the part of all Air Force personnel.

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Sexual Harassment Awareness

Cognitive Lesson Objective:
- Comprehend the concept and consequences of sexual harassment.

Cognitive Samples of Behavior:
- State the Air Force policy on sexual harassment.

- State commander/supervisory responsibilities regarding sexual harassment.

- Explain the various forms of sexual harassment.

- Summarize the effects of sexual harassment on mission accomplishment.

- Identify informal and formal means of relief from sexual harassment.

- Explain what penalties could be associated with sexual harassment.

Affective Lesson Objective:
- Value the Air Force sexual harassment policy.

Affective Sample of Behavior:
- Assert the importance of preventing and responding to sexual harassment.

As an Air Force officer, it's important you know that it's Air Force policy to conduct its affairs free from unlawful discrimination, and to provide equal opportunity and treatment for all members irrespective of their age, color, national origin, race, ethnic group, religion, or gender, except as prescribed by statute or policy. This is the foundation of AFI 36-2706, Equal Opportunity (EO) Program.

Due to DoD-wide heightened interest in sexual harassment issues, it's important you are aware of current DoD/AF policy on sexual harassment, what constitutes sexual harassment, what the harmful effects of sexual harassment are, and how to report sexual harassment.

During this lesson, you'll discuss case studies which depict several examples of sexual harassment to ensure you understand what sexual harassment is and how to deal with it when it occurs.

Sexual Harassment Definition

Sexual harassment is a crime under the UCMJ, Article 93, "Cruelty and Maltreatment." Sexual harassment is a form of discrimination that involves unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature when:

- Submission to such conduct is made directly or indirectly as a term or condition of employment

- Submission to or rejection of such conduct is used as a basis for an employment decision affecting the person

- Such conduct has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an individual's work performance or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive work environment

The following examples of sexual harassment show how this behavior can be **verbal, nonverbal, or physical.**

Verbal Sexual Harassment. Verbal sexual harassment may include inquiries into a person's intimate or personal relationships, sexually oriented comments about one's appearance, or continued pressure for dates, particularly after refusals.

Nonverbal Sexual Harassment. Nonverbal sexual harassment may include sexually demeaning notes or cartoons, nude pictures in and around the work area, or ashtrays, coffee mugs, or figurines of a sexual nature.

Physical Sexual Harassment. Physical sexual harassment may include patting, pinching, hugging, grabbing, rubbing, massaging, deliberate touching, or any other unnecessary physical contact. Blocking a person's path, or pinning a person against a wall can also constitute sexual harassment.

Air Force Policy

Sexual harassment can be blatant or subtle; it can be deliberate or can occur because of the perceptions of individuals who think they've been sexually harassed, and both men and women can be the subject of sexual harassment.

The Air Force policy on sexual harassment is zero tolerance. Because the numbers of sexual harassment complaints filed and validated are both up, commanders are taking the zero tolerance policy on sexual harassment quite seriously.

Effects of Sexual Harassment

Anything that infringes on accomplishing the Air Force mission cannot, and will not, be tolerated. Sexual harassment can, indeed, be a serious barrier to mission accomplishment. Sexual harassment, real or perceived, degrades leadership and interferes with command authority and mission effectiveness. Additionally, it may create situations that negatively affect unit cohesiveness. This could be evidenced by positions of authority being weakened, peer group relationships being jeopardized, decreased job performance, loss of morale, or perceptions that certain individuals will receive favorable or preferential treatment over others.

Avenues of Complaint

Air Force members who believe they've been sexually harassed may address their complaint through informal or formal means.

At an informal level, the complainant could seek out the potential harasser and communicate to him/her that their unwanted sexual behavior, gestures, or comments are unwelcome. Such behavior needs correction **immediately**, as it occurs. The nature of the incident, whether it's isolated or an example of repeated behavior, may impact whether the incident should be taken to a higher level. Another informal means may be to inform the potential harasser's supervisor or your supervisor. A complainant may lodge and document informal complaints with the Equal Opportunity office. The EO staff can assist complainants with summarizing allegations and providing advice **but are not part of the resolution process.**

At a more formal level, the complainant has several choices, ranging from their chain of command, legal office, security forces, the chaplain, Equal Opportunity office, Inspector General (IG) system, Congressional channels, or the US Attorney General. Complainants must submit formal complaints in writing to the EO office. Once submitted and accepted by the EO staff, the issue becomes an official concern of the Air Force. The process involves gathering information for the commander or individual with jurisdiction to resolve the situation. If the complaint is not within the authority of the EO office, it will be immediately referred to the appropriate agency for resolution.

Another formal means of processing a complaint is through the IG Complaint System, outlined in AFI 90-201, Inspector General Activities. Any member of the Air Force, military or civilian, has the right to file a complaint for actual or perceived sexual harassment, without fear of retribution or reprisal. Individuals have this right, whether the complaint is found to be valid or without merit. The objective of the IG complaint system is to conduct a fair and impartial review in attempting to resolve a complaint.

The IG complaint system provides a means of resolving a problem where no other method exists. It's important to note that if other regulations do provide a method for resolving a particular problem, the IG Complaint System should not be used. Examples of subjects covered by other guidance include civilian employee grievances, appeals to enlisted or officer performance reports, claims against the government, correction of military records, and suggestions.

Although complaints should be resolved at the lowest possible level, a complaint may be filed directly with an IG representative at any level of command. Even though the chain of command may provide the fastest means of resolving the problem, an individual is not prohibited from entering a complaint at any higher level.

Commander/Supervisory Responsibilities

Commanders and supervisors need to be especially sensitive to any complaints of sexual harassment brought before them. If a commander or supervisor doesn't take the steps necessary to determine the validity of the complaint, he/she may actually be condoning the existence of a situation that constitutes sexual harassment. By definition, the action of condoning the situation is also sexual harassment, and may warrant action against the commander or supervisor.

Remember, all incidents and allegations of sexual harassment need to be investigated to determine their validity. Commanders and supervisors should consider each situation individually. The seriousness of the allegations would determine if a formal investigation should be initiated. If the sexual harassment complaint is found to be valid, the commander must take swift, firm corrective or disciplinary action against the offender. Additionally, the commander must ensure no retaliatory action is taken against the complainant. The exact nature of the corrective or disciplinary action taken is dependent on the severity and nature of the incident. Specific corrective or disciplinary actions are difficult to ascertain; however, as a general rule, the corrective or disciplinary actions should be consistent with punishments for other similar offenses and should be consistent with the severity of the offense. In either case, actions taken should ensure the offender clearly understands the Air Force policy of zero tolerance for sexual harassment and ensures that the offenses aren't repeated.

Finally, commanders and supervisors must take special care to ensure reprisals of a direct or indirect nature do not take place with the complainant. Because reprisals may be very subtle and hard to substantiate, it may be necessary to change supervisors or to move one of the individuals involved.

Penalties of Sexual Harassment

Air Force statistics show that most sexual harassment complaints found to be valid result in oral or written reprimands, but sometimes far stricter penalties are imposed. In fact, sexual harassment can lead to court-martial action for the offender.

For example, an officer at Hill AFB, Utah was court-martialed and convicted of criminal charges in connection with sexual harassment. This officer was sentenced to six months of confinement for sexually harassing five women, including three enlisted members, a fellow officer, and the wife of an airman in his unit. During a three-year period, the offender approached the women when they were alone and asked them for sexual favors. In the case of the Airman's wife, the officer threatened to have her husband removed from the service if she told anyone about his proposition. In addition to the confinement, the officer was dismissed from the service and ordered to forfeit $6,000 in pay and allowances.

Sexual harassment, real or perceived, is a serious offense not to be taken lightly. Through education and awareness, you play a vital role in preventing, reporting, and not condoning sexual harassment.

CASE STUDIES

The following case studies will be discussed in the class/flight room. Please make notes and be prepared to discuss them.

CASE #1

A female captain in civilian clothes was taunted by a male lieutenant, also in civilian clothes, outside a base club. The two were not assigned to the same unit and did not know each other. The male was wearing a T-shirt that identified his unit and two of his co-workers observed the incident. The lieutenant followed the captain down the sidewalk, yelling sexually explicit suggestions at her. She continued walking. The lieutenant grabbed the captain by the arm, and then touched her breasts. At that point, one of the lieutenant's co-workers called him by his last name and told him to leave the woman alone. Afterwards, the woman reported the incident through her chain of command. The lieutenant's commander investigated the incident and ordered non-judicial punishment for the lieutenant.

Group Discussion Questions

1. At what point did the lieutenant's behavior become inappropriate?
2. When does showing an interest in a person of the opposite sex constitute sexual harassment?
3. Does it make any difference that the lieutenant and captain were from different units?
4. Does it make any difference that the lieutenant was unaware that the victim out-ranked him?

CASE #2

A male staff sergeant had been counseled on two occasions by his female supervisor for marginal performance of his duties. Immediately following the second counseling session, the staff sergeant alleged to his Officer in Charge (OIC) that his supervisor had made inappropriate sexual comments to him during that session. He further alleged the supervisor had repeatedly asked him for dates. He stated his performance was not marginal, but that the supervisor was marking him down because he refused to date her. There were no witnesses. The supervisor denied all the allegations.

Group Discussion Questions

1. What is the appropriate response for the OIC and commander?
2. Should the supervisor change her behavior?
3. Should the staff sergeant change his behavior?

CASE #3

A female Airman overheard a male technical sergeant telling his flight of his sexual exploits over the weekend. She told him the explicitness of his stories had made her very uncomfortable. She explained that she was "offended and thought that others--including men--might have been upset." The technical sergeant replied, "Look, I've grown up around men. I apologize. I will try to clean up my act. I didn't realize you'd be offended."

Group Discussion Questions

1. What, if anything, was wrong with the jokes and stories?
2. Did the Airman handle the situation correctly? Would you have done something different? What would you do?
3. Should she have gone to the commander?

CASE #4

A female dorm guard alleged a Charge of Quarters (CQ) on duty referred to her by an inappropriate term of endearment during a conversation over the call box. The commander questioned the duty flight and found the CQ on duty did refer to the Airman as "Honey."

Group Discussion Questions

1. Was the CQ on duty being professional? Why or why not?
2. Does the CQ's on duty use of "Honey" constitute sexual harassment?
3. How would the CQ on duty feel if his statement was returned with "Sure, doll?"

CASE #5

A storage room off the corner of the warehouse contains a sink where employees make coffee and wash up. Its walls and ceilings are completely covered by pictures of nude women in graphic poses. The only female working in the warehouse complained to her supervisor on several occasions, but his response was always that she should have expected such things when she chose to work in the warehouse with its all-male staff.

Group Discussion Questions

1. Does this behavior constitute sexual harassment? Why or why not?
2. What, if anything, should the OIC do about this situation?

CASE #6

A staff sergeant comes in late to the office. She explains she's late because someone rear-ended her car. When her supervisor (a male lieutenant) comes over to talk to her, he places his arm around her, holds her hand, touches her shoulder, and stands very close to her as he expresses his concern. It is rumored that the staff sergeant and the Lieutenant are having an affair. After they both left the office the other members of the office discussed the lieutenant's behavior and whether the rumors were true.

Group Discussion Questions

1. What was the intent of the lieutenant in expressing his concerns about the sergeant?
2. Did his intentions have any impact on the perceptions of the people in the office?
3. Did the other members of the office who were discussing the situation act correctly?
4. What are some ways to correct this behavior/incident?

CASE #7

A female civilian is sitting at her desk working. She is approached by a male staff sergeant who repeats his often-stated request for her to go out with him on a date. The female civilian declines and addresses the staff sergeant's constant request for a date. The staff sergeant waves off her rebuff.

Group Discussion Questions

1. Does this seemingly natural situation between a man and a woman constitute sexual harassment? Why or why not?
2. Does the civilian act correctly? Should she take any further action?

CASE #8

A female captain asks to speak with her supervisor's boss (a colonel) on a private matter. Once inside his office, she tells the colonel she has been sexually harassed by her supervisor, a male lieutenant colonel. The colonel dismisses the accusation as being misunderstood by the captain. He bases his perception on the fact her supervisor is a long-time friend of his and would never do what she is alleging.

Group Discussion Questions

1. Based on your understanding of the Air Force's definition of sexual harassment, how would you judge the reaction of the colonel to the captain's complaint?
2. Did the colonel's actions or inaction constitute condoning sexually harassing behavior? Why or why not?
3. Were the actions of the colonel sexual harassment? (Explain)
4. What can the captain do about this situation?

CASE #9

NOTE: Same scenario as previous case, with a different outcome.

A female captain asks to speak with her supervisor's boss (a colonel), on a private matter. Once inside his office, she tells the colonel she has been sexually harassed by her supervisor, a male lieutenant colonel. After listening to her story, the colonel assures her he will conduct an inquiry, and if the allegations are true, will take appropriate action. His inquiry reveals likely sexual harassment, and he takes swift and appropriate action.

Group Discussion Questions

1. Did the colonel act appropriately in conducting an inquiry? (Explain)
2. Should the colonel have initiated a formal investigation? Why or why not?
3. If the sexual harassment complaint is valid, what should be done to resolve the incident?
4. Should the lieutenant colonel be punished for his actions? What should happen to him?
5. What should happen to the captain who made the complaint?
6. How can retaliation against the captain by the lieutenant colonel be prevented?
7. What options are available to the colonel? To the captain?

Conclusion

To illustrate the severity of EO violations, read the following letter received from a survey on sexual harassment.

Dear Colonel Rosenbach,

I hope you receive this letter. The survey can tell you how I feel, but not why. And the latter I think is much more important.

I was one of the first women in my field, and the first woman in this lab. I was alone in this lab for over 3-1/2 years. I mean alone. The only two things I had in common with my fellow workers were that we'd been to the same school, and that we were all alive. That was quite clear. They didn't want me here, a woman, doing the same job. The sexual cuts, jokes, lack of professional regard, and many slights of a more subtle nature finally hit home, and having never been exposed to this kind of treatment before, I didn't know what to do. You can't talk about it with your supervisor. He's one of them. There are no other women working with you to talk to. What do you do? Grin and bear it, and try to keep excusing them. But eventually even that wears thin. I have worked in the field I've been trained in (electronics) about 3 months total out of the 5 years I've been in this lab. The rest of the time, I worked testing tire gauges, micrometers, and other dimensional PME. I can no longer repair the simplest electronic meter. I was not allowed to work and gain experience in the field in which I was trained in school. I have worked on a base yearbook, made charts for the commander, and filed technical orders. I am filing them now, as a full time job. I don't even work in a lab anymore.

I have come to hate the men I work for. I distrust their motives, decisions, and management. I only hope I can get my head together when I get out this summer, so this horrible period of my life will not adversely affect the rest of my adult life.

(**NOTE**: The letter was signed and she added this postscript:)

It may not show in my letter, but I love the Air Force, the jets, the community spirit, and the challenge. I wish I could be part of it.

Colonel Rosenbach noted the Airman was a hardworking employee, causing no disciplinary problems during her career.

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Suicide Prevention

Cognitive Lesson Objective:
- Know key factors in the Air Force Suicide Prevention Program.

Cognitive Samples of Behavior:
- List the risk factors associated with suicide.

- Explain what actions Wingmen may take to intervene in impending suicides.

- List the reasons why people fail to seek suicide prevention help.

- Identify who is responsible to help prevent suicides.

Affective Lesson Objective:
- Respond positively to the importance of the Air Force Suicide Prevention Program.

Affective Samples of Behavior:
- Recognize signs and symptoms of distress in yourself and others.

- Be prepared to intervene using the A.C.E. model when you recognize distressed Wingmen.

Law of Armed Conflict

Cognitive Lesson Objective:
- Know how the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC) affects the parties in war.

Cognitive Samples of Behavior:
- State your responsibilities as a professional military officer for reporting a violation of the Law of Armed Conflict.
- Name the two series of treaties that have the greatest influence on the Law of Armed Conflict.
- List the people who are entitled to Prisoner of War status under the Law of Armed Conflict.
- State when aircraft can attack targets located in an area densely populated with civilians.
- Identify the types of economic sanctions available to enforce the laws of war.

Affective Lesson Objective:
- Respond to the importance of the LOAC to members of the US Armed Forces.

Affective Samples of Behavior:
- Read the assigned information before attending the lecture.
- Voluntarily participate in classroom discussion.

LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT

War has been a predominant feature throughout our history. While the methods of fighting these wars have changed dramatically throughout history, certain elements have remained constant. One of the most obvious characteristics is the incredibly violent nature of war. In an attempt to prevent unnecessary harm to civilians and societies at large, nations have adopted a series of treaties and laws that are known as the Law of Armed Conflict.

History

Throughout the history of war, belligerents have recognized that it is best to treat certain people, property, and places as exempt from armed conflict. While there is evidence of international law dating back thousands of years, the codified law of war is a fairly recent development. Francis Lieber prepared the first modern, comprehensive code on the proper conduct of war in 1863. Lieber developed the Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field, which covered areas such as protection of private property, noncombatants, prisoners of war, and punishment for war crimes.[1] While these laws were enforceable only on US forces, the principles were acknowledged by many countries, and the rules were instrumental in developing the Hague Conventions on land warfare in 1899 and 1907.

Another critical development in the Law of Armed Conflict occurred at a similar time in Europe. In 1859, Henry Dunant witnessed the Battle of Solferino, in Northern Italy. His experience treating the wounded after the battle led to the eventual creation of the International Committee of the Red Cross.[2] He was also instrumental in drafting the first Geneva Convention in 1864, followed by subsequent Conventions in 1906, 1929, and 1949.[3] These conventions, over the period of several decades, have focused on the treatment of the sick and wounded, prisoners of war, and civilian personnel in times of war.

Terminology

The Law of Armed Conflict is that part of international law that regulates the conduct of armed hostilities; it is often termed the "law of war." The United States and several other countries have stated that the Law of Armed Conflict is the preferred term, as we have not officially declared war since World War II.

Your Professional Responsibility

As a professional military officer, these laws bind you. The Constitution of the United States, Article VI, Clause 2, states: all treaties made, or which shall be made under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land.

Furthermore, Article 18 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) authorizes a General Court-Martial to try a military member for a violation of the law of war, and numerous articles in the UCMJ establish certain conflict-related offenses (e.g., misbehavior before the enemy under Article 99).

You are responsible for complying with the Law of Armed Conflict, as well as ensuring your subordinates comply. If at any time, you become aware of a violation of the Law of Armed Conflict, you are to report the violation to your immediate commander.[4] The immediate commander is the lowest ranking individual with command responsibilities. This person may be different from your supervisor, who may or may not have command responsibility. If the commander is apparently involved in the incident, then the report should be made to the next higher person with command authority. The commander will then consult the Staff Judge Advocate and the proper investigative agency to deal with the violation.

The Law of Armed Conflict

International law governs the conduct of nations and serves to protect their interests, to ensure citizens are treated equally, and to predict, with some degree of assurance, what other nations will do in a given situation.[5] The Law of Armed Conflict is a subset of international law.

It's interesting that we use the term "Law of Armed Conflict" as though there were a single set of laws that apply to all countries. In reality, the Law of Armed Conflict is a series of conventions, treaties, and customs that have been established by nations throughout history.

Customary international law arises out of the conduct of nations during hostilities, and is binding on all nations. Customs are often difficult to define in concrete terms, because they are constantly changing and adapting to new situations. Thus, customary law is constantly evolving and adapting itself to new situations. For example, today, the law is evolving rapidly in the areas of computer networks, space law, and intellectual property. Despite a lack of concrete codes, elements of customary law may be found in international conventions, declarations, judicial decisions, international and national tribunals, and other documentary materials.

It's important to note treaties and conventions are binding only on those nations that have ratified the treaty or convention. While the United States has entered numerous treaties, there are two treaties that have the greatest influence on the Law of Armed Conflict: the Hague Conventions and the Geneva Conventions.

The Hague Conventions

At the end of the 19th century, Czar Nicholas II of Russia called together the principal nations of the world to discuss and resolve the problems of maintaining universal peace, reducing armaments, and improving the conditions of warfare. Twenty-six nations attended the conference in 1899, and the delegates from the conference signed three

formal conventions, or treaties. The first convention set up permanent procedures for the optional arbitration of controversial issues between nations. This treaty created the Permanent Court of Arbitration, popularly known as The Hague Court or Hague Tribunal. The second and third conventions revised some of the customs, and classified whether individuals qualified as combatants, noncombatants, or neutrals. These two conventions were supplemented by three declarations: to stay in force five years, and to forbid the use of poison gas, expanding (or dumdum) bullets, and bombardment from the air by balloons or by other means.

The second Hague Conference took place between June and October 1907, and was attended by representatives from 44 nations. The second conference created 13 conventions, which were concerned principally with clarifying and amplifying the understandings reached in the first conference.

This conference was complicated by the introduction of new technologies, most notably the Zeppelin and the airplane. While different states had different perspectives on the legitimate use of aerial attack, it was decided that the restrictions on attacking cities through the air could no longer be enforced. There was no concise decision made, but Article 25 of the 1899 Land Warfare Convention was amended to read:

"The attack or bombardment, by whatever means, of towns, villages, dwellings or buildings which are undefended is prohibited."

Several problems emerged from this amendment. First, the Land Warfare Convention conflicted on certain occasions with the Conference's Ninth Convention, "Concerning Bombardment by Naval Forces in Time of War." Article 2 of the Naval Convention identified particular military objects that were to be considered lawful targets for bombardment to include the following:

"Military works, military or naval establishments, depots of arms or war materiel, workshops or plant which could be utilized for the needs of the hostile fleet or army, and the ships of war in the harbor."

The conflicting information between the two conventions left much of the information subject to interpretation. It was further compounded by the ambiguous term "undefended" city. For example, at the outset of World War I, the British debated whether placing anti-aircraft guns in London would make it a "defended city." If the Germans perceived it to be defended, then they could openly attack any military target in the city, but if no guns were emplaced then it would be undefended. In the end, the guns were emplaced.[6] Ironically, the Germans placed little consideration whether there were guns in place or not. They viewed London as a legitimate military target because it contained the administrative offices concerned with the direction of the war.[7]

The attending delegates arranged a third Hague conference, but it was canceled because of the outbreak of World War I. Following World War I, a number of treaties and agreements were signed, but few had the strength of the Hague Conventions.

The Geneva Conventions

World War II demonstrated the inadequacies of the previous conventions and the abuses that some nations were willing to commit in attempting to achieve their objectives. Following the war, the world powers agreed that stronger conventions needed to be made. The Geneva Conventions signed in 1949 are the laws currently recognized and are actually four separate agreements: Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick, and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War; and Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War. It's important to note that although these are official conventions (i.e. they would be enforceable only against nations signing the conventions), they are considered in large part to be customary international law and to be binding on all nations.

Combatants

Members of the armed forces are lawful combatants, regardless of their gender, or whether they volunteered or were drafted. International law states that lawful combatants must distinguish themselves from the civilian population in order for the civilian population to be protected. A lawful combatant is authorized to engage in acts of war on behalf of his state, and he is also a legal target of an act of war.

When their homeland is being invaded, the civilian population has the right to rise up and take arms to resist the invasion. They do not have the obligation to be organized or bear a fixed distinctive symbol. They are entitled to POW status as long as they carry their arms openly and generally adhere to the Law of Armed Conflict. They are lawful combatants only during the invasion. Once the area becomes occupied, a civilian has no legal right to engage in warfare; if he does, he can be tried and punished for his actions.

Many times, a conquering nation will face one or more resistance groups. Resistance movements in France constantly harassed the Nazis during World War II. These resistance members are given combatant status if they meet the following four criteria:

- The force has a responsible command structure.

- The members wear a fixed distinctive insignia recognizable at a distance and they are distinguishable from the civilian population.

- The members carry their arms openly.

- The resistance must conduct its operations in accordance with the laws of armed conflict.

Spies are not protected under the Law of Armed Conflict. A spy is defined as an individual "acting clandestinely, or on false pretenses, [who] obtains or endeavors to obtain information in the zone of operations of a belligerent, with the intention of communicating it to the hostile party. Thus soldiers not wearing a disguise, who have penetrated into the zone of operations of a hostile army for the purpose of obtaining information, are not considered spies."[8] Spies, once they rejoin their army, are entitled to protected status and are not responsible for their previous acts of espionage.[9]

Prisoners of War

The fate and treatment of captured enemy combatants owes much to the principle of humanity. In the past, victorious armies have frequently slaughtered the defeated enemy, enslaved them, and held valuable prisoners for ransom. These practices officially ceased with the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, which called for the release of prisoners without ransom.[10] The general principle is that a combatant without arms is defenseless and therefore entitled to protections granted other noncombatants. However, captors are justified in taking precautions to prevent prisoners from taking up arms against them again.

The Third Geneva Convention specifies the categories of personnel who qualify to be treated as POWs (prisoners of war) if captured by the enemy. Members of a nation's military force are entitled to POW status. The member of the military force is uniformed, armed, and subject to an internal disciplinary system which includes a chain of command. Militia and volunteer units would also constitute part of the armed force.[11] Mercenaries fighting along side of a nation's armed force are not given POW status, as they are motivated by a desire for private gain.[12]

Members of an armed force of a government not recognized by the detaining power are entitled to POW status. This provision was implemented because the Germans did not recognize the Free French during World War II and refused to grant POW status to its captured members.[13]

It's also important to note states do not have to officially declare war in order for their personnel to be entitled to POW status. The North Vietnamese, therefore, violated the Geneva Convention when they failed to recognize American Airmen as POWs, because the United States did not declare war against Vietnam.

Certain individuals who do not engage in acts of war may be entitled to POW status. Civilians who accompany the armed forces, news correspondents, technical representatives, and supply contractors are granted POW status, if captured. As noted on the previous page, civilians defending their homeland during an invasion are also entitled to POW status.

POWs "must at all times be humanely treated."[14] The Geneva Convention specifically requires a detaining power to protect the individual and his dignity. It prohibits killing or torturing prisoners. Prisoners may not be used for scientific or medical experimentation. Although a captured prisoner may slow a troops' movement, expose the capturing troops to greater danger or consume the troops' provisions, a member of the detaining power is not justified in executing the prisoner.

Wounded and Sick

International law grants special protection to those who are wounded, sick, or shipwrecked, as well as those who care for them. The wounded, sick, or shipwrecked are no longer in a defensible position, and they are no longer engaged in hostilities.[15]

After an engagement, parties must search for and collect the wounded, sick, or shipwrecked. The military may appeal to the local civilian population to assist in the search for, or care of, the wounded and sick.[16] The civilian population may not expose these protected persons to violence. For the purposes of treatment, all persons collected must be treated as if they were the party's nationals. There can be no distinction between friend and foe. Distinctions for treatment will be based only on grounds of medical priority.[17]

This Geneva Convention also requires parties to search for the dead after an engagement. The search should be made immediately.[18] Records must be maintained of the dead, and this information, along with articles of sentimental value, must be passed to the deceased's nation. The deceased's remains must be honorably interned, preferably in individual graves for later identification, if necessary. Cremation is only authorized on hygienic or religious grounds.[19]

Medical and Religious Personnel

Medical and religious personnel are considered "protected persons" because of their humanitarian missions. As protected persons, they may not be subjected to attack and must be allowed to carry out their mission. In return for this protection, medical and religious personnel may not engage in hostile operations.[20] Medical personnel are those who are exclusively engaged in the search for, or the collection, transport or treatment of the wounded and sick, or in the prevention of disease, and staff exclusively engaged in the administration of medical units and establishments. Medical personnel may carry small arms for self-protection and the protection of their patients without losing protected status. Chaplains attached to the armed forces are protected persons, although enlisted chaplain assistants are lawful combatants. By US policy, chaplains are not authorized to bear arms. If medical or religious personnel fall into the hands of the enemy, they do not become prisoners of war; instead they are referred to as "retained persons" and should be retained only as long as the medical or spiritual needs of the prisoners of war require their presence.[21]

Medical facilities and equipment are also safeguarded from attack. The Geneva Convention requires that medical facilities and transports be marked in order to maintain protected status. They must display a clearly visible symbol, the Red Cross, Red Crescent, or Red Lion and Sun (formerly used by Iran) on a white background.[22] Even though the marking should protect the medical facilities from attack, the United States reserves the option of not marking its facilities. The line commander, not the medical commander, is responsible for determining if a facility should be marked. For example, a commander may choose not to mark a facility if the enemy does not recognize the facility's protected status even if the facility is marked. However, deciding not to mark a medical facility may likely lead to loss of the protected status, since the enemy cannot be presumed to know it is a medical facility in the absence of the required marking.

A medical facility may be subject to capture. The captors must allow medical personnel to carry on their care for the wounded and sick. A medical facility may lose its special protection if it is being used for military and not humanitarian purposes. In such a case, the facility would become a lawful object of attack. However, the belligerent must warn the facility of the violation and of its intention to attack it.[23] A warning is not required if it would be impractical.

Properly marked medical transports being used for humanitarian purposes may not be the subject of attack. Medical transports may include aircraft, hospital ships, and ambulances. The enemy may not see the Red Cross if an airplane is flying at thirty thousand feet. Therefore, the commander should tell the enemy the nature of the mission, the route, time, and altitude. This helps ensure the enemy will not accidentally shoot down the aircraft mistaking it for a legitimate military target.

Civilians

During the 20th century, the civilian population experienced great suffering due to the effects of war. To limit this suffering during military operations:

- Special zones protect civilians. A "safety zone" may be created to protect the especially vulnerable portion of the population, such as the elderly and sick.[24]

- Temporary shelter may be provided in a combat area in a "neutralized zone" for all civilians who are endangered.[25]

If a belligerent is employing an economic blockade or siege against an enemy, the belligerent must allow medical supplies to pass through for the benefit of civilians.[26] Additionally, food and clothing for the benefit of children under the age of fifteen and for expectant mothers are also allowed to pass through the blockade. The belligerent is entitled to search the contents of the shipment and [receive] assurances of the destination of the consignment.

Once a belligerent occupies enemy territory, the civilian population comes under its control. The occupation begins once the occupier has replaced the territory's government. The primary focus of the civilian convention is to restrict the occupier's power over the civilian population. The occupier is the administrator for the territory.[27] It is responsible for the well being of the population. The occupier is responsible for order. The occupier may punish those civilians resisting its occupation.[28] It may not engage in collective punishment.[29] Members of the population may not be tried for acts committed before the occupation. The Civilian Convention limits the power of the occupier by allowing the death penalty to be imposed only when the offense would have been punishable by death in the territory before occupation.[30] Less serious offenses are to be dealt with by internment or imprisonment.

Aerial Bombardment

Airpower in times of war can be a decisive factor in the conflict. It can strike at the enemy's core facilities without having to first defeat massed armies in the field. Today's high-powered aircraft can attack virtually any legitimate military target. One of the primary concerns in developing an air campaign is what constitutes a legitimate military target. The Law of Armed Conflict relating to aerial bombardment traces its origin to the Hague Conference of 1899. The nations party to the conference adopted a declaration forbidding bombs to be dropped from balloons for five years.

Since then airpower has changed dramatically, and the law governing aerial bombardment has been refined as well. One of the most critical periods in the development of aerial bombardment law was during World War II. Both Allied and Axis powers conducted strategic bombing campaigns against enemy facilities. Many times, these raids resulted in devastating casualties to the enemy's civilian population. When we look back at this period, there are three critical forces responsible for the casualties. First, the bombing itself was inaccurate. Destroying a target the size of a house required approximately 4500 B-17s carrying a total of nine thousand tons of bombs.[31] A second factor was the escalating nature of reprisals and counter reprisals by all sides in the conflict. A third factor was the failure to effectively separate war industry and other vital targets from the population centers, thereby necessitating target area bombing.

Today, the laws governing aerial bombardment consist partly of guidance from the original Hague Conferences, [from] experiences in World War II, and [from] the Geneva Conventions. One of the most important of these rules is the general protection granted to individual civilians and civilian objects. For example, schools and houses are protected from military operations, to include aerial bombardment. This does not mean that military operations cannot inflict civilian casualties; rather, the population itself cannot be viewed as a military target. Therefore, air forces can attack key military targets in heavily populated areas so long as the overall military gains from the attack outweigh the risks posed to the civilian population.[32] It's important to note that the defending country is responsible for ensuring that its populace is removed from key military targets. That is, the enemy should not use its people as shields.

The United States and its coalition partners confronted Iraq's use of human shields on numerous occasions throughout the Gulf War. The most publicized incident during the war was the bombing of the Al Firdos bunker in Baghdad. Many people have questioned the attack, which resulted in the death of scores of Iraqi civilians, but according to the law, coalition forces conducted a legitimate attack. Evidence was presented stating that the facility was converted to a military command and control center. Intelligence collected indicated a ten-foot-thick concrete ceiling, camouflaged exterior to make it look as though it were already struck, a military presence detected through satellite imagery, and intercepted military command signals.[33] Iraqi civilians sought refuge in the bunker on a floor above the command post during the nighttime coalition air raids. Coalition planners were unaware of the civilian presence in the bunker, and authorized the attack.[34]

The responsibility for the unfortunate civilian deaths lies ultimately with the Iraqi government. The government ignored their legal obligations on two counts. First, they failed to prevent noncombatants from entering a military facility. Second, they converted an air raid shelter to a Command, Control, and Communications bunker, thereby locating a military objective in an area surrounded by the civilian populace.[35]

If the coalition planners had been aware of the civilian presence, the target may not have been attacked. Evidence exists indicating that the air campaign was the most discriminate air campaign in history. The coalition's rules of engagement (ROE) were much more stringent than the Law of Armed Conflict in regard to aerial bombardment. If a coalition aircrew could not locate its target or find an alternative one, the ROE required the pilots to return, weapons loaded. Consequently, approximately 25 percent of all combat missions culminated in undelivered ordinance.[36]

Enforcing the Law of Armed Conflict

There are a wide variety of sanctions the international community can place against a state in violation of the Law of Armed Conflict. While there are several cases throughout history demonstrating one or two of these principles, the sanctions imposed against Iraq immediately following the Persian Gulf War are a good example of what can be done. During the Gulf War, Iraq committed numerous violations of international law and the Law of Armed Conflict. Due to the wide range of flagrant violations, Iraq received universal criticism.

Instruments of Enforcement

Condemnation is the least threatening method of ensuring compliance.[37] Its purpose is to raise international public opinion against the offending state, in order to encourage them to correct their offending behavior. In the case of Iraq, condemnation came on numerous occasions, with the strongest measures coming from the U.N. Security Council. Condemnation was evident throughout the conflict starting with Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, and spanning through their numerous political, human rights, and Law of Armed Conflict violations.

Condemnation is seen not only as the least threatening, but also as the least-effective method. When countries seek to send a stronger message, they sometimes choose to rupture diplomatic relations.[38] This is done by severing diplomatic relations with an offending state as a form of protest. While this sanction sends a serious message to the offending state, it makes it difficult to rectify the problem, because diplomatic communication has ceased.

When several states seek to send a strong message to the offending state, the offending nation may also be expelled from membership in an international organization.[39] Similar to rupturing diplomatic relations; this sanction can make it extremely difficult to solve a problem through peaceful means. As a result, the UN has expelled states on only two separate occasions. The first state was South Africa, due to its continued support of apartheid, and the second was the Serbian-controlled Yugoslav federation, in an attempt to pressure the Serbs to abate their human rights violations.[40]

Economic Sanctions

Countries and international organizations may also enforce economic sanctions. The UN Security Council must authorize unilateral economic sanctions during times of peace. Economic sanctions may come in a variety of forms, including embargoes, boycotts, blockades, and seizure of property belonging to the offending state. For example, the Security Council approved Resolution 661 (6 August 1990) against Iraq. The sanctions included the following:

- A boycott on the import of all commodities and products originating in Iraq or Kuwait. The key target was oil, which accounted for 95 percent of Iraq's export earnings.

- With the exception of humanitarian assistance, a total embargo was imposed against the sale or supply of all products to anyone in Iraq or Kuwait.

- All financial transactions and transfers of funds to the Iraqi government or to any other entity in Iraq or Kuwait were forbidden.

- To protect the assets of Kuwait from Iraqi confiscation, such assets in any member state were to be frozen.

- All contracts with Iraq or Kuwait which could impede the sanctions program, were to be suspended.[41]

Reprisals

If these sanctions do not yield the desired end-state, then more serious measures may be taken. Reprisals are the commission of acts that—although illegal—may, under the specific circumstances of the given case, become justified. The guilty adversary has behaved illegally, and the reprisal is taken as the last resort. In order for a reprisal to be considered lawful, it must meet certain criteria:

- It must be in response to a serious violation of international law.

- It must be for the purpose of compelling the adversary to observe the law.

- There must be reasonable notice that reprisals will be taken.

- Other reasonable means to secure compliance must be attempted.

- A reprisal must be directed against the personnel or property of an adversary.

- The reprisal must be in proportion to the original violation.

- It must be publicized.

- It must be authorized by national authorities at the highest political level, and entails full state responsibility.

It's important to note the Geneva Conventions strictly prohibit reprisals against the sick and wounded, prisoners of war, shipwrecked persons, and buildings or equipment protected by the conventions.

Although reprisals have been effective in stopping violations of international law, they also have a tendency to escalate the conflict or, if used improperly, to cause counterreprisals. Reprisals are also controversial from a military operations perspective. Specifically, in diverting scarce military resources to reprisals a nation weakens its overall fighting effectiveness, and may strengthen the enemy's will to fight.

Reciprocity refers to the customary view that one nation's adherence to many of the rules of law is conditional to an opposing forces' adherence to the law. Reciprocity, similar to reprisals, can escalate the conflict. The vital difference between reciprocity and reprisals involves the nature of the act. Reprisals focus on a single violation, whereas reciprocity stems from a permanent disregard for international law.

Compensation or reparations are monetary payments incurred by states to make amends to parties for injuries suffered. In the case of Iraq, the Security Council demanded Iraq accept liability for damages in Kuwait, and set the payment at 30 percent of Iraqi oil revenues.[42]

Finally, violations of the Law of Armed Conflict may be subject to criminal enforcement. As stated earlier, the United States recognizes all treaties as being equivalent to US law. In these cases, Americans violating the laws of armed conflict are, in effect, violating US law and may stand trial for such offenses.

The United States, as well as other nations, may try captured enemy personnel for deliberate violations of the Law of Armed Conflict. After World War II, the United States conducted or took part in over 800 of these trials, of which the Nuremberg Trials are the most famous. These trials must meet certain minimum standards of fairness and due process, set out in detail in the 1949 Geneva Conventions. Failure to accord captured personnel the right to a fair trial is itself a serious violation of the Law of Armed Conflict.

American pilots experienced this firsthand during the Vietnam War. The North Vietnamese refused to grant aircrews prisoner-of-war status, as they were all branded war criminals without receiving due process of the law.

Conclusion

Despite lapses by some nations in complying with the Law of Armed Conflict and a lack of ironclad enforcement mechanisms, the Law of Armed Conflict has a central role in modern warfare. The United States respects and upholds the law, and expects its military personnel to follow it under all circumstances. History has demonstrated the positive impact a foundation in the Law of Armed Conflict has upon military members in time of war. The law has a central role in the development of rules of engagement, campaign planning, and execution. Efforts to educate military personnel on the law and to comply with the law are reflected in our current operations in the Middle East, Bosnia, Kosovo, and other hot spots around the world.

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Uniform Code of Military Justice

Cognitive Lesson Objective:
- Know selected articles of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) and rights of the accused.

Cognitive Sample of Behavior:
- Differentiate between articles 2, 7, 15, and 31 of the UCMJ.

Affective Lesson Objective:
- Respond positively to selected articles of the UCMJ.

Affective Sample of Behavior:
- Read the information section of this lesson.

The UCMJ was enacted in 1950. Prior to that, each service had its own military jurisprudence. Laws such as the Articles of War originated in colonial times and were revised from time to time. The UCMJ was enacted to provide a single military jurisprudence for all branches of the Armed Forces. Military members obey it just as they obey state and federal laws. By executive order, the President has promulgated rules of procedures, evidence, and punishments that complement the UCMJ. These are collected in the Manual for Courts-Martial, or MCM.

This lesson consists of readings to enhance your understanding of military law. The readings consist of articles 2, 7, 15, and 31 of the UCMJ, and the punitive articles (77-134). This material is provided for information only and as reference material for the Military Law Case Studies. Take care to read only the articles needed to answer your sample of behavior as well as all the punitive articles 77-134.

CHAPTER 47. UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE

SUBCHAPTER 1. GENERAL PROVISIONS

§ 801. Art. 1. Definitions

In this chapter—

(1) The term "Judge Advocate General" means, severally, the Judge Advocates General of the Army, Navy, and Air Force and, except when the Coast Guard is operating as a service in the Navy, an official designated to serve as Judge Advocate General of the Coast Guard by the Secretary of Homeland Security.

(2) The Navy, the Marine Corps, and the Coast Guard when it is operating as a service in the Navy, shall be considered as one armed force.

(3) The term "commanding officer" includes only commissioned officers.

(4) The term "officer in charge" means a member of the Navy, the Marine Corps, or the Coast Guard designated as such by appropriate authority.

(5) The term "superior commissioned officer" means a commissioned officer superior in rank or command.

(6) The term "cadet" means a cadet of the United States Military Academy, the United States Air Force Academy, or the United States Coast Guard Academy.

(7) The term "midshipman" means a midshipman of the United States Naval Academy and any other midshipman on active duty in the naval service.

(8) The term "military" refers to any or all of the armed forces.

(9) The term "accuser" means a person who signs and swears to charges, any person who directs that charges nominally be signed and sworn to by another, and any other person who has an interest other than an official interest in the prosecution of the accused.

(10) The term "military judge" means an official of a general or special court-martial detailed in accordance with section 826 of this title (article 26).

(11) REPEALED.

[Note: The definition for "law specialist" was repealed by Public Law 109-241, title II, § 218(a)(1), July 11, 2006, 120 Stat. 256. The text was stricken but subsequent paragraphs were not renumbered.]

(12) The term "legal officer" means any commissioned officer of the Navy, Marine Corps, or Coast Guard designated to perform legal duties for a command.

(13) The term "judge advocate" means—

(A) an officer of the Judge Advocate General's Corps of the Army or the Navy;

(B) an officer of the Air Force or the Marine Corps who is designated as a judge advocate; or

(C) a commissioned officer of the Coast Guard designated for special duty (law).

(14) The term "record," when used in connection with the proceedings of a court-martial, means—

(A) an official written transcript, written summary, or other writing relating to the proceedings; or

(B) an official audiotape, videotape, or similar material from which sound, or sound and visual images, depicting the proceedings may be reproduced.

(15) The term "classified information" means—

(A) any information or material that has been determined by an official of the United States pursuant to law, an Executive order, or regulation to require protection against unauthorized disclosure for reasons of national security, and

(B) any restricted data, as defined in section 11(y) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2014(y)).

(16) The term "national security" means the national defense and foreign relations of the United States.

§ 802. Art. 2. Persons subject to this chapter

(a) The following persons are subject to this chapter:

(1) Members of a regular component of the armed forces, including those awaiting discharge after expiration of their terms of enlistment; volunteers from the time of their muster or acceptance into the armed forces; inductees from the time of their actual induction into the armed forces; and other persons lawfully called or ordered into, or to duty in or for training in, the armed forces, from the dates when they are required by the terms of the call or order to obey it.

(2) Cadets, aviation cadets, and midshipmen.

(3) Members of a reserve component while on inactive-duty training, but in the case of members of the Army National Guard

of the United States or the Air National Guard of the United States only when in Federal service.

(4) Retired members of a regular component of the armed forces who are entitled to pay.

(5) Retired members of a reserve component who are receiving hospitalization from an armed force.

(6) Members of the Fleet Reserve and Fleet Marine Corps Reserve.

(7) Persons in custody of the armed forces serving a sentence imposed by a court-martial.

(8) Members of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, Public Health Service, and other organizations, when assigned to and serving with the armed forces.

(9) Prisoners of war in custody of the armed forces.

(10) In time of declared war or contingency operation, persons serving with or accompanying an armed force in the field.

(11) Subject to any treaty or agreement to which the United States is or may be a party or to any accepted rule of international law, persons serving with, employed by, or accompanying the armed forces outside the United States and outside the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Virgin Islands.

(12) Subject to any treaty or agreement to which the United States is or may be a party or to any accepted rule of international law, persons within an area leased by or otherwise reserved or acquired for the use of the United States which is under the control of the Secretary concerned and which is outside the United States and outside the Canal Zone, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Virgin Islands.

(13) Individuals belonging to one of the eight categories enumerated in Article 4 of the Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, done at Geneva August 12, 1949 (6 UST 3316), who violate the law of war.

(b) The voluntary enlistment of any person who has the capacity to understand the significance of enlisting in the armed forces shall be valid for purposes of jurisdiction under subsection (a) and a change of status from civilian to member of the armed forces shall be effective upon the taking of the oath of enlistment.

(c) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a person serving with an armed force who—

(1) submitted voluntarily to military authority;

(2) met the mental competence and minimum age qualifications of sections 504 and 505 of this title at the time of voluntary submission to military authority;

(3) received military pay or allowances; and

(4) performed military duties;

is subject to this chapter until such person's active service has been terminated in accordance with law or regulations promulgated by the Secretary concerned.

(d)(1) A member of a reserve component who is not on active duty and who is made the subject of proceedings under section 81 (article 15) or section 830 (article 30) with respect to an offense against this chapter may be ordered to active duty involuntarily for the purpose of

(A) investigation under section 832 of this title (article 32);

(B) trial by court-martial; or

(C) nonjudicial punishment under section 815 of this title (article 15).

(2) A member of a reserve component may not be ordered to active duty under paragraph (1) except with respect to an offense committed while the member was

(A) on active duty; or

(B) on inactive-duty training, but in the case of members of the Army National Guard of the United States or the Air National Guard of the United States only when in Federal service.

(3) Authority to order a member to active duty under paragraph (1) shall be exercised under regulations prescribed by the President.

(4) A member may be ordered to active duty under paragraph (1) only by a person empowered to convene general courts-martial in a regular component of the armed forces.

(5) A member ordered to active duty under paragraph (1), unless the order to active duty was approved by the Secretary concerned, may not

(A) be sentenced to confinement; or

(B) be required to serve a punishment consisting of any restriction on liberty during a period other than a period of inactive-duty training or active duty (other than active duty ordered under paragraph (l)).

(e) The provisions of this section are subject to section 876(d)(2) of this title (article 76b(d)(2).

§ 803. Art. 3. Jurisdiction to try certain personnel

(a) Subject to section 843 of this title (article 43), a person who is in a status in which the person is subject to this chapter and who committed an offense against this chapter while formerly in a status in which the person was subject to this chapter is not relieved from amenability to the jurisdiction of this chapter for that offense by reason of a termination of that person's former status.

(b) Each person discharged from the armed forces who is later charged with having fraudulently obtained his discharge is, subject to section 843 of this title (article 43), subject to trial by court-martial on that charge and is after apprehension subject to this chapter while in the custody of the armed forces for that trial. Upon conviction of that charge he is subject to trial by court-martial for all offenses under this chapter committed before the fraudulent discharge.

(c) No person who has deserted from the armed forces may be relieved from amenability to the jurisdiction of this chapter by virtue of a separation from any later period of service.

(d) A member of a reserve component who is subject to this chapter is not, by virtue of the termination of a period of active duty or inactive-duty training, relieved from amenability to the jurisdiction of this chapter for an offense against this chapter committed during such period of active duty or inactive-duty training.

§ 804. Art. 4. Dismissed officer's right to trial by court-martial

(a) If any commissioned officer, dismissed by order of the President, makes a written application for trial by court-martial setting forth, under oath, that he has been wrongfully dismissed, the

President, as soon as practicable, shall convene a general court-martial to try that officer on the charges on which he was dismissed. A court-martial so convened has jurisdiction to try the dismissed officer on those charges, and he shall be considered to have waived the right to plead any statute of limitations applicable to any offense with which he is charged. The court-martial may, as part of its sentence, adjudge the affirmance of the dismissal, but if the court-martial acquits the accused or if the sentence adjudged, as finally approved or affirmed, does not include dismissal or death, the Secretary concerned shall substitute for the dismissal ordered by the President a form of discharge authorized for administrative issue.

(b) If the President fails to convene a general court-martial within six months from the preparation of an application for trial under this article, the Secretary concerned shall substitute for the dismissal order by the President a form of discharge authorized for administrative issue.

(c) If a discharge is substituted for a dismissal under this article, the President alone may reappoint the officer to such commissioned grade and with such rank as, in the opinion of the President, that former officer would have attained had he not been dismissed. The reappointment of such a former officer shall be without regard to the existence of a vacancy and shall affect the promotion status of other officers only insofar as the President may direct. All time between the dismissal and the reappointment shall be considered as actual service for all purposes, including the right to pay and allowances.

(d) If an officer is discharged from any armed force by administrative action or is dropped from the rolls by order of the President, he has no right to trial under this article.

§ 805. Art. 5. Territorial applicability of this chapter

This chapter applies in all places.

§ 806. Art. 6. Judge Advocates and legal officers

(a) The assignment for duty of judge advocates of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Coast Guard shall be made upon the recommendation of the Judge Advocate General of the armed force of which they are members. The assignment for duty of judge advocates of the Marine Corps shall be made by direction of the Commandant of the Marine Corps. The Judge Advocate General or senior members of his staff shall make frequent inspection in the field in supervision of the administration of military justice.

(b) Convening authorities shall at all times communicate directly with their staff judge advocates or legal officers in matters relating to the administration of military justice; and the staff judge advocate or legal officer of any command is entitled to communicate directly with the staff judge advocate or legal officer of a superior or subordinate command, or with the Judge Advocate General.

(c) No person who has acted as member, military judge, trial counsel, assistant trial counsel, defense counsel, assistant defense counsel, or investigating officer in any case may later act as a staff judge advocate or legal officer to any reviewing authority upon the same case.

(d)(1) A judge advocate who is assigned or detailed to perform

the functions of a civil office in the Government of the United States under section 973(b)(2)(B) of this title may perform such duties as may be requested by the agency concerned, including representation of the United States in civil and criminal cases.

(2) The Secretary of Defense, and the Secretary of Homeland Security with respect to the Coast Guard when it is not operating as a service in the Navy, shall prescribe regulations providing that reimbursement may be a condition of assistance by judge advocates assigned or detailed under section 973(b)(2)(B) of this title.

§ 806a. Art. 6a. Investigation and disposition of matters pertaining to the fitness of military judges

(a) The President shall prescribe procedures for the investigation and disposition of charges, allegations, or information pertaining to the fitness of a military judge or military appellate judge to perform the duties of the judge's position. To the extent practicable, the procedures shall be uniform for all armed forces.

(b) The President shall transmit a copy of the procedures prescribed pursuant to this section to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives.

SUBCHAPTER II. APPREHENSION AND RESTRAINT

§ 807. Art. 7. Apprehension

(a) Apprehension is the taking of a person into custody.

(b) Any person authorized under regulations governing the armed forces to apprehend persons subject to this chapter or to trial thereunder may do so upon reasonable belief that an offense has been committed and that the person apprehended committed it.

(c) Commissioned officers, warrant officers, petty officers, and noncommissioned officers have authority to quell quarrels, frays and disorders among persons subject to this chapter and to apprehend persons subject to this chapter who take part therein.

§ 808. Art. 8. Apprehension of deserters

Any civil officer having authority to apprehend offenders under the laws of the United States or of a State, Commonwealth, or possession, or the District of Columbia may summarily apprehend a deserter from the armed forces and deliver him into the custody of those forces.

§ 809. Art. 9. Imposition of restraint

(a) Arrest is the restraint of a person by an order, not imposed as a punishment for an offense, directing him to remain within

certain specified limits. Confinement is the physical restraint of a person.

(b) An enlisted member may be ordered into arrest or confinement by any commissioned officer by an order, oral or written, delivered in person or through other persons subject to this chapter. A commanding officer may authorize warrant officers, petty officers, or noncommissioned officers to order enlisted members of his command or subject to his authority into arrest or confinement.

(c) A commissioned officer, a warrant officer, or a civilian subject to this chapter or to trial thereunder may be ordered into arrest or confinement only by a commanding officer to whose authority he is subject, by an order, oral or written, delivered in person or by another commissioned officer. The authority to order such persons into arrest or confinement may not be delegated.

(d) No person may be ordered into arrest or confinement except for probable cause.

(e) Nothing in this article limits the authority of persons authorized to apprehend offenders to secure the custody of an alleged offender until proper authority may be notified.

§ 810. Art. 10. Restraint of persons charged with offenses

Any person subject to this chapter charged with an offense under this chapter shall be ordered into arrest or confinement, as circumstances may require; but when charged only with an offense normally tried by a summary court-martial, he shall not ordinarily be placed in confinement. When any person subject to this chapter is placed in arrest or confinement prior to trial, immediate steps shall be taken to inform him of the specific wrong of which he is accused and to try him or to dismiss the charges and release him.

§ 811. Art. 11. Reports and receiving of prisoners

(a) No provost marshal, commander or a guard, or master at arms may refuse to receive or keep any prisoner committed to his charge by a commissioned officer of the armed forces, when the committing officer furnishes a statement, signed by him, of the offense charged against the prisoner.

(b) Every commander of a guard or master at arms to whose charge a prisoner is committed shall, within twenty-four hours after that commitment or as soon as he is relieved from guard, report to the commanding officer the name of the prisoner, the offense charged against him, and the name of the person who ordered or authorized the commitment.

§ 812. Art. 12. Confinement with enemy prisoners prohibited

No member of the armed forces may be placed in confinement in immediate association with enemy prisoners or other foreign nationals not members of the armed forces.

§ 813. Art. 13. Punishment prohibited before trial

No person, while being held for trial, may be subjected to punishment or penalty other than arrest or confinement upon the charges pending against him, nor shall the arrest or confinement imposed upon him be any more rigorous than the circumstances

required to insure his presence, but he may be subjected to minor punishment during that period for infractions of discipline.

§ 814. Art. 14. Delivery of offenders to civil authorities

(a) Under such regulations as the Secretary concerned may prescribe, a member of the armed forces accused of an offense against civil authority may be delivered, upon request, to the civil authority for trial.

(b) When delivery under this article is made to any civil authority of a person undergoing sentence of a court-martial, the delivery, if followed by conviction in a civil tribunal, interrupts the execution of the sentence of the court-martial, and the offender after having answered to the civil authorities for his offense shall, upon the request of competent military authority, be returned to military custody for the completion of his sentence.

SUBCHAPTER III. NON-JUDICIAL PUNISHMENT

§ 815. Art. 15. Commanding Officer's non-judicial punishment

(a) Under such regulations as the President may prescribe, and under such additional regulations as may be prescribed by the Secretary concerned, limitations may be placed on the powers granted by this article with respect to the kind and amount of punishment authorized, the categories of commanding officers and warrant officers exercising command authorized to exercise those powers, the applicability of this article to an accused who demands trial by court-martial, and the kinds of courts-martial to which the case may be referred upon such a demand. However, except in the case of a member attached to or embarked in a vessel, punishment may not be imposed upon any member of the armed forces under this article if the member has, before the imposition of such punishment, demanded trial by court-martial in lieu of such punishment. Under similar regulations, rules may be prescribed with respect to the suspension of punishments authorized hereunder. If authorized by regulations of the Secretary concerned, a commanding officer exercising general court-martial jurisdiction or an officer of general or flag rank in command may delegate his powers under this article to a principal assistant.

(b) Subject to subsection (a) any commanding officer may, in addition to or in lieu of admonition or reprimand, impose one or more of the following disciplinary punishments for minor offenses without the intervention of a court-martial—

(1) upon officers of his command

(A) restriction to certain specified limits, with or without suspension from duty, for not more than 30 consecutive days;

(B) if imposed by an officer exercising general court-martial jurisdiction or an officer of general or flag rank in command

(i) arrest in quarters for not more than 30 consecutive days;

(ii) forfeiture of not more than one-half of one month's pay per month for two months;

(iii) restriction to certain specified limits, with or without suspension from duty, for not more than 60 consecutive days;

(iv) detention of not more than one-half of one month's pay per month for three months;

(2) upon other personnel of his command—

(A) if imposed upon a person attached to or embarked in a vessel, confinement on bread and water or diminished rations for not more than three consecutive days;

(B) correctional custody for not more than seven consecutive days;

(C) forfeiture of not more than seven days' pay;

(D) reduction to the next inferior pay grade, if the grade from which demoted is within the promotion authority of the officer imposing the reduction or any officer subordinate to the one who imposes the reduction;

(E) extra duties, including fatigue or other duties, for not more than 14 consecutive days;

(F) restriction to certain specified limits, with or without suspension from duty, for not more than 14 consecutive days;

(G) detention of not more than 14 days' pay;

(H) if imposed by an officer of the grade of major or lieutenant commander, or above

(i) the punishment authorized under clause (A);

(ii) correctional custody for not more than 30 consecutive days;

(iii) forfeiture of not more than one-half of one month's pay per month for two months;

(iv) reduction to the lowest or any intermediate pay grade, if the grade from which demoted is within the promotion authority of the officer imposing the reduction or any officer subordinate to the one who imposes the reduction, but an enlisted member in a pay grade above E4 may not be reduced more than two pay grades;

(v) extra duties, including fatigue or other duties, for not more than 45 consecutive days;

(vi) restriction to certain specified limits, with or without suspension from duty, for not more than 60 consecutive days;

(vii) detention of not more than one-half of one month's pay per month for three months.

Detention of pay shall be for a stated period of not more than one year but if the offender's term of service expires earlier, the detention shall terminate upon that expiration. No two or more of the punishments of arrest in quarters, confinement on bread and water or diminished rations, correctional custody, extra duties, and restriction may be combined to run consecutively in the maximum amount imposable for each. Whenever any of those punishments are combined to run consecutively, there must be an apportionment. In addition, forfeiture of pay may not be combined with detention of pay without an apportionment. For the purpose of this subsection, "correctional custody" is the physical restraint of a person during duty or nonduty hours and may include extra duties, fatigue duties, or hard labor. If practicable, correctional custody will not be served in immediate association with persons awaiting trial or held in confinement pursuant to trial by court-martial.

(c) An officer in charge may impose upon enlisted members assigned to the unit of which he is in charge such of the punishments authorized under subsection (b)(2)(A)-(G) as the Secretary concerned may specifically prescribe by regulation.

(d) The officer who imposes the punishment authorized in sub-section (b), or his successor in command, may, at any time, suspend probationally any part or amount of the unexecuted punishment imposed and may suspend probationally a reduction in grade or a forfeiture imposed under subsection (b), whether or not executed. In addition, he may, at any time, remit or mitigate any part or amount of the unexecuted punishment imposed and may set aside in whole or in part the punishment, whether executed or unexecuted, and restore all rights, privileges and property affected. He may also mitigate reduction in grade to forfeiture or detention of pay. When mitigating—

(1) arrest in quarters to restriction;

(2) confinement on bread and water or diminished rations to correctional custody;

(3) correctional custody or confinement on bread and water or diminished rations to extra duties or restriction, or both; or

(4) extra duties to restriction; the mitigated punishment shall not be for a greater period than the punishment mitigated.When mitigating forfeiture of pay to detention of pay, the amount of the detention shall not be greater than the amount of the forfeiture. When mitigating reduction in grade to forfeiture or detention of pay, the amount of the forfeiture or detention shall not be greater than the amount that could have been imposed initially under this article by the officer who imposed the punishment mitigated.

(e) A person punished under this article who considers his punishment unjust or disproportionate to the offense may, through the proper channel, appeal to the next superior authority. The appeal shall be promptly forwarded and decided, but the person punished may in the meantime be required to undergo the punishment adjudged. The superior authority may exercise the same powers with respect to the punishment imposed as may be exercised under subsection (d) by the officer who imposed the punishment.Before acting on an appeal from a punishment of -

(1) arrest in quarters for more than seven days;

(2) correctional custody for more than seven days;

(3) forfeiture of more than seven days' pay;

(4) reduction of one or more pay grades from the fourth or a higher pay grade;

(5) extra duties for more than 14 days;

(6) restriction for more than 14 days; or

(7) detention of more than 14 days' pay;

the authority who is to act on the appeal shall refer the case to a judge advocate or a lawyer of the Department of Homeland Security for consideration and advice, and may so refer the case upon appeal from any punishment imposed under subsection (b).

(f) The imposition and enforcement of disciplinary punishment under this article for any act or omission is not a bar to trial by court-martial for a serious crime or offense growing out of the same act or omission, and not properly punishable under this article; but the fact that a disciplinary punishment has been enforced may be shown by the accused upon trial, and when so shown shall be considered in determining the measure of punishment to be adjudged in the event of a finding of guilty.

(g) The Secretary concerned may, by regulation, prescribe the form of records to be kept of proceedings under this article and may also prescribe that certain categories of those proceedings shall be in writing.

(2) if the trial counsel is qualified to act as counsel before a general court-martial, the defense counsel detailed by the convening authority must be a person similarly qualified; and

(3) if the trial counsel is a judge advocate or a member of the bar of a Federal court or the highest court of a State, the defense counsel detailed by the convening authority must be one of the foregoing.

§ 828. Art. 28. Detail or employment of reporters and Interpreters

Under such regulations as the Secretary concerned may prescribe, the convening authority of a court-martial, military commission, or court of inquiry shall detail or employ qualified court reporters, who shall record the proceedings of and testimony taken before that court or commission. Under like regulations the convening authority of a court-martial, military commission, or court of inquiry may detail or employ interpreters who shall interpret for the court or commission.

§ 829. Art. 29. Absent and additional members

(a) No member of a general or special court-martial may be absent or excused after the court has been assembled for the trial of the accused unless excused as a result of a challenge, excused by the military judge for physical disability or other good cause, or excused by order of the convening authority for good cause.

(b) Whenever a general court-martial, other than a general court-martial composed of a military judge only, is reduced below five members, the trial may not proceed unless the convening authority details new members sufficient in number to provide not less than five members. The trial may proceed with the new members present after the recorded evidence previously introduced before the members of the court has been read to the court in the presence of the military judge, the accused, and counsel for both sides.

(c) Whenever a special court-martial, other than a special court-martial composed of a military judge only, is reduced below three members, the trial may not proceed unless the convening authority details new members sufficient in number to provide not less than three members. The trial shall proceed with the new members present as if no evidence had previously been introduced at the trial, unless a verbatim record of the evidence previously introduced before the members of the court or a stipulation thereof is read to the court in the presence of the military judge, if any, the accused and counsel for both sides.

(d) If the military judge of a court-martial composed of a military judge only is unable to proceed with the trial because of physical disability, as a result of a challenge, or for other good cause, the trial shall proceed, subject to any applicable conditions of section 8 16(l)(B) or (2)(C) of this title (article 16(1)(B) or (2)(C)), after the detail of a new military judge as if no evidence had previously been introduced, unless a verbatim record of the evidence previously introduced or a stipulation thereof is read in court in the presence of the new military judge, the accused, and counsel for both sides.

SUBCHAPTER VI. PRE-TRIAL PROCEDURE

§ 830. Art. 30. Charges and specifications

(a) Charges and specifications shall be signed by a person subject to this chapter under oath before a commissioned officer of the armed forces authorized to administer oaths and shall state—

(1) that the signer has personal knowledge of, or has investigated, the matters set forth therein; and

(2) that they are true in fact to the best of his knowledge and belief.

(b) Upon the preferring of charges, the proper authority shall take immediate steps to determine what disposition should be made thereof in the interest of justice and discipline, and the person accused shall be informed of the charges against him as soon as practicable.

§ 831. Art. 31. Compulsory self-incrimination prohibited

(a) No person subject to this chapter may compel any person to incriminate himself or to answer any question the answer to which may tend to incriminate him.

(b) No person subject to this chapter may interrogate, or request any statement from an accused or a person suspected of an offense without first informing him of the nature of the accusation and advising him that he does not have to make any statement regarding the offense of which he is accused or suspected and that any statement made by him may be used as evidence against him in a trial by court-martial.

(c) No person subject to this chapter may compel any person to make a statement or produce evidence before any military tribunal if the statement or evidence is not material to the issue and may tend to degrade him.

(d) No statement obtained from any person in violation of this article, or through the use of coercion, unlawful influence, or unlawful inducement may be received in evidence against him in a trial by court-martial.

§ 832. Art. 32. Investigation

(a) No charge or specification may be referred to a general court-martial for trial until a thorough and impartial investigation of all the matters set forth therein has been made. This investigation shall include inquiry as to the truth of the matter set forth in the charges, consideration of the form of charges, and a recommendation as to the disposition which should be made of the case in the interest of justice and discipline.

(b) The accused shall be advised of the charges against him and of his right to be represented at that investigation by counsel. The accused has the right to be represented at that investigation as

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§ 877. Art. 77. Principals

Any person punishable under this chapter who

(1) commits an offense punishable by this chapter, or aids, abets, counsels, commands, or procures its commission; or

(2) causes an act to be done which if directly performed by him would be punishable by this chapter; is a principal.

§ 878. Art. 78. Accessory after the fact

Any person subject to this chapter who, knowing that an offense punishable by this chapter has been committed, receives, comforts, or assists the offender in order to hinder or prevent his apprehension, trial, or punishment shall be punished as a court-martial may direct.

§ 879. Art. 79. Conviction of lesser included offense

An accused may be found guilty of an offense necessarily included in the offense charged or of an attempt to commit either the offense charged or an offense necessarily included therein.

§ 880. Art. 80. Attempts

(a) An act, done with specific intent to commit an offense under this chapter, amounting to more than mere preparation and tending, even though failing, to effect its commission, is an attempt to commit that offense.

(b) Any person subject to this chapter who attempts to commit any offense punishable by this chapter shall be punished as a court-martial may direct, unless otherwise specifically prescribed.

(c) Any person subject to this chapter may be convicted of an attempt to commit an offense although it appears on the trial that the offense was consummated.

§ 881. Art. 81. Conspiracy

Any person subject to this chapter who conspires with any other person to commit an offense under this chapter shall. if one or more of the conspirators does an act to effect the object of the conspiracy, be punished as a court-martial may direct.

§ 882. Art. 82. Solicitation

(a) Any person subject to this chapter who solicits or advises another or others to desert in violation of section 885 of this title (article 85) or mutiny in violation of section 894 of this title (article 94) shall, if the offense solicited or advised is attempted or committed, be punished with the punishment provided for the commission of the offense, but, if the offense solicited or advised is not committed or attempted, he shall be punished as a court-martial may direct.

(b) Any person subject to this chapter who solicits or advises another or others to commit an act of misbehavior before the enemy in violation of section 899 of this title (article 99) or sedition in violation of section 894 of this title (article 94) shall, if the offense solicited or advised is committed, be punished with the punishment provided for the commission of the offense, but, if the offense solicited or advised is not committed, he shall be punished as a court-martial may direct.

§ 883. Art. 83. Fraudulent enlistment, appointment, or separation

Any person who—

(1) procures his own enlistment or appointment in the armed forces by knowingly false representation or deliberate concealment as to his qualifications for the enlistment or appointment and receives pay or allowances thereunder; or

(2) procures his own separation from the armed forces by know-

ingly false representation or deliberate concealment as to his eligibility for that separation; shall be punished as a court-martial may direct.

§ 884. Art. 84. Unlawful enlistment, appointment, or separation

Any person subject to this chapter who effects an enlistment or appointment in or a separation from the armed forces of any person who is known to him to be ineligible for that enlistment, appointment, or separation because it is prohibited by law, regulation, or order shall be punished as a court-martial may direct.

§ 885. Art. 85. Desertion

(a) Any member of the armed forces who—

(1) without authority goes or remains absent from his unit, organization, or place of duty with intent to remain away therefrom permanently;

(2) quits his unit, organization, or place of duty with intent to avoid hazardous duty or to shirk important service; or

(3) without being regularly separated from one of the armed forces enlists or accepts an appointment in the same or another one of the armed forces without fully disclosing the fact that he has not been regularly separated, or enters any foreign armed service except when authorized by the United States; is guilty of desertion.

(b) Any commissioned officer of the armed forces who, after tender of his resignation and before notice of its acceptance, quits his post or proper duties without leave and with intent to remain away therefrom permanently is guilty of desertion.

(c) Any person found guilty of desertion or attempt to desert shall be punished, if the offense is committed in time of war, by death or such other punishment as a court-martial may direct, but if the desertion or attempt to desert occurs at any other time, by such punishment, other than death, as a court-martial may direct.

§ 886. Art. 86. Absence without leave

Any member of the armed forces who, without authority—

(1) fails to go to his appointed place of duty at the time prescribed;

(2) goes from that place; or

(3) absents himself or remains absent from his unit, organization, or place of duty at which he is required to be at the time prescribed; shall be punished as a court-martial may direct.

§ 887. Art. 87. Missing movement

Any person subject to this chapter who through neglect or design misses the movement of a ship, aircraft, or unit with which he is required in the course of duty to move shall be punished as a court-martial may direct.

§ 888. Art. 88. Contempt toward officials

Any commissioned officer who uses contemptuous words against the President, the Vice President, Congress, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of a military department, the Secretary of Homeland Security, or the Governor or legislature of any State,

Commonwealth, or possession in which he is on duty or present shall be punished as a court-martial may direct.

§ 889. Art. 89. Disrespect toward superior commissioned officer

Any person subject to this chapter who behaves with disrespect toward his superior commissioned officer shall be punished as a court-martial may direct.

§ 890. Art. 90. Assaulting or willfully disobeying superior commissioned officer

Any person subject to this chapter who—

(1) strikes his superior commissioned officer or draws or lifts up any weapon or offers any violence against him while he is in the execution of his office; or

(2) willfully disobeys a lawful command of his superior commissioned officer;

shall be punished, if the offense is committed in time of war, by death or such other punishment as a court-martial may direct, and if the offense is committed at any other time, by such punishment, other than death, as a court-martial may direct.

§ 891. Art. 91. Insubordinate conduct toward warrant officer, noncommissioned officer, or petty officer

Any warrant officer or enlisted member who

(1) strikes or assaults a warrant officer, noncommissioned officer, or petty officer, while that officer is in the execution of his office;

(2) willfully disobeys the lawful order of a warrant officer, noncommissioned officer, or petty officer; or

(3) treats with contempt or is disrespectful in language or deportment toward a warrant officer, noncommissioned officer, or petty officer while that officer is in the execution of his office;

shall be punished as a court-martial may direct.

§ 892. Art. 92. Failure to obey order or regulation

Any person subject to this chapter who—

(1) violates or fails to obey any lawful general order or regulation;

(2) having knowledge of any other lawful order issued by a member of the armed forces, which it is his duty to obey, fails to obey the order; or

(3) is derelict in the performance of his duties; shall be punished as a court-martial may direct.

§ 893. Art. 93. Cruelty and maltreatment

Any person subject to this chapter who is guilty of cruelty toward, or oppression or maltreatment of, any person subject to his orders shall be punished as a court-martial may direct.

§ 894. Art. 94. Mutiny or sedition

(a) Any person subject to this chapter who—

(1) with intent to usurp or override lawful military authority, refuses, in concert with any other person, to obey orders or otherwise do his duty or creates any violence or disturbance is guilty of mutiny;

(2) with intent to cause the overthrow or destruction of lawful civil authority, creates, in concert with any other person, revolt, violence, or other disturbance against that authority is guilty of sedition;

(3) fails to do his utmost to prevent and suppress a mutiny or sedition being committed in his presence, or fails to take all reasonable means to inform his superior commissioned officer or commanding officer of a mutiny or sedition which he knows or has reason to believe is taking place, is guilty of a failure to suppress or report a mutiny or sedition.

(b) A person who is found guilty of attempted mutiny, mutiny, sedition, or failure to suppress or report a mutiny or sedition shall be punished by death or such other punishment as a court-martial may direct.

§ 895. Art. 95. Resistance, flight, breach of arrest, and escape

Any person subject to this chapter who—

(1)   resists apprehension;

(2)   flees from apprehension;

(3)   breaks arrest; or

(4)   escapes from custody or confinement;

shall be punished as a court-martial may direct.

§ 896. Art. 96. Releasing prisoner without proper authority

Any person subject to this chapter who, without proper authority, releases any prisoner committed to his charge, or who through neglect or design suffers any such prisoner to escape, shall be punished as a court-martial may direct, whether or not the prisoner was committed in strict compliance with law.

§ 897. Art. 97. Unlawful detention

Any person subject to this chapter who, except as provided by law, apprehends, arrests, or confines any person shall be punished as a court-martial may direct.

§ 898. Art. 98. Noncompliance with procedural rules

Any person subject to this chapter who—

(1) is responsible for unnecessary delay in the disposition of any case of a person accused of an offense under this chapter;or

(2) knowingly and intentionally fails to enforce or comply with any provision of this chapter regulating the proceedings before, during, or after trial of an accused;

shall be punished as a court-martial may direct.

§ 899. Art. 99. Misbehavior before the enemy

Any person subject to this chapter who before or in the presence of the enemy—

(1) runs away;

(2) shamefully abandons, surrenders, or delivers up any command, unit, place, or military property which it is his duty to defend;

(3) through disobedience, neglect, or intentional misconduct en-

dangers the safety of any such command, unit, place, or military property;

(4) casts away his arms or ammunition;

(5) is guilty of cowardly conduct;

(6) quits his place of duty to plunder or pillage;

(7) causes false alarms in any command, unit, or place under control of the armed forces;

(8) willfully fails to do his utmost to encounter, engage, capture, or destroy any enemy troops, combatants, vessels, aircraft, or any other thing, which it is his duty so to encounter, engage, capture, or destroy; or

(9) does not afford all practicable relief and assistance to any troops, combatants, vessels, or aircraft of the armed forces belonging to the United States or their allies when engaged in battle; shall be punished by death or such other punishment as a court-martial may direct.

§ 900. Art. 100. Subordinate compelling surrender

Any person subject to this chapter who compels or attempts to compel the commander of any place, vessel, aircraft, or other military property, or of any body of members of the armed forces, to give it up to an enemy or to abandon it, or who strikes the colors or flag to any enemy without proper authority, shall be punished by death or such other punishment as a court-martial may direct.

§ 901. Art. 101. Improper use of countersign

Any person subject to this chapter who in time of war discloses the parole or countersign to any person not entitled to receive it or who gives to another who is entitled to receive and use the parole or countersign a different parole or countersign from that which, to his knowledge, he was authorized and required to give, shall be punished by death or such other punishment as a court-martial may direct.

§ 902. Art. 102. Forcing a safeguard

Any person subject to this chapter who forces a safeguard shall suffer death or such other punishment as a court-martial may direct.

§ 903. Art. 103. Captured or abandoned property

(a) All persons subject to this chapter shall secure all public property taken from the enemy for the service of the United States, and shall give notice and turn over to the proper authority without delay all captured or abandoned property in their possession, custody, or control.

(b) Any person subject to this chapter who—

(1) fails to carry out the duties prescribed in subsection (a);

(2) buys, sells, trades, or in any way deals in or disposes of captured or abandoned property, whereby he receives or expects any profit, benefit, or advantage to himself or another directly or indirectly connected with himself; or

(3) engages in looting or pillaging;

shall be punished as a court-martial may direct.

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§ 904. Art. 104. Aiding the enemy

Any person who—

(1) aids, or attempts to aid, the enemy with arms, ammunition, supplies, money, or other things; or

(2) without proper authority, knowingly harbors or protects or gives intelligence to or communicates or corresponds with or holds any intercourse with the enemy, either directly or indirectly; shall suffer death or such other punishment as a court-martial or military commission may direct.

§ 905. Art. 105. Misconduct as prisoner

Any person subject to this chapter who, while in the hands of the enemy in time of war—

(1) for the purpose of securing favorable treatment by his captors acts without proper authority in a manner contrary to law, custom, or regulation, to the detriment of others of whatever nationality held by the enemy as civilian or military prisoners; or

(2) while in a position of authority over such persons maltreat them without justifiable cause;

shall be punished as a court-martial may direct.

§ 906. Art. 106. Spies

Any person who in time of war is found lurking as a spy or acting as a spy in or about any place, vessel, or aircraft, within the control or jurisdiction of any of the armed forces, or in or about any shipyard, any manufacturing or industrial plant, or any other place or institution engaged in work in aid of the prosecution of the war by the United States, or elsewhere, shall be tried by a general court-martial or by a military commission and on conviction shall be punished by death.

§ 906a. Art. 106a. Espionage

(a)(1) Any person subject to this chapter who, with intent or reason to believe that it is to be used to the injury of the United States or to the advantage of a foreign nation, communicates, delivers, or transmits, or attempts to communicate, deliver, or transmit, to any entity described in paragraph (2), either directly or indirectly, any thing described in paragraph (3) shall be punished as a court-martial may direct, except that if the accused is found guilty of an offense that directly concerns (A) nuclear weaponry, military spacecraft or satellites, early warning systems, or other means of defense or retaliation against large scale attack, (B) war plans, (C) communications intelligence or cryptolineart information, or (D) any other major weapons system or major element of defense strategy, the accused shall be punished by death or such other punishment as a court-martial may direct.

(2) An entity referred to in paragraph (1) is—

(A) a foreign government;

(B) a faction or party or military or naval force within a foreign country, whether recognized or unrecognized by the United States; or

(C) a representative, officer, agent, employee, subject, or citizen of such a government, faction, party, or force.

(3) A thing referred to in paragraph (1) is a document, writing, code book, signal book, sketch, photograph, photolineart negative, blueprint, plan, map, model, note, instrument, appliance, or information relating to the national defense.

(b)(1) No person may be sentenced by court-martial to suffer death for an offense under this section (article) unless—

(A) the members of the court-martial unanimously find at least one of the aggravating factors set out in subsection (c); and

(B) the members unanimously determine that any extenuating or mitigating circumstances are substantially outweighed by any aggravating circumstances, including the aggravating factors set out under subsection (c).

(2) Findings under this subsection may be based on—

(A) evidence introduced on the issue of guilt or innocence;

(B) evidence introduced during the sentencing proceeding; or

(C) all such evidence.

(3) The accused shall be given broad latitude to present matters in extenuation and mitigation.

(c) A sentence of death may be adjudged by a court-martial for an offense under this section (article) only if the members unanimously find, beyond a reasonable doubt, one or more of the following aggravating factors:

(1) The accused has been convicted of another offense involving espionage or treason for which either a sentence of death or imprisonment for life was authorized by statute.

(2) In the commission of the offense, the accused knowingly created a grave risk of substantial damage to the national security.

(3) In the commission of the offense, the accused knowingly created a grave risk of death to another person.

(4) Any other factor that may be prescribed by the President by regulations under section 836 of this title (Article 36).

§ 907. Art. 107. False official statements

Any person subject to this chapter who, with intent to deceive, signs any false record, return, regulation, order, or other official document, knowing it to be false, or makes any other false official statement knowing it to be false, shall be punished as a court-martial may direct.

§ 908. Art. 108. Military property of United States—Loss, damage, destruction, or wrongful disposition

Any person subject to this chapter who, without proper authority—

(1) sells or otherwise disposes of;

(2) willfully or through neglect damages, destroys, or loses; or

(3) willfully or through neglect suffers to be lost, damaged, sold, or wrongfully disposed of;

any military property of the United States, shall be punished as a court-martial may direct.

§ 909. Art. 109. Property other than military property of United States - Waste, spoilage, or destruction

Any person subject to this chapter who willfully or recklessly wastes, spoils, or otherwise willfully and wrongfully destroys or

damages any property other than military property of the United States shall be punished as a court-martial may direct.

§ 910. Art. 110. Improper hazarding of vessel

(a) Any person subject to this chapter who willfully and wrongfully and wrongfully hazards or suffers to be hazarded any vessel of the armed forces shall suffer death or such punishment as a court-martial may direct.

(b) Any person subject to this chapter who negligently hazards or suffers to be hazarded any vessel of the armed forces shall be punished as a court-martial may direct.

§ 911. Art. 111. Drunken or reckless operation of a vehicle, aircraft, or vessel

(a) Any person subject to this chapter who—

(1) operates or physically controls any vehicle, aircraft, or vessel in a reckless or wanton manner or while impaired by a substance described in section 912a(b) of this title (article 112a(b)), or

(2) operates or is in actual physical control of any vehicle, aircraft, or vessel while drunk or when the alcohol concentration in the person's blood or breath is equal to or exceeds the applicable limit under subsection (b), shall be punished as a court-martial may direct.

(b)(1) For purposes of subsection (a), the applicable limit on the alcohol concentration in a person's blood or breath is as follows:

(A) In the case of the operation or control of a vehicle, aircraft, or vessel in the United States, such limit is the lesser of—

(i) the blood alcohol content limit under the law of the State in which the conduct occurred, except as may be provided under paragraph (2) for conduct on a military installation that is in more than one State; or

(ii) the blood alcohol content limit specified in paragraph (3).

(B) In the case of the operation or control of a vehicle, aircraft, or vessel outside the United States, the applicable blood alcohol content limit is the blood alcohol content limit specified in paragraph (3) or such lower limit as the Secretary of Defense may by regulation prescribe.

(2) In the case of a military installation that is in more than one State, if those States have different blood alcohol content limits under their respective State laws, the Secretary may select one such blood alcohol content limit to apply uniformly on that installation.

(3) For purposes of paragraph (1), the blood alcohol content limit with respect to alcohol concentration in a person's blood is 0.10 grams of alcohol per 100 milliliters of blood and with respect to alcohol concentration in a person's breath is 0.10 grams of alcohol per 210 liters of breath, as shown by chemical analysis.

(4) In this subsection:

(A) The term "blood alcohol content limit" means the amount of alcohol concentration in a person's blood or breath at which operation or control of a vehicle, aircraft, or vessel is prohibited.

(B) The term "United States" includes the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, Guam, and American Samoa and the term "State" includes each of those jurisdictions.

§ 912. Art. 112. Drunk on duty

Any person subject to this chapter other than a sentinel or lookout, who is found drunk on duty, shall be punished as a court-martial may direct.

§ 912a. Art 112a. Wrongful use, possession, etc., of controlled substances

(a) Any person subject to this chapter who wrongfully uses, possesses, manufactures, distributes, imports into the customs territory of the United States, exports from the United States, or introduces into an installation, vessel, vehicle, or aircraft used by or under the control of the armed forces a substance described in subsection (b) shall be punished as a court-martial may direct.

(b) The substances referred to in subsection (a) are the following:

(1) Opium, heroin, cocaine, amphetamine, lysergic acid diethylamide, methamphetamine, phencyclidine, barbituric acid, and marijuana and any compound or derivative of any such substance.

(2) Any substance not specified in clause (1) that is listed on a schedule of controlled substances prescribed by the President for the purposes of this article.

(3) Any other substance not specified in clause (1) or contained on a list prescribed by the President under clause (2) that is listed in schedules I through V of section 202 of the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 812).

§ 913. Art. 113. Misbehavior of sentinel

Any sentinel or lookout who is found drunk or sleeping upon his post or leaves it before being regularly relieved, shall be punished, if the offense is committed in time of war, by death or such other punishment as a court-martial may direct, but if the offense is at any other time, by such punishment other than death as a court-martial may direct.

§ 914. Art 114. Dueling

Any person subject to this chapter who fights or promotes, or is concerned in or connives at fighting a duel, or who, having knowledge of a challenge sent or about to be sent, fails to report the fact promptly to the proper authority, shall be punished as a court-martial may direct.

§ 915. Art. 115. Malingering

Any person subject to this chapter who for the purpose of avoiding work, duty, or service—

(1) feigns illness, physical disablement, mental lapse, or derangement; or

(2) intentionally inflicts self-injury;

shall be punished as a court-martial may direct.

§ 916. Art 116. Riot or breach of peace

Any person subject to this chapter who causes or participates in any riot or breach of the peace shall be punished as a court-martial may direct.

§ 917. Art. 117. Provoking speeches or gestures

Any person subject to this chapter who uses provoking or reproachful words or gestures towards any other person subject to this chapter shall be punished as a court-martial may direct.

§ 918. Art. 118. Murder

Any person subject to this chapter who, without justification or excuse, unlawfully kills a human being, when he—

(1) has a premeditated design to kill;

(2) intends to kill or inflict great bodily harm;

(3) is engaged in an act that is inherently dangerous to another and evinces a wanton disregard of human life; or

(4) is engaged in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of burglary, sodomy, rape, rape of a child, sexual assault, sexual assault of a child, aggravated sexual contact, sexual abuse of a child, robbery, or aggravated arson; is guilty of murder, and shall suffer such punishment as a court-martial may direct, except that if found guilty under clause (1) or (4), he shall suffer death or imprisonment for life as a court-martial may direct.

§ 919. Art. 119. Manslaughter

(a) Any person subject to this chapter who, with an intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm, unlawfully kills a human being in the heat of sudden passion caused by adequate provocation is guilty of voluntary manslaughter and shall be punished as a court-martial may direct.

(b) Any person subject to this chapter who, without an intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm, unlawfully kills a human being -

(1) by culpable negligence; or

(2) while perpetrating or attempting to perpetrate an offense, other than those named in clause (4) of section 918 of this title (article 118), directly affecting the person;

is guilty of involuntary manslaughter and shall be punished as a court-martial may direct.

§ 919a. Art. 119a. Death or injury of an unborn child

(a)(1) Any person subject to this chapter who engages in conduct that violates any of the provisions of law listed in subsection (b) and thereby causes the death of, or bodily injury (as defined in section 1365 of title 18) to, a child, who is in utero at the time the conduct takes place, is guilty of a separate offense under this section and shall, upon conviction, be punished by such punishment, other than death, as a court-martial may direct, which shall be consistent with the punishments prescribed by the President for that conduct had that injury or death occurred to the unborn child's mother.

(2) An offense under this section does not require proof that—

(i) the person engaging in the conduct had knowledge or should have had knowledge that the victim of the underlying offense was pregnant; or

(ii) the accused intended to cause the death of, or bodily injury to, the unborn child.

(3) If the person engaging in the conduct thereby intentionally kills or attempts to kill the unborn child, that person shall, instead of being punished under paragraph (1), be punished as provided under sections 880, 918, and 919(a) of this title (articles 80, 118, and 119(a)) for intentionally killing or attempting to kill a human being.

(4) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the death penalty shall not be imposed for an offense under this section.

(b) The provisions referred to in subsection (a) are sections 918, 919(a), 919(b)(2), 920(a), 922, 924, 926, and 928 of this title (articles 118, 119(a), 119(b)(2), 120(a), 122, 124, 126, and 128).

(c) Nothing in this section shall be construed to permit the prosecution—

(1) of any person for conduct relating to an abortion for which the consent of the pregnant woman, or a person authorized by law to act on her behalf, has been obtained or for which such consent is implied by law;

(2) of any person for any medical treatment of the pregnant woman or her unborn child; or

(3) of any woman with respect to her unborn child.

(d) In this section, the term "unborn child" means a child in utero, and the term "child in utero" or "child, who is in utero" means a member of the species homo sapiens, at any stage of development, who is carried in the womb.

§ 920. Art. 120. Rape and sexual assault generally

[Note: This statute applies to offenses committed on or after 28 June 2012. The previous versions of Article 120 are located as follows: for offenses committed on or before 30 September 2007, see Appendix 27; for offenses committed during the period 1 October 2007 through 27 June 2012, see Appendix 28.]

(a) *Rape.* Any person subject to this chapter who commits a sexual act upon another person by—

(1) using unlawful force against that other person;

(2) using force causing or likely to cause death or grievous bodily harm to any person;

(3) threatening or placing that other person in fear that any person will be subjected to death, grievous bodily harm, or kidnapping;

(4) first rendering that other person unconscious; or

(5) administering to that other person by force or threat of force, or without the knowledge or consent of that person, a drug, intoxicant, or other similar substance and thereby substantially impairing the ability of that other person to appraise or control conduct; is guilty of rape and shall be punished as a court-martial may direct.

(b) *Sexual Assault.* Any person subject to this chapter who—

(1) commits a sexual act upon another person by—

(A) threatening or placing that other person in fear;

(B) causing bodily harm to that other person;

(C) making a fraudulent representation that the sexual act serves a professional purpose; or

(D) inducing a belief by any artifice, pretense, or concealment that the person is another person;

(2) commits a sexual act upon another person when the person knows or reasonably should know that the other person is asleep, unconscious, or otherwise unaware that the sexual act is occurring; or

(3) commits a sexual act upon another person when the other person is incapable of consenting to the sexual act due to—

(A) impairment by any drug, intoxicant, or other similar substance, and that condition is known or reasonably should be known by the person; or

(B) a mental disease or defect, or physical disability, and that condition is known or reasonably should be known by the person; is guilty of sexual assault and shall be punished as a court-martial may direct.

(c) *Aggravated Sexual Contact.* Any person subject to this chapter who commits or causes sexual contact upon or by another person, if to do so would violate subsection (a) (rape) had the sexual contact been a sexual act, is guilty of aggravated sexual contact and shall be punished as a court-martial may direct.

(d) *Abusive Sexual Contact.* Any person subject to this chapter who commits or causes sexual contact upon or by another person, if to do so would violate subsection (b) (sexual assault) had the sexual contact been a sexual act, is guilty of abusive sexual contact and shall be punished as a court-martial may direct.

(e) *Proof of Threat.* In a prosecution under this section, in proving that a person made a threat, it need not be proven that the person actually intended to carry out the threat or had the ability to carry out the threat.

(f) *Defenses.* An accused may raise any applicable defenses available under this chapter or the Rules for Court-Martial. Marriage is not a defense for any conduct in issue in any prosecution under this section.

(g) *Definitions.* In this section:

(1) *Sexual act.* The term 'sexual act' means—

(A) contact between the penis and the vulva or anus or mouth, and for purposes of this subparagraph contact involving the penis occurs upon penetration, however slight; or

(B) the penetration, however slight, of the vulva or anus or mouth of another by any part of the body or by any object, with an intent to abuse, humiliate, harass, or degrade any person or to arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person.

(2) *Sexual contact.* The term 'sexual contact' means—

(A) touching, or causing another person to touch, either directly or through the clothing, the genitalia, anus, groin, breast, inner thigh, or buttocks of any person, with an intent to abuse, humiliate, or degrade any person; or

(B) any touching, or causing another person to touch, either directly or through the clothing, any body part of any person, if done with an intent to arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person. Touching may be accomplished by any part of the body.

(3) *Bodily harm.* The term 'bodily harm' means any offensive touching of another, however slight, including any nonconsensual sexual act or nonconsensual sexual contact.

(4) *Grievous bodily harm.* The term 'grievous bodily harm' means serious bodily injury. It includes fractured or dislocated bones, deep cuts, torn members of the body, serious damage to internal organs, and other severe bodily injuries. It does not include minor injuries such as a black eye or a bloody nose.

(5) *Force.* The term 'force' means—

(A) the use of a weapon;

(B) the use of such physical strength or violence as is sufficient to overcome, restrain, or injure a person; or

(C) inflicting physical harm sufficient to coerce or compel submission by the victim.

(6) *Unlawful Force.* The term 'unlawful force' means an act of force done without legal justification or excuse.

(7) *Threatening or placing that other person in fear.* The term 'threatening or placing that other person in fear' means a communication or action that is of sufficient consequence to cause a reasonable fear that non-compliance will result in the victim or another person being subjected to the wrongful action contemplated by the communication or action.

(8) *Consent.*

(A) The term 'consent' means a freely given agreement to the conduct at issue by a competent person. An expression of lack of consent through words or conduct means there is no consent. Lack of verbal or physical resistance or submission resulting from the use of force, threat of force, or placing another person in fear does not constitute consent. A current or previous dating or social or sexual relationship by itself or the manner of dress of the person involved with the accused in the conduct at issue shall not constitute consent.

(B) A sleeping, unconscious, or incompetent person cannot consent. A person cannot consent to force causing or likely to cause death or grievous bodily harm or to being rendered unconscious. A person cannot consent while under threat or fear or under the circumstances described in subparagraph (C) or (D) of subsection (b)(1).

(C) Lack of consent may be inferred based on the circumstances of the offense. All the surrounding circumstances are to be considered in determining whether a person gave consent, or whether a person did not resist or ceased to resist only because of another person's actions.

§ 920a. Art. 120a. Stalking

(a) Any person subject to this section—

(1) who wrongfully engages in a course of conduct directed at a specific person that would cause a reasonable person to fear death or bodily harm, including sexual assault, to himself or herself or a member of his or her immediate family;

(2) who has knowledge, or should have knowledge, that the specific person will be placed in reasonable fear of death or bodily harm, including sexual assault, to himself or herself or a member of his or her immediate family; and

(3) whose acts induce reasonable fear in the specific person of death or bodily harm, including sexual assault, to himself or herself or to a member of his or her immediate family; is guilty of stalking and shall be punished as a court-martial may direct.

(b) In this section:

(1) The term 'course of conduct' means—

(A) a repeated maintenance of visual or physical proximity to a specific person; or

(B) a repeated conveyance of verbal threat, written threats, or threats implied by conduct, or a combination of such threats, directed at or toward a specific person.

(2) The term 'repeated', with respect to conduct, means two or more occasions of such conduct;

(3) The term 'immediate family', in the case of a specific person, means a spouse, parent, child, or sibling of the person, or any other family member, relative, or intimate partner of the person who regularly resides in the household of the person or who within the six months preceding the commencement of the course of conduct regularly resided in the household of the person.

§ 920b. Art. 120b. Rape and sexual assault of a child

[Note: This statute applies to offenses committed on or after 28 June 2012. Article 120b is a new statute designed to address only child sexual offenses. Previous versions of child sexual offenses are located as follows: for offenses committed on or before 30 September 2007, *see* Appendix 27; for offenses committed during the period 1 October 2007 through 27 June 2012, *see* Appendix 28.]

(a) *Rape of a Child.* Any person subject to this chapter who—

(1) commits a sexual act upon a child who has not attained the age of 12 years; or

(2) commits a sexual act upon a child who has attained the age of 12 years by—

(A) using force against any person;

(B) threatening or placing that child in fear;

(C) rendering that child unconscious; or

(D) administering to that child a drug, intoxicant, or other similar substance; is guilty of rape of a child and shall be punished as a court-martial may direct.

(b) *Sexual Assault of a Child.* Any person subject to this chapter who commits a sexual act upon a child who has attained the age of 12 years is guilty of sexual assault of a child and shall be punished as a court-martial may direct.

(c) *Sexual Abuse of a Child.* Any person subject to this chapter who commits a lewd act upon a child is guilty of sexual abuse of a child and shall be punished as a court-martial may direct.

(d) *Age of Child.*

(1) *Under 12 Years.* In a prosecution under this section, it need not be proven that the accused knew the age of the other person engaging in the sexual act or lewd act. It is not a defense that the accused reasonably believed that the child had attained the age of 12 years.

(2) *Under 16 Years.* In a prosecution under this section, it need not be proven that the accused knew that the other person engaging in the sexual act or lewd act had not attained the age of 16 years, but it is a defense in a prosecution under subsection (b) (sexual assault of a child) or subsection (c) (sexual abuse of a child), which the accused must prove by a preponderance of the evidence, that the accused reasonably believed that the child had attained the age of 16 years, if the child had in fact attained at least the age of 12 years.

(e) *Proof of Threat.* In a prosecution under this section, in proving that a person made a threat, it need not be proven that the person actually intended to carry out the threat or had the ability to carry out the threat.

(f) *Marriage.* In a prosecution under subsection (b) (sexual assault of a child) or subsection (c) (sexual abuse of a child), it is a defense, which the accused must prove by a preponderance of the evidence, that the persons engaging in the sexual act or lewd act were at that time married to each other, except where the accused commits a sexual act upon the person when the accused knows or reasonably should know that the other person is asleep, unconscious, or otherwise unaware that the sexual act is occurring or when the other person is incapable of consenting to the sexual act due to impairment by any drug, intoxicant, or other similar substance, and that condition was known or reasonably should have been known by the accused.

(g) *Consent.* Lack of consent is not an element and need not be proven in any prosecution under this section. A child not legally married to the person committing the sexual act, lewd act, or use of force cannot consent to any sexual act, lewd act, or use of force.

(h) *Definitions.* In this section:

(1) *Sexual Act and Sexual Contact.* The terms 'sexual act' and 'sexual contact' have the meanings given those terms in section 920(g) of this title (article 120(g)).

(2) *Force. The term 'force' means—*

(A) the use of a weapon;

(B) the use of such physical strength or violence as is sufficient to overcome, restrain, or injure a child; or

(C) inflicting physical harm. In the case of a parent-child or similar relationship, the use or abuse of parental or similar authority is sufficient to constitute the use of force.

(3) *Threatening or Placing That Child in Fear.* The term 'threatening or placing that child in fear' means a communication or action that is of sufficient consequence to cause the child to fear that non-compliance will result in the child or another person being subjected to the action contemplated by the communication or action.

(4) *Child.* The term 'child' means any person who has not attained the age of 16 years.

(5) *Lewd Act. The term 'lewd act' means—*

(A) any sexual contact with a child;

(B) intentionally exposing one's genitalia, anus, buttocks, or female areola or nipple to a child by any means, including via any communication technology, with an intent to abuse, humiliate, or degrade any person, or to arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person;

(C) intentionally communicating indecent language to a child by any means, including via any communication technology, with an intent to abuse, humiliate, or degrade any person, or to arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person; or

(D) any indecent conduct, intentionally done with or in the presence of a child, including via any communication technology, that amounts to a form of immorality relating to sexual impurity which is grossly vulgar, obscene, and repugnant to common propriety, and tends to excite sexual desire or deprave morals with respect to sexual relations.

§ 920c. Art. 120c. Other sexual misconduct

[Note: This statute applies to offenses committed on or after 28 June 2012. Article 120c is a new statute designed to address other

sexual offenses not already addressed in Article 120 and Article 120b. Previous versions of these other sexual offenses are located as follows: for offenses committed on or before 30 September 2007, see Appendix 27; for offenses committed during the period 1 October 2007 through 27 June 2012, see Appendix 28.]

(a) *Indecent Viewing, Visual Recording, or Broadcasting.* Any person subject to this chapter who, without legal justification or lawful authorization—

(1) knowingly and wrongfully views the private area of another person, without that other person's consent and under circumstances in which that other person has a reasonable expectation of privacy;

(2) knowingly photographs, videotapes, films, or records by any means the private area of another person, without that other person's consent and under circumstances in which that other person has a reasonable expectation of privacy; or

(3) knowingly broadcasts or distributes any such recording that the person knew or reasonably should have known was made under the circumstances proscribed in paragraphs (1) and (2); is guilty of an offense under this section and shall be punished as a court-martial may direct.

(b) *Forcible Pandering.* Any person subject to this chapter who compels another person to engage in an act of prostitution with any person is guilty of forcible pandering and shall be punished as a court-martial may direct.

(c) *Indecent Exposure. Any person subject to this chapter who intentionally exposes, in an indecent manner, the genitalia, anus, buttocks, or female areola or nipple is guilty of indecent exposure and shall by punished as a court-martial may direct.*

(d) *Definitions.* In this section:

(1) *Act of Prostitution.* The term 'act of prostitution' means a sexual act or sexual contact (as defined in section 920(g) of this title (article 120(g))) on account of which anything of value is given to, or received by, any person.

(2) *Private Area.* The term 'private area' means the naked or underwear-clad genitalia, anus, buttocks, or female areola or nipple.

(3) *Reasonable Expectation of Privacy.* The term 'under circumstances in which that other person has a reasonable expectation of privacy' means—

(A) circumstances in which a reasonable person would believe that he or she could disrobe in privacy, without being concerned that an image of a private area of the person was being captured; or

(B) circumstances in which a reasonable person would believe that a private area of the person would not be visible to the public.

(4) *Broadcast.* The term 'broadcast' means to electronically transmit a visual image with the intent that it be viewed by a person or persons.

(5) *Distribute.* The term 'distribute' means delivering to the actual or constructive possession of another, including transmission by electronic means.

(6) *Indecent Manner.* The term 'indecent manner' means conduct that amounts to a form of immorality relating to sexual impurity which is grossly vulgar, obscene, and repugnant to common propriety, and tends to excite sexual desire or deprave morals with respect to sexual relations.

§ 921. Art. 121. Larceny and wrongful appropriation

(a) Any person subject to this chapter who wrongfully takes, obtains, or withholds, by any means, from the possession of the owner or of any other person any money, personal property, or article of value of any kind—

(1) with intent permanently to deprive or defraud another person of the use and benefit of property or to appropriate it to his own use or the use of any person other than the owner, steals that property and is guilty of larceny; or

(2) with intent temporarily to deprive or defraud another person of the use and benefit of property or to appropriate it to his own use or the use of any person other than the owner, is guilty of wrongful appropriation.

(b) Any person found guilty of larceny or wrongful appropriation shall be punished as a court-martial may direct.

§ 922. Art. 122. Robbery

Any person subject to this chapter who with intent to steal takes anything of value from the person or in the presence of another, against his will, by means of force or violence or fear of immediate or future injury to his person or property or to the person or property of a relative or member of his family or of anyone in his company at the time of the robbery, is guilty of robbery and shall be punished as a court-martial may direct.

§ 923. Art. 123. Forgery

Any person subject to this chapter who, with intent to defraud—

(1) falsely makes or alters any signature, to, or any part of, any writing which would, if genuine, apparently impose a legal liability on another or change his legal right or liability to his prejudice; or

(2) utters, offers, issues, or transfers such a writing, known by him to be so made or altered;
is guilty of forgery and shall be punished as a court-martial may direct.

§ 923a. Art. 123a. Making, drawing, or uttering check, draft, or order without sufficient funds

Any person subject to this chapter who—

(1) for the procurement of any article or thing of value, with intent to defraud; or

(2) for the payment of any past due obligation, or for any other purpose, with intent to deceive;
makes, draws, utters, or delivers any check, draft, or order for the payment of money upon any bank or other depository, knowing at the time that the maker or drawer has not or will not have sufficient funds in, or credit with, the bank or other depository for the payment of that check, draft, or order in full upon its presentment, shall be punished as a court-martial may direct. The making, drawing, uttering, or delivering by a maker or drawer of a check, draft, or order, payment of which is refused by the drawee because of insufficient funds of the maker or drawer in the draw-

ee's possession or control, is prima facie evidence of his intent to defraud or deceive and of his knowledge of insufficient funds in, or credit with, that bank or other depository, unless the maker or drawer pays the holder the amount due within five days after receiving notice, orally or in writing, that the check, draft, or order was not paid on presentment. In this section, the word "credit" means an arrangement or understanding, express or implied, with the bank or other depository for the payment of that check, draft, or order.

§ 924. Art. 124. Maiming

Any person subject to this chapter who, with intent to injure, disfigure, or disable, inflicts upon the person of another an injury which

(1) seriously disfigures his person by a mutilation thereof;

(2) destroys or disables any member or organ of his body; or

(3) seriously diminishes his physical vigor by the injury of any member or organ;

is guilty of maiming and shall be punished as a court-martial may direct.

§ 925. Art. 125. Sodomy

(a) Any person subject to this chapter who engages in unnatural carnal copulation with another person of the same or opposite sex or with an animal is guilty of sodomy. Penetration, however slight, is sufficient to complete the offense.

(b) Any person found guilty of sodomy shall be punished as a court-martial may direct.

§ 926. Art. 126. Arson

(a) Any person subject to this chapter who willfully and maliciously burns or sets on fire an inhabited dwelling, or any other structure, movable or immovable, wherein to the knowledge of the offender there is at the time a human being, is guilty of aggravated arson and shall be punished as court-martial may direct.

(b) Any person subject to this chapter who willfully and maliciously burns or sets fire to the property of another, except as provided in subsection (a), is guilty of simple arson and shall be punished as a court-martial may direct.

§ 927. Art. 127. Extortion

Any person subject to this chapter who communicates threats to another person with the intention thereby to obtain anything of value or any acquittance, advantage, or immunity is guilty of extortion and shall be punished as a court-martial may direct.

§ 928. Art. 128. Assault

(a) Any person subject to this chapter who attempts or offers with unlawful force or violence to do bodily harm to another person, whether or not the attempt or offer is consummated, is guilty of assault and shall be punished as a court-martial may direct.

(b) Any person subject to this chapter who—

(1) commits an assault with a dangerous weapon or other means or force likely to produce death or grievous bodily harm; or

(2) commits an assault and intentionally inflicts grievous bodily harm with or without a weapon;

is guilty of aggravated assault and shall be punished as a court-martial may direct.

§ 929. Art. 129. Burglary

Any person subject to this chapter who, with intent to commit an offense punishable under section 918–928 of this title (article 118–128), breaks and enters, in the nighttime, the dwelling house of another, is guilty of burglary and shall be punished as a court-martial may direct.

§ 930. Art. 130. Housebreaking

Any person subject to this chapter who unlawfully enters the building or structure of another with intent to commit a criminal offense therein is guilty of housebreaking and shall be punished as a court-martial may direct.

§ 931. Art. 131. Perjury

Any person subject to this chapter who in a judicial proceeding or in a course of justice willfully and corruptly—

(1) upon a lawful oath or in any form allowed by law to be substituted for an oath, gives any false testimony material to the issue or matter of inquiry; or

(2) in any declaration, certificate, verification, or statement under penalty or perjury as permitted under section 1746 of title 28, United States Code, subscribes any false statement material to the issue or matter of inquiry;

is guilty of perjury and shall be punished as a court-martial may direct.

§ 932. Art. 132. Frauds against the United States

Any person subject to this chapter—

(1) who, knowing it to be false or fraudulent—

(A) makes any claim against the United States or any officer thereof; or

(B) presents to any person in the civil or military service thereof, for approval or payment, any claim against the United States or any officer thereof;

(2) who, for the purpose of obtaining the approval, allowance, or payment of any claim against the United States or any officer thereof—

(A) makes or uses any writing or other paper knowing it to contain any false or fraudulent statements;

(B) makes any oath to any fact or to any writing or other paper knowing the oath to be false; or

(C) forges or counterfeits any signature upon any writing or other paper, or uses any such signature knowing it to be forged or counterfeited;

(3) who, having charge, possession, custody, or control of any money, or other property of the United States, furnished or intended for the armed forces thereof, knowingly delivers to any person having authority to receive it, any amount thereof less than that for which he receives a certificate or receipt; or

(4) who, being authorized to make or deliver any paper certifying the receipt of any property of the United States furnished or intended for the armed forces thereof, makes or delivers to any person such writing without having full knowledge of the truth of the statements therein contained and with intent to defraud the United States;

shall, upon conviction, be punished as a court-martial may direct.

§ 933. Art. 133. Conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman

Any commissioned officer, cadet, or midshipman who is convicted of conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman shall be punished as a court-martial may direct.

§ 934. Art. 134. General article

Though not specifically mentioned in this chapter, all disorders and neglects to the prejudice of good order and discipline in the armed forces, all conduct of a nature to bring discredit upon the armed forces, and crimes and offenses not capital, of which persons subject to this chapter may be guilty, shall be taken cognizance of by a general, special, or summary court-martial, according to the nature and degree of the offense, and shall be punished at the discretion of that court.

SUBCHAPTER XI. MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS

§ 935. Art. 135. Courts of inquiry

(a) Courts of inquiry to investigate any matter may be convened by any person authorized to convene a general court-martial or by any other person designated by the Secretary concerned for that purpose, whether or not the persons involved have requested such an inquiry.

(b) A court of inquiry consists of three or more commissioned officers. For each court of inquiry the convening authority shall also appoint counsel for the court.

(c) Any person subject to this chapter whose conduct is subject to inquiry shall be designated as a party. Any person subject to this chapter or employed by the Department of Defense who has a direct interest in the subject of inquiry has the right to be designated as a party upon request to the court. Any person designated as a party shall be given due notice and has the right to be present, to be represented by counsel, to cross-examine witnesses, and to introduce evidence.

(d) Members of a court of inquiry may be challenged by a party, but only for cause stated to the court.

(e) The members, counsel, the reporter, and interpreters of courts of inquiry shall take an oath to faithfully perform their duties.

(f) Witnesses may be summoned to appear and testify and be examined before courts of inquiry, as provided for courts-martial.

(g) Courts of inquiry shall make findings of fact but may not express opinions or make recommendations unless required to do so by the convening authority.

(h) Each court of inquiry shall keep a record of its proceedings, which shall be authenticated by the signatures of the president and counsel for the court and forwarded to the convening authority. If the record cannot be authenticated by the president, it shall be signed by a member in lieu of the president. If the record cannot be authenticated by the counsel for the court, it shall be signed by a member in lieu of the counsel.

§ 936. Art. 136. Authority to administer oaths and to act as notary

(a) The following persons on active duty or performing inactive-duty training may administer oaths for the purposes of military administration, including military justice:

(1) All judge advocates.

(2) All summary courts-martial.

(3) All adjutants, assistant adjutants, acting adjutants, and personnel adjutants.

(4) All commanding officers of the Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard.

(5) All staff judge advocates and legal officers, and acting or assistant staff judge advocates and legal officers.

(6) All other persons designated by regulations of the armed forces or by statute.

(b) The following persons on active duty or performing inactive-duty training may administer oaths necessary in the performance of their duties:

(1) The president, military judge, trial counsel, and assistant trial counsel for all general and special courts-martial.

(2) The president and the counsel for the court of any court of inquiry.

(3) All officers designated to take a deposition.

(4) All persons detailed to conduct an investigation.

(5) All recruiting officers.

(6) All other persons designated by regulations of the armed forces or by statute.

(c) The judges of the United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces may administer the oaths authorized by subsections (a) and (b).

§ 937. Art. 137. Articles to be explained

(a)(1) The sections of this title (articles of the Uniform Code of Military Justice) specified in paragraph (3) shall be carefully explained to each enlisted member at the time of (or within fourteen days after)—

(A) the member's initial entrance on active duty; or

(B) the member's initial entrance into a duty status with a reserve component.

(2) Such sections (articles) shall be explained again—

(A) after the member has completed six months of active duty

Bibliography:
Manual for Courts-Martial, United States Government Printing Office, 2012 Edition Composition, Appointment and Jurisdiction of Courts-Martial.

Cognitive Lesson Objectives:
- Know the basic elements of the Military Justice system.

Cognitive Samples of Behavior:
- Differentiate between Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) and Manual for Courts-Martial (MCM).

- Describe the need for a separate legal system for the military.

- Identify your rights in the Military Justice system.

- Identify the methods used to maintain discipline.

- Describe the purpose of non-judicial punishment.

- Identify the three types of courts-martial.

- Describe the functions of the Staff Judge Advocate (SJA) and the Area Defense Counsel (ADC).

Affective Lesson Objective:
- Value the Military Justice system.

Affective Sample of Behavior:
- Assert the importance of a separate legal system.

When you take the oath of office, you raise your right hand and say that you will support and defend the Constitution of the United States. Are you fully aware of what that entails? Many of the Air Force's governing documents, like Air Force Instructions (AFIs), stem from the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) and the Manual for Courts-Martial (MCM). The UCMJ and the MCM stem from the Constitution. By raising your right hand, you're stating that you'll abide by the Constitution, the UCMJ, the MCM, and all other instructions and directives that apply to the military. That's a big commitment. As an officer, you're expected to uphold and enforce military standards; the military justice system will help you enforce those standards.

Much of what will be discussed in this lesson is interrelated with the *Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ)* reading. Use the UCMJ reading as a cross-reference to help build your foundation of the military justice system.

THE MILITARY JUSTICE SYSTEM

To ensure an orderly existence, a society must have sound laws that are administered fairly. In a civil society, many governing bodies—city, county, state, and federal—make and administer laws. But in addition to civil laws, the US military society has its own laws.

Because of the vital services the military performs, there must be a high level of morale and good order and discipline. While effective leadership is the most desirable means of maintaining these qualities, it doesn't work in all cases. It's unfortunate, but true, that there are people who don't respond to any type of leadership and who commit offenses for which they must be punished. For the military to continue functioning smoothly, we must have a separate judicial system that allows us to enforce our laws, punishing members who violate them.

As an officer, you will have an important role in military justice. You must prepare yourself to accept the responsibilities of this role and perform the duties necessary to administer military justice. There may come a time when you'll have to prefer charges against a person who has committed an offense, investigate such offenses, or serve as a member on a court-martial. All of these tasks carry with them a great deal of responsibility. To execute them correctly, you must have a fundamental understanding of the military justice system.

Foundations and History of Military Justice

Military criminal law, or military justice as it's more popularly called, is closely related to civilian criminal law. Its sources are many and varied, some considerably older than the United States and its Constitution. However, the Constitution is the primary source of the law governing our military establishment.

Early Codes

The first governing document used by our forces, the Articles of War (1775), was taken directly from the existing British Articles of War, which had been used in Great Britain since 1765. The Second Continental Congress adopted these articles after they were prepared by a committee consisting of George Washington, Philip Schuyler and others, three days before Washington took command of the Continental Army. These articles, with some amendments, remained in effect until 1806.

The Constitution

Although the Articles of War preceded the Constitution by more than 10 years, the Constitution is the true source of our military law. This was well emphasized by Salmon P. Chase after he became Chief Justice of the United States in 1864. He stated that "the Constitution itself provides for military government as well as for civilian government… There is no law for the government of the citizens, the Army, or the Navy of the United States, within American jurisdiction, which is not contained in or derived from the Constitution."

The writers of the Constitution decided that the military should operate under a separate judicial system based upon a system of balanced controls. Therefore, the Constitution was designed to give the President and Congress certain, yet distinctive, powers. Specifically, the Constitution designates the President as Commander in Chief of the armed forces, and vests in him the power necessary to carry out the responsibilities of this position. The Constitution gives Congress the power to raise and support an Army, provide and maintain a Navy, and make rules for governing the land, air, and naval forces. This separation of power is an important element of our military justice system.

Articles of War (1920)

The aftermath of World War I brought about the Articles of War (1920) and a more strict review procedure. In 1906 and 1917 in Brownsville, Texas, and Houston, Texas, respectively, soldiers were accused of starting riots which resulted in the death of one person in Brownsville and several people in Houston. The soldiers had prompt trials in both instances and were found guilty. The court dishonorably discharged those involved in the Brownsville riots and handed down death and life imprisonment sentences to those involved in the Houston riots. Within a matter of months, the field commanders carried out the sentences. Although the commanders acted in accordance with existing laws, many people believed the sentences were carried out much too quickly without adequate appellate review. The demands for reform following these incidents prompted the War Department to issue General Order 7 in January 1918. This order provided that all severe sentences such as death, dismissal, or dishonorable discharge, be reviewed by the Judge Advocate General in Washington, D.C. The final ruling, which resulted after this review,

could then be carried out. To implement this order, the War Department established a Board of Review (or the Judge Advocate General's Office) in Washington, D.C. This marked the beginning of automatic appellate review of certain court-martial cases.

Other key articles forbade referral of a case for trial by general court-martial until after a thorough and impartial investigation with the accused present. These articles also gave the accused the opportunity to present evidence and cross-examine witnesses. Later, the Articles of 1920 resulted in the creation of the court-martial manuals of 1921 and 1928 that set forth "company punishment" procedures.

Elson Act (1949 Manual)

The Elson Act brought about further reform to the Army judicial system by amending the 1920 Articles. By a separate congressional bill passed in 1948, all laws affecting the Army military justice system were applied to the now separate Air Force and published in a 1949 manual. This legislation provided for enlisted people to serve as court members in certain cases, and placed a lawyer on the court as a law member. If the trial counsel was a lawyer, the law required the defense counsel to be similarly qualified. It also established petitions for new trials and, for the first time, prohibited criticism of courts by commanders. The Act introduced bad conduct discharges as a form of punishment and established higher-level review boards composed of three general officers.

Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) and Manual for Courts-Martial (MCM)

In 1948, the Secretary of Defense, James V. Forrestal, appointed a committee of civilian and military lawyers to create a military justice system that would apply to all branches of the armed forces and would be uniform in interpretation and construction. Upon this committee's recommendation, Congress passed an act on May 5, 1950, entitled the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ). The new code modified and consolidated the Army Articles of War, Articles for the Government of the Navy, and Disciplinary Laws of the Coast Guard.

When Congress enacted the UCMJ in 1950, it used its constitutional authority to make laws to govern the armed forces. Despite the comprehensive legal coverage the UCMJ provides, no legislation can provide for all contingencies likely to arise in the actual operation of a judicial system. For this reason, Congress gave the President authority to issue implementing instructions to put the UCMJ into operation. Consequently, on February 8, 1951, President Harry S. Truman issued an executive order to put into effect the MCM, United States, 1951. As an order of the President, this manual had the full force and effect of law, and was binding on all people subject to the UCMJ. Later, executive orders by Presidents Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson revised certain provisions of the 1951 Manual; President Johnson replaced the 1951 Manual with the MCM, 1969. President Reagan published the MCM, 1984. The manual is periodically republished when authorized by Congress and the President.

The intent of the MCM is to address the field of military justice as thoroughly as possible under the restrictions of a working manual. The MCM contains a wide range of materials, including the full texts of the US Constitution, UCMJ, and authority, composition, and procedures of court-martial. It also includes texts on rules of evidence applicable in court-martial and on the punitive articles and guides for writing most charges and specifications to state an offense according to the UCMJ. The design of the MCM is such that it doesn't require frequent reference to the UCMJ. You will, likely, have to refer to the UCMJ when you have an active duty legal problem involving the military justice system.

From this review of the history of our military justice system, you can see that the basic ideas of our modern articles evolved through tests by military forces for over 200 years. The UCMJ reflects centuries of experience in criminal law and military justice.

REASONS FOR A SEPARATE JUSTICE SYSTEM

What we've discussed so far gives you some background information on the evolution of our military justice system. Let's now consider the need for a justice system separate from the civilian sector.

Discipline

The first argument in favor of a separate military justice system concerns discipline. Although one might argue that civil law could serve as a substitute for military law in enforcing discipline, certain factors underlie the provision for a separate justice system for service-connected offenses. To begin with, the military community differs in some ways from the civilian community in its view of what is and isn't a crime. Absent without leave (AWOL) is an example of a uniquely military crime. Civilians absent without an excuse from their jobs have not committed a crime; rather, they've performed an act that has primarily personal consequences. Members of the armed forces who are AWOL could endanger their unit's mission and place the lives of others in jeopardy. The consequences of being AWOL clearly identify it as a criminal offense.

To ensure effective discipline in the armed forces, justice must be administered by people familiar with the military system and its needs. Military members are better able than civilians to understand and respond to problems involving military offenses. Consequently, they're more qualified to serve on courts trying these offenses. For example, in a trial for dereliction of duty, a civilian may consider it unreasonable to sentence the defendant to a lengthy period of confinement. In contrast, a military member tends to view the offense differently, being more inclined to see how the offender might have endangered the mission and lives of others.

Along these same lines, fair and equitable punishment for military members depends upon a clear understanding of the offender, and the circumstances surrounding the offense. On the basis of the member's past military record, training, experience, and potential value, military court members can then impose a suitable punishment. These and other considerations enable military courts to deal with military offenses more effectively than civilian courts.

Military Justice Worldwide

The second argument supporting a separate military justice system springs from the mobile nature of our military establishment. Military personnel are always subject to deployment across state or national boundaries on short notice. Since military justice is an essential tool for maintaining discipline, commanders must have a judicial system available whenever and wherever their units and personnel are deployed. They can't afford to be restricted by judicial districts or any other territorial limitations.

Another consideration is that the Constitution doesn't extend the power of the US federal judicial system to foreign soil. It's politically impossible to have US civilian courts meet and try cases in foreign sovereign territories. Therefore, the military must take along laws that can be administered solely by and for the military. The UCMJ was designed to meet this requirement. It's worldwide in jurisdiction and applicable wherever members of the armed forces are stationed.

YOUR LEGAL RIGHTS

As a member of the armed forces, you retain mainly the same legal rights you had as a civilian. The Constitution and the UCMJ guarantee and protect your legal rights. The most important of these rights are the rights to remain silent and to see an attorney. Your legal rights will be discussed further in this section.

Rights Advisement

When a suspect is interrogated about an offense, the official must advise the suspect of certain rights. These are the rights set forth in Article 31 of the UCMJ for military suspects and in the Fifth Amendment (also known as Miranda warnings) for civilian suspects. Rights advisements were made applicable to military personnel in United States v. Tempia, 16 Court of Military Appeals 629, 37 Court Martial Reports 249 (1967).

Depending on the circumstances and status of the suspect (military or civilian), either the Article 31 rights or Fifth Amendment rights (Miranda rights) are required. If the civilian suspect is being questioned and is in a custodial setting, placed in pretrial restraint, or charges have been preferred, a Fifth Amendment rights advisement must be given. In

certain circumstances, only Article 31 rights advisement is required. Article 31 advises individuals of their right against self-incrimination but does not provide any right to counsel for requests of voice or handwriting samples and requests for bodily fluids.

Before any voluntary confession may be made, an individual must be advised under Article 31 of the following:

- The nature of the accusation.

- The right to remain silent; that is, say nothing at all.

- The fact that any statement the individual makes, orally or in writing, may be used as evidence in a trial by court-martial or in any other judicial or administrative proceedings. In a custodial interrogation:

- The right to consult with a lawyer.

- The right to have a lawyer present during the interview.

- The right to obtain a civilian lawyer of the individual's own choosing and at the individual's own expense.

- The right to have a government-appointed military lawyer.

- The right to request a lawyer at any time during the interview.

- The right to stop the questioning at any time if the individual decides not to answer questions.

- The fact that if the individual requests a lawyer during questioning, the interview will be suspended until a lawyer is made available.

Advisement of rights should not be given to a person who is not a suspect. If it becomes evident during a conversation that someone is a suspect, cease all questioning and advise the individual of his/her rights. Rights advisement is also not required when executing a search authorization or when requesting consent to search.

A suspect can waive his/her Article 31 rights. If a suspect wishes to waive his/her rights, he/she must give an affirmative acknowledgment to the following three waiver questions:

- Do you understand your rights?

- Do you want a lawyer?

- Are you willing to make a statement?

A suspect has a constitutional and statutory right to exercise his/her rights. A suspect can voluntarily waive these rights after advisement and make a statement, but at any time the suspect can exercise his/her rights. If he/she does so, all interrogation must cease. No reprisal action can be taken or threatened if a person asserts these rights. However, the statements made prior to exercising these rights are admissible.

Compulsory Self-Incrimination Prohibited

The Fifth Amendment of the US Constitution holds that "no person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself." Self-incrimination is an admission or confession of guilt, oral or written. To ensure this right against self-incrimination, it is required to advise all suspects questioned or taken into custody of certain rights under Article 31 of the UCMJ, as discussed in the prior section. Any statement made without advisement of these rights would be considered compulsory.

Following rights advisement, any voluntary statement a member makes can be used against him/her in a trial by court-martial. If a statement is obtained that violates the Article 31 rights or if coercion, unlawful influence, or unlawful inducement are used to obtain a statement, the evidence is not admissible in a court-martial.

Whether a service member asserts these rights against self-incrimination is his/her choice. There can be no reprisal action against a member who exercises these rights. A member who isn't a suspect is not entitled to an advisement of rights and can be ordered to produce a statement of his/her observation or knowledge of a crime. Failure to give a statement in such a case violates Article 92. If a member gives a false sworn statement, Article 134 has been violated.

Right to Counsel

A counsel is an attorney who, among other duties, may advise a person suspected of committing a crime. Civilian court decisions established that in certain types of cases, the accused should be given counsel by the court free of charge if he/she can't afford to obtain one at his/her own expense. Long before these civilian court decisions, the Air Force provided legal counsel free of charge to all accused before summary, special, and general courts-martial, and to those being offered Article 15, UCMJ punishment. This lawyer is the Area Defense Counsel (ADC). Without a lawyer's assistance and advice, those accused could be at a disadvantage if they don't understand their rights. Members also have the right to obtain civilian counsel, at the member's expense.

The ADC is explained in further detail in this chapter in the *Legal Support* section.

Procedures for Apprehension and Restraint

Apprehension is the taking of a person subject to the UCMJ into custody. Any person, regardless of rank, who is assigned and performing duty as guard or police is authorized to apprehend anyone subject to the UCMJ if there is reasonable belief that an offense was committed and if the person being apprehended committed it. This means facts and circumstances must satisfy a reasonable belief to conclude an offense was or is being committed. Additionally, commissioned officers, warrant officers, petty officers, and noncommissioned officers have the authority to "quell quarrels, frays, and disorders" among persons subject to the UCMJ and to apprehend persons who take part therein.

Civilian law enforcement officials also generally have the power to arrest military members for offenses committed in their presence and for felonies upon probable cause. Resisting or fleeing apprehension is a punishable offense under Article 95.

When placing an individual under apprehension, the simple statement, "You're under apprehension," is usually sufficient. If a member places an offender into apprehension and he/she resists, use only the minimal amount of force necessary to secure custody.

Search, Seizure, and Inspection

First of all, it is important to define what searches, seizures, and inspections, since they all play a very different, but important, role in the military justice system. A *search* is an examination of a person, property, or premises to uncover evidence of a crime or criminal intent, such as stolen goods, burglary tools, weapons, or other evidence. A *seizure* is the taking of such items by authorities for evidence at a court-martial. An *inspection* is an examination of the whole or part of a unit, organization, installation, aircraft, or vehicle to determine and to ensure the security, military fitness, or good order and discipline of the unit, organization, or installation.

Search, Seizure, and Inspection Authority. Before any search, seizure, or inspection can be conducted, it must be authorized by the proper authority. Most searches and inspections (and henceforth seizures) must be authorized by the express permission, written or oral, issued by a commander, military judge, or magistrate, depending on the circumstances, to search a person or an area. Civilian authorities issue search warrants, which authorize the same. Regardless, in most cases, the Staff Judge Advocate (SJA) should be consulted before a search, seizure, or inspection is authorized.

The Constitution requires the issuance of a warrant or permission before any search or seizure; however, there are exceptions. For example, if the search and seizure are incidental to an arrest or if a person consents to it, which will be explained in further detail later in this section, no warrant or permission prior to the search and seizure is required.

Commanders have the authority to authorize searches, seizures, and inspections for areas in which they have authority. For example, a commander has the authority to authorize an inspection in any building his/her squadron has operations out of. Additionally, a commander can authorize a search or inspection to be held in the dormitory that his/her personnel reside. To inspect the living quarter's of personnel, a health and welfare inspection is typically used.

Health and Welfare Inspection. A commander, first sergeant, or designated representative may inspect a dormitory room where a unit member resides for morale, health, welfare, and cleanliness under the pretense that the inspection is being performed with the intention to ascertain and ensure the readiness of personnel and equipment. This can be done without the occupant's permission. Contraband that is discovered may be confiscated. Contraband is defined as material that the possession of is, by its very nature,

unlawful. Material may be declared to be unlawful by appropriate statute, regulation, or order. For example, if alcohol is prohibited in a dormitory, it is considered contraband. Evidence discovered in plain view is admissible for an Article 15 action or a court-martial.

There are instances when a health and welfare inspection is considered illegal. Inspections are not authorized that are used primarily to obtain evidence for use in a trial. Inspections directed immediately following a report of a specific offense in the unit, organization, dormitory, etc. that were not previously scheduled are also illegal. Additionally, inspections cannot be targeted at specific individuals who may be under investigation or suspicion of an offense. Any property seized during these illegal searches/inspections cannot be used for an Article 15 or court-martial. However, all evidence found can be used for administrative purposes, e.g., reprimands, control roster, drug rehabilitation, etc.

Consent Search. A search of a person or property may be conducted with consent of the person or occupant of the place to be searched. The occupant has the right to refuse consent and may limit the scope of consent or withdraw it at any time. If there are at least two occupants of a room, a single occupant can consent to a search of his or her part of the room and the common areas of the room. A consent search may be illegal if consent is not freely and voluntarily given.

There is a difference between voluntary consent and acquiescence to an authority figure. The former is legal; the latter is illegal. Acquiescence can be demonstrated by the following examples:

- After smelling marijuana, the commander knocks on the dormitory door. When the occupant opens the door, the commander declares that he wants to search the room. If the occupant steps back, remains silent, and waves in the commander, this is acquiescence.

- A 1st Lt asks the occupant for permission to search, and the occupant asks, "What if I refuse?" If the lieutenant says, "We will just get a search warrant," or a similar statement showing no free choice of the occupant, and the occupant then submits.

To get effective consent, the individual requesting to search a room should say something like, "I request your permission to search your room." The occupant's consent, if given, can be verbal or written, although the latter is preferred. If consent is verbally given, ensure the conversation is heard by an independent witness, not only the occupant's roommate or friend. Do not accept an ambiguous reply like a shrugging of the shoulders, a waving of the hand, or "Uh-huh." In such cases, seek clarification. It is best for consent to be obtained in writing.

Probable Cause Search. Probable cause to search exists when there is a reasonable belief that the person, property, or evidence sought is located in the place or on the person to be searched. A probable cause search is authorized by either a commander, military judge, or magistrate.

Investigations and Inquiries

Investigations into matters are an essential piece in the due process of military law and in maintaining good order and discipline. Before commanders or other officials can make any decisions, all of the facts must be presented and evaluated. There are various means to investigate matters depending on the nature of the allegations and severity, but before any investigation begins, it is best to contact the Staff Judge Advocate (SJA) for legal advice regarding the situation.

In some instances, commanders have the authority to investigate matters within their command. These investigations are implemented by a commander and are called Commander Directed Investigations (CDI). A CDI should be utilized when another investigative channel does not exist or is less suitable. A CDI can be used to investigate such matters as a violation of a standard of conduct, such as a member violating a standard set in an Air Force Instruction (AFI), or abuse of authority within an organization.

In other instances, the matter being investigated needs to be elevated to a higher level and a CDI is not an appropriate means of investigation. When an issue is discovered that is usually dealt with by an otherwise established grievance or appeals channel, such as the Inspector General (IG) or the Office of Special Investigations (OSI), that office is responsible for investigating the issue. For example, in matters of reprisal or restriction a CDI is never appropriate and the IG is the delegated investigating authority. Also, in all matters where sexual assault or domestic abuse are being investigated, the OSI is the lead investigating agency.

Some matters can be investigated using a CDI or an investigation by another agency. When these instances that are in the "gray area" occur, it is always best to air on the side of caution and contact the SJA or other appropriate agency prior to beginning an investigation. For example, when investigating UCMJ offenses, SJA should be contacted to determine if the investigation should be handled at the Commander's level or higher. Law enforcement will typically investigate serious offenses for which the punishment is likely to be non-judicial punishment (NJP) or court-martial but for less serious offenses a CDI may be appropriate. For allegations of discrimination based on color, national origin, race, ethnic group, religion or sex, including sexual harassment, the issue should be brought to the attention of the Equal Opportunity (EO) office prior to deciding who the investigating authority is and in some cases, the EO office will lead the investigation.

For additional information on the roles and responsibilities of the IG and investigations, please refer to AFI 90-301.

Understanding Your Responsibilities in Military Justice

The military justice system is one tool used to maintain good order and discipline. In meeting your responsibilities as an officer, you may have the opportunity to take certain actions either administratively or under the UCMJ. Officers have a general responsibility to give their full support to the UCMJ when a breach in discipline occurs. The following are some specific responsibilities that you have as an officer:

- Support your commander in the application of the military justice system.

- Become involved when breaches of discipline occur in your presence and report all such violations to the proper authorities.

- Be prepared to investigate incidents when ordered to do so. (This means you should be familiar with the rules of evidence and resources available to assist you in conducting the investigation)

- Familiarize yourself with the rules in the UCMJ for apprehending, arresting, and confining violators of the code.

- Be prepared to counsel Airmen on their legal rights under the UCMJ, or refer them to proper legal authorities for guidance.

- Provide leadership and counseling to obtain the maximum positive behavior change in the individual receiving non-judicial punishment.

- Be prepared to recommend disciplinary courses of action under the UCMJ.

The primary purpose of military law is to enforce discipline, which can be defined in the military sense as "an attitude that encourages everyone to work voluntarily and enthusiastically toward organizational goals." Officers should do everything within their power to uphold good order and discipline and prevent breaches in discipline. If all efforts at prevention fail, the next most reasonable step is correction through expressions of disapproval, verbal reprimands, or remedial training.

Commanders can choose an escalated response to discipline within a unit. A variety of administrative tools are available to identify deficiencies to Airman and hopefully rehabilitate them, without using punishment. An Article 15, or non-judicial punishment, is also a rehabilitative tool, but carries consequences such as reduction in rank, money or restriction to base. Judicial action (summary, special, or general court-martial) is used as a last resort to punish those who repeatedly or seriously violate the standards of conduct required in military life. The readiness and strength of each organization largely depends on how you accept your responsibility and use your authority in relation to the military justice system to maintain discipline. If you don't become an active member in supporting the military justice system, the system, as well as the capabilities of the organization to perform its mission, will suffer.

MAINTAINING DISCIPLINE

The main purpose of military law is to enforce discipline. Discipline, in the military sense, does not simply imply punishment for wrongdoing. It's a broad concept that implies a state of mind, or an attitude that prompts people to work eagerly and voluntarily to accomplish organizational goals. This kind of self-motivated discipline is essential to the effectiveness and efficiency of the Air Force. For this reason, Air Force

leaders are vitally concerned with maintaining a work environment characterized by good order and discipline. When people do not comply with expected standards, however, there are three broad methods of helping commanders maintain discipline: *administrative tools, non-judicial punishment, and judicial actions.*

Sometimes, when a service member's behavior is disruptive, or performance is unacceptable, discipline is required. Simply defined, discipline is "management action to encourage compliance with organizational standards." It's a type of training that strives to correct and mold personal knowledge, attitudes, and behavior so that workers exert themselves willingly for better cooperation and performance.

Undoubtedly, the way of maintaining discipline is through prevention. It represents all the essential qualities of good leadership because it places primary emphasis on eliciting the highest performance from each person. Unfortunately, there will occasionally be an individual who violates a regulation in spite of sound leadership practices.

Preventive discipline is action taken to encourage members to follow standards and regulations to prevent infractions. The overall objective is to encourage self-discipline rather than having discipline imposed by superiors. Preventive discipline communicates standards to personnel and encourages members to adhere to them. The intent is to explain the reasons behind standards and to build a positive spirit of self-discipline. In addition, it encourages members' participation in setting standards. Members will be more supportive of standards stated positively instead of negatively, such as "safety first!" rather than "don't be careless!" Members usually want to know the reasons behind a rule so it'll make more sense to them.

Recognizing Individual Differences

It's particularly important that an officer knows and appreciates the fact that in all walks of life, including the Air Force, individual differences in personality and ability must be considered. The Manual for Courts-Martial (MCM) recognizes these individual differences by requiring commanders to evaluate each offense on an individual basis. It prohibits policies where certain categories of offenses must be disposed of by an Article 15, regardless of the circumstances. It also prohibits the establishment of predetermined punishments for certain classifications of offenses. Preventive discipline must take into account human variations in personality and behavior.

Outstanding performance must be recognized and commended. This means establishing high standards, measuring performance against these standards, and rewarding those personnel who measure up. The reverse is also true. A leader must have explicit standards, reliable measurements of performance, and a procedure for taking remedial action against those personnel who refuse to measure up. The establishment of these standards should recognize individual differences.

Administrative Tools

Administrative tools are available to a commander to discipline members for various rule infractions. These tools help a commander discourage further infractions and to ensure that further acts are in compliance with standards.

An Airman's immediate supervisor usually initiates administrative tools, but some actions may require action and/or approval by the commander. There are three objectives of taking administrative action:

- To reform the offender

- To deter others from similar actions

- To maintain consistent, effective group standards

Administrative tools have a positive impact. They are educational and corrective, rather than a negative retaliation at personnel who have done wrong (though some do carry career impacting consequences). A negative, punishing approach introduces undesirable side effects such as apathy and fear of the supervisor. The goal of discipline is to improve the future rather than punish for the past.

This approach is exemplified by an anecdote told by General C. Kenny. The event took place in the summer of 1942.

General Kenny, then Commanding General of the Fourth Air Force, headquartered in San Francisco, had before him a young officer who had been reported to the general because of certain misconduct. This blond youngster, hardly out of his teens, was a fighter pilot. He'd been reported for looping the Golden Gate Bridge in a P-38, then flying so low through San Francisco that people in office buildings had to look down to see the buzzing airplane. Then he hedgehopped across some clotheslines and the prop wash blew a housewife's washing from the clothesline. The investigating officer recommended trial by general court-martial.

General Kenny sized up the culprit and decided on a disciplinary method other than punishment. He tried correction. He gave the young pilot a verbal dressing down and then sent him to help the housewife wash her laundry. In that instance, corrective action paid off dramatically; the pilot went to combat in the Pacific and gained Air Force immortality as the leading ace in World War II. His name? Richard I. Bong.

The measure that General Kenny used as correction could be identified as admonition, or reprimand. It's one of the best administrative tools one can apply. Administrative tools emphasize a corrective way of dealing with discipline problems versus taking punitive action.

There are a variety of administrative tools available, but this lesson will focus on *unfavorable information files (UIF), control rosters, counseling, admonitions, and reprimands.*

Unfavorable Information Files (UIFs)

The UIF is an official record of unfavorable information concerning an Air Force member's personal conduct and duty performance. It documents administrative, judicial, or nonjudicial censures concerning the member's performance, responsibility, behavior, and so on. What documents go in a UIF depends on the rank of the offender (officer versus enlisted), what action was taken (court versus non-judicial punishment), and the punishment that was given (duration of punishment administered in an Article 15). Some items are required to be included while others are optional and the commander's discretion for filing in the UIF. Documents such as an Article 15 under the UCMJ, a record of conviction from a court-martial, or a letter of reprimand (LOR), are some of the documents that are required to be filed in a UIF. When a document is filed into the UIF, the member must be informed and allowed a chance to respond.

Responsibilities. In the UIF process, different personnel fill various roles. The following paragraphs will explain the duties of certain personnel in the UIF process.

Commanders. Commanders at all levels may take action to establish, remove, or destroy UIFs for all personnel within their jurisdiction. It's important that commanders guard against referring trivial unfavorable information for file in the UIF. Depending on the nature of the document and the document's disposition dates, a file can be held in the UIF anywhere from 6 months to 4 years.

Supervisors. Commanders may refer documents written by the supervisor for filing in the UIF. Letters of counseling (LOC), letters of admonishment (LOA), and letters of reprimand (LOR) are types of documents that will be or may be referred by the commander to be filed in the UIF. As a supervisor, it is your responsibility to correctly document a subordinate's unacceptable performance, as it may be filed in a UIF. You must also remember to keep your commander informed of unfavorable incidents or behavior problems involving members under your supervision, especially those who already have UIFs.

UIF Monitor. The Military Personnel Section (MPS) will appoint an individual to act as the base UIF monitor. Individual units will appoint a unit UIF monitor as well. UIF monitors are responsible for the overall maintenance and disposition of UIF, both hardcopy and electronically, whatever is used in that location.

Additionally, the UIF monitor will ensure only authorized personnel view UIFs. Commanders and first sergeants may access the files of the personnel in their jurisdiction at any time: commanders can access all members' files, first sergeants can only access those of enlisted members. OPR and EPR rating officials, when preparing to write or endorse a performance report, may view a UIF as well.

For more information on the UIF process, refer to AFI 36-2907 *Unfavorable Information File (UIF) Program.*

Control Roster

Like UIFs, control rosters are an important management tool to foster rehabilitation of personnel. Commanders may use the control roster to set up an observation period for individuals whose duty performance is substandard or who fail to meet or maintain Air Force standards of conduct, bearing, and integrity, on- or off-duty. A control roster is a physical list with the names of personnel who are under this observation status; this list assists commanders and supervisors in controlling and managing such members. When considering if placement on a control roster is proper or necessary, consideration should be given to prior incidents, acts, failures, counseling, and rehabilitative efforts.

Control rosters give members the chance to improve in their deficient area during a specific time period. Commanders must ensure members on the control roster understand that they expect improvement during the observation period. Placement on the control roster isn't a punishment, but it does affect the individual in certain personnel programs. For example, as long as members are on a control roster, they're ineligible for reenlistment, promotion, or permanent change of station (PCS) reassignment (except for a mandatory move).

Commanders may take action to place, continue, or remove personnel on the control roster; however, they should never use the control roster when administrative, personnel, judicial, or non-judicial action is more appropriate. The commander may have an individual removed from the control roster before the end of the observation period. The commander should do this when retention on the roster no longer serves a useful management purpose, or if the commander determines the control roster action was based on false information.

The commander has most of the responsibility in the control roster process, but you, as a supervisor, play a vital role. As an individual's supervisor, you're in the best position to effectively monitor and evaluate the member's performance and conduct during the observation period. In your day-to-day contact with the individual, you should note any improvement or deterioration in performance to warrant either the removal or continuation of the control roster.

For more information on the control roster process, refer to AFI 36-2907 *Unfavorable Information File (UIF) Program.*

Counseling, Admonitions, and Reprimands

Oral and written counselings, and written reprimands and admonitions, are management tools that commanders and supervisors use to take corrective action on subordinates. An oral or written counseling is usually the first step in attempting to correct an individual's behavior. It calls attention to the deficiency and gives the individual an attempt to correct the behavior without severe consequences. An administrative admonition carries a stronger degree of censure than a counseling. An administrative reprimand is similar to an admonition, but it carries a more serious degree of severity.

Commanders and supervisors at all levels have the responsibility to ensure subordinates maintain Air Force standards. You should bring any deviations from these standards to the attention of the individual concerned. Usually commanders will use a graduated approach and only after taking lesser actions, such as counseling, to correct a problem, will they use the more formal admonitions or reprimands. However, depending on the infraction, a reprimand may certainly be an appropriate first step. Authority for using counselings, admonitions, and reprimands is inherent, and comes from the responsibilities of commanders and supervisors to correct subordinates' behavior.

While they can be done orally, counselings, admonitions, and reprimands should usually be written to document the corrective action. As a supervisor, if you issue a letter of counseling (LOC), letter of admonishment (LOA), or letter of reprimand (LOR), you may elect to send it to the unit commander for information or conversely, keep it private and wait to see if the member improves or continues his/her substandard performance. The unit commander may decide to keep a document for future reference or have the document entered into a member's UIF. A recommendation concerning the disposition of the letter may be included in the letter. You should always retain a copy of the LOC, LOA, or LOR, and send copies to other superiors of the individual as you see appropriate.

If the unit commander intends to place a written admonition or reprimand in a person's UIF, the commander must notify the member in writing of this action. The individual has the option of providing the commander with any comments or documents for reconsideration of the proposed UIF action. Also, the individual must acknowledge, in writing, that notification was made.

Counselings, administrative admonitions, and reprimands are not punitive in nature. You shouldn't confuse these with punitive reprimands that may result from court-martial convictions or acceptance of non-judicial punishment under Article 15, UCMJ.

Written letters of counseling, admonition, and reprimand can be used as evidence in punitive actions, and therefore, must be written correctly and follow certain requirements. Failure to follow the requirements for drafting and maintaining these documents could limit the use of the documents in a subsequent proceeding.

The following are requirements for drafting and maintaining a letter of counseling (LOC), letter of admonishment (LOA), or letter of reprimand (LOR):

Drafting the Letter—LOCs, LOAs, and LORs must state the following:

- What the member did or failed to do, citing specific incidents and their dates.

- What improvement is expected.

- That further deviation may result in more severe action.

- That the member has three duty days to respond and provide rebuttal matters.

- That all supporting documents become part of the record.

- That the person who initiates the LOC, LOA, or LOR has three duty days to advise the individual of their decision regarding any comments submitted by the individual

Privacy Act Requirements: Written counselings, admonitions, and reprimands are subject o the rules of access, protection, and disclosure outlined in AFI 33-332, Air Force Privacy Act Program. Therefore, all LOCs, LOAs, and LORs must contain a paragraph outlining the applicability of the Privacy Act to the document. Copies held by supervisors, commanders, and those filed in a member's UIF or personnel information file (PIF) are subject to the same Privacy Act rules.

Procedures: A person intending to issue an LOC, LOA, or LOR should:

- Investigate to determine the infraction occurred.

- Draft the letter according to the requirements of AFI 36-2907 as set forth above.

- Read the individual the letter and have the member immediately acknowledge receipt on the original letter by filling in the date received and signing.

- If the member refuses to acknowledge receipt, the person who issued the letter should write on the original letter beneath the member's signature block in the acknowledgement section, "<<Rank and Name of Member>> refused to acknowledge receipt."

- Give the member a copy of the letter.

- After three duty days from the date the letter was issued, have the member indicate in an indorsement (example in attachment at end of this section) of the original letter whether or not the member is submitting a response to the letter. Have the member fill in the date of the indorsement, strike through the inapplicable language in parentheses, and sign the indorsement.

- Attach any matters the member submits in response to the original letter.

- If the member refuses to complete or sign the indorsement, the person who issued the letter should write on the original letter beneath the member's signature block, "<<Rank and Name of Member>> failed to provide matters in response to this letter within three duty days (or 30 days for reservists not serving on extended active duty) and refused to complete the 1st Ind," along with the issuer's signature block, signature, and the date.

- If the member submits a response, advise the member within three duty days of the submission of the response of the final decision concerning information submitted by the member in an indorsement (example in attachment at end of this section). See AFI 36-2907, para 3.5.1.6, concerning this requirement. If using an indorsement similar to that in the attachment, the issuer of the letter should fill in the date of the indorsement, strike through the inapplicable language in parentheses, and sign the indorsement.

- Inform the member's chain of command of the letter. If appropriate or requested, send the letter with all indorsements, and any documents submitted by the member to the member's superiors or commander for information, action, or approval for entry in the member's PIF, UIF, or both.

A sample template of a letter of counseling or letter of reprimand is that the end of this reader.

Non-Judicial Punishment

What is non-judicial punishment? One of the definitions Webster gives for the word "judicial" is "of or pertaining to courts of justice." On the basis of this definition, we can conclude that non-judicial punishment is punishment not imposed by a court of justice. In the armed forces, Article 15 of the UCMJ authorizes commanders to impose punishment for minor offenses upon military members under their command. In the Air Force, this means any Air Force member from Airman Basic to General can be punished under the provisions of this article.

Purpose and Implications. Article 15 of the UCMJ gives commanders a tool for maintaining morale, discipline, and efficiency within their units. Article 15 gives commanders the flexibility to punish military members for offenses not serious enough to warrant the stigma attached to a court-martial conviction, but more serious than a letter of counseling, admonishment, or reprimand. Commanders should use Article 15 punishment to correct or rehabilitate offenders. Commanders must also take into account what other disciplinary actions have been considered. They should also ensure that other corrective actions have already been taken, if appropriate, and were proven ineffective as a means of rehabilitation.

Although Article 15 punishment is imposed by the commander, it can be recommended by other officers or NCOs. Action under Article 15 of the UCMJ is a serious matter with critical and lasting effects on military members and their careers. For this reason, caution should be used when making recommendations, ensuring that less severe corrective actions have been exhausted first.

Minor Offense. A key word in Article 15 is that the offense must be "minor," but the term "minor" can be misleading. A minor offense depends on multiple factors including the offender's age, rank, record, duty assignment, and experience. Ordinarily, a minor offense is an offense for which the maximum sentence imposable would not include dishonorable discharge or confinement for longer than 1 year.

Punishments Under Article 15. Under Article 15 of the UCMJ, if a military member is found guilty of an offense, the commander has the authority to administer such nonjudicial punishment actions as reduction in grade, forfeiture of pay, restriction to base, extra duty, or other punishment. The amount of punishment has limitations based upon the rank of both the commander and the offender. These non-judicial tools under Article 15 are an important corrective action which maintains effective and efficient good order and discipline within an organization.

Procedures. Imposing non-judicial punishment is simple and direct. The commander initially collects evidence, reviews the offender's unfavorable information file (UIF), if applicable, and personnel records, and consults with the base staff judge advocate (SJA). The SJA provides advice and guidance on the drafting of the allegations of misconduct, adequacy of the evidence in support of the action, and amount of punishment being imposed in similar cases. The SJA also assists in preparing the initial notification to the offender. This notification serves to inform members of their basic rights. Members are advised that the decision to accept non-judicial punishment is a serious matter that may adversely affect their careers. Although it won't create a court conviction record or go into a member's criminal record, it will remain a part of his/her permanent military records and may affect future opportunities for training, assignments, and promotions.

A member has certain rights when being offered an Article 15. The member has the right to demand a trial by court-martial in lieu of accepting the Article 15. Additionally, it is important for military members of all ranks to know of their right to consult the Area Defense Counsel (ADC) for legal advice prior to accepting nonjudicial punishment or demanding trial by court-martial.

Judicial Punishment

As mentioned earlier, the term "judicial" is "of or pertaining to the courts of justice." When we speak of judicial punishment, we mean punishment determined by a court-martial. There are three types of courts-martial: *summary, special, and general.*

Summary Court-Martial. A summary court-martial (SCM) tries minor offenses. In conducting the trial, the summary court-martial acts promptly. It normally consists of one officer who develops the evidence for both the accused and the government, finds the accused guilty or not guilty, and imposes sentence on the guilty. Air Force policy dictates provision of counsel to the accused, if requested. Like an Article 15, an accused can refuse to be tried by a summary court-martial and demand a trial before a special court-martial. If found guilty, however, the accused must bear the burden of a federal conviction and much higher punishment possibilities. Article 20, UCMJ, and paragraph 16b of the MCM expressly limit the summary court's power to punish offenders. The summary court-martial is for enlisted members only.

Special Court-Martial. A special court-martial (SPCM) normally tries offenses of intermediate severity. It usually consists of a military judge and panel of not less than three court members. (Enlisted accused may request that one-third of the panel consist of enlisted members.) The proceedings also include a military judge, trial counsel (prosecutor), defense counsel, the accused, and a court reporter to record the proceedings. The accused may make an oral or written request for trial by military judge alone and, if approved by the military judge, the court-members are excused. The military judge presides over the trial, instructing the court-members on the law, and ruling on motions and objections by the counsel. Air Force policy provides for a military judge on every special court-martial.

General Court-Martial. A general court-martial (GCM) tries the most serious offenses and is convened by a Numbered Air Force commander (or equivalent). Cases can't be referred for trial by general court-martial without a thorough investigation pursuant to Article 32 of the UCMJ, which is similar to a grand jury hearing but with greater rights for the accused. The general court-martial is composed of a military judge and not less than a five-member panel, which may include at least one-third enlisted members at the request of an enlisted accused. It also includes a military judge, trial counsel, defense counsel, the accused, and a court reporter. The accused may request trial by military judge alone, by oral or written application, except in a capital case. The maximum authorized punishment this court-martial may impose is limited only by the maximum allowable for the offenses under consideration. It may extend to death.

MILITARY LEGAL SUPPORT

Air Force bases have two servicing legal counsels to provide legal assistance to Air Force personnel: the Staff Judge Advocate (SJA) and Area Defense Counsel (ADC). Both the SJA and ADC are comprised of licensed attorneys, who are commissioned officers, and trained paralegals. The difference between the two offices is with who the two offices represent. The SJA is the commander's legal staff who represents the Air Force in all legal matters ranging from courts-martial to government procurement and environmental issues. The SJA also provides legal assistance to the military members at that base in areas such as wills, powers of attorneys, and civil matters, to name a few. The opposing counsel is the Area Defense Counsel (ADC), who represents all active duty Air Force personnel in criminal defense matters. The ADC's office and chain of command are separate from those of the Staff Judge Advocate, to avoid even the slightest perception that the commander or the Staff Judge Advocate could influence how the counsel represented their clients. Let's take a closer look at the roles and responsibilities of these two offices:

Staff Judge Advocate (SJA)

The Staff Judge Advocate (SJA) is the commander's lawyer at each Air Force base and runs the installation legal office. Most legal offices are divided into the following areas of responsibility:

Military Justice. This section prosecutes all courts-martial, gives legal advice to police investigators and commanders concerning criminal investigations, advises and assists the unit commanders with Article 15s and other administrative disciplinary actions, and reviews all of these procedures for completeness and legal sufficiency.

Claims. This section settles claims filed against the Government for such things as damage to household goods during PCS moves, damage to private property caused by the Air Force (such as damages caused by aircraft accidents), and medical malpractice. This office also files claims on behalf of the government against those who injure military members or their dependents (in order to recover hospital costs incurred by the Government) or who damage or destroy Government property.

Civil Law. This section provides notary service, wills and powers of attorneys, and provides legal assistance to all military members and their dependents, free of charge. This section also conducts legal reviews for commanders, ranging from government contracts and fiscal issues to environmental law issues. Most civil law sections conduct administrative discharge boards. Attorneys from the civil law section also spend a great deal of time on preventive law issues. During tax season, the civil law section helps military members fill out and file their tax returns. This is one busy section of the legal office!

Area Defense Counsel (ADC)

The Area Defense Counsel program was created in 1974 to "improve the credibility of the military justice system by removing any appearance that military defense counsels are constrained professionally because they're assigned to the command of the convening authority." Each Area Defense Counsel (ADC) office is a tenant unit on the installation and its chain of command runs through a Chief Circuit Defense Counsel to the Chief of Defense Services in Washington, D.C. Each Area Defense Counsel is selected by the Judge Advocate General, based on his/her legal experience and courtroom skills. The ADC provides legal advice and representation to military members under the following circumstances:

Criminal Investigation. When a military member becomes the subject of a criminal investigation and is called in for interrogation, he or she has the right to speak to a lawyer. The ADC will advise suspects of their rights and what actions they might take.

Letters of Reprimand. When a military member receives a letter of reprimand (LOR), the ADC can assist in preparing a response to the reprimand. Sometimes it can help the situation if the ADC talks to the commander on behalf of the member.

Article 15. The ADC will review the evidence and advise the member whether to accept the Article 15 or demand a trial by court-martial. The ADC can assist the member in preparing a presentation for the commander, including gathering statements from witnesses and helping write a statement from the member.

Administrative Demotions and Separations. The ADC will help prepare a response and presentation for a member facing an administrative separation or demotion. If the member is entitled to a board, the ADC will represent the member before the board.

Courts-Martial. The ADC will represent the accused before all courts-martial. They will investigate the charges, review the evidence and interview witnesses, and then prepare the defense that will be presented at trial. They will advise the accused of their rights and help them in making important decisions, such as whether to plead guilty or not guilty, and whether they should testify at trial.

> **"I sometimes wish that people would put a little more emphasis upon the observance of the law than they do upon its enforcement."**
>
> **—Calvin Coolidge**

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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
AIR UNIVERSITY (AETC)

DATE

MEMORANDUM FOR INDIVIDUAL'S RANK NAME

FROM: OFFICE SYMBOL OR RANK NAME

SUBJECT: Letter of Counseling/Reprimand

1. An investigation has disclosed that you, (insert misconduct). Your conduct violated the Uniform Code of Military Justice, Articles xx and xx

2. Explain the misconduct. Use separate paragraphs for different misconduct.

3. You are hereby counseled/reprimanded! Insert counseling/reprimand language. The language should be tailored to the individual and the act.

4. The following information required by the Privacy Act is provided for your information. **AUTHORITY**: 10 U.S.C. 8013. **PURPOSE**: To obtain comments or documents you desire to submit (on a voluntary basis) for consideration concerning this action. **ROUTINE USES**: Provides you an opportunity to submit comments or documents for consideration. If provided, the comments and documents you submit become part of this action. **DISCLOSURE**: Your written acknowledgement of receipt and signature are mandatory. Any other comments or documents you provide are voluntary.

5. You will acknowledge receipt of this letter immediately by signing below. Any comments or documents you wish to be considered concerning this Letter of Counseling/Reprimand must be submitted to me within three (3) duty days from receipt of this letter. Any requests for additional time must be approved by me prior to the due date/time for your response.

YOUR NAME, Rank, USAF
Duty Title

1st Ind, RANK NAME   Date:
_____

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

Receipt of this letter acknowledged on _____ at _____ hours. I have reviewed the allegations contained in this Letter of Counseling/Reprimand. I understand

that I have three (3) duty days from receipt of this letter to provide a response, and that I must include in my response any comments or documents I wish to be considered concerning this letter. I understand that this Letter of Counseling/Reprimand, if upheld, will be included in my Personal Information File (PIF) and/or my Unfavorable Information File (UIF). I understand that I may consult the Area Defense Counsel in this matter.

NAME, Rank, USAF
Duty Title

2nd Ind, RANK/NAME   Date: _____

I have reviewed the allegation(s) contained in this letter.

_____ (initial) I am submitting the attached documents in response.

_____ (initial) I hereby waive my right to respond.

NAME, Rank, USAF
Duty Title

3rd Ind, OFFICE SYMBOL or RANK NAME

_____ (initial) The member did not submit matters in response. My decision stands and (will) (will not) be filed in the member's (PIF) (UIF).

_____ (initial) The member submitted matters in response. I have reviewed the response. My final decision is: this letter stands as written and (will) (will not) be filed in the member's (PIF) (UIF).

_____ (initial) The member submitted matters in response. I have reviewed the response. My final decision is: this letter is withdrawn.

YOUR NAME, Rank, USAF
Duty Title

4th Ind, RANK/NAME

ACKNOWLEDGMENT

Final action acknowledged on _____ at _____ hours.

NAME, Rank, USAF
Duty Title

Military Justice Case Studies

Activity Statement:
- Determine what military justice and discipline problems exist and the appropriate action for an officer to take based on selected case studies.

Affective Lesson Objective:
- Respond to an officer's responsibility in military justice situations.

Affective Sample of Behavior:
- Participate in case study discussion.

MILITARY JUSTICE CASE STUDIES

You'll now apply what you've learned in the preceding military justice lesson. During this class, we'll discuss genuine problem situations involving military law. Analyze these problems and recommend appropriate actions. Use this student reader for reference purposes during the seminar.

Case Study #1

Your commander goes on leave and you're placed on orders to assume a command for the first time. That weekend, you get a phone call that awakens you at 0130. You answer and hear this very excited voice:

"Sir/Ma'am, this is SSgt Smith at the Security Forces law enforcement desk. Sorry to wake you up, but we have a problem with one of your people. We responded to an emergency call from an individual who stated that he had been threatened with a knife. Amn Wilson, his military working dog, and I responded; when we got there, we chased the suspect halfway across the base and into the dormitory. The suspect refused to come out. I told him to come out or we'd send in the military working dog. He eventually came out and we apprehended, searched, and handcuffed him. We identified him as A1C Charles Green from your unit. We were unable to find the knife. I asked him where the knife was but he wouldn't say anything. I asked him for consent to search his room for the knife, but he said he wasn't going to say anything until he got a lawyer. Sir/Ma'am, we want your permission to search his room."

You ask SSgt Smith, "What's the building and room number they want to search?"

"Just a second, sir/ma'am," SSgt Smith says. You hear SSgt Smith say, "Hey, Amn Wilson, make sure your dog is keeping a good eye on Green." "Green, your commander wants to know your room number so we can search it." After a minute, SSgt Smith returns to the line and says, "Excuse me, sir/ma'am, Green just said he did it and he'll let us search his room, so we don't need your permission. I'll let you get back to bed. Sorry for waking you." (Click)

Is what ensued legal? What actions should you take?

Case Study #2

You supervise 12 enlisted personnel and one civilian. Thursday morning, you notice A1C Johnson came to work 25 minutes late. His supervisor later tells you that when he counseled A1C Johnson, the Airman exploded. His outburst went something like this:

"YOU'RE PICKING ON ME! ALL OF YOU ARE PICKING ON ME! YOU KNOW IT, TOO! Sergeant Ahern was 15 minutes late yesterday, but you never said a thing because she's a woman! The chief was late Monday and you never said anything either! The only reason you're throwing this at me now is because I'm black!"

At that point, he stopped shaking his fist in the supervisor's face and stormed out of the office. He slammed the door hard, causing a glass window to shatter.

What offenses has A1C Johnson committed? What actions should you take?

Case Study #3

It's Friday afternoon and you are at the squadron's TGIF party. You've had five beers, maybe more. As you are driving home, you are stopped by a security forces (SF) member. He asks to see your military identification card and your driver's license. You reply with slurred speech, "I didn't do anything wrong!"

"Sir/Ma'am," says the SF member, "I have reason to believe you are impaired. I need you to step out of the vehicle. Do you consent to a field sobriety test?"

"I can pass any test, pig. Let me show you!" You stagger and start to fall. The security forces member grabs you to prevent your fall. "Leave me alone," you say, and you try to hit him

What offenses have you committed? Should you have been apprehended by the security forces member? Explain.

Case Study #4

As an aircraft maintenance officer, you visit the flight line late one evening to check on the program. Your NCOIC of the night shift can't be found on the flight line. You notice an unattended truck is parked too close to one of the aircraft—a safety violation. When you walk into the maintenance office, you find several aircraft mechanics lying on the floor asleep. After waking them up, you tell one of them to move the truck. One of the mechanics acts extremely disgruntled and replies, "You have a driver's license, you can move it just as easily as we can."

What offenses have been committed? What actions should you take?

Case Study #5

You're counseling a Senior Airman who has encountered financial problems. During the conversation, she tells you she recently took $200 from a fellow Airman's room in the dormitory. You solicit further details and then place the senior Airman under apprehension, confine him to the dormitory, and initiate an investigation.

Was this the correct action to take? Explain.

Case Study #6

You receive an email that one of your subordinates, A1C Otto, did not show up for her dental appointment, a mandatory appointment. This is the second time in two months that this happened. She received a verbal warning on the first offense.

What actions should you take for A1C Otto's repeated failure to go to a mandatory appointment? If A1C Otto continues to fail to keep mandatory appointments and is facing adverse action by the Air Force, where can she go to receive council?

Case Study #7—*Air National Guard Scenario*

2d Lt Simpson is an Air National Guardsman whose guard installation is co-located on an active duty installation. During a drill weekend, one of her subordinates, SSgt Lewis, does not return from lunch. 2d Lt Simpson asks around the shop to find out if anyone has seen him. One of her Airmen tells her that he thinks he saw SSgt Lewis being detained by an employee at the Base Exchange but was not sure what was going on. Soon after, 2d Lt Simpson gets a phone call from security forces informing her that SSgt Lewis was caught shoplifting.

What actions should follow?

Case Study #8—*Air National Guard Scenario*

TSgt Johnson, a member of the Alabama Air National Guard, is deployed to Afghanistan to assist the communications squadron in building up the network infrastructure. One evening, after a long day of installing cable, TSgt Johnson decides to join some of his squadron mates in a card game. One of his teammates brings some alcohol that he received in a care package. Alcohol is strictly prohibited at this deployed location, but TSgt Johnson and his teammates have a few drinks anyway, violating Article 92 of the UCMJ, *Failure to Obey.* A few days later, the squadron's leadership becomes aware of the fact that alcohol was consumed at this card game.

What organizations and individuals will have a part in handling this situation? What roles do they have?

The Code of Conduct

Cognitive Lesson Objective:
- Comprehend the principles of the Code of Conduct.

Cognitive Samples of Behavior:
- Distinguish correct courses of action in accordance with each article of the Code of Conduct.

- Summarize the interrelation of the Core Values and the Code of Conduct.

Affective Lesson Objective:
- Respond to the value of the Code of Conduct to you as an Air Force Officer.

Affective Samples of Behavior:
- Voluntarily discuss the value of the Code of Conduct.

- Voluntarily discuss correct courses of action in accordance with the Code of Conduct.

"SIJAN! MY NAME IS LANCE PETER SIJAN!"

These words are immortalized in the book, *Into the Mouth of the Cat* by Malcolm McConnell. These words resonate with anyone familiar with Captain Lance Sijan, an F-4C pilot who was shot down on 9 Nov 1967 while on a mission over North Vietnam. Despite serious injuries, he survived the crash of his F-4 and evaded capture for 45 days. Even with a compound fracture in his leg, a skull fracture, and a mangled right hand, he overpowered one of his guards and escaped shortly after his initial capture. Upon his recapture, Captain Sijan was repeatedly tortured. His fellow POWs witnessed his commitment to the Code of Conduct in his refusal to disclose any information, and his near unbelievable continuing attempts to escape despite his worsening medical condition. "I'm not going to tell you. It's against the Code," became Captain Sijan's mantra, as reported by his fellow POW Colonel Bob Craner. Captain Sijan would later become the first graduate of the United States Air Force Academy to receive the Medal of Honor, posthumously awarded to his parents in 1976.

With Captain Sijan's extraordinary leadership and moral courage above and beyond the call of duty in mind, let us now look at the Code of Conduct. This Code of Conduct—which applies to all military members whether in combat, captivity, or any other circumstance—has stood the test of time and war since 1955 when the President signed Executive Order 10631 into law proclaiming an official Code of Conduct for members of the US Armed Forces. That is not to say that the Code has not been revised or changed to reflect emerging trends in warfare. For example, the Code was made gender-neutral by President Reagan to reflect our more diverse fighting force. A more substantial change occurred in 1977 by President Carter's Executive Order 12017. This change is fairly significant and warrants brief discussion here.

One of the reasons a Presidential Commission was appointed in 1976 to evaluate whether there was a need to revise the code stemmed from the implicit legal requirement in the original Article V: "When questioned, should I become a prisoner of war, I am bound to only give name, rank, service number, and date of birth." Instead of being a moral or ethical guide, this seemed to have the weight of law. Military members were ordered to resist capture at all costs and if captured, to attempt escape; to give the enemy no information than what was explicitly allowed in Article V; to obey the orders of senior officers; to accept no favors from the enemy; and to make no written or oral statements disloyal to the United States. Failure to strictly adhere to this could result in disciplinary action.

But American POW experiences in Korea and Vietnam proved that we had entered a new type of warfare, one in which our enemy felt no obligation to honor the humane constraints of the Geneva Convention. Our POWs may very well be subjected to extreme coercion beyond any reasonable ability to resist. Following the war in Vietnam, we learned that many POWs truly anguished over how to handle interrogations in light of the Code. Must

they strictly adhere to it as long as physically and mentally possible, or could they offer up misinformation to secure a cessation of torture? Many suffered unbearable guilt because they had "cracked" under torture and had given more than what Article V allowed.

Moreover, what happens if in obeying one provision of the Code means that you have to disobey another provision? Arguably the best example of this lies with what happened to Captain John Dramesi. In April 1967, while on a bombing mission in North Vietnam, Captain Dramesi's aircraft was shot down and he was immediately captured. Despite his injuries, he managed to escape but was quickly recaptured and punished for the attempt. This did not deter him and in May 1969, he and another POW, Edwin Atterberry, again attempted escape. Within 12 hours, they were recaptured. As punishment for the escape attempt, Captain Dramesi was repeatedly tortured for days on end, denied sleep, and put on a bread and water diet for 30 days. But the North Vietnamese did not punish Dramesi and Atterberry alone; they also punished the entire POW camp populace. Afterwards, the senior officers outlawed further escape attempts. This created a significant dilemma. The Code directs you to make every effort to escape and yet equally requires you to obey the lawful orders of your superiors. Can a senior officer order a modification to the Code in order to ensure the survival of fellow prisoners? Regardless of how conflicted POWs may have been about this, it became clear that it was impossible to follow the Code literally under the given circumstances.

The result of the Vietnam War, as reflected in the new 1977 Code of Conduct, was a more realistic guide for how one should handle oneself if faced with captivity. It released the POW from the "die before you talk" mentality that caused so much shame and guilt to those prisoners who were unable to withstand the dehumanizing and brutal torture of their captors. Article V was changed to reflect our understanding of this new era of warfare. The word "bound" was changed to "required," and the word "only" was deleted. This then changes the Code from one of implicit legal requirement to one of a more structured, ethical guide that can give a POW strength without shame, a path to follow without guilt. As a Navy spokesman explained, "The feeling was to make [the Code of Conduct] more reasonable. You can only take so much... They don't expect you to be a superman, or superwoman, or superhuman."

Ultimately, as stated in *Taking Command,* "Like any soldier, each leader must adhere to the moral obligations prescribed by the Code. In addition, the leader is responsible for training his/her [troops] to do likewise. He/she manages and inspires his/her subordinates in a manner that maximizes their opportunity to abide by the Code. Therefore, a leader must understand fully the details of the Code, its purposes, and underlying principles."

CODE OF THE US FIGHTING FORCE

As a member of the Armed Forces of the United States, you're protecting our nation. It's your duty to oppose all enemies of the United States in combat or, if a captive, in a prisoner of war compound. Your behavior is guided by the Code of Conduct, which has evolved from the heroic lives, experiences, and deeds of Americans from the Revolutionary War through our combat operations in Operation Iraqi Freedom.

Your obligations as a US citizen and a member of the Armed Forces stem from the traditional values underlying the American experience as a nation. These values are best expressed in the US Constitution and Bill of Rights, which you've sworn to uphold and defend. You would have these obligations—to your country, your service and unit, and your fellow Americans—even if the Code of Conduct had never been formulated as a high standard of general behavior.

Just as you have a responsibility to your country under the Code of Conduct, the United States government has an equal responsibility: to always keep faith in you and stand by you as you fight for your country. If you're unfortunate enough to become a prisoner of war, you should know that your government will care for your dependents and will never forget you. Furthermore, the government will use every reasonable means to contact, support, and gain release for you and for other prisoners of war.

To live up to the Code, you must not only know its words but the ideas and principles behind those words. What follows below is an extract from Department of the Army Pamphlet 360-512, which contains the Code, an explanation of its principles, and a statement of the standards expected of you. You will also find woven into the Code, Captain Sijan's story as he remains one of the best examples of an Airman Warrior who lived and ultimately died by the Code of Conduct.

The Code of Conduct is an ethical guide. Its six articles deal with your chief concerns as an American in combat; these concerns become critical when you must evade capture, resist while a prisoner, interact with fellow prisoners, or escape from the enemy.

Although the Code of Conduct applies to all military personnel, there are special allowances made for medical personnel and chaplains, often referred to as retained personnel. These allowances apply for specific Articles and enable these personnel to better execute their unique, specialized duties.

Experiences of captured Americans reveal that to survive captivity honorably demands great courage, deep dedication and high motivation. To sustain these personal values throughout captivity requires that you understand and believe strongly in our free and democratic institutions, love your country, trust in the justice of our cause, keep faithful and loyal to your fellow prisoners, and hold firmly to your religious and moral beliefs in time of trial. Your courage, dedication and motivation supported by understanding, trust and fidelity will help you endure the terrors of captivity, and return to your family, home and nation with honor and pride.

Article I

I am an American, fighting in the forces which guard my country and our way of life. I am prepared to give my life in their defense.

All men and women in the Armed Forces have the duty at all times and under all circumstances to oppose the enemies of the United States and support its national interests. In training or in combat, alone or with others, while evading capture or enduring captivity, this duty belongs to each American defending our nation regardless of circumstances.

If the captors allow medical personnel and chaplains to perform their professional duties, these personnel may exercise a degree of flexibility concerning some of the specific provisions of the Code of Conduct to perform their professional duties. The degree of flexibility can only be employed if it's in the best interests of the medical and spiritual needs of their fellow military service members and their country. Like all members of the armed forces, medical personnel and chaplains are accountable for all of their actions.

Captain Sijan's harrowing journey into the Code of Conduct began in Nov. 1967 when his F-4, piloted by Colonel John W. Armstrong, was hit while on a bombing pass over North Vietnam near Laos. Although Colonel Armstrong was never heard from again, contact was made with Captain Sijan who became known as "AWOL 1." More than 120 aircraft participated in the enormous search-and-rescue effort to recover him and Colonel Armstrong.

The rescue effort was taking heavy ground fire from all directions and there was considerable concern that laying down suppressive fire would hit Captain Sijan. While the rescue crews worried about Captain Sijan's condition, he worried about the safety of the pararescue personnel. Captain Sijan knew he was surrounded by the enemy and knew that anyone coming down to rescue him was placing their own life in considerable jeopardy. The enemy would love nothing better than to capture two for the price of one. For this reason, with Jolly Green 15, an HH-3E helicopter, hovering overhead nearby, Captain Sijan waved off the pararescueman and said, "I see you, I see you. Stay where you are. I'm coming to you!"

Captain Sijan never made it to Jolly Green 15's position.

Article II

I will never surrender of my own free will. If in command, I will never surrender the members of my command while they still have the means to resist.

As an individual, a member of the armed forces may never voluntarily surrender. When isolated and no longer able to inflict casualties on the enemy, the American soldier has an obligation to evade capture and rejoin friendly forces.

It is the responsibility of every military member to evade capture as long as it is reasonable to do so, and even in the most difficult of times, men and women throughout warfare have found the strength and courage to do this. Take, for example, the remarkable courage of Captain Bill Andrews, a F-16 pilot shot down approximately 30 miles northwest of Basra, Iraq, on 27 February 1991. Not only did he evade capture for a time, he also provided an area description and direction to his flight. He made numerous threat calls and directed members of his flight to execute a break turn and initiate decoy flares in response to surface-to-air missile launches. In these instances, the pilots indicated that they would have suffered direct hits had Captain Andrews not made the threat calls from the ground. Captain Andrews provided this life saving support while injured, exposed in the open, and while being fired upon by enemy forces. He managed to avoid capture for several hours, but was eventually captured by Iraqi forces; he was released on 6 March 1991 along with several others.

In the case of Captain Sijan, he found himself gravely injured, alone, and in desperate need of food and water. He managed through courage and willpower alone to evade the enemy and capture for 45 days as he painfully, day by day, dragged himself along the ground towards what he hoped would be freedom. Former Captain Guy Gruers, one of Captain Sijan's later cell mates, reports that, "He said he'd go for two or three days and nights—as long as possibly could—and then he'd be exhausted and sleep. As soon as he'd wake up, he'd start again, always traveling east."

Ultimately, only when evasion by an individual is impossible and further fighting would lead only to death with no significant loss to the enemy should one consider surrender. With all reasonable means of resistance exhausted and with certain death the only alternative, capture doesn't imply dishonor.

The responsibility and authority of a commander never extends to the surrender of a command to the enemy while the command has the power to fight and evade. When isolated, cut off, or surrounded, a unit must continue to fight until relieved or able to rejoin friendly forces through continued efforts to break out or evade the enemy.

Article III

If I am captured I will continue to resist by all means available. I will make every effort to escape and aid others to escape. I will accept neither parole nor special favors from the enemy.

The duty of a member of the armed forces to use all means available to resist the enemy isn't lessened by the misfortune of captivity. A POW is still legally bound by the Uniform Code of Military Justice and ethically guided by the Code of Conduct. Consider, for example, Captain Sijan's continued efforts to escape while in captivity. As Colonel Craner asserts, Captain Sijan never gave up on the idea of escape in all the days they were held captive together. "In fact, that was one of the first things he mentioned when we first went into his cell at Vinh: 'How are we going to get out of here? Have you guys figured out how

we're going to take care of these people? Do you think we can steal one of their guns?…' Even later, he kept dwelling on the fact that he'd made it once and he was going to make it again."

Under the provisions of the Geneva Convention, a prisoner of war is also subject to certain rules imposed by the captor nation. When repatriated, a prisoner of war won't be condemned for having obeyed reasonable captor rules, such as daily chores or sanitation regulations. The duty of a member of the armed forces to continue to resist doesn't mean a prisoner should engage in unreasonable harassment as a form of resistance. Retaliation by captors to the detriment of that prisoner and other prisoners is frequently the primary result of such harassment.

The Geneva Convention recognizes that a POW may have the duty to attempt escape. In fact, the Geneva Convention prohibits a captor nation from executing a POW simply for attempting escape. Under the authority of the senior official, often called the senior ranking officer, or "SRO," a POW must be prepared to escape whenever the opportunity presents itself. In a POW compound, the senior POW must consider the welfare of those remaining behind after an escape. However, as a matter of conscious determination, a POW must plan to escape, try to escape, and assist others to escape.

Contrary to the spirit of the Geneva Convention, enemies engaged by US forces since 1950 have regarded the POW compound as an extension of the battlefield. In doing so, they've used a variety of tactics and pressures, including physical and mental mistreatment, torture and medical neglect to exploit POWs for propaganda purposes, to obtain military information, or to undermine POW organization, communication, and resistance.

Such enemies have attempted to lure American POWs into accepting special favors or privileges in exchange for statements, acts, or information. American POWs must neither seek nor accept special favors or privileges.

One such privilege is called parole. Parole is a promise by a prisoner of war to a captor to fulfill certain conditions—such as agreeing not to escape nor to fight again once released—in return for such favors as relief from physical bondage, improved food and living conditions, or repatriation ahead of the sick, injured, or longer-held prisoners. The United States does not authorize any service member to sign or enter into any such parole agreement

Under the Geneva Conventions, medical personnel and chaplains who fall into the hands of the enemy are entitled to be considered "retained personnel" and are not to be considered prisoners of war. The enemy is required by the Conventions to allow such persons to continue to perform their medical or religious duties, preferably for POWs of their own country. When the services of these "retained personnel" are no longer needed for these duties, the enemy is obligated to return them to their own forces.

- The medical personnel and chaplains of the US Armed Forces who fall into the hands of the enemy must assert their rights as "retained personnel" to perform their medical and religious duties for the benefit of the POWs and must take every opportunity to do so.

- If the captor permits medical personnel and chaplains to perform their professional functions for the welfare of the POW community, special latitude is authorized for these personnel under the Code of Conduct as it applies to escape.

- Medical personnel and chaplains don't, as individuals, have a duty to escape or to actively aid others in escaping as long as they are treated as "retained personnel" by the enemy. However, US experience since 1949, when the Geneva Conventions were written, reflects no compliance by captors of US personnel with these provisions of the Conventions. American medical and chaplain personnel must be prepared to be subjected to the same treatment as other American prisoners of war.

- In the event the captor doesn't permit medical personnel and chaplains to perform their professional functions, they're considered identical to all other POWs with respect to their responsibilities under the Code of Conduct. Under no circumstances will the latitude granted medical personnel and chaplains be interpreted to authorize any actions or conduct detrimental to the POWs or the interest of the United States.

Article IV

If I become a prisoner of war, I will keep faith with my fellow prisoners. I will give no information nor take part in any action which might be harmful to my comrades. If I am senior, I will take command. If not, I will obey the lawful orders of those appointed over me and will back them up in every way.

Informing, or any other action to the detriment of a fellow prisoner, is despicable and is expressly forbidden. Prisoners of war must avoid helping the enemy identify fellow prisoners who may have knowledge of particular value to the enemy and who may, therefore, be made to suffer coercive interrogation.

Strong leadership and communication are essential to discipline. Discipline is the key to camp organization, resistance, and even survival. Personal hygiene, camp sanitation, and care of sick and wounded are imperative. Officers and noncommissioned officers of the United States must continue to carry out their responsibilities and exercise their authority in captivity. The senior, regardless of service, must accept command. This responsibility, and accountability, may not be evaded.

If the senior is incapacitated or is otherwise unable to act, the next senior person will assume command. Camp leaders should make every effort to inform all POWs of the chain of command and try to represent them in dealing with enemy authorities. The responsibility of subordinates to obey the lawful orders of ranking American military personnel remains unchanged in captivity.

Medical personnel are generally prohibited from assuming command over non-medical personnel and chaplains are generally prohibited from assuming command over military personnel of any branch. Military Service regulations which restrict eligibility of these personnel for command will be explained to personnel of all Services at an

appropriate level of understanding to preclude later confusion in a POW camp. The Geneva Convention Relative to Treatment of Prisoners of War provides for election of a "prisoners' representative" in POW camps containing enlisted personnel, but no commissioned officers. American POWs should understand that such a representative is only a spokesman for the actual senior ranking person. Should the enemy appoint a POW chain of command for its own purposes, American POWs should make all efforts to adhere to the principles of Article IV.

As with other provisions of this Code, common sense and the conditions of captivity will affect the way in which the senior person and the other POWs organize to carry out their responsibilities. What is important is that everyone support and work within the POW organization.

Article V

When questioned, should I become a prisoner of war, I am required to give name, rank, service number, and date of birth. I will evade answering further questions to the utmost of my ability. I will make no oral or written statements disloyal to my country and its allies or harmful to their cause.

When questioned, a prisoner of war is required by the Geneva Convention and this Code to give name, rank, service number (social security number), and date of birth. The prisoner should make every effort to avoid giving the captor any additional information. The prisoner may communicate with captors on matters of health and welfare and additionally may write letters home and fill out a Geneva Convention "capture card."

This Article and its explanation also apply to medical personnel and chaplains ("retained personnel"). They're required to communicate with the captor in connection with their professional responsibilities, subject to the restraints discussed in Article I and VI.

It's a violation of the Geneva Convention to place a prisoner under physical or mental duress, torture, or any other form of coercion in an effort to secure information. If under such intense coercion, a POW discloses unauthorized information, makes an unauthorized statement, or performs an unauthorized act, that prisoner's peace of mind and survival require a quick recovery of courage, dedication, and motivation to resist anew each subsequent coercion.

Actions every POW should resist include making oral or written confessions and apologies, answering questionnaires, providing personal histories, creating propaganda recordings, broadcasting appeals to other prisoners of war, providing any other material readily usable for propaganda purposes, appealing for surrender or parole, furnishing self-criticisms, communicating on behalf of the enemy to the detriment of the United States, its allies, or its armed forces.

Every POW should also recognize that any confession signed or any statement made may be used by the enemy as false evidence that the person is a "war criminal" rather than a prisoner of war. Several countries have made reservations to the Geneva Convention in which they assert that a "war criminal" conviction deprives the convicted individual of prisoner of war status, removes that person from protection under the Geneva Convention, and revokes all rights to repatriation until a prison sentence is served.

Experiences of American prisoners of war have proved that, although enemy interrogation sessions may be harsh and cruel, one can resist brutal mistreatment when the will to resist remains intact. The testimony of Captain Sijan's fellow POW, Colonel Bob Craner, illustrates this:

> "As best as I can recall, it was New Year's Day of 1968 when they brought this guy in at night. The Rodent [a prison guard] came into the guy's cell next to mine and began his interrogation. It was clearly audible. He was on this guy for military information, and the responses I heard indicated he [Sijan] was in very, very bad shape. His voice was very weak. It sounded to me as though he wasn't going to make it. The Rodent would say, 'Your arm, your arm, it is very bad. I am going to twist it unless you tell me.' The guy would say, 'I'm not going to tell you; it's against the Code.' Then he would start screaming... The guy wouldn't give in. He'd say, 'Wait till I get better, you're really going to get it.' Finally, I heard this guy rasp, 'Sijan! My name is Lance Peter Sijan!' That's all he told him."

Ultimately, the best way for a prisoner to keep faith with country, fellow prisoners and self is to provide the enemy with as little information as possible.

Article VI

I will never forget that I am an American, fighting for freedom, responsible for my actions, and dedicated to the principles which made my country free. I will trust in my God and in the United States of America.

A member of the armed forces remains responsible for personal actions at all times. A member of the armed forces who is captured has a continuing obligation to resist and to remain loyal to country, service, unit, and fellow prisoners.

Upon repatriation, POWs can expect their actions to be reviewed; both as to circumstances of capture and conduct during detention. The purpose of such review is to recognize meritorious performance, as well as to investigate possible misconduct. Each review will be conducted with due regard for the right of the individual and consideration for the conditions of captivity; for captivity, of itself isn't a condition of deserving blame.

Members of the armed forces should remember that they and their dependents will be taken care of by the appropriate service and that pay and allowances, eligibility and procedures for promotion, and benefits for dependents continue while the service member is detained. Service members should assure that their personal affairs and family matters

(such as pay, powers of attorney, current will, and provisions for family maintenance and education) are properly and currently arranged. Failure to arrange matters can create a serious sense of guilt for a POW and place unnecessary hardship on family members.

The life of a prisoner of war is hard. Each person in this stressful situation must always sustain hope, must resist enemy indoctrination. Prisoners of war standing firm and united against the enemy will support and inspire one another in surviving their ordeal and in prevailing over misfortune with honor.

We have to wonder at how Captain Sijan—alone, brutalized, sick, starving, and wounded—could have accomplished what he did. He evaded capture, escaped, withstood dehumanizing and excruciating torture, and inspired his fellow POWs to continue fighting. His father once said that it was his son's love for his home and his competitive spirit that carried him through his ordeal in Vietnam. "What made Lance do what he did? One thing, for sure. He always wanted to come home whether it was in pieces or as a hero."

GUIDANCE FOR PEACETIME CAPTIVITY

While the Code of Conduct is a moral guide designed to assist military personnel in combat or those being held prisoners of war, it also has bearing on those personnel who may find themselves isolated from US control in peacetime, or in a situation not related specifically in the Code of Conduct. Specifically, there are two Articles—Article III and Article V—that require modification to provide guidance for peacetime captivity. Please note that not all Articles of the Code of Conduct are listed below; only those that require modification for peacetime captivity are listed.

US military personnel, because of their wide range of activities, are subject to peacetime detention by unfriendly governments or captivity by terrorist groups. This guidance seeks to help US military personnel survive these situations with honor and doesn't constitute a means for judgment or replace the UCMJ as a vehicle for enforcement of proper conduct. This guidance, although exactly the same as the Code of Conduct in some areas, applies only during peacetime. The term "peacetime" means that armed conflict doesn't exist, or where armed conflict does exist but the United States isn't involved directly.

US military personnel, whether detainees or captives, can be assured that the US government will make every good faith effort to obtain their earliest release. Faith in one's country and its way of life, faith in fellow detainees or captives, and faith in one's self are critical to surviving with honor and resisting exploitation. Resisting exploitation and having faith in these areas are the responsibility of all Americans. On the other hand, the destruction of such faith must be the assumed goal of all captors determined to maximize their gains from a detention or captive situation.

Regardless of the type of detention or captivity, or harshness of treatment, US military personnel will maintain their military bearing. They should make every effort to remain calm, courteous, and project personal dignity. Discourteous, unmilitary behavior seldom serves the long-term interest of the detainee, captive, or hostage. Such behavior, in some situations, can jeopardize survival and severely complicate efforts to gain release of the detained, captured, or hostage-held military member.

Capture by terrorists is generally the least predictable and structured form of peacetime captivity. The captor qualifies as an international criminal. The possible forms of captivity vary from spontaneous hijacking to a carefully planned kidnapping. In such captivities, hostages play a greater role in determining their own fate since the terrorists in many instances expect or receive no rewards for providing good treatment or releasing victims unharmed.

If assigned in or traveling through areas of known terrorist activity, US military personnel shall exercise prudent antiterrorism measures to reduce their vulnerability to capture. During the process of capture and initial internment, they should remain calm and courteous, since most casualties among hostages occur during this phase.

For peacetime detention:

- YOU are subject to the laws of the country where you are abducted

- AVOID aggressive, combative, or illegal behavior

- REQUEST embassy, allied, or neutral representatives

- YOU ARE NOT protected under Geneva Accords

Article III

If I am captured I will continue to resist by all means available. I will make every effort to escape and aid others to escape. I will accept neither parole nor special favors from the enemy.

- Escape attempts will be made only after careful consideration of the risk of violence, chance of success, and detrimental effects on detainees remaining behind. Jailbreak in most countries is a crime; escape attempts provide the detainer with further justification to prolong detention by charging additional violations of its criminal or civil law and result in bodily harm or even death to the detainee.

- US military personnel must keep faith with their fellow hostages and conduct themselves according to the guidelines of this enclosure. Hostages and kidnap victims who consider escape to be their only hope are authorized to make such attempts. Each situation will be different and the hostage must weigh carefully every aspect of the decision before he/she attempts to escape.

- Accept release unless doing so compromises individual honor or causes damage to the United States or its allies. Persons in charge of US military detained personnel will authorize release under almost all circumstances.

Article V

When questioned, should I become a prisoner of war, I am required to give name, rank, service number, and date of birth. I will evade answering further questions to the utmost of my ability. I will make no oral or written statements disloyal to my country and its allies or harmful to their causes.

- Provide name, rank, social security number, date of birth and innocent circumstances leading to detention. Discussions should be limited to and revolve around health and welfare matters, conditions of fellow detainees, and going home.

- Surviving in some terrorist detentions may depend on hostages conveying a personal dignity and apparent sincerity to the captors. Hostages, therefore, may discuss nonsubstantive topics such as sports, family, and clothing, to convey to the terrorists the captive's personal dignity and human qualities.

- The hostage will make every effort to avoid embarrassing the United States and the host government. The purpose of this dialogue is for the hostage to become a "person" in the captor's eyes, rather than a mere symbol of his or her ideological hatred. Such a dialogue should also strengthen the hostage's determination to survive and resist. A hostage may also listen actively to the terrorist's feeling about his or her cause to support the hostage's desire to be a "person" to the terrorist; however, he or she should never pander, praise, participate, or debate the terrorist's cause with him or her.

Summary

The responsibilities of a leader during combat are no different from the responsibilities in any other situation, for example, one must effectively lead a unit in the accomplishment of its mission. The Code of Conduct is a formalization of the unwritten creed that American fighting men and women who have dedicated themselves to since the birth of our nation. It is a professional code of moral conduct based upon human freedoms and dignity. The Code of Conduct fits the very nature of a free man who holds firm convictions. As well as the soldier lives by the Code, it will serve him in turn."

We can stop to consider what we would do in certain situations, but we cannot predict with any certainty the situations we will be thrust into during our service in the military. For this reason, we need to have a foundation of traditions, character, and spirit to build on. We have to know our Core Values and how they relate to demonstrating a warrior ethos. We have to understand how we as Airman Warriors, in answering our nation's call, execute our profession of arms. We have to understand, internalize, and live our Airman's Creed. Through this, we can find strength in our warrior ethos and can adhere to the Code

of Conduct in even the most trying of times. Adhering to our warrior ethos and the Code of Conduct forges a bond that ties you and all other military members together in strength, fidelity, and honor.

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USEUCOM Area of Responsibility

Activity Statement:

- Deliver briefings and participate in discussions about various aspects of culture and US interests in the United States European Command (USEUCOM) area of responsibility (AOR).

Affective Lesson Objective:

- Respond to the importance of Air Force officers understanding US national security concerns in the AOR, regional cultural perspectives, and the Combatant Command's mission in the AOR.

Affective Samples of Behavior:

- Voluntarily discuss US national security concerns in the USEUCOM AOR.

- Value that an understanding of regional cultural perspectives is key to relating and communicating with partners in the USEUCOM AOR.

- Assert the importance of the Combatant Command's mission in light of US national security concerns in the USEUCOM AOR.

OVERVIEW OF UNITED STATES

EUROPEAN COMMAND

(USEUCOM) AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY

For several years after World War II the services maintained separate commands in Europe that reported directly to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, but America's rapid post-war demobilization, followed by the end of the occupation of Germany in 1949, led many to question the US commitment to the defense of Western Europe against the Soviet Union. The period saw a sense of looming crisis in the West about how to provide for the common defense, especially after the Berlin Crisis of 1948-49, when the Soviet Union blocked access to the divided city and the United States and United Kingdom responded with an unprecedented airlift. In 1949 the allies established the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), but did little else to meet their new commitments.

In June 1950 the United States and its allies were jolted into action by the surprise attack on South Korea by communist North Korea. Early in 1951 NATO established Allied Command Europe and the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE). General Dwight D. Eisenhower was called from retirement to become the first Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR). The United States continued to defend Korea, but simultaneously sent massive reinforcements to Europe to deter the Soviet Union from similar aggression there.

To provide for national command within NATO and to help control this build-up of forces, General Eisenhower proposed a separate command for all US forces in Europe. USEUCOM was established on 1 August 1952 to provide "unified command and authority" over all US forces in Europe. Because the senior US commander would continue as Supreme Allied Commander Europe, Eisenhower recommended giving "a maximum of delegated authority" to a four-star deputy. The first US Commander-in-Chief Europe (USCINCEUR) was General Matthew B. Ridgway, former commander of Eighth Army and the Far East Command during the Korean War. Eisenhower returned to the United States just as the new command was established.

USEUCOM prepared plans for the defense of Western Europe within the NATO framework against the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact and used the Military Assistance Program to help its NATO partners build their military capabilities as well. USEUCOM also assumed responsibility for command and control of US nuclear forces, and in 1961 began operating an airborne command post, Operation SILK PURSE.

The Cold War was marked by continued tensions with the Soviet Union, including widespread unrest in Eastern Europe following the death of Joseph Stalin. USEUCOM also conducted out-of-sector operations such as a major contingency operation to Lebanon in 1958. In 1961 Berlin once again became a flash point when the Soviets erected a wall to stop the hemorrhage of people fleeing Communist rule.

In the early 1960s, sharp policy disagreements emerged within NATO, and in 1966 France demanded the removal of all US and NATO headquarters and forces from French soil. The following year SHAPE moved to Mons, Belgium, while Headquarters USEUCOM moved to Patch Barracks. Headquarters Seventh Army moved to Heidelberg, where it merged with Headquarters US Army, Europe.

During the 1970s, force protection concerns in Europe grew as terrorist groups such as the Red Army Faction and the Red Brigades targeted US facilities and personnel with bombings, kidnapping, and assassinations. Palestinian groups brazenly conducted terror operations in Europe, such as the kidnapping of Israeli athletes during the 1972 Munich Olympic Games.

During the 1980s, the armed forces began to recover from the Vietnam War and US forces in Europe grew to over 350,000. The unified command plan was changed in 1983 to transfer responsibility for the Middle East from USEUCOM to a new combatant command, US Central Command (USCENTCOM), but USEUCOM retained responsibility for the "confrontation states" of Israel, Lebanon, and Syria. At the same time USEUCOM was formally assigned responsibility of Africa, south of the Sahara.

In the 1990s, USEUCOM reached out to the emerging democracies and was also active in peace and stability operations in the Balkans, including Bosnia, Macedonia, and Kosovo. But it had to conduct these new missions with fewer assigned forces as its strength fell below 120,000.

Immediately after the attacks against New York and Washington DC on September 11, 2001, NATO invoked Article V of the treaty and deployed a NATO early warning aircraft to help monitor the skies over North America. USEUCOM provided major forces for operations in Afghanistan and Iraq and stepped up its efforts to protect US interests in Europe and Africa. Subsequent terrorist attacks in the USEUCOM theater in Casablanca, Madrid, London, and Algiers made it clear that terrorism demanded a collective response. USEUCOM worked to build partner capacity in Europe and Africa for peacekeeping operations and deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan.

As USEUCOM's challenges evolved, so did its missions and functions. In 2003 the headquarters reorganized to establish the USEUCOM Plans and Operations Center. From 2006-2008 it helped stand-up a new unified command, US Africa Command, which took over responsibility for Department of Defense activities in Africa on October 1, 2008.

Territory

USEUCOM's area of responsibility covers almost one-fifth of the planet including all of Europe, large portions of Asia, parts of the Middle East, and the Arctic and Atlantic Oceans. The command is responsible for US military relations with NATO and 51 countries on two continents, with a total population of almost one billion people.

While geographically located in the Middle East, Israel is considered a part of USEUCOM. Another state of interest is the Holy See, commonly known as the Roman Catholic Vatican. The following table lists all the countries in which the United States has a vital national interest that are within the USEUCOM AOR.

Albania	Germany	Montenegro
Andorra	Greece	Netherlands
Armenia	Holy See (the Vatican)	Norway
Austria	Hungary	Poland
Azerbaijan	Iceland	Portugal
Belarus	Ireland	Romania
Belgium	Israel	Russia
Bosnia and Herzegovina	Italy	San Marino
Bulgaria	Kosovo	Serbia
Croatia	Latvia	Slovakia
Cyprus	Lichtenstein	Slovenia
Czech Republic	Lithuania	Spain
Denmark	Luxembourg	Sweden
Estonia	Macedonia	Switzerland
Finland	Malta	Turkey
France	Moldova	Ukraine
Georgia	Monaco	United Kingdom

History & Myth

Although the human history of the lands under the purview of USEUCOM reaches back thousands of years, the political map of Europe as we know it today did not take shape until after the Thirty Years' War ended in 1648 with the Peace of Westphalia.

Covering the rich and diverse history of the 51 nations under the responsibility of USEUCOM would take more than the space allotted in these pages; however, key historical events of the region are outlined to serve as an introduction.

Early European History

The foundation of Western Civilization and the nations we call part of USEUCOM today come from ancient peoples who migrated into southern Europe from Asia Minor well before 3000 BCE, and developed into what we now know as Ancient Greece. By 336 BCE, when Alexander the Great gained the throne of Macedonia, the Greek world had devolved into oligarchy after over 100 years of warfare. Within 15 months, Alexander the Great marched his armies as far north as the Danube River, destroyed the city of Thebes in Egypt, marched into Greek cities and demanded submission, and stamped out rebellions. In 334 BCE he marched into Asia, and in 327 BCE his empire extended as far

east as India. With Alexander's death in 323 BCE, classical Greece came to an abrupt end, and a century of warfare arrived as his generals struggled for control. Eventually, Alexander's world was split into the three kingdoms of Macedonia, Western Asia, and Egypt, much of which was later reunited under Roman rule.

Around 500 BCE the Romans settled in northern Italy. Here they constructed a new form of political organization called a republic and drew up the Roman constitution. The Romans embraced the Greek civilization to the east and learned from their mistakes. Ancient Greece is renowned for its art, philosophy, and cultural achievements, but the Greeks could not maintain their world view for more than a few centuries; the Romans, however, built a world that lasted for over 1,000 years. The Roman Republic, from 509 BCE until 31 BCE, developed the distinctive Roman forms of law and government, while the period from 31 BCE to 476 CE constitutes the period we know as the Roman Empire. In this second period of Roman rule, particularly under Augustus Caesar, Rome captured and controlled all of modern-day France, Spain, Greece, Asia Minor, Palestine, North Africa, and Great Britain. This is also the period in which a mysterious new religious movement appeared among the lower orders of the Roman peoples—Christianity.

From approximately 410 CE until 476 CE, Rome and the Roman Empire underwent a rapid devolution. By the end of the fifth century, the western Roman Empire split into various Germanic kingdoms. The Ostogoths settled in Italy, the Franks in Gaul, the Burgundians in Provence, the Visigoths in Spain, and the Angles and Saxons in England. Christianity, meanwhile, spread through these tribes and became firmly established throughout Europe. This blending of Greco-Roman tradition, Judeo-Christian tradition, and Germanic custom formed the beginnings of a distinctive western European culture as the area began to separate itself culturally, geographically, religiously, politically, and economically from the remains of the Roman Empire—now known as Byzantium—and the Muslim world. In this period, from approximately 500 to 1000 (the early Middle Ages) Europe as we have come to know it was born.

The Enlightenment

In a period of approximately 100 years, from the late seventeenth through the eighteenth century, Europe as a whole underwent an intellectual revolution that rippled through society and had lasting repercussions for the entire world. This revolution is known as the Enlightenment.

Though many of the greatest philosophers of the Enlightenment—Montesquieu, Rousseau, and Voltaire, among others—came from France, the "founding fathers" of the Enlightenment were actually British: John Locke, Issac Newton, and Francis Bacon. These three men formed the foundations of what became Enlightenment thought—a world grounded in reason and observation. The ideas that emerged from the Enlightenment inspired revolutions, most notably the American and French Revolutions, and developed the concepts of modern science and the scientific method. The most famous phrase of Thomas Jefferson's Declaration of Independence—"life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness"—owes itself to John Locke's theories on natural rights, including the rights to

life, liberty, and property as outlined in his *Two Treatises of Government*. Thomas Paine was another British philosopher of the Enlightenment, who inspired two revolutions: the American Revolution, following the publication of *Common Sense* in 1776, and the French Revolution, following the publication of *The Rights of Man* in 1791.

Some of the most debated issues of the nineteenth century, including theories of evolution, modern economics, and socialism, trace their roots to ideas presented in Europe during the eighteenth century. Likewise, some of the least debated issues of our modern era including Newton's concrete and scientific explanation of the movement of the universe, the idea of human progress, and the founding principles of most of the modern social sciences also owe their background to this period. By the end of the Enlightenment era, Europe transformed from a world grounded in medieval social, political, and economic traditions into the peak of the industrial revolution and worldwide colonialism.

Wars and Unification

The early history of Europe is a history of empires: the Roman Empire, the Holy Roman Empire, the Ottoman Empire, the Spanish Empire, the Russian Empire, and the Napoleonic Empire, to name a few. Most of the countries in the USEUCOM territory were, at some point, part of one or more of these empires as they spread across the region. Military might dictate political borders, social structures, economics, and language for centuries. Unification was a military process of seizing land and peoples by force and incorporating neighboring territory into ever-expanding empires, typically controlled by a monarch or dictator. Areas on the borders of powerful nations such as France, Spain, and Russia, changed hands numerous times, often within the lifetime of the people who lived in the territory.

This idea of unification by military force began to change in the modern era. The two World Wars had a profound effect on the psyche of the European nations. Though treaties between nations had been a fact of life for centuries, World War I resulted in the first real effort to politically unite Europe, and the world, in a lasting and peaceful contract known as the League of Nations. Europe was divided by World War II into two basic factions; even "neutral" nations such as Sweden and Switzerland were ultimately still involved in the conflict. When the war came to an end, the world as a whole was fundamentally changed by the arrival of nuclear weapons. This powerful threat in the hands of the two rival superpowers—Russia and the United States—sparked conflict that divided Europe for the next 50 years. This threat of nuclear war, and the memory of all of the European wars of the past, shifted the focus of European unification from militarily to politically-minded.

There has been an increasing trend towards political, economic, and military unification in Europe. The United Nations, born from the old League of Nations after World War II, was the first real symbol of unity in Europe. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was a military alliance of several European nations, the United States, and Canada formed in response to the United Soviet Socialist Republic (USSR) communist threat. When Western Germany joined NATO in 1955, the USSR established the Warsaw Treaty, which served the same military purpose for the USSR that NATO served for

Western Europe. In the 1950s the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and the European Economic Community (EEC) were formed by six European nations— Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and West Germany—as unified political and economic efforts intended to escape from the severe nationalism that sparked the Second World War. Over the following decades, several other nations joined these quasi-joint organizations, and in 1993 the two organizations fully merged and were renamed into what is today known as the European Union, consisting of 27 of the 51 USEUCOM nations.

Economic Systems

Throughout its history and into the present day, Europe provides examples of the four most basic economic systems in the world: the traditional economy, market economy, mixed economy, and planned economy. Few, if any, nations in USEUCOM maintain traditional economic systems, but this was the economy of old Europe: decisions were made on the basis of custom or tradition. A traditional economy does not allow for individual achievement, new technology, or growth, but under traditional systems, such as feudalism, economic growth is not of particular concern to the population. However, with the social upheaval caused by the advent of the industrial revolution and the Enlightenment, new economic theories developed that radically changed the economic view of Europe.

The market economy, a system in which goods and services are traded and prices are typically the result of subjective value judgments, is commonly known as capitalism. In a true market economy prices are influenced by competition among buyers and sellers and market decisions are dominated by supply and demand. Market economies with little or no governmental intervention are known as free markets. While the United States is often viewed as a purely capitalist economy, a better example of a pure market economy is Switzerland. On the opposite side of the spectrum from the market economy is the planned economy, or command economy, in which decisions about production, distribution, commodity, and service prices of goods and services are made by the government. Market forces have little or no say in the economic decisions. There is less flexibility in this type of economy, however there is also little or no need for resources in advertising or marketing. Socialism and Soviet communism fall under this heading.

Mixed economies, predictably, fall in the middle between the market economy and planned economy, and are perhaps the dominant economic form in Europe. A mixed economy combines certain features of the other two types so that both private business and government play an important role in economic decision-making. There is flexibility in some areas and government control in others. This type of economic system is favored in societies that seek to balance a wide range of political and economic views—the United Kingdom (UK) serving as a prime example in Europe.

In 1945, Europe was seeking a way to create a European economic market comparable to the superpower that was the United States. In the aftermath of WWII, a number of organizations emerged that sought to rebuild Europe and the European economy, primarily by uniting sovereign nations in support of common economic goals. In 1993,

these various agencies came together as the European Union. Over the course of the next 10 years, the European Union expanded from mostly Western European nations to include many of the nations of the former Soviet Union.

One of the goals of the European Union from the beginning was the adoption of a common currency throughout Europe. In 1999, the Euro was introduced in bank operations and conversion rates. The gradual introduction was finalized in 2002 with the introduction of Euro currency and the withdrawal of national currencies; however, the Euro remains a hotly debated subject in Europe. On the positive side, it provides trade efficiency and diversification of reserve currencies, but on the negative side it eliminates national sovereignty and creates an environment dependent on the stability of a single currency. Adoption of the Euro is not a mandatory requirement for membership in the European Union, and several member nations—the UK for example—have opted out of adoption of the unified currency. Nevertheless, the Euro is growing in prominence in Europe.

Political Systems

While the European Union has become one of the most prominent features of the political landscape in the USEUCOM AOR, it has not always been the case. Prior to its founding, and especially during the Cold War, the major divisions in this part of the world centered around the differing ideals of communist and democratic thought. Therefore, to understand European politics as a whole requires an understanding of the impact the Soviet Union had on the political and military atmosphere of Eastern Europe.

NOTE: The following is an excerpt from the Library of Congress Country study on the former Soviet Union.

While liberating Eastern Europe from Nazi Germany in World War II, the Red Army established political and military control over that region. The Soviet Union intended to use Eastern Europe as a buffer zone for the forward defense of its western borders and to keep threatening ideological influences at bay. Continued control of Eastern Europe became second only to defense of the homeland in the hierarchy of Soviet security priorities.

On May 14, 1955, the Soviet Union institutionalized its East European alliance system, henceforth known as the Warsaw Pact, when it met with representatives from Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, and Romania in Warsaw to sign the multilateral Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance, which was identical to their existing bilateral treaties with the Soviet Union. The 1955 treaty establishing the Warsaw Pact stated that relations among the signatories were based on total equality, mutual noninterference in internal affairs, and respect for national sovereignty and independence. It declared that the Warsaw Pact's function was collective self-defense of the member states against external aggression, as provided for in Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. Until the early 1960s, the Soviet Union used the Warsaw Pact more as a tool in East-West diplomacy than as a functioning political-military alliance. The Warsaw

Pact administered both the political and the military activities of the Soviet alliance system in Eastern Europe. A series of changes that began in 1969 gave the Warsaw Pact the structure it retained through the late 1980s.

Political Organization. The general (or first) secretaries of the communist and workers' parties and heads of state of the Warsaw Pact member states met in the Political Consultative Committee (PCC). The PCC provided a formal point of contact for the Soviet and East European leaders in addition to less formal bilateral meetings and visits. As the highest decision-making body of the Warsaw Pact, the PCC was charged with assessing international developments that affected the security of the allied states and warranted the execution of the Warsaw Pact's collective self-defense provisions. In practice, however, the Soviet Union was unwilling to rely on the PCC to perform this function, fearing that Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Romania would use PCC meetings to oppose Soviet plans and policies. Beginning in the late 1960s, when several member states began to use the alliance structure to confront Soviet domination and assert more independent foreign policies, the Soviet Union had to negotiate to gain support for its foreign policy within Warsaw Pact councils.

Military Organization. The Warsaw Pact's military organization was larger and more active than the alliance's political bodies. Several different organizations were responsible for implementing PCC directives on defense matters and developing the capabilities of the national armies that constituted the Warsaw Pact's armed forces. The principal task, however, of the military organizations was to link the East European armies to the Soviet armed forces. The alliance's military agencies coordinated the training and mobilization of the East European national forces assigned to the Warsaw Pact. In turn, these forces could be deployed in accordance with Soviet military strategy against an Non-Soviet Warsaw Pact (NSWP) country or NATO. The Joint Staff was the only standing Warsaw Pact military body and the official executive organ of the Committee of Ministers of Defense, commander in chief, and Military Council. As such, it performed the bulk of the Warsaw Pact's work in the military realm. Like the Joint Command, the Joint Staff had both Soviet and East European officers. The non-Soviet officers also served as the principal link between the Soviet and East European armed forces. The Joint Staff organized all joint exercises and arranged multilateral meetings and contacts of Warsaw Pact military personnel at all levels.

Beginning in the late 1960s and continuing into the 1970s, the Soviet Union abandoned its earlier efforts to achieve the simultaneous dissolution of NATO and the Warsaw Pact and concentrated instead on détente—legitimating the territorial status quo in Europe. The consequences of détente, however, also posed a significant challenge to Soviet control of Eastern Europe by causing a crisis in Soviet-East German relations, blurring the strict bipolarity of the Cold War era, opening Eastern Europe to greater Western influence, and loosening Soviet control over its allies. Despite these problems, the détente period witnessed relatively stable Soviet-East European relations within the Warsaw Pact.

In the late 1970s, the West grew disenchanted with détente, which had failed to prevent Soviet advances in the Third World, the deployment of SS-20 intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) aimed at West European targets, the invasion of Afghanistan, or the suppression of Solidarity. The Soviet Union used the renewal of East-West tension as a justification for forcing its allies to close ranks within the Warsaw Pact. But restoring the alliance's cohesion and renewing its confrontation with Western Europe proved difficult after several years of good East-West relations.

In the mid- to late 1980s, the future of the Warsaw Pact hinged on Mikhail Gorbachev's developing policy toward Eastern Europe. He demonstrated a greater sensitivity to East European concerns than previous Soviet leaders by briefing the NSWP leaders in their own capitals after the 1985 Geneva and 1986 Reykjavik superpower summit meetings. In 1987 the Warsaw Pact, under Soviet tutelage, adopted a defense-oriented military doctrine. In the late 1980s, however, mounting economic difficulties and the advanced age of trusted, long-time communist party leaders, like Gustáv Husák in Czechoslovakia, Todor Zhivkov in Bulgaria, and János Kádár in Hungary, intensified the danger of domestic turmoil and internal power struggles in the NSWP countries and threatened the alliance's cohesion.

The reforms begun by Gorbachev and carried on by Boris Yeltsin eventually saw the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the formation of several new countries, and greater independence for the Eastern European countries formerly dominated by the Soviets.

Art

Prior to the European Renaissance, the vast majority of art in Europe was religiously based. Books were handmade objects, treasured as works of art and symbols of enduring knowledge, frequently bound in covers set with enamel, jewels, and ivory, typically made by monks, and recognized as an attribute of God regardless of their actual content. Gothic architecture provided an engineering challenge that resulted in some of the most well-known and breathtaking buildings in the world. Paintings, stained glass, and even tapestries were intricately created around religious themes and stories. In the fifteenth through seventeenth centuries, the period commonly known as the Renaissance, musicians and artists traveled extensively throughout Europe so that, despite regional differences, European art of all forms maintained overall similarities based on the period, rather than the region.

The most important music of the Renaissance was developed for the church. However by the end of the Renaissance, the Reformation swept through Europe and patronage of music was split between the Catholic church, Protestant churches, royal courts, wealthy amateurs, and music printing. Inspired by classical Greece, musicians of the Renaissance began to link music and poetry in an increasingly dramatic fashion in an attempt to stir the listener's emotions. Opera evolved out of this transformation in musical creation, combined with the courtly entertainments of the period; in a similar fashion, ballet and modern dance evolved out of this same period. Noblemen and noblewomen were expected to maintain an upright carriage and grace. In the late seventeenth and

eighteenth centuries, professional dancers began to gain prominence, focusing on fast footwork, high jumps, and multiple turns. French King Louis XIV instituted a school for dancers in 1669, which established the vocabulary of classical dance as we know it today. Western European dance favors symmetry, balance, and harmony of the entire body. Early dance choreography was related to contemporary social dances and costumes were based on court dress of the time, with tight corsets for women and short skirts for men. As a result, female dancers' movements were considerably restricted, while male dancers dominated the stage.

The Enlightenment played a critical role in the evolution of western art, as the influence of reason and observation of the world changed both the visual and fine arts. Religious subjects began to disappear as religion itself was questioned under this rapidly spreading philosophy. Trends in the visual arts leaned towards paintings and drawings of what could be seen and experienced in the world, discarding the romantic and idealized, and seeking simplicity, harmony, and proportion. The stories told in opera and ballet were the stories of the nature of man, in keeping with the Enlightenment search for knowledge and truth. In reaction to the rational, secular ideas of the Enlightenment, romanticism emerged in the nineteenth century as an art form that embraced uncontrollable power, unpredictably, and extremes. Music became something accessible to the general public, not just the courts and the church, whether it was through large performances to the public in theaters or intimate parlor music. Until the development of the phonograph, radio, and television in the twentieth century, the piano became the central component of domestic life for the middle class.

The development of mass industry, the colonialism that brought Chinese and Japanese culture into Europe, and rapid developments in the social sciences and intellectual theories in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries brought sweeping changes to art in Europe as well, including the development of entirely new genres of art, such as photography and modern dance.

Mission and Current Posture

The mission of the US European Command is to conduct military operations, international military engagement, and interagency partnering to enhance transatlantic security and defend the United States. This is done by establishing an agile security organization able to conduct full-spectrum activities as part of "whole of government" solutions to secure enduring stability in Europe and Eurasia.

Headquartered in Stuttgart, Germany, USEUCOM is a joint forces community of approximately 1,000 US Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines, and government civilians, who work and live at four different locations around the city. From its state-of-the-art plans and operations center, the command directs the operation of more than 100,000 military and civilian personnel operations across 10.7 million square miles of land and 13 million square miles of ocean. The command is also responsible for maintaining the quality of life, including health care and schools, for almost 130,000 military family members living in Europe.

In his 2010 posture testimony, ADM James Stavridis, USEUCOM/CC, reported on the current state of the command. He said:

> The Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines, and Civilians at USEUCOM contribute to our national security every day through professional engagements with our Allies and partners in the European theater. Operationally, USEUCOM continuously strives to find flexible authorities and funding mechanisms to build the capacity of those partner nations willing to fight side-by-side with the United States.

> Furthermore, USEUCOM's efforts to fulfill the short-term task of building enduring capability are vital to ensuring the long-term stability and security of Europe. In addition to increasing the contributions of our allies and partners to operations outside Europe, building partner capacity allows us to make significant progress toward achieving strategic objectives within the AOR. For example, conducting security sector reform assessments in Albania, which is an inter-agency effort critical to integrating Balkan countries into the European community. USEUCOM also has numerous programs targeted at countering the proliferation of WMD throughout the theater, but we cannot stop there. With greater flexibility, these authorities can achieve greater strategic goals in support of our theater and national objectives.

> US European Command serves as an important link between the United States and our friends in Europe, effectively bridging the Atlantic. We are building and strengthening relations with our European partners that will help us ensure the security of the United States at home and abroad.

Conclusion

USEUCOM has helped keep the peace in Europe, the Middle East, and Africa for more than half a century. As it transforms for the future, it will continue to meet new challenges. Its vision is of an agile security organization with a "whole of government" approach seeking to support enduring stability and peace in Europe and Eurasia. Through USEUCOM, the United States is committed to enduring partnerships, cooperative solutions to mutual security challenges, and ready forces to provide regional security. Hopefully this overview of USEUCOM has piqued your interest to learn more about the European and Eurasian countries included in this command's area of responsibility. To help you do that, refer to the next section for links to Internet sources that provide more specific information about this area of the world.

STUDENT ASSIGNMENTS

Students will select a specific country from the list provided and deliver a 5-9 minute prepared briefing addressing the topic. Use the framework below to develop the main points, but to ensure the topics are covered you must submit your list of preferred main points to your instructor for approval prior to beginning your research. To assist in your research, a list of Web sites is provided on the next page.

Additionally, you must prepare a ½ to 1-page bullet background paper on your subject. You should provide a copy of your paper to your instructor prior to your briefing. You can then use the paper to give your briefing. The bullet paper will follow the format in *The Tongue and Quill.* Pick a country and two domains from the lists below:

Countries: France, Germany, Greece, Israel, Russia, Serbia, Turkey, United Kingdom

Domains: Family & Kinship, Religion & Spirituality, Sex & Gender, Politics & Social Relations, Economics & Resources, Time & Space, Language & Communication, Technology & Material, History & Myth, Sustenance & Health, Aesthetics & Recreation, Learning & Knowledge

Main Point 1 (choose one from the list of cultural domains)

Main Point 2 (choose a different domain for your 2nd main point)

RESEARCH SITES

- **Defense Language Institute** http://www.dliflc.edu/products.html
- **Field Support Modules** http://fieldsupport.dliflc.edu/index.aspx
- **Library of Congress** http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/profiles.html
- **Military Policy Awareness Links** http://merln.ndu.edu/index.cfm?type=page&pageID=3
- **Miller Center of Public Affairs** http://millercenter.org/scripps
- **NATO** http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/index.htm
- **The World Factbook** https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/index.html
- **United Nations** http://www.un.org/en/
- **US Department of State—Background Notes** http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/
- **US Department of State—Regional Bureaus** http://www.state.gov/p/index.htm
- **US Department of State—Terrorism Country Reports** http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/

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Civilian Personnel

Cognitive Lesson Objective:
- Know the Air Force Civilian Personnel System.

Cognitive Samples of Behavior:
- Identify reasons why the Department of Defense employs civilians.

- Describe the differences between the General Schedule (GS) and Federal Wage System.

- State sources of supervisory guidance for people who supervise civilians.

- State the complaint channels available to civilian employees concerning discrimination.

Affective Lesson Objective:
- Respond positively to the importance of the Air Force Civilian Personnel System.

Affective Samples of Behavior:
- Read the information provided on the Civilian Personnel System.

- Actively participate in class discussion on Civilian Personnel.

CIVILIAN PERSONNEL

America's defense establishment is far from being an exclusively military organization. Actually, about a million civilians are engaged in a wide variety of activities that support the Armed Forces. To accomplish its mission, the Air Force employs over 140,000 U.S. citizen civilians worldwide and, in addition, about 12,000 non-US citizens at its many bases in overseas areas. These people are employed in more than 6,000 different types of jobs at all levels of responsibility and pay. Together, with military personnel, they represent an indispensable part of our national defense team: a part of the total force.

Why employ civilians? In a Department of Defense policy statement, four good reasons for employing civilians are cited and explained:

- To acquire abilities not otherwise available. Many of the abilities needed by today's highly technical Armed Forces aren't primarily military. Hence, it's often more efficient and economical to hire already qualified civilians than to give years of non-military training to military personnel. A good example would be a scientist of outstanding ability whose work as a civilian could contribute greatly to military research and development. Many skilled civilian specialists are employed by the Air Force to assist and augment the military force, thus avoiding the need to pull military personnel from more direct military duties.

- To assure continuity of administration and operation. Civilian employees can stay longer in a single assignment and location than military personnel. They're not subject to involuntary overseas assignments or to involuntary assignments to other military installations within the United States. Many career civilian employees serve 20 to 40 years in a single specialty—often at the same installation. Thus they provide the continuity and "corporate memory" that's often necessary and sometimes vital, while improving the quality of the support they give.

- To obtain a nucleus of trained workers that can be expanded in an emergency. The advantages of having a nucleus of trained and experienced workers on hand becomes obvious during an emergency. Civilians thoroughly familiar with their support activity are invaluable in breaking in newcomers during periods of rapid expansion. They make it easier for our defense establishment to go on an emergency footing quickly.

- To free military personnel for military duties. Freeing military personnel for strictly military duties is a long-standing function of civilian workers. Civilians are employed, whenever possible, to relieve military personnel of essential support functions. They enable military personnel to concentrate fully on their mission of training to keep combat ready, or to react immediately at full strength when an aggressor strikes.

Basic Policies For Management of DOD Civilian Positions

HQ USAF/A1M determines and justifies the number of civilians required to support the Air Force mission. From the allocation that's approved for the USAF, A1M further allocates civilian manpower spaces to major commands and operating agencies. Each installation or level of command must fully document justification for civilian spaces before such spaces may be authorized.

Several agencies become involved in the allocation and certification process. The requesting agency prepares a position description and documents the need for the position. Management engineering personnel will then review the position and certify it, if justified. The local Civilian Personnel Flight (CPF) must then classify the position and determine the grade level. Only after this long and highly complex process of justifying, certifying, and classifying has been completed can recruiting begin.

Civilian Personnel Flight specialists responsible for recruiting applicants for vacancies may use various sources to obtain candidates. In consultation with the supervisor, the CPF specialists determine the sources to use for recruiting applicants. Applicants internal to the local work force include those employees who are eligible for promotion, those who voluntarily seek reassignment at their current grade or assignment to a lower grade, and those who are eligible for re-promotion. External applicants who may apply for hiring consideration may include employees seeking to transfer from other DoD components or other federal agencies, persons eligible for re-employment (reinstatement), military veterans, persons eligible for appointment based on certain disabilities, and persons eligible for priority placement. After the vacancy has been publicized and the applicants have been rated and ranked, the supervisor may begin the process of determining which applicant is best qualified for the vacancy. (Although the CPF refers only those applicants possessing the qualifying knowledge, skills, and abilities for the vacancy, the supervisor makes the final decision on which candidate is best qualified.)

Of course, the Air Force is an equal opportunity employer. Executive Order 11478 reaffirms the long-standing federal policy prohibiting discrimination against any employee or applicant because of race, color, sex, age, religion, or national origin. Handicapped persons may also be hired on the same basis as other job applicants.

The main legal point of consideration is that selection (or non-selection) for a position should not be based on an applicant's disability or other non-merit factors such as race, sex, color, religion, national origin, or age.

While supervisors may consider applicants from various sources, they should be aware of, and adhere to, any local collective bargaining agreement clauses that impact upon the merit promotion process.

Position Descriptions

Classification of a civilian's position (or job) description is not based on AFSCs as with the military members, but on duties and responsibilities required to support mission requirements. As a supervisor of a civilian, you are responsible for assigning the duties and making sure that the employee understands them. In essence, the position description is the official document that outlines the major duties that must be performed and determines the grade at which the employee will be paid.

A position description is adequate if it states the responsibilities, principal duties, technical expertise required, and supervisory relations of a position sufficiently and clearly. You, as supervisor, must insure the position description is accurate. If an employee is required to perform significant duties which aren't described in the position description, you could have a grievance filed against you. The Classification Section of CPF can help you with specifics when you need to write or revise a position description.

How Not To Write A Position Description

We have included this to show you, with a bit of humor, how extreme some position descriptions can be in describing duties and responsibilities.

JOB DESCRIPTION (GS-15)

SUPERVISORY CONTROLS

Without direct or intermediate supervision, and with a broad latitude for independent judgment and discretion, the incumbent directs, controls, and regulates the movement of interstate commerce; representing a cross-section of the wealth of the American economy.

MAJOR DUTIES

- On the basis of personal judgment founded on past experience, the incumbent integrates the variable factors in an overbearing situation and on the priority of flow in interstate and intrastate commerce, both animate and inanimate. These decisions relative to the priority of flow in interstate and intrastate commerce, both animate and inanimate, are irrevocable and not subject to appellate review by a higher authority, nor can they be revised by legal determination of any echelon of our jurisprudence.

- The decisions of the incumbent are important since they affect with great finality the movement of agricultural products, forest products, minerals, manufacturer's goods, machine tools, construction equipment, military personnel, defense material, new materials and products, finished goods, semi-finished products, small business, large business, public utilities, and government agencies.

- In the effective implementation of these responsibilities, the incumbent must exercise initiative, ingenuity, imagination, intelligence, industry, with persons from all segments of society, both official and private, ranging from top governmental and industrial officials to independent private citizens and aliens participating in the inter and intra-state movement of persons and things. Above all, the incumbent must possess decisiveness and ability to inspire motivation on the part of others. Failure to properly appraise the menace of an unfolding development could result in temporary crippling disruption of the orderly flow of commerce essential to the national economy and, additionally, generate great mental anguish and frustration among the portions of the society concerned, thus adversely affecting the health and welfare of innumerable personnel of American industry who are responsible for the formulation of day-to-day policy and guidance implementation of the conveyance of transportation, both interstate and intrastate.

- In short, at highway construction projects where only one-way traffic is possible, this person waves a red flag and tells which car to go first.

General Schedule (GS) and Federal Wage System Positions

DoD civilians fall under a number of career programs, with nearly two-thirds of them being GS employees. The second largest category, Wage Grade (WG), falls under the Federal Wage System.

GS positions consist of the so-called "white collar" jobs. Included in this category are the professional, technical managerial, clerical, administrative, and fiscal services. The grade level for a GS position is based upon the duties and responsibilities set forth in the position description, and may range from GS-1 through GS-15. The minimum and maximum salary of each grade level is established by executive order, and applies throughout the federal government, regardless of the geographic area in which the employee works. Senior Executive Service (SES) includes very-high managers (equivalent to general officer grades). They receive fixed salaries.

Federal Wage System employees fill "blue collar" positions. This category includes the skilled or unskilled trades or crafts such as sheet metal workers, mechanics, and facility maintenance personnel. Wage System employees are paid on an hourly basis, according to the prevailing rate of pay for their particular trade or craft in the geographic area in which they work. A wide spread of grade levels also prevails in wage system positions, depending upon the skill proficiency required, and supervisory responsibilities entailed on the job. WG civilians work under the supervision of Wage Group Leaders (WL) and Wage Group Supervisors (WS). The grades within the various categories are stated as numbers (with 1 as the lowest level) following the category abbreviation: e.g., GS-5, GS-14, WG-8, SES-1, etc.

Military Grade vs. Civilian Grade

The question of equivalency of military grade and civilian grade sometimes arises, but there isn't official correlation between the two. Although high-grade civilian employees may perform "officer-type" duties in support activities, they're not part of the military chain of command.

The grade equivalency question arises most frequently in instances where military and civilian personnel are working in the same organizational element, and generally reduces itself to a question of who supervises whom. Civilian and military grade equivalencies provide no adequate answer; instead, such determinations are the prerogative of local managers. Commanders exercise discretionary authority in specific instances.

For protocol purposes only, certain civilian and military grade equivalencies do unofficially exist. For example, on most Air Force bases civilians in the grade of GS-7 or above are eligible for membership in the Officer's Open Mess. When on TDY, they're housed in officer billets. For protocol purposes, an SES is usually afforded General Officer privileges. In general, civilians whose duties are roughly equivalent to officer duties enjoy, for protocol purposes, officer-type privileges.

The following chart should give you a general idea of relative military equivalency of the various GS and SES grades:

Civilian Grade	Military Grade (Rough Equivalent)
GS-1 to GS-3	E-1 to E-3 (Airman Basic to Airman First Class)
GS-4	E-4 (Senior Airman)
GS-5	E-5 and E-6 (Staff Sergeant and Technical Sergeant)
GS-6	E-7 to E-9 (Master Sergeant to Chief Master Sergeant)
GS-7	0-1 (Second Lieutenant)
GS-8 and GS-9	0-2 (First Lieutenant)
GS-10 and GS-11	0-3 (Captain)
GS-12	0-4 (Major)
GS-13 and GS-14	0-5 (Lieutenant Colonel)
GS-15	0-6 (Colonel)
SES-1 to SES-6	0-7 (Brigadier General to General)

We emphasize that this is a general guide only, so don't be surprised to see a second lieutenant supervising a GS-11. It all depends on the circumstances involved.

Work Relationships

Your on-the-job relationship with civilian employees may include the following:

You may work under the supervision of a civilian employee. Although this situation is somewhat rare, you may have a civilian supervisor. Exceptions, when found, are usually in scientific research, education, or other support-type professional career fields. In this circumstance, the duties would usually be very specialized, and your supervisor highly qualified. Furthermore, this civilian would be responsible for writing your OPR. The opportunity to work under a highly qualified individual--civilian or military--can prove very beneficial in terms of furthering your own technical expertise and professional growth.

You will encounter civilian employees as co-workers. This will be true regardless of your specialty. As a pilot, for example, you would encounter civilian employees on many flight lines. Virtually no transaction in your military pay or the handling of your military personnel records will take place without a civilian employee being involved. Other civilians will fill positions as office workers, or supervisors in sections working closely with your own.

At some point, perhaps very early in your Air Force career, you'll probably supervise civilian employees. Generally speaking, military supervision of civilian personnel is common. As their supervisor, you'll be responsible for performing your supervisory duties in a competent and professional manner. You'll also be responsible for meeting all regulatory requirements relating to the supervision and management of civilian personnel.

In any of the situations described, your interpersonal relationships with civilian employees shouldn't be significantly different from those with military personnel in the same work situation. Civilian employees are conscientious, capable, mission-oriented workers who, when provided competent leadership, contribute significantly to mission accomplishment. The principles of human relations and individual group dynamics apply, whether dealing with civilian personnel or military personnel.

Sources of Supervisory Guidance

If you do wind up supervising civilians, we urge you to quickly learn all you can about the Civilian Performance Appraisal and Awards Systems. You should also become thoroughly familiar with the local labor-management contract negotiated between your base and the local union (yes, the Civil Service is largely unionized). The contract will explain local grievance procedures and a myriad of other requirements and procedures, which if you understand and comply with them should make you a better manager. While civilian personnel administration procedures differ significantly from those for military personnel, two sources of authoritative guidance are available to supervisors:

- The "36" series of Air Force publications (instructions, manuals, pamphlets, etc.) deal extensively with civilian personnel matters. This includes hiring, firing, promotions, demotions, awards, disciplinary actions, and a wide range of other matters which relate to civilian personnel administration. As a supervisor of civilian personnel, you'll find the "36" series of publications especially helpful.

- Each Air Force base has a Civilian Personnel Flight servicing civilian employees in its area. Qualified civilian personnel specialists in such areas as employee utilization, position classification, equal opportunity, administration and other important areas staff this office. The office staff is available, upon call, to provide expert guidance and assistance. The Civilian Personnel Flight offers full assistance to supervisors, as well as their civilian employees.

Dealing with Poor Performers

What do you do if the employee has done something, or failed to do something, that adversely affects his/her work, the ability of others to do their work, or the agency's mission? You are faced with decisions on how to handle the incident, or series of incidents. First, you must decide whether the incident involves the employee's poor job performance, or an act of misconduct or delinquency. Normally it is one or the other, but in some cases it may be both. Next, you must decide what type of management action will best deal with the incident(s). There are many possible causes for an employee's performance and/or conduct problems. For example, illness, disability, substance abuse, personality conflict, family problems, lack of training, and low job morale. The nature of the problem will determine the course of action to be taken. Maybe the employee should be referred to the Employee Assistance Program for drug or alcohol counseling, or a medical exam may be needed to determine physical or mental capability to do the job.

If the problem is failure to meet standards, and the employee has been advised of those standards, then appropriate actions would be taken under the Performance Management Program. Initial steps could include performance counseling, training, and/or close supervision. If performance continues to be unacceptable, then more severe actions could be reassignment, demotion, or removal.

If the problem is misconduct or delinquency such as tardiness, failure to properly request leave, insubordination, theft, etc., then your option could be to take disciplinary action. Maintaining discipline usually is not a problem within a work environment where reasonable rules and standards of conduct and performance are clearly communicated, and consistently and equitably enforced. There are situations of misconduct or delinquency, however, where there is no alternative but to penalize. In these instances, management's options, in order of least severe to most severe, include:

- Oral admonishment

- Reprimands

- Suspensions

- Reduction in Grade and/or Pay (in some cases)

- Removals

Constructive discipline is preventive in nature, taken only when necessary, and done promptly and equitably. Its objectives are to develop, correct, and rehabilitate employees, and encourage their acceptance of appropriate responsibility and standards of conduct.

Before administering any form of punishment, the employee must be provided a reasonable opportunity to demonstrate acceptable performance. The time needed to demonstrate acceptable performance is a judgment made by the supervisor. The normal rule is 60-90 days.

When administering disciplinary actions, management has the burden of proof. In establishing the individuals record, it is important that you have:

- Examples of work products that failed to meet previously set standards of performance

- Documents which detail the time given the employee to show acceptable performance and the assistance given

- Examples of the employee's performance during the opportunity period

- The various procedural steps followed in proposing and deciding the course of action

- The documentation of any counseling, referral or attempts to refer for assistance

In any case, if you are having trouble with a civilian employee, be sure to contact the local Civilian Personnel Office for guidance on how to proceed.

Complaint Channels Available to Civilians

A civilian who feels that he/she has been subjected to discrimination because of race, religion, color, sex, national origin, age, or disability may file a complaint as a means of having the allegations addressed. The complaints of alleged discrimination may be filed with the installation's Equal Opportunity (EO) Counselor, directly with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), or with the US Federal District Court. In most cases, however, complaints initially filed with the EEOC or in federal court may be referred without action back to the complainant, with instructions for entering the complaint into the local administrative channels for processing. Complaints are categorized into two forms, informal pre-complaint and formal.

Civilian complaints are initially dealt with on an informal basis. Each federal employment agency has an EO Counselor Staff. The employee (complainant) initiates his or her complaint through contacting one of the counselors on this staff. After securing sufficient information from the complainant, the counselor conducts an informal inquiry. The purpose of the informal inquiry is to gather facts and resolve the issue/problem raised by the complainant. Informal resolution is the ultimate goal of the counselor. The EO Counselor does not make findings of discrimination, but works to resolve the issue(s) informally.

However, if the complainant is not satisfied with any informal resolution proposals, he/she has the right to file a formal complaint. In other words, if informal resolution attempts fail, the complainant can request a formal investigation.

The findings of the informal inquiry are compiled into a report and submitted to the installation Chief EO Counselor. The Chief EO Counselor reviews the complaint and ensures that the issues are acceptable for processing. Thereafter, the complaint file is forwarded to the DoD Office of Complaints Investigation (OCI) for formal processing. In addressing the issues of the complaint, the OCI investigator conducts formal interviews, takes sworn statements, and examines any materials, files, or records pertinent to the complaint. At the conclusion of the formal investigation, the OCI investigator compiles a report, and refers the investigative findings and recommendations to the installation Commander. It should be noted that the investigative findings may or may not confirm that discrimination has occurred. The organizational Commander where the alleged discrimination occurred and/or the installation Commander use the report and findings to offer a resolution, if there are findings of discriminations. If there are no findings of discrimination in the report, the agency is not required to act on the report. If the complainant is satisfied with the recommended resolution when discrimination is confirmed, he/she (complainant) may withdraw the complaint. If the complainant is dissatisfied with investigative findings, he/she may request a decision without a hearing from the AF Civilian Appellate Review Office (AFCARO) or a hearing from the EEOC.

If a complainant requests an EEOC hearing, the results of that hearing are forwarded to the installation Commander, Chief EEO Counselor, as well as AFCARO. Again, resolution attempts are made at the installation level if there are findings of discrimination. If resolution is achieved, the complainant signs an agreement and withdraws the complaint. If resolution is not achieved, AFCARO issues a decision. This decision becomes the final Air Force decision on the complaint, unless that decision is overturned in court or the complainant appeals to the EEOC and prevails.

Throughout the course of the complaint process, there are strict timelines with which the parties (complainant and management) must comply. Some timelines set the number of days a complainant has to appeal a decision or finding, and file for the next level of administrative review. Other timelines set the number of days that the Air Force or an investigative agency, such as OCI, must issue a decision or notify the complainant of matters pertinent to the complaint. It should be noted that at any point during the complaint process, the parties (complainant and management) may resolve the complaint. Resolution at the lowest level in the early stages of the process is the most effective means of dealing with the complaint. When allowed to continue without resolution, beginning with the informal stage and extending to through the formal stage, a complaint has the potential to cost more than $80,000. If the complainant prevails, he/she may be awarded compensatory damages up $300,000.

As a supervisor of civilian employees, it is imperative that you manage everyone fairly and ensure that the decisions you make are not based on non-merit factors such as race, religion, sex, age, national origin, color, or disability. Remember, employees may file a complaint because they feel that a decision or action over which you have control is discriminatory. Make sure that the environment you control and the people you manage are not subjected to discrimination.

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The Enlisted Force

Cognitive Lesson Objective:
- Know key elements of the enlisted force structure.

Cognitive Samples of Behavior:
- Describe the three tiers of the enlisted force structure.

- Identify the special positions a senior noncommissioned officer (SNCO) can hold.

- Describe significant milestones in the evolution of the noncommissioned officer (NCO).

- State the purpose of each of the enlisted Professional Military Education (PME) schools.

Affective Lesson Objective:
- Value the contributions and purpose of the enlisted force.

Affective Samples of Behavior:
- Express appreciation for the contributions enlisted members have made.

- Assert the importance of understanding the enlisted force as an officer.

THE HERITAGE AND HISTORY

OF THE ENLISTED FORCE

Since the Army Aeronautical Division was formally created in 1907, enlisted Airmen have served at the leading edge. They have been pilots, navigators, bombardiers, mechanics, gunners, engineers, communication specialists, cooks, clerks, and much more. They helped perfect aerial bombing, jumped with the first parachutes, and tested ejection seats. They sacrificed their lives for their comrades and the mission. Their legacy is a proud heritage and history. This chapter brings to light the many significant achievements of enlisted men and women and provides insight into the evolution of the Air Force enlisted corps.

The US military services use many of the ranks they started with in 1775. The leaders adopted the organization, regulations, and ranks of the British army and navy with only minor changes. This is not surprising because our Revolutionary Army was made up of colonial militia units that had been organized and drilled by British methods for years. Most of the military experience of the soldiers and their officers, George Washington among them, came from service in militia units fighting alongside British army units during the French and Indian War of 1754 through 1763.

Professional Military Names

The basic names for members of the military profession go back several centuries. Seaman comes from an Old English word that was pronounced "see-man," and means a person whose occupation is on the sea. A Soldier is a person who serves in a military force for pay. This name comes from the Latin word "solidus," a Roman coin used for paying military men.

Sergeant also comes from a Latin word, "serviens," meaning servant, but is much older. In medieval times, the "servant" may have become a fighting man for self-preservation because combat often amounted to attacking everyone, regardless of whether they were armed. The sergeant became an experienced warrior who might ride a horse but was not wealthy enough to afford all the equipment and retainers to qualify as a knight. As an experienced soldier, he might be called upon to take charge of a group of serfs or other common people forced to serve in an army of feudal levies. The sergeant would conduct what training he could to teach his charges to fight, lead them into battle, and most importantly, keep them from running away during a battle. Sergeant was not a rank but an occupation. Sergeant became a regular position and then a rank as army organizations evolved. It has been a key rank in British and European armies for several hundred years. When the US Army and Marine Corps started in 1775, it was natural that both included sergeants.

Private was the first enlisted rank. It comes from the Latin word "privus" that meant an individual person without an office. The term as a military rank seems to come from the sixteenth century when individuals had the privilege of enlisting or making contracts to serve as private soldiers in military units.

Airman is a more recent word that means someone involved with flying. The Air Force may have formally given this title to members of its four lowest enlisted ranks in 1952, but all Air Force members are Airmen.

Insignia

The first US military insignia was used during the Revolutionary War. Even then, the sergeant's role in troop leadership was recognized as important enough to be given distinctive grade insignia. In 1775, the Continental Army did not have enough uniforms to distinguish the officers from their men. The Continental Congress tried to standardize a brown uniform, but without any authority to raise money, this was easier said than done. Officers wore remnants of old military dress with no thought given to similarity of color. The enlisted men wore their work or hunting clothes. Many had no coat or shoes and wore handkerchiefs for hats. When General George Washington took command of the Army at Cambridge, he was obliged to develop badges so that rank would be indicated at sight.

One of his first orders read as follows: "As the Continental Army has unfortunately no uniforms, and consequently many inconveniences must arise from not being able to distinguish the commissioned officers from the privates, it is desired that some badges of distinction may be immediately provided; for instance—that the corporals may be distinguished by an epaulette or stripe of green cloth sewed upon the right shoulder, the sergeants by one of red."

"Chevron" is a French word meaning rafter or roof. Chevrons appeared on shields and coats-of-arms for knights, barons, and kings and have been a recognized symbol of honor since the twelfth century. French soldiers started wearing cloth chevrons with the points up on their coat sleeve in 1777 as length of service and good conduct badges. In 1782, George Washington ordered that enlisted men who served for three years "with bravery, fidelity, and good conduct" wear "a narrow piece of white cloth, of angular form" on the left sleeve of the uniform coat as a badge of honor.

Air Force stripes date back to 1948. The basic design was one of several presented to 150 enlisted members at Bolling Air Force Base, Washington, DC, in late 1947. On March 9, 1948, General Hoyt S. Vandenberg, the Air Force Vice Chief of Staff at the time, approved the designed.

US Air Force Enlisted Force Evolution

From the beginning, aviators had to deal with establishing, recruiting, and training a group of enlisted men to care for the airplanes. On July 18, 1914, convinced of the need to bolster military aviation as a result of the impending war in Europe, Congress passed a legislative bill that established the Aviation Section within the Army Signal Corps and authorized 101 enlisted men. Forty men trained as aviation mechanics, 12 received flight training, and the remaining 49 went directly to squadrons where they served in a second tier of occupational specialties including fireman, fuel-truck operator, and cook. Although most training at the beginning was hands-on, by 1915, aviation instructors at the Technical Instruction School in San Diego, California, designed a certification process based on performance and a written test. Enlisted men earning the certification were rewarded with a 50-percent pay raise. On the eve of WWI, and within the first few years of existence, enlisted Airmen had an identifiable image consisting of a technically-driven and skilled group of experts who, by sheer novelty of the technology, differentiated themselves from other Army branches.

World War I

WWI proved critical to the development of the Army Air Service, which had evolved from the Aviation Section of the Army Signal Corps. With only 65 officers, 1,120 enlisted members, and 200 old planes, the Army faced a monumental task in April 1917 when the Allied powers requested a minimum of 2,000 planes per month and the required number of Airmen to fly and repair them. A month later the request increased to 5,000 pilots, 50,000 mechanics, and 45,000 planes. The expanded Air Service and the technological growth furthered the development of enlisted personnel policy, especially in the areas of recruiting and training. In the area of recruiting, the original Airmen were experienced volunteers from the Army Signal Corps. Under the Selective Service Act of 1917, the Air Service would receive men new to the military. The military also developed new personnel classification procedures and tests to measure aptitude and predict potential job proficiency. In 1918, the Air Service convinced the Classification Committee to design special tests to select only those mechanically inclined for jobs in military aviation.

World War II

During WWII, the tremendous demand for technical manpower presented a problem. To maintain extremely complex equipment, weapons, and systems, the services needed skilled specialists. There was no centralized basic or technical skills training; squadron commanders and first sergeants usually dictated the amount and type of training. As a result of the need to train thousands of men, both basic and technical training were centralized, standardized, and separated from the unit. Basic training evolved from learning about military protocol on the job to a system of centralized recruit reception centers. Reception centers indoctrinated, tested, and classified recruits, then sent them to training centers where the new Airman received technical training.

Enlisted Pilot Program

The 77th Congress enacted Public Law 99 on June 3,1941, which authorized the training of enlisted men as aviation pilots. On August 20, 1941, 183 enlisted men of the US Army Air Forces began pilot training just 2 months and 18 days after Congress approved the program. The first pilot training class, 42-C, finished its training and graduated as staff sergeant pilots on March 7, 1942—one-half graduating from Kelly Field and the other half from Ellington Field in Texas. After graduation, the class was assigned to the 82d Fighter Group when it was first organized at Muroc, California.

In the fall of 1943, the group proceeded to North Africa. Although one-half of the class was retained in the states to instruct other pilots, the other members of this class downed 130 enemy aircraft in aerial combat and produced nine of WWII's fighter aces. During the war, graduating sergeant pilots were assigned to every conceivable type of flying job. At least 16 sergeant pilots were assigned as pilots for generals. In particular, one sergeant pilot, Charles I. Bennett, became the personal pilot of General Dwight D. Eisenhower; another, Eddie R. Russell, performed similar duties for Field Marshall Montgomery. Many flew in P-38, P-39, P-40, P-47, P-51, and Spitfire-equipped fighter units. Many other sergeant pilots went to combat in A-20, A-36, B-17, B-24, B-25, B-26, and B-29 aircraft in Europe, Africa, China-Burma-India, and the Pacific.

During the short time the enlisted pilot program existed, a total of 2,143 men graduated as sergeant pilots from 31 different bases across the country. The program ended with the graduation of class 42-J. All students graduating after that class were directly appointed to the rank of flight officer or second lieutenant. Records still being compiled show that at least 333 sergeant pilots served until retirement from either active military service or the Reserve forces. One retired in the grade of master sergeant, two as warrant officer (equivalent to the wartime rank of flight officer), two as second lieutenant, five as first lieutenant, 13 as captain, 80 as major, 141 as lieutenant colonel, 85 as colonel, three as brigadier general, and one as major general. At least two of the former sergeants did not elect to transfer to the Air Force but remained with the Army until retirement. One noncommissioned officer took his experience and skills to the Coast Guard, eventually retiring as a lieutenant commander.

When the Air Force separated from the Army, two "flying sergeants," Master Sergeant Tom Rafferty and Master Sergeant George H. Holmes, elected to switch. By doing so, they became the Air Force's first and last flying sergeants. Sergeant Rafferty, a 1933 flying school graduate, perished in a 1950 plane crash in the high Sierras, which left Sergeant Holmes, a 1921 graduate, as the lone noncommissioned officer pilot. Sergeant Holmes was an extraordinary individual. He served in naval aviation as a machinist during WWI. His early association with aviation inspired him to immediately enlist in the Army Air Service after the war ended. He applied for flight training soon after he enlisted and, in 1920, began primary training at March Field as a cadet. After graduation, his class was discharged. Those like Holmes, who held prior rank, were given the option to revert to that rank and remain in the service or to separate from the service. He opted for a discharge and became a civilian.

Holmes returned to the Army in 1931, enlisting as a sergeant at Randolph Field. After securing special authority to fly as a noncommissioned officer, he did so as a buck sergeant for nearly nine years. In 1940, he was promoted to technical sergeant and rated as a command pilot. By March 1941, he was a master sergeant; in 1942, he was promoted to captain. He rose to the rank of lieutenant colonel by the war's end and remained at that rank until 1946. Holmes then reverted to his previous rank of master sergeant at Kelly Field, where he remained until transferred to Brazil as the pilot and crew chief of the airplane assigned to the Joint US-Brazil Military Commission. His retirement in May 1957 marked the end of the enlisted pilot era.

The Career Force

Changing American Society's Perceptions. During the war, the draft was used to supply sufficient manpower. When the WWII draft ended in 1947, the military initially found it difficult to recruit high-quality volunteers. A public opinion survey contended that the biggest problem for the Air Force was that the American public did not understand what the military did in peacetime. Plus, the public did not look favorably upon the military as a lifetime career. From 1946 through 1955, the Air Force strived to create a climate in which military service was viewed by the public as an appropriate career. The word "career" stressed the idea that the American military offered youth a job and a chance for upward mobility. The meaning of career has changed over time, but in the 1940s it came to denote an acceptable occupation rewarded with education, promotion opportunity, good pay, benefits, and a retirement.

Internal Changes—The Doolittle Board. Reforms within the military also helped Americans see the armed forces in a new light. Much of the credit for these reforms came from enlisted veterans who voiced their concerns after returning home from the war and the three ex-enlisted men who, along with three ex-officers served on the Doolittle Board. On March 27,1946, the Officer and Enlisted Man's Relationship Board met in Washington, DC. Nicknamed the Doolittle Board after its chairman, Lieutenant General James Doolittle, the board sought a way to make the Army more compatible with a democratic nation. The report sketched the framework for postwar military reforms by advocating pay scales connected with industry, promotion based on merit, grievance procedures and a manual of enlisted men's rights, and the idea that all off-duty military personnel be free to pursue normal social patterns comparable to the nation's democratic ways of life.

Structure. The Air Force has always favored an enlisted force structure with a high percentage of senior noncommissioned officers. Beginning in the 1920s, the Army Air Service, compared to the other services, preferred a "top-heavy" enlisted grade structure. Military leaders believed the technological demands of the airplane and length of training to make personnel proficient required a more senior, highly-skilled, and experienced enlisted force. From its inception, a chief Air Force goal was to create a stable, well-trained cadre of career-bound noncommissioned officers. The Air Force formally expressed this policy in the early 1960s when it announced a program—55/45 Air Force—to stabilize the enlisted force structure. The program envisioned an enlisted force consisting of 55 percent career Airmen and 45 percent first-term Airmen. The Air Force believed that such a balance

would answer both the service's needs for highly skilled enlisted members and still provide for adequate promotion opportunities. Although the percentage of career Airmen versus first-term Airmen has varied over the years, the 55/45 balance has remained the standard.

Force Management

The Airman Career Program, the Weighted Airman Promotion System (WAPS), and the Total Objective Plan for Career Airman Personnel (TOPCAP) aimed to create an ideal enlisted force structure with balanced experience levels and opportunities for advancement.

Airman Career Program. Central to the creation of the career force was a new classification system that tied enlisted personnel to distinct career paths known as Air Force specialties—each job received a specialty code. In the late 1950s, the Airman Career Program replaced the old Army classification system used during WWII. This program provided a means for supervisors to rate enlisted personnel by skill level (merit), as well as time in service and time in grade (longevity).

Weighted Airman Promotion System (WAPS). Hand-in-hand with the Airman Career Program was the introduction of a new promotion system. Initially, the Air Force retained the Army's promotion system that based promotions on unit or squadron vacancies. In 1953, the Army system was dropped in favor of a centralized promotion system. The centralized system set quotas within career fields and individual specialties with the idea of reducing overages in any field or specialty by attrition and a retraining program. By the late 1950s, there was severe promotion stagnation in most career fields caused by the massive influx of personnel during the Korean Conflict buildup, known later as the "Korean hump." The promotion system was neither systematic nor well understood by enlisted personnel. Despite efforts to explain the system and improve it, complaints mounted until they captured the attention of Congressman L. Mendel Rivers, Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee. He held a series of hearings that resulted in the Air Force and Army initiating major policy revisions. The Air Force adopted the Weighted Airman Promotion System (WAPS) in 1970. The WAPS made promotion contingent on clearly defined criteria, such as test scores and time in grade.

Total Objective Plan for Career Airman Personnel (TOPCAP). Implemented during fiscal year 1973, TOPCAP initiated an up-or-out career path for noncommissioned officers, similar to the officer program. It was adopted to specifically address the Korean hump. TOPCAP set a high-year-of-tenure mark for the various enlisted grades. For example, under the original TOPCAP plan, staff sergeants (SSgt) could serve only 20 years before being required to retire, while chief master sergeant (CMSgt) could serve a maximum of 30 years.

Management Training

Within a year of separation, air planners began working on two programs that eventually laid the unifying groundwork for making the noncommissioned officer a professional body. The first, the Airman Career Program, has been discussed. Second, they adopted management training as a precursor for noncommissioned officer education. A professional noncommissioned officer by definition had to be an expert in his or her military job and increasingly a trained manager of military resources. In 1952, the first noncommissioned officer academy was opened in England under the Strategic Air Command and management training evolved into the current Professional Military Education (PME) system in 1984.

The Evolution of the Roles of the Noncommissioned Officer

Although the Air Force collaborated with the Military Service Publishing Company to produce a handbook for noncommissioned officers and Airmen as early as 1948, there were still no specific definitions of noncommissioned officer duties by 1953. In early 1953, planners asked noncommissioned officers to prepare a regulation identifying noncommissioned officer responsibilities. Essentially, the definitions that emerged described individuals who were both leaders and managers. They could work without supervision, understand complex job-related problems, and train subordinates in technical and military subjects. Regardless of their technical specialty, they were also military leaders. Hence, the definition called for them to conduct drill and ceremonies, understand the Uniform Code of Military Justice, and become thoroughly familiar with the history of their unit.

Since planners gave no instructions on how to implement this new regulation, Major Commands (MAJCOM) and units began devising their own programs. A survey of noncommissioned officers at Scott Air Force Base, Illinois, resulted in guidance reemphasizing the privileges, authority, and responsibilities of noncommissioned officers. Master sergeants (MSgt) were exempted from most additional duties, including retreat formations, while technical sergeants (TSgt) and staff sergeants (SSgt) performed duties such as barracks chief, mess count, and quarters inspector. Noncommissioned officers received head-of-the-line privileges in pay lines, retreat formations, and in mess halls. They could also cash checks without an officer's endorsement and were not restricted by distance of travel during their off-duty time. Separate "NCO-only" tables were established at the mess halls and separate rooms were established for single NCOs. Finally, like officers, "the word of NCOs" was directed by the Scott Air Force Base installation commander to be "accepted, without question, by all personnel."

Other bases also contributed new ideas for boosting noncommissioned officer status. Some commanders formed noncommissioned officer advisory councils in which participants discussed Air Force quality-of-life issues and many installation commanders assigned officers' jobs to NCOs. At Sampson Air Force Base, New York, Major General Richard Lindsay assigned four NCOs to take over the jobs of supply officers. In the Continental Air Command headquarters, two master sergeants took charge of the records management program and received commendation medals for handling jobs usually assigned to field grade officers. At Kelly Air Force Base, Texas, in the Continental Military Air Transport

Service Command, the commander assigned each NCO the job of training specialist. There, each NCO was responsible for the complete training of five subordinates and for recommending the promotion action for each.

Senior Master Sergeant (SMSgt) and Chief Master Sergeant (CMSgt) Grades. By the late 1950s, the Air Force faced two related personnel problems—promotion stagnation due to the "Korean hump" and the sometimes less-than-clear status of its warrant officers. The promotion stagnation had a terrible impact on morale and the Air Force had a number of warrant officers whom it did not know how to categorize. In 1958, Congress created two new enlisted grades: senior master sergeant (SMSgt), with a pay grade of E-8, and chief master sergeant (CMSgt), with a pay grade E-9, to help alleviate these problems. The new grades opened up promotions and, rather than promoting senior supervisory NCOs to warrant officers, the Air Force could now promote highly qualified NCOs to senior master sergeant and chief master sergeant. Although added responsibility did not come immediately with the new grades, it did come eventually as NCOs proved they could handle whatever the Air Force asked of them.

Senior Noncommissioned Officer Responsibilities. In the early 1970s, the Air Force addressed the issue of increased responsibility for senior noncommissioned officers. Since the creation of the grades of senior master sergeant (SMSgt) and chief master sergeant (CMSgt), individuals holding these grades complained they were not granted responsibilities commensurate with their grade. A number of Major Command (MAJCOM) and wing commanders individually adopted the practice of choosing a senior enlisted advisor. These individuals worked with and advised commanders on all matters relating to the enlisted force. Eventually this lead to the creation of the Chief Master Sergeant of the Air Force (CMSAF) position and senior enlisted advisors (SEA). Later still, the title senior enlisted advisors (SEA) changed to command chief master sergeants (CCM).

Chief Master Sergeant of the Air Force (CMSAF). The idea of creating a Chief Master Sergeant of the Air Force (CMSAF) position surfaced in the Air Force as early as 1964, when the Air Force Association's Airman Advisory Council presented the idea. At that time, Air Force leadership rejected the proposal, fearing that such a position might undermine the formal chain of command. Purposeful action did not come until 1966, when Congressman Rivers introduced a bill that would mandate each of the services to appoint a senior noncommissioned officer. Congressman Rivers became convinced the Air Force needed to follow the example of the Marine Corps, which had created the position of Sergeant Major of the Marine Corps in 1957, and the Army, which had created the position of Sergeant Major of the Army in 1965, and appoint a senior enlisted advisor to the Air Force Chief of Staff. Although the Rivers bill never passed, the Air Force recognized the tremendous support behind the proposal. On October 24, 1966, Air Force Chief of Staff General John P. McConnell announced the creation of the position of Chief Master Sergeant of the Air Force (CMSAF). In April 1967, Chief Master Sergeant Paul W. Airey became the first to wear the unique insignia with the wreath around the star. Over the next decade, support for the office grew among both the senior leadership and within the enlisted force.

Senior Enlisted Advisors (SEA). From the beginning, the Chief Master Sergeant of the Air Force (CMSAF) relied upon a network of senior noncommissioned officers at each major command. Lieutenant General A. J. Russel, Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, made it official when he wrote in 1970, "The durability of the positions at major command level to provide the commander an additional channel of communication with Airmen and NCOs is recognized." To meet this need, commanders were authorized to establish a senior Airman advisor position. "Use of the title Senior Enlisted Advisor for such positions is considered appropriate," General Russel wrote.

On November 1, 1998, the title "senior enlisted advisor" formally changed to "command chief master sergeant" (CCM) to designate wing-level chief master sergeant advisors. The major command positions reflect the change and are called major command, command chief master sergeant. The creation of CMSAF, as well as the appointment of SEAs and the granting of more responsibility to all senior NCOs, represented the Air Force's concrete recognition of the professionalism of its enlisted force, especially its NCOs.

ACHIEVEMENTS OF ENLISTED AIRMEN

Many enlisted Airmen have made great sacrifices and contributions to our nation. The following lists highlight enlisted Airmen who have been honored with our nation's and Air Force's highest awards and have made significant contributions to our present military force.

Enlisted Medal of Honor Recipients

The Medal of Honor is the highest award for valor in action against an enemy force which can be bestowed upon an individual serving in the Armed Services of the United States. It is generally presented to its recipient by the President of the United States of America in the name of Congress.

World War II

- Sergeant Maynard H. Smith

- Staff Sergeant Archibald Mathies

- Technical Sergeant Forrest L. Vosler

- Staff Sergeant Henry E. Erwin

Vietnam War

- Airman First Class William H. Pitsenbarger

- Airman First Class John L. Levitow

- Chief Master Sergeant Richard L. Etchberger

Enlisted Air Force Cross Recipients

The Air Force Cross is awarded to US and foreign military personnel and civilians who have displayed extraordinary heroism in one of the following situations: while engaged in action against a US enemy, while engaged in military operations involving conflict with a foreign force, or while serving with a friendly nation engaged in armed conflict against a force in which the United States is not a belligerent party. The Air Force Cross is awarded when the heroic actions fall just short of warranting the Congressional Medal of Honor.

Prior to 1960, when Congress established the Air Force Cross, enlisted men were decorated with the Distinguished Service Cross for heroic actions. In the Vietnam era, countless Airman performed brave acts which were above and beyond the call of duty; however, of the enlisted airmen, only 21 were awarded the Air Force Cross. Since 1975, only three Airman have earned the award, bringing the total to 24 recipients.

Vietnam War

- Airman First Class William A. Robinson

- Airman Third Class Arthur N. Black

- Airman First Class William H. Pitsenbarger

- Airman Second Class Duane D. Hackney

- Sergeant Russell M. Hunt

- Staff Sergeant Eugene L. Clay

- Sergeant Larry W. Maysey

- Chief Master Sergeant Richard L. Etchberger

- Sergeant Dennis M. Richardson

- Sergeant Nacey Kent, Jr.

- Sergeant Thomas A. Newman

- Airman First Class Joel E. Talley

- Technical Sergeant Victor R. Adams

- Airman First Class Charles D. King

- Sergeant Michael E. Fish

- Technical Sergeant Donald G. Smith

- Sergeant Theodore R. Hamlin

- Technical Sergeant Leroy M. Wright

- Staff Sergeant Charles L. Shaub

- Sergeant Charles D. McGrath

- Staff Sergeant Jon D. Harston

Somalia

- Technical Sergeant Timothy A. Wilkinson

Operation Enduring Freedom

- Senior Airman Jason D. Cunningham

- Technical Sergeant John A. Chapman

Other Significant Enlisted Achievements

Throughout the history of American air power, enlisted men and women have left their mark. From the Airman on the flight line to the Airman processing individuals for deployment, the enlisted corps ensures that the nation's air arm is ready to meet any challenge. This section highlights significant enlisted heritage events and a few of the many achievements made by enlisted members.

- *30 June 1898.* Sergeant William Ivy makes the first balloon ascent of the Spanish-American War.

- *1 August 1907.* Corporal Eddie Ward and Private First Class Joseph Barrett are assigned to the newly established Army Signal Corps aeronautical division as the first enlisted Airmen.

- *August 1910.* Corporal Glen Madole helps develop tricycle landing gear for the Army's first airplane.

- *1912.* Private Beckwith Havens becomes the first National Guard aviator.

- *14 August 1912.* Sergeant Vernon Burge receives rating as the Army's first enlisted pilot.

- *28 September 1912.* In College Park, Maryland, Corporal Frank Scott becomes the first enlisted man to die in a plane crash. Scott Air Force Base, Illinois, is named in his honor.

- *29 April 1914.* Sergeant William Ocker receives his pilot license. Ocker was the first pilot to take aloft an airborne radio and is known as the father of blind (instrument) flight.

- *18 July 1914.* Congress creates the Aviation Section of the Signal Corps and authorizes the training of enlisted pilots.

- *27 August 1916.* Private Frederick Libby becomes the first American to down five enemy aircraft in WWI.

- *5 November 1916.* Eugene Bullard, the first African-American aviator, enlists in the French Flying Corps.

- *3 June 1918.* Corporal John G. Oechsner shares his invention of "the variable pitch propeller" with the War Department, but the War Department rejects it.

- *19 May 1919.* Master Sergeant Ralph Bottriel makes the first parachute jump with a backpack parachute.

- *5 September 1923.* Staff Sergeant Ulysses S. Nero sinks the battleship USS *New Jersey*, helping Brigadier General William "Billy" Mitchell further prove air viability against naval warships.

- *14 December 1923.* Sergeant A. B. Jewell and Sergeant K. T. Widekamp complete the first cross-country bomber flight.

- *17 March 1924.* Sergeant Alva L. Harvey, Sergeant Henry Ogden, and Sergeant Jack Harding take off in Douglas Cruisers on what is to become the first "around the world" flight.

- *2 July 1926.* Congress enacts House Resolution 10827, stating enlisted pilots would comprise 20 percent of tactical units in peacetime.

- *1 January–7 January 1929.* Sergeant Roy Hooe participates in the world record endurance flight of the Air Corps aircraft Question Mark.

- *1933–1941.* Master Sergeant Harley Fogleman founded and served as the first commander of what was later to become Edwards Air Force Base, California.

- *1935–1941.* Master Sergeant Ralph Gray develops the high altitude fuel pressure regulator.

- *7 March 1942.* Class 42-C, containing 93 Airmen, graduates from Kelly and Ellington Fields as the first enlisted pilot group trained under Public Law 99.

- *11 May 1942.* Army Air Force Private Joe Alexander is captured by the Japanese in the Philippines becoming the youngest prisoner of war in WWII at age 15.

- *August 1943.* Staff Sergeant Benjamin F. Warmer is publicly awarded the title of "Ace" by General Spaatz, although he was never officially recognized by the Army Air Forces.

- *17 August 1946.* First Sergeant Lawrence Lambert becomes the first Airman to test an ejection seat, for which he receives the Cheney Award.

- *8 July 1948.* Women's Army Corps (WAC) Staff Sergeant Esther Blake becomes the first woman to enlist in the Air Force.

- *9 November 1950.* Sergeant Harry J. Lavene becomes the first enlisted aerial gunner MiG "killer."

- *November 1952.* The first permanent professional military education course, noncommissioned officer academy, opens in England, under Strategic Air Command.

- *9 February 1958.* Airman First Class Donald G. Farrell "lifts off" on the first simulated trip to the moon.

- *1 June 1960.* Grace A. Peterson becomes the first female chief master sergeant.

- *6 June 1961.* Sergeant James Howell performs the first live supersonic seat ejection.

- *1967.* Chief Master Sergeant George R. Edenfield designs the first egress seat trainer, better known as the Edenfield trainer.

- *3 April 1967.* Chief Master Sergeant Paul Airey is installed as the first Chief Master Sergeant of the Air Force.

- *18 December 1972.* Tail gunner Staff Sergeant Samuel Turner scores the first of only two aerial kills ever from a B-52, during Operation Linebacker II in Vietnam.

- *1 September 1979.* Chief Master Sergeant Dorothy Holmes is the first enlisted female to retire with 30 years of total active federal military service (TAFMS).

- *11 July 1990.* Chief Master Sergeant Thomas J. Williams is the first enlisted recipient of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) Roy Wilkins Meritorious Award.

- *30 September 1991.* Four enlisted gunners fly the last "aircrew gunner" mission at Minot Air Force Base, North Dakota, ending 75 years of enlisted aircraft gunners aboard bomber aircraft. (NOTE: Aircraft armament systems specialists, AFSC 2W1X1, continue to serve as aerial gunners aboard MH-53 Pave Low, HH-60 Pave Hawk, and AC-130 Spectre aircraft.)

The Air Force Enlisted Heritage Research Institute (AFEHRI)

The Air Force Enlisted Heritage Research Institute (AFEHRI) was established at Maxwell-Gunter Air Force Base, Alabama on May 23,1997, by Lieutenant General Joseph Redden, Commander, Air University. The institute's mission is to preserve the rich and dramatic heritage and tradition of the enlisted corps of the US Air Force and predecessor services in the development of air power. The institute is home to the Enlisted Heritage Hall, which features artifacts, art collections, pictorial exhibits, written and oral documentation, videos, and photograph collections.

THE ENLISTED FORCE STRUCTURE

Philosophy. The enlisted force is a diverse corps of functionally and operationally specialized Airmen. Yet, despite the natural differences found across functional and operational lines, there is a compelling need for a common approach to career progression, professional development, and the assumption of increased supervisory and leadership responsibilities. To best leverage our resources we must have consistent, well-defined expectations, standards, and opportunities for growth for all Airmen, regardless of specialty or command. The enlisted force structure provides this consistency and common approach. It is the enlisted force structure that defines the enlisted corps as Airmen, rather than merely specialists.

All elements of the enlisted force structure reflect the Air Force Core Values of Integrity First, Service Before Self, and Excellence in All We Do, and are essential to the profession of arms. The Core Values are the basis for Air Force policies, guidance, and overall focus.

Purpose. The enlisted force structure defines the responsibilities of each rank to best meets mission requirements. It provides a common, stable career structure for all enlisted personnel, and provide all Airmen the opportunity for professional growth.

Three-Tier Enlisted Force Structure

The enlisted force is comprised of distinct and separate tiers. Each correlates to increased levels of training, education, technical competence, experience, leadership, and managerial responsibilities. These three tiers are junior enlisted airman, noncommissioned officer (NCO, and senior noncommissioned officer (SNCO).

The Junior Enlisted Airman Tier. This tier consists of airman basic (AB), airman (Amn), airman first class (A1C), and senior airman (SrA). These Airmen are initially focused on adapting to the requirements of the military profession, achieving technical proficiency, and learning to be highly productive members of the Air Force. Once promoted to SrA, they begin to exercise limited supervision and leadership as they prepare for increased responsibilities, while continuing to broaden their technical skills. The following four ranks comprise the junior enlisted airman tier:

- *Airman Basic (AB).* An airman basic is primarily in a learning capacity, adapting to the requirements of the military profession, acquiring knowledge of military customs, courtesies, and Air Force standards, as well as striving to attain technical proficiency. He or she can perform basic tasks under close supervision when at their first duty station. ABs operate at the tactical level. The official term of address is Airman Basic or Airman.

- *Airman (Amn).* An airman, while still learning and adapting to the military profession, is expected to understand and conform to military standards, customs, and courtesies. An Amn begins to show job proficiency at basic tasks and still requires significant supervision and support. An Amn operates at the tactical level. The official term of address is Airman.

- *Airman First Class (A1C).* An airman first class must fully comply with Air Force standards and is expected to devote his or her efforts to the mastery of skills required in the career field and the military profession while simultaneously becoming effective team members. After a few months at the first duty station, A1Cs are usually skilled on numerous tasks. Continued supervision is essential to an A1C's ongoing technical and professional growth. An A1C typically earns his or her 5-skill level at this grade. An A1C operates at the tactical level. The official term of address is Airman First Class or Airman.

- *Senior Airman (SrA). A* senior airman commonly performs as a skilled technician and trainer. It is essential that a SrA begins developing supervisory and leadership skills through progressive responsibility on the job, professional military education, individual study, and supervisor mentoring. When utilized as supervisors, SrA strive to establish themselves as effective first-line supervisors through the maximum use of guidance and assistance from the NCOs above them. A SrA may serve as a reporting official, or supervisor, upon completion of Airman Leadership School (ALS). A SrA operates at the tactical level. The official term of address is Senior Airman or Airman.

The Noncommissioned Officer (NCO) Tier. This tier consists of staff sergeant (SSgt) and technical sergeant (TSgt). NCOs continue their technical growth, become expert hands-on technicians, and serve as first-line supervisors. NCOs ensure their team members work together to accomplish the mission. NCOs are responsible for training and developing the Airmen they supervise to become future NCOs. They also continue to develop their own leadership skills in preparation for increased responsibilities. The following two ranks comprise the NCO tier:

- *Staff Sergeant (SSgt).* A staff sergeant is primarily a highly-skilled technician with supervisory and training responsibilities. A staff sergeant must continuously strive to further his or her development as a technician. A SSgt must also strive for greater supervisory competence and should be given opportunities to demonstrate leadership as he or she develops. A SSgt is responsible for his or her subordinates and the effective accomplishment of all assigned tasks. He or she ensures proper and effective use of all personnel and materiel under his or her control. A SSgt operates at the tactical level. The official term of address is Staff Sergeant or Sergeant.

- *Technical Sergeant (TSgt).* In addition to providing sound supervision and training, a technical sergeant is often a technical expert within his or her specialty. He or she is responsible for the development of all assigned enlisted personnel. A TSgt must obtain maximum performance from each subordinate and ensure the

mission is efficiently and effectively accomplished. A TSgt must continuously strive to broaden and perfect his or her technical expertise and supervisory techniques. The official term of address is Technical Sergeant or Sergeant.

The Senior Noncommissioned Officer (SNCO) Tier. This tier consists of master sergeant (MSgt), senior master sergeant (SMSgt), and chief master sergeant (CMSgt). Senior noncommissioned officers are a critical component of the Air Force's ability to project air power. SNCOs have a great deal of experience and leadership ability, which they use to leverage resources and personnel against a variety of mission requirements. The SNCO's primary focus is on accomplishing the organization's mission through the skillful use of teams. They also concentrate on further developing teams and people, both technically and professionally. They participate in the decision-making process, as appropriate, on a variety of technical, operational, and organizational issues. A few go on to serve at the highest levels in the Air Force as strategic leaders and managers. The following three ranks comprise the SNCO tier:

- *Master Sergeant (MSgt).* Master sergeants are transitioning from technical expert and first-line supervisors to operational leader, able to merge personnel talents, skills, and resources with other teams' functions to effectively accomplish the mission, while continuing to develop leadership and management skills. This rank carries significantly increased responsibilities and requires broad technical and managerial perspective. MSgt-selects should immediately enroll in and complete Course 12 or 14, the senior noncommissioned officer professional military education distance learning courses, in preparation for their new role. MSgts normally operate at the operational level of leadership. The official term of address is Master Sergeant or Sergeant.

- *Senior Master Sergeant (SMSgt).* Senior master sergeants are key, experienced, operational leaders, skilled at merging personnel talents, skills, and resources with other teams' functions to effectively accomplish the mission. SMSgts continue to develop their leadership and management skills in preparation for expanded responsibilities and higher leadership positions. SMSgts normally operate at the operational level of leadership. Per United States Code, no more than two percent of the enlisted force can hold this rank at any given time. The official term of address is Senior Master Sergeant or Sergeant.

- *Chief Master Sergeant (CMSgt).* The rank of chief master sergeant is the highest enlisted rank in the Air Force, with the exception of the CMSAF. Per United States Code, no more than one percent of the enlisted force can hold this rank at any given time. Since its inception, the CMSgt has evolved to hold a very distinctive role in the force. Superiors and subordinates alike rightfully place very high expectations upon those serving in this grade. CMSgts serve in key leadership roles at all levels in the Air Force from flight level to the Air Staff. They serve as commandants, superintendents, program managers, Command Chief Master Sergeants (CCM), functional managers, and career field managers. The Air Force ensures only the very best noncommissioned officers are promoted to this top

rank. CMSgts, as senior leaders, must at all times epitomize the finest qualities of a military leader. CMSgts bring substantial institutional, operational, and functional experience, as well as strong leadership skills, to their organizations and to all assigned tasks. CMSgts must continually strive to further develop their leadership and management skills to prepare for future roles. As key mentors, they must actively develop their junior enlisted, NCOs, and SNCOs into enlisted leaders. CMSgts serve at the operational and strategic levels, depending on assignment. The official term of address is Chief Master Sergeant or Chief.

Special Senior Noncommissioned Officer Positions

First Sergeant. The first sergeant is an expeditionary leader serving in a special duty position, rich in custom and tradition. The first sergeant works directly for—and derives authority from—the commander at home station and deployed locations, and serves as the commander's critical link within the unit for all matters concerning enlisted members. A distinguishing diamond device on the chevron identifies the first sergeant. In today's rapidly deployable Air Force, the first sergeant is critical to providing the commander a mission-ready force to execute the unit mission. As the vital link between the commander, unit personnel, and support agencies, the first sergeant must ensure the force understands the commander's policies, goals, and objectives, and that support agencies are responsive to the needs of unit personnel and their families. Additionally, the first sergeant must remain vigilant for and move to resolve issues that, left unchecked, would adversely impact Airmen readiness.

The first sergeant is responsible for providing sound advice to the commander on a wide range of topics including the health, esprit de corps, discipline, mentoring, well-being, career progression, recognition, and professional development of all assigned enlisted members. Furthermore, working with his or her fellow SNCOs and supervisors, the first sergeant ensures discipline is equitably maintained, and the goals of health, esprit de corps, discipline, mentoring, and welfare of the enlisted force are met.

In addition to responsibilities and obligations at the unit level, first sergeants must work closely with the Command Chief Master Sergeant (CCM) to prepare the enlisted force to execute the wing and base missions. They must also participate in a variety of activities that support the total needs of the military community. Based on the cumulative and important responsibilities and the impact of this position, only the most dedicated professional senior noncommissioned officers should apply and be selected for this special duty.

Superintendent. The superintendent is the senior noncommissioned officer who is the enlisted leader of the squadron, group, or wing-level functions. Only senior noncommissioned officers will hold the duty title of Superintendent.

Command Chief Master Sergeant (CCM). The Command Chief Master Sergeant (CCM) position exists at the major command (MAJCOM), wing, and/or other authorized organizational levels. Command Chief Master Sergeants (CCM) lead the enlisted force in that organization and advise commanders on matters that affect the enlisted force,

such as proper utilization, quality of enlisted leadership, management and supervisor training, operations tempo, and quality of life. CCMs monitor compliance with Air Force standards, serve on advisory councils, and maintain a close relationship with the local community. They maintain a liaison between their commander, the enlisted force, and staff members, and they communicate with commanders on problems, concerns, morale, and attitudes of the enlisted force. They also ensure the enlisted force knows and understands commander policies. They serve as the functional manager for assigned first sergeants. A distinguishing star device on the chevron identifies the CCM.

Chief Master Sergeant of the Air Force (CMSAF). The position of Chief Master Sergeant of the Air Force was created to provide a representative voice for issues concerning the enlisted corps. The CMSAF acts as personal advisor to the Air Force Chief of Staff and Secretary of the Air Force regarding the welfare, health, morale, proper utilization, and progress of the enlisted force. In this capacity, the CMSAF testifies before various legislative committees on issues such as pay and compensation. The CMSAF is the senior-ranking enlisted member in the Air Force.

ENLISTED PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT

Enlisted Upgrade Training

Upgrade training is the key to the total enlisted training program. It is designed to increase skills and abilities in our enlisted force and leads to the award of a higher skill level. Each Air Force specialty code (AFSC) sets upgrade requirements for the award of 3-, 5-, 7-, and 9-skill levels. Depending on the specific career field, the awarding of each skill level can require on-the-job training, formal training, a career development course (CDC), and/or certain time requirements. The intent of the career development course (CDC) is to teach technical skills for the skill level desired. CDCs are tested and Airmen must pass the CDC test with the set minimum score or higher.

Enlisted Professional Military Education

The Thomas N. Barnes Center for Enlisted Education. The Barnes Center discharges Air University's responsibility for the education of future enlisted leaders throughout the Air Force. It began in 1993 as the College for Enlisted Professional Military Education, and since its inception the Barnes Center has been refining, adapting, and deploying professional military education curriculum for enlisted education in the world's best Air Force. The mission is implemented by the following in-residence schools:

- **Airman Leadership School (ALS)**. Airman Leadership School is the first of three programs enlisted professionals complete during their Air Force careers. It is attended by senior airmen and is designed to provide the skills necessary to become an effective first-line supervisor. Completion of ALS in-residence is

required to perform duties as a reporting official, or rater, and to be eligible for promotion to staff sergeant. Airman Leadership Schools operate at almost every installation across the Air Force.

- **Noncommissioned Officer Academy (NCOA).** The Noncommissioned Officer Academy's mission is to prepare technical sergeants to be professional, war-fighting Airmen who can lead and manage Air Force units in the employment of air, space, and cyberspace power. The goal is for technical sergeants to understand their position in the military structure and develop the skills necessary to be effective supervisors and leaders. Resident NCOA completion is required within 2 years of sewing on TSgt and to be eligible for promotion to MSgt.

- **Senior Noncommissioned Officer Academy (SNCOA).** The Air Force established the Senior Noncommissioned Officer Academy in 1972 to enhance development of senior noncommissioned officers through professional military education. In January 1973, the SNCOA conducted its first class of 120 SNCOs at Maxwell AFB-Gunter Annex AL. The Senior Noncommissioned Officer Academy's mission is to prepare senior NCOs to lead the enlisted force in the employment of air, space, and cyberspace power in support of national security objectives. The vision of the SNCOA is to equip today's senor enlisted leaders to be tomorrow's expeditionary warriors. SNCOA in-residence is required for promotion to SMSgt.

The following courses are available via distance learning in addition to- or in-lieu of the in-residence courses :

- **Airman Leadership School (ALS—Course 1).** Airman Leadership School (Course 1) is a distance-based course available to Reserve and Air National Guard Airmen only. Course 1 consists of five volumes that prepare Airmen to be good communicators and supervisors. Course 1 graduates earn eight Community College of the Air Force (CCAF) semester hours of college credit.

- **Noncommissioned Officer Academy (NCOA—Course 9).** Noncommissioned Officer Academy (Course 9) is a distance-based course available to Reserve and Air National Guard Airmen only. Course 9 consists of five volumes that focus on being an operational Airman and manager. Course 9 graduates earn eight Community College of the Air Force (CCAF) semester hours of college credit.

- **Senior Noncommissioned Officer Academy (SNCOA—Course 14).** Senior noncommissioned officer professional military education (Course 14) is a distance-learning course. It is available to Air Force active duty, Reserve, and Air National Guard Airmen. Course 14 covers human resource and organizational management, among other topics. Although the course is voluntary, completion is highly encouraged for active duty personnel and required for a senior rater endorsement on SNCO enlisted performance reports. Course 14 graduates earn four Community College of the Air Force (CCAF) semester hours of college credit.

Conclusion

The enlisted force comprises approximately 80 percent of our Air Force. Understanding the roles, responsibilities, and history of the enlisted force is critical to being a leader in our Air Force. For more information regarding our enlisted force, Air Force Pamphlet (AFPAM) 36-2241, *Professional Development Guide, and* AFI 36-2618, *The Enlisted Force Structure,* are great resources.

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Bullet Statements

Affective Lesson Objective:

- Value the importance of writing effective bullet statements in accordance with AFH 33-337, *The Tongue & Quill*.

Affective Samples of Behavior:

- Assert the importance of writing effective bullet statements.

- Differentiate between effective and ineffective bullet statements.

- Explain the impact that effective bullet statements have on an Air Force career.

BECOMING A BETTER LEADER THROUGH IMPROVED WRITING SKILLS

Today's Air Force is more competitive than ever before. In order to advance, all leaders have to be able to write well and express themselves clearly. This is sometimes difficult for those who are not familiar with Air Force technical writing requirements. Effective communication skills, especially writing skills, can make the difference between a good officer and a great one. A leader with effective writing skills can launch the career of a well-deserving Airman or capture an Airman's inadequate performance to allow rehabilitation or separation from the Air Force. Your writing affects the careers of yourself and your Airmen. Documentation, both positive and negative, is required to distinguish your Airmen's accomplishments from others. Everything from letters of appreciation or performance reports to award nominations will significantly influence future promotions and ensure the Air Force's best are recognized.

In today's Air Force, lieutenants are thrust into leadership roles quicker than ever, doing jobs required of captains not so many years ago. Depending on a lieutenant's career field and unit size, he/she could supervise hundreds of people during his/her first assignment. Being new to a profession that expects the most from its leaders is hard enough, but when you have to look out for the careers and welfare of others, the pressure is on. Your ability to accurately capture performance and accomplishments in writing are crucial. You may be thinking, "I don't need to write, I'm only a lieutenant," or "Commanders, secretaries, and executive officers do the writing." Recognizing the outstanding skills, acts, or progress of your Airmen and then ensuring they receive adequate documentation is the sign of a concerned and dedicated leader.

Officer Performance Reports (OPR), Enlisted Performance Reports (EPR), and award nominations differ from letters of appreciation in one major way—you write in telegraphic bullet statements, not full sentences. Throughout our lives, we are taught to write in complete, flowing sentences that are pleasing to the eye—forget that. You are now in a different world with different customs, courtesies, and writing styles. OPRs and EPRs are a critical component of the enlisted and officer evaluation systems. Each time a supervisor completes a performance report, he/she is expected to evaluate an Airman's performance during the rating period and the individual's potential for future success. Throughout the entire reporting period, you should be keeping notes on specific accomplishments and acts of the Airmen you supervise. It is also important to have your Airmen keep notes on themselves. This will be a tremendous help when it comes time to write evaluations. It is hard to know everything your Airmen do during the rating period, and even more difficult to recall their achievements in a short time.

The Air Force uses the AF Form 1206 as the accepted method of submitting an award nomination, or award package, as you may hear it be referred to. Similar to the OPR or EPR, the AF Form 1206 is written in bullet statements expressing what the individual did and the impact of the action. Although each award's criteria is different, there are set categories in which to write. For example, a quarterly award package usually contains

the following categories: job performance in primary and additional duties, significant self-improvement, and base or community involvement. Most awards look for the well-rounded individual, not just the best worker. Therefore, you must encourage your Airmen to volunteer for activities and events, both on base and in the local community. Along with encouraging volunteering their time and efforts for good causes, you should also ensure they are improving themselves. Check the progress of on-the-job training and the pursuit of a degree or other certification, whether it be through the Community College of the Air Force or another higher-learning institution. These are important aspects of bettering oneself and raising an Airman's chance for promotion. Being proactive and staying involved on an every day basis, instead of waiting until an awards package is due, will make you a better leader and writer and your Airmen will become more productive members of the Air Force.

Being a good officer and leader means managing your time between mission and people. You must be able to successfully accomplish your unit's mission, but you can't do it without the help of your people. If you take care of your people by taking the time to recognize their efforts, your personnel will have a personal investment in helping you achieve mission success.

Ensuring you take the time to write high-quality OPRs, EPRs, and awards packages gets Airmen the recognition they deserve and are great ways to look out for the well-being and future success of your Airmen. Developing your writing skills will not only help each individual you supervise, but will make the Air Force a better place to work. Our overall objective is to describe an accurate word picture of an individual in the reader's mind. As a leader, you should make this a top priority. Whether it's an award package or performance report, the way these are written can **MAKE** or **BREAK** a career!

What is a Bullet Statement?

There is very little information written concerning writing effective bullets. The best guide you have is AFH 33-337, *The Tongue and Quill*; the accepted guideline for writing in the Air Force today. *The Tongue and Quill* defines a bullet statement as the "clear, concise "bottom line" of an idea or a single accomplishment and its impact. Additionally, according to AFI 36-2406, bullets are limited to two lines per bullet. However, two lines for every bullet is going to be too much—that can take up a lot of space! So, the first thing to do is to find out what the rules are in your organization. Just as every boss or commander is different, people will be different on their expectations and requirements. Some units will mandate writing one-line bullets, while others will say two-line bullets are fine. Neither is wrong—it goes back to what the commander wants and his/her expectations.

Bullet statements are short, fragmented, telegraphic statements written to do two things: recount an accomplishment (action) and show significance (impact). A lack of critical information leads to confusing, ambiguous, or weak bullet statements. Compare the following bullet statements:

- Superstar NCO; took care of his responsibilities in a timely manner; ready for more

- Revamped unit fitness management folders; created history sheets to chronicle each individual's performance

- Tracked and reported gains/losses to unit superintendent; enabled SFS/CC and ACC/SF to make accurate manning decisions regarding AEF

The first bullet has neither of the two critical components mentioned above. It is vague and meaningless and shows laziness on the part of the writer.

The second bullet shows promise but could be better. It did recount the action and give a related outcome (revamped fitness management folders and created history sheets). However, it is missing the significance, or impact factor. As a new supervisor for this Airman, what does this statement mean to you? It probably does not mean much unless you have worked with the fitness management program before. This is why the significance aspect is so important—certain things will mean little to others not directly involved or with first-hand knowledge.

The third bullet has each of the critical components. Any new commander or supervisor can understand the importance of sustaining critical mission requirements. When you, as the writer or supervisor, produce quality bullet statement on one of your Airmen's EPRs, you send a signal to your Airmen that you care about their future in the Air Force. Furthermore, when it comes time to write other awards packages, you will have quality inputs to cut and paste from the EPR to the AF Form 1206.

Two Elements of an Effective Bullet Statement (T&Q, pages 211-213, 225-235)

An effective bullet has two elements—the **accomplishment** and the **impact**.

ACCOMPLISHMENT. The accomplishment should answer: *What did the person do? How well was the action done? What was the result?* Ensure the bullet statement is specific, accurate, and brief. Quantify as much as possible; use percentages, numbers, time and money values, time and money saved, the number of personnel supervised, and resource oversight.

> **Example:** Managed dynamic training program for 548 personnel with 100% completion rate

IMPACT. The impact should answer: *What level (unit, wing, base, AF) was affected? What is the overall significance (or so what)?* Make sure to qualify and quantify here, too… it helps reader understand the importance. Consider the impact to the overall mission or big picture; ask, "So what?" Then ask, "So what?" again to ensure you find the true impact.

>   **Example:** Ensured wing fully-qualified for 41 short-notice deployments and 127 worldwide assignments

COMPLETE ACCOMPLISHMENT-IMPACT (A-I) BULLET: Managed dynamic training program for 548 personnel with 100% completion rate; ensured wing fully-qualified for 41 short-notice deployments and 127 worldwide assignments

Writing Military Style

As you can see, the nature of writing in the military is very different than writing in the civilian sector. In general, writing military style encompasses the elements of "writing in plain English" and the components of writing effectively. These principles specifically apply when it comes time to writing award packages or performance reports; however, you'll write using the bullet statement. It is important to know that bullet statement format breaks the rules of standard grammar—it focuses on concise specifics rather than general information and is not in the normal sentence format.

Basic Formatting Techniques

Follow these guidelines to ensure your bullet statements flow effectively:

- Do not use periods (.) at the end of bullet statements

- Use the double dash (—), ellipsis (…) or semicolon (;) to indicate a pause or break in thought

- Use exclamation marks (!) sparingly

- Generally, avoid using articles (a, an, the), conjunctions (and, but, or) and pronouns (he, she, him, her)

- Avoid using negative words (isn't, can't)

Size and Length of Bullets

Normally, bullets should be written in one to two lines. The primary bullet shouldn't have more than one or two secondary sub-bullets. A sub-bullet indicates the result, impact or scope of the primary bullet. Leave as little "white space" as possible at the end of a line or bullet. Avoid allowing a single word to go to a second line. Allowing a word or two on a second line will waste valuable space; you want to minimize all the white space, or unused space, on a line or in the block of the form being used.

Writing Tips

For our purposes here, we'll focus on writing a positive, effective bullet statement. This will help you paint an extraordinary word picture for the deserving individual. Remember, the outcome could have a direct impact on an individual's career. You'll have the awesome opportunity to help others obtain their goals and dreams!

- Use hard-hitting facts, actions, and phrases; start with a strong, fact-filled statement

- Each bullet should contain substance; limit "fluff"

- Use active voice

- Be enthusiastic and make your writing come alive!

- Focus on outstanding duty performance

- Use common terms everyday people can understand, instead of using job specific jargon

- Validate with comments from outside agencies (HQ USAF, MAJCOM, Wing, etc.)

Final Thoughts

Describing the accomplishments of your personnel is one of the most important responsibilities a leader has. It is extremely important to take the time to capture the actions completed and craft those into award-winning bullets on performance reports and award nominations. Focus on the elements of "writing in plain English" to write powerful, effective bullet statements. Continually strive to improve your writing and you will help build others' careers and give them the recognition they richly deserve!

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Bullet Statement Practicum

Activity Statement:

- Create bullet statements based on a simulated situation in accordance with AFH 33-337, *The Tongue and Quill*.

Affective Lesson Objective:

- Respond to the importance of effective bullet statements.

Affective Sample of Behavior:

- Demonstrate effective bullet statement development in accordance with AFH 33-337, *The Tongue and Quill*.

**All materials for this lesson will be provided during classroom session.

Airman Comprehensive Assessment Process

Cognitive Lesson Objective:
- Know key elements of the Airman Comprehensive Assessment (ACA) Process.

Cognitive Samples of Behavior:
- State the purpose of the ACA

- Identify which Airmen are required to receive an ACA.

- State when ACA sessions are held for each rank.

- Describe the sources of rater errors.

- Identify the ways to avoid rater errors.

Affective Lesson Objective:
- Value the ACA Process.

Affective Sample of Behavior:
- Assert the importance of the ACA.

This lesson will give you a basic understanding of the ACA component of both the officer and enlisted evaluation systems. Your understanding of the ACA Process is vitally important because it is the first step to improving performance and significantly impacts career progression. This lesson will focus on who is required to receive an ACA and how to conduct proper ACA sessions.

FORMAL ASSESSMENT PROCESS

Airman Comprehensive Assessment is private, formal communication between a rater and ratee to communicate responsibility, accountability, Air Force culture, Airman's critical role in support of the mission, individual readiness, and performance feedback on expectations regarding duty performance and how well the ratee is meeting those expectations to include information to assist the ratee in achieving success. It is intended to increase Airmen interaction and support at all levels. If done correctly, mentorship will create and sustain a culture of belonging. The ACA is also intended to provide Airmen an opportunity to discuss their personal and professional goals The ACA session is not to be confused with normal day-to-day feedback; this type of feedback does not require formal documentation.

ACA Requirements:

- An initial ACA session is held for all Airmen from AB–Col, within 60 days of being assigned a rating official.

- A mid-term ACA session is held for all Airmen in the ranks of AB–SMSgt and 2d Lt–Lt Col. This session is due at the midpoint of the EPR/OPR supervision period or approximately at the 180-day point of supervision (for Airmen who do not receive EPRs, an ACA will be given every 180 days of supervision until the first EPR is written).

- An end-of-reporting period/follow-up ACA session is performed in conjunction with the close-out of a performance report. This is an opportunity to discuss performance as marked on the report and expectations for the future. This feedback is mandatory for those individuals in the rank of AB–TSgt and 2d Lt–Capt.

- Anytime the rater determines a need for one.

- Within 30 days of a request from a ratee (provided at least 60 days have passed since the last session).

HELPFUL HINTS FOR EFFECTIVE ACA SESSIONS

Preparation

- **Observe Performance and Keep Notes:** The most important factor in preparing for an ACA session is to routinely observe the performance of the ratee. You cannot expect to comment on strong and weak areas, trends and any degree of improvement, without routinely watching performance. Routinely take notes about behavior and the impact of that behavior, collect examples of work or letters of appreciation, talk to others who are knowledgeable about duty performance, and actively interact with ratees. Information should be collected over time and in a variety of circumstances to foster a solid evaluation.

- **Schedule the Time and Place:** Schedule the ACA session far enough in advance so you and the ratee have sufficient time to prepare for it. Set aside enough time to ensure that everything on the agenda is covered. Select a room that allows for privacy, face-to-face discussion, has proper lighting and ventilation, and prevents outside distractions or interruptions to ensure both parties are comfortable.

- **Setting the Agenda:** For initial ACA sessions, be sure to include ratee's duty description and responsibilities, expectations and targets to hit in order to meet those expectations, and a brief synopsis of the mission and status of the unit. These items will lay the groundwork for an effective, productive working relationship between the rater and the ratee by providing the motivation to achieve the highest levels of performance. For follow-on sessions, establish an agenda that reviews the last ACA session, covers observed behaviors since the last ACA session, what was done well, what could have been done better, and any additional areas you feel are necessary.

- **Avoid Pitfalls:** Pitfalls include personal bias, stereotyping, loss of emotional control, inflexible methods, reluctance to provide feedback, and inadequate planning. Examples include rating someone outstanding when they are not or drawing conclusions based on limited observations. There are many other examples; however, pitfalls always lead to a discussion of general impressions versus specific aspects of performance. Remember—the EES and OES are based on performance. By practicing good observation skills and a positive attitude, potential pitfalls can easily be avoided.

- **Preparing the ACA Form:** The appropriate portions of the ACA Worksheet are prepared before the session takes place. Remember the worksheet is private and can be handwritten or typed. It serves to direct the discussion and also provides space for goal setting and other comments the rater cares to make. The rater must sign and date the form the day of the session.

During the ACA Session

- **Opening the ACA Session:** Creating a relaxed atmosphere is key to opening a discussion. Seating arrangement should foster open communication; place the chairs around a table rather than conducting the session across your desk.

- **Identifying the Purpose and Discussing Topics:** Take the time to fully explain the purpose of the session and to seek input from the ratee. Remember to focus on the individual's strengths and accomplishments as well as the recommended improvement areas. Be specific about the observed behavior and the impact it had on others. Give your full attention to the individual, both mentally and physically; they know when you are not being sincere.

- **Develop and Implement a Course of Action:** Develop a plan to achieve success and include specific objectives and priorities. Ensure that you write everything down on the worksheet; this will help to summarize everything for the individual and also to serve as a "memory jogger" for later.

- **Miscellaneous Tips:**

  - Perceptions and opinions should be presented as such and not as facts.

  - Feedback is pointless unless a ratee benefits from it. Praise for the sake of praise has no value. It should motivate, build self-confidence, or reinforce top performance.

  - Listen carefully, paraphrase what is heard to check perceptions, and ask questions for clarification.

  - Avoid "loaded" terms that produce emotional reactions and heighten defenses.

Closing the Session

- **Summarizing:** Take a few minutes to review the key items discussed and reinforce the goals for the next observation period. Be sure to end on a positive, encouraging, and forward-looking note. Don't forget to sign the worksheet, make a copy for your file and give the original to the ratee.

- **Follow-up and Monitoring the Subordinate's Performance:** Use existing notes to monitor the individual's progress. Remember, you should never wait to give feedback. Informal feedback given on a regular basis helps to keep the ratee on the road to improvement and increases motivation while preventing new problems from developing.

RESPONSIBILITIES UNDER THE ACA PROCESS

The Ratee will:

- Know when ACA sessions are due.

- Request an ACA session, if needed.

- Notify the rater and, if necessary, the rater's rater when a required or requested ACA session does not take place.

- Sign the worksheet and rater's copy of the ACA notice indicating the date the supervisor conducted the session.

The Rater will:

- Prepare for, schedule, and conduct a ACA session regardless of whether the rater received a notice. Conflicts such as being geographically separated, TDY etc., are not excuses not to perform ACA sessions.

- Stay aware of standards and expectations and consider them when providing feedback to personnel.

- Provide realistic feedback to help ratees improve their performance. Realistic feedback includes discussion with the ratee, and written comments on the ACA Worksheet, not just marks on the form.

- Provide the original completed and signed worksheet to the ratee.

- Maintain a copy of the signed and dated ACA notice.

- Document behavior that may result in further administrative or judicial action on another form or memo other than a ACA Worksheet.

- Observe the ratee's behavior and duty performance, achievements, and efficiency. Raters should attempt to obtain meaningful information from as many sources as possible, including those who previously supervised the ratee during the report period. Gathering this additional information ensures feedback is provided covering the entire rating period.

- Assess the ratee's typical performance in relation to specific performance factors. Isolated instances of poor or outstanding performance may not represent the ratee's typical performance. Raters should consider the significance and frequency of incidents when assessing total performance. Some one-time incidents merit special consideration.

The Rater's Rater will:

- Monitor personnel to ensure raters properly conduct ACA sessions.

- Conduct ACA sessions when a ratee's rater is not available due to unusual circumstances or when assuming the rater's responsibilities.

The Unit Commander will:

- Administer the ACA program.

- Monitor raters and ratees to ensure ACA sessions are conducted properly and in a timely manner.

- Visit the work places and ask personnel questions about their jobs and the feedback they are receiving.

- Hold supervisors accountable for not conducting ACA sessions. Consider disciplining and removing raters who fail to conduct documented ACA sessions from supervisory positions.

ACA WORKSHEET

There are two different forms used for documenting an enlisted member's ACA session. One is the Airman Basic through Technical Sergeant ACA Worksheet, AF Form 931; and the other is the Master Sergeant through Chief Master Sergeant ACA Worksheet, AF Form 932. You'll find samples of these forms attached at the end of this lesson.

The form used for documenting an officer's ACA session (2d Lt through Col) is AF Form 724. A sample of this form is attached to the lesson.

SUMMARY

A conscious decision was made to make the ACA a key element in the evaluation system. The basic design of the process allows every supervisor to take control of the evaluation process for his/her subordinates. The ACA Process gives you the opportunity to explain, in very specific terms, where a ratee stands and what you expect the ratee to do.

Bibliography:

AFI 36-2406. *Officer and Enlisted Evaluation Systems*, 2 January 2013 (Incorporating Air Force Guidance Memorandum 3 [AFGM3], 1 July 2014).

AIRMAN COMPREHENSIVE ASSESSMENT (ACA) WORKSHEET (AB thru TSgt)

I. PERSONAL INFORMATION

NAME (Last, First, Middle Initial)	RANK	UNIT

II. TYPE OF ASSESSMENT ☐ INITIAL ☐ MID-TERM ☐ FOLLOW-UP ☐ RATEE REQUESTED ☐ RATER DIRECTED

III. SELF-ASSESSMENT (To be completed by Ratee and forwarded to Rater) Rating Scale: Y=Yes, understands; N=Need more information

	RATEE
RESPONSIBILITY:	
1. Understands the importance of doing the right thing even when it is unpopular or difficult.	
2. Understands the importance of responsibility in the use of and care of equipment and assets.	
3. Understands the importance of admitting shortcomings or mistakes.	
4. Understands the importance of refusing to partake in inappropriate behavior(s) despite social pressure.	
5. Understands the importance of accomplishing tasks in a timely manner.	
6. Understands the importance of providing support and welfare, of family, and ensuring they are prepared for separations and/or reunions. (If applicable)	
ACCOUNTABILITY:	
7. Understands the importance of the Air Force Core Values/Standards and how others should be accountable.	
8. Understands the importance of applying situational awareness and sound judgment.	
9. Understands the importance of living within ones means (financially, budgets, saves, spends responsibility, etc.).	
AIR FORCE CULTURE:	
10. Understands the importance of leading by example.	
11. Understands the importance of respecting one's self and others.	
12. Understands the importance of looking after fellow Airmen and their families (to include while fellow Airmen are deployed).	
13. Understands the importance of showing enthusiasm in being an Airman and in inspiring others to reach their full potential.	
14. Understands the importance of upholding the proud heritage of the Air Force and the importance of displaying the professional characteristics of an Airman at all times (24/7).	
SELF:	
15. Understands the importance of setting aside time to assess self, as-well-as personal and professional goals.	
16. Understands the importance of setting aside quality time to be with family and friends.	
17. Understands the importance of striving to meet personal/professional goals. Review Section VII for discussion during feedback session.	

IV. AIRMAN'S CRITICAL ROLE IN SUPPORT OF THE MISSION (To be completed by Rater):

V. INDIVIDUAL READINESS INDEX (Completed by Rater after talking to Unit Deployment Manager)
R= RED (UNSAT/NOT CURRENTLY DEPLOYABLE), **G=GREEN** (HIGHLY SAT/CURRENTLY DEPLOYABLE) ☐ **AF Indicator** [   ]

VI. PERFORMANCE: LEADERSHIP/PRIMARY DUTIES/FOLLOWERSHIP/TRAINING (To be completed by Rater) - Information may be used on next EPR
(Using AFI 36-2618, The Enlisted Force Structure, as the standard of expected performance commensurate with the Airman's rank, to what degree did the Airman comply with performance expectations.)

1. Task Knowledge/Proficiency: Consider the quality, quantity, results, and impact of the Airman's knowledge and ability to accomplish tasks	Demonstrated insufficient ability; required re-accomplishment of tasks; requires more guidance/experience (few Airmen) ☐	Demonstrated acceptable ability and consistently produced good quality, quantity, results, and impact (majority of Airmen) ☐	Routinely delivered high-quality work early; produced more than expected of current grade (some Airmen) ☐	Knowledge and skills impact far beyond those of peers; efforts directly elevated unit's impact on mission success (very few Airmen) ☐
2. Initiative/Motivation: Describes the degree of willingness to execute duties, motivate colleagues, and develop innovative new processes	Displayed little to no effort in accomplishing duties, lacked motivation and did not display initiative (few Airmen) ☐	Displayed good effort in performance of assigned tasks; mindful of others' needs and developed new processes (majority of Airmen) ☐	Self-starter on task completion, proactively assisted colleagues, routinely sought out new ways to execute mission (some Airmen) ☐	Inspired work ethic, aggressively sought to improve others' motivation, drove innovative environments (very few Airmen) ☐
3. Skill Level Upgrade Training: Consider skill level awarding course, CDC timeliness completion, course exam results, and completion of core task training N/A (Airman possessed required skill level/training) ☐	Did not complete or took excessive time to obtain required skill level (few Airmen) ☐	Progressed in or obtained skill level within prescribed time and standard (majority of Airmen) ☐	Progressed in or obtained skill level ahead of time and above standard (some Airmen) ☐	Completed CDCs and core task training requirements far ahead of schedule and obtained excellent course exam score (very few Airmen) ☐
4. Duty Position Requirements, qualifications, and certifications: Consider duty position qualifications, career field certifications (if applicable), and readiness requirements N/A (Airman possessed training commensurate with grade prior to reporting period) ☐	Did not complete or took excessive time to obtain required training (few Airmen) ☐	Progressed in or obtained training within prescribed time and standards (majority of Airmen) ☐	Progressed in or obtained training ahead of time and above standards (some Airmen) ☐	Completed training requirements far ahead of schedule and if tested obtained excellent scores (very few Airmen) ☐
5. Training of others: Consider the impact the Airman made to train others N/A (No valid opportunity for Airman to train) ☐	When tasked to train, Airman made minimal to no effort to train others; did not meet expectations (few Airmen) ☐	Effectively imparts skills and knowledge to others (majority of Airmen) ☐	Consistently seized opportunities to train subordinates and peers; trainees became highly skilled (some Airman) ☐	Peerless teacher; selflessly imparts expertise to subordinates, peers and superiors with significant impact on mission (very few Airman) ☐

6. COMMENTS

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VII. FOLLOWERSHIP/LEADERSHIP

1. Resource utilization *(e.g., time management, equipment, and manpower and budget)*: Consider how effectively the Airman utilizes resources to accomplish the mission	Improperly or inconsistently managed time and other resources *(few Airmen)*	☐	Made good use of available time and other resources within Airman's control *(majority of Airmen)*	☐	Sought better ways to more effectively utilize time and other resources *(some Airmen)*	☐	Sought after utilization expert in saving time, equipment, manpower, and budget with impact outside of work center or unit *(very few Airmen)*	☐
2. Comply with/enforce standards: Consider personal adherence and enforcement of fitness standards, dress and personal appearance, customs and courtesies, and professional conduct	Failed to meet some or all standards *(few Airmen)*	☐	Consistently met all standards, exceeded some *(majority of Airmen)*	☐	Exceeded all standards of fitness, conduct, appearance and behavior; influenced others by example *(some Airmen)*	☐	Is the model Airman, raised the standard in all areas for others to emulate; coached others *(few Airmen)*	☐
3. Communication skills: Describes how well the Airman receives and relays information, thoughts, and ideas up and down the chain of command *(includes listening, reading, speaking, and writing skills)*; fosters an environment for open dialogue	Not articulate; does not assimilate or convey information in a clear and concise manner *(few Airmen)*	☐	Able to convey most information in an understandable manner; makes some effort to improve communication skills *(majority of Airmen)*	☐	Clearly conveyed complex information in a concise manner; improved communication skills in themselves and others; encouraged and considered others' input *(some Airmen)*	☐	Remarkable communicator; mentor and teacher; has the presence and confidence in any setting; sought out by leaders for various communication forums *(very few Airmen)*	☐
4. Caring, respectful and dignified environment *(teamwork)*: Rate how well the Airman's selfless consideration and expectation of others and value of diversity, set the stage for an environment of dignity and respect, to include promoting a healthy organizational climate	Airman displayed little to no respect for others and/or themselves *(few Airmen)*	☐	Fostered a dignified environment by consistently treating Airmen and themselves with respect *(majority of Airmen)*	☐	Displayed strong interpersonal skills by proactively meeting others' needs, held others accountable for professional conduct to enhance a dignified environment *(some Airmen)*	☐	Unmatched interpersonal skills; always displayed exemplary conduct and behavior with actions that are tone-setting, resulting in measurable increases in teamwork and unit effectiveness *(very few Airmen)*	☐

5. COMMENTS

VIII. WHOLE AIRMAN CONCEPT

1. Air Force Core Values: Consider how well the Airman adopts, internalizes and demonstrates our Air Force Core Values of Integrity First, Service Before Self, and Excellence in All We Do	Airman failed to adhere to the Air Force Core Values *(few Airmen)*	☐	Consistently demonstrated the Air Force Core Values, both on and off duty *(majority of Airmen)*	☐	Embodiment of Integrity, Service Before Self, and Excellence; encouraged others to uphold Air Force Core Values *(some Airmen)*	☐	Airman for others to emulate; personal conduct exudes Air Force Core Values; influential leader who inspired other to embody Core Values *(very few Airmen)*	☐
2. Personal and Professional development: Consider the amount of effort the Airman devoted to improve themselves and their work center/unit through education and involvement	Made little to no effort to complete expected professional and/or personal development *(few Airmen)*	☐	Established goals and progressed to meet those goals for professional and/or personal development *(majority of Airmen)*	☐	Driven Airman; exceeded both professional and personal development goals with positive impact on individual performance or mission accomplishment *(some Airmen)*	☐	Relentlessly pursued personal and professional development of themselves and others; efforts resulted in significant positive impact to unit and/or Air Force *(few Airmen)*	☐
3. Esprit de corps and community relations: Consider how well Airman promotes camaraderie, embraces esprit de corps, and acts as an Air Force ambassador	Made little to no effort to promote esprit de corps or community involvement *(few Airmen)*	☐	Fostered esprit de corps through volunteerism and actively involved in base and community events *(majority of Airmen)*	☐	Active participant; organized and occasionally led team building and community events *(some Airmen)*	☐	Epitomizes an Air Force ambassador; Airman consistently and selflessly led efforts that inspired esprit de corps with significant impact to the mission and community *(few Airmen)*	☐

4. COMMENTS

IX. KNOWING YOUR AIRMAN *(To be discussed by Ratee and Rater during feedback session)*

1. How do you think you are **performing** in the unit? How can your unit help you **perform** better?

2. What are some of your **goals for self-improvement**? *(Goals should be SMART – **S**pecific, **M**easurable, **A**ttainable, **R**ealistic, and **T**ime-bound).*

   2a. Do you have **personal** *(family, financial, fitness, etc.)* **goals**? Would you like to discuss?

   2b. What are your **professional** *(assignments, academic, professional, etc.)* **goals** *(i.e., CCAF, BA, SNCOA completion, special duties, etc.)*?

3. Do you have stressors in your life? If so, what are you goals for reducing them? How can we help?

4. Do you have Wingmen? Do you have at least one mentor?

5. How would you rate yourself as a Wingman and a mentor? Can you provide some specific examples?

6. Would you like to offer any suggestions/feedback? *(e.g., unit improvements, safety, productivity enhancements, existing programs, living conditions)*

7. Expectations for unit and Ratee *(Areas for improvement, strengths and weaknesses; recommendations for improvement)*.

NOTE: This information is to enhance open communication; the rater will not utilize or document any areas discussed in **Section III** or **IX** when preparing evaluations *(Ref: AFI 36-2406).*

RATEE SIGNATURE	RATER SIGNATURE	DATE

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AIRMAN COMPREHENSIVE ASSESSMENT (ACA) WORKSHEET *(MSgt thru CMSgt)*

I. PERSONAL INFORMATION

NAME *(Last, First, Middle Initial)*	RANK	UNIT

II. TYPE OF ASSESSMENT ☐ INITIAL ☐ MID-TERM ☐ FOLLOW-UP ☐ RATEE REQUESTED ☐ RATER DIRECTED

III. SELF-ASSESSMENT *(To be completed by Ratee and forwarded to Rater)* **Rating Scale: Y=Yes, understands; N=Need more information**

RESPONSIBILITY:	RATEE
1. Understands the importance of doing the right thing even when it is unpopular or difficult.	
2. Understands the importance of responsibility in the use of and care of equipment and assets.	
3. Understands the importance of admitting shortcomings or mistakes.	
4. Understands the importance of refusing to partake in inappropriate behavior(s) despite social pressure.	
5. Understands the importance of accomplishing tasks in a timely manner.	
6. Understands the importance of providing support and welfare, of family, and ensuring they are prepared for separations and/or reunions. *(If applicable)*	
ACCOUNTABILITY:	
7. Understands the importance of the Air Force Core Values/Standards and how others should be accountable.	
8. Understands the importance of applying situational awareness and sound judgment.	
9. Understands the importance of living within their means *(financially, budgets, saves, spends responsibility, etc.)*.	
AIR FORCE CULTURE:	
10. Understands the importance of leading by example.	
11. Understands the importance of respecting one's self and others.	
12. Understands the importance of looking after fellow Airmen and their families *(to include while fellow Airmen are deployed)*.	
13. Understands the importance of showing enthusiasm in being an Airman and in inspiring others to reach their full potential.	
14. Understands the importance of upholding the proud heritage of the Air Force and the importance of displaying the professional characteristics of an Airman at all times *(24/7)*.	
SELF:	
15. Understands the importance of setting aside time to assess self, as-well-as personal and professional goals.	
16. Understands the importance of setting aside quality time to be with family and friends.	
17. Understands the importance of striving to meet personal/professional goals. Review Section VII for discussion during feedback session.	

IV. AIRMAN'S CRITICAL ROLE IN SUPPORT OF THE MISSION *(To be completed by Rater)*:

V. INDIVIDUAL READINESS INDEX *(Completed by Rater after talking to Unit Deployment Manager)*
R= RED *(UNSAT/NOT CURRENTLY DEPLOYABLE)*, **G=GREEN** *(HIGHLY SAT/CURRENTLY DEPLOYABLE)* ☐ **AF Indicator** [____]

VI. PERFORMANCE: LEADERSHIP/PRIMARY DUTIES/FOLLOWERSHIP/TRAINING *(To be completed by Rater)* - Information may be used on next EPR
(Using AFI 36-2618, The Enlisted Force Structure, as the standard of expected performance commensurate with the Airman's rank, to what degree did the Airman comply with performance expectations.)

1. Mission Accomplishment: Consider the Airman's ability to lead and produce timely, high quality/quantity, mission-oriented results	Displayed little to no aptitude or competence to complete task; failed to lead team to effective results *(few Airmen)* ☐	Consistently led team(s) to produce quality results; accomplished all assigned tasks *(majority of Airmen)* ☐	Mission-oriented leader; repeatedly led team to execute high-quality work early; efforts directly elevated work center performance *(some Airmen)* ☐	Widely recognized and emulated as a producer and leader; drove significant improvement toward mission accomplishment beyond assigned unit *(very few Airmen)* ☐
2. Resource utilization *(e.g., time management, equipment, manpower and budget)*: Consider how effectively the Airman leads their team to utilize their resources to accomplish the mission	Ineffectively managed manpower, time and other resources *(few Airmen)* ☐	Ensured proper and effective use of all resources under their control to ensure mission accomplishment *(majority of Airmen)* ☐	Innovatively led team to continuously improve efficient use of assigned resources *(some Airmen)* ☐	Recognized expert; generated new innovators that saved resources while enhancing mission accomplishment *(very few Airmen)* ☐
3. Team Building: Consider the amount of innovation, initiative and motivation displayed by the Airman and their subordinates *(collaboration)*	Displayed little to no effort in building team; subordinate capability hindered *(few Airmen)* ☐	Effective collaborator; promoted relationships among team members and sought to accomplish mission in ways that support team cohesion *(majority of Airmen)* ☐	Aggressively partnered to achieve goals; promoted highly creative and energetic team that increased mission capability *(some Airmen)* ☐	Widely recognized and emulated as a teacher, coach and leader; drove team to significant mission capability improvements beyond unit *(very few Airmen)* ☐
4. Mentorship: Consider how well Airman knows their subordinates, accepts personal responsibility for them, and is accountable for their professional development	Displayed little to no effort to mentor subordinates, took no accountability, abdicated responsibility for subordinate development *(few Airmen)* ☐	Active, visible leader; deliberately developed Airmen into better followers, leaders, and supervisors *(majority of Airmen)* ☐	Develops and institutes innovative programs; challenges subordinates to exceed their perceived potential thereby enhancing mission capability *(some Airmen)* ☐	Sought after mentor; subordinate and unit performance far surpassed expected results due to their mentorship skill *(very few Airmen)* ☐
5. Communication skills: Describes how well the Airman communicates *(includes listening, reading, speaking and writing skills)* in various mediums, translates superiors' direction into specific tasks and responsibilities, fosters an environment for open dialogue and enhances communication skills of subordinates	Lacks ability to effectively communicate *(few Airmen)* ☐	Able to receive information and effectively communicate up/down the chain of command; fosters approachable environment *(majority of Airmen)* ☐	Expert communicator; clearly conveyed complex information to subordinates and superiors; fostered enhanced communication skills in others; encouraged candid environment *(some Airmen)* ☐	Dynamic communicator and astute listener; has presence and confidence in any setting; Airman and subordinates sought out by leaders for various communication forums *(very few Airmen)* ☐

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6. Complies with/enforces standards: Consider personal adherence and fostering an environment where everyone enforces fitness standards, dress and personal appearance, customs and courtesies, and professional conduct	Failed to personally meet some or all standards and/or failed to address subordinates non-compliance		Consistently met and enforced standards in all areas; influenced others by example *(majority of Airmen)*		Exceeded all standards of fitness, conduct, appearance, and behavior; proactively coached others to meet standards *(some Airmen)*		Is the Airman emulated by others, raised the standard in all areas; persistently drove Airmen to exceed standards *(very few Airmen)*	
7. Duty Environments: Rate how well the Airman establishes and maintains caring, respectful, and dignified environments while valuing diversity, to include promoting a healthy organizational climate	Actions failed to engender a respectful atmosphere *(few Airmen)*		Produced work center marked by mindful consideration and absent of negative treatment of others *(majority of Airmen)*		Generated energetic, positive environments people seek to work at, demanded equal and dignified treatment for all *(some Airmen)*		Model supervisor and leader who coached others to duplicate vibrant and highly productive teams marked by respectful treatment of others *(very few Airmen)*	
8. Training: Describes how well the Airman and their team complies with upgrade, duty position, and certification requirements	Consistently failed to produce qualified team members and/or adhere to training requirements *(few Airmen)*		Produced Airmen who successfully progressed and obtained training qualifications on-time; met personal training requirements *(majority of Airmen)*		Generated high-performance team(s) that developed and instituted innovative training programs; challenged self, subordinates and other trainees to exceed requirements (some Airmen)		Sought after training leader, continually refined team training techniques to enhance productivity; mentored other team leads to replicate benchmark training environment *(very few Airmen)*	

9. COMMENTS

VII. WHOLE AIRMAN CONCEPT

1. Air Force Core Values: Consider how well the Airman adopts, internalizes, demonstrates and insists on adherence of our Air Force Core Values of Integrity First, Service Before Self and Excellence in All We Do	Airman failed to adhere to and enforce the Air Force Core Values *(few Airmen)*		Ensured subordinates and self consistently demonstrated the Air Force Core Values on and off duty *(majority of Airmen)*		Embodiment of Integrity, Service Before Self, and Excellence; demanded others uphold and live by the Core Values *(some Airmen)*		Airman for others to emulate; personal conduct exudes Air Force Core Values; influential leader who inspired others to embody the Core Values *(very few Airmen)*	
2. Personal and Professional Development: Consider effort the Airman devoted to improve their subordinates, their work center/unit and themselves	Made little to no effort to encourage subordinates to complete expected personal and/or professional development or progress in their own development *(few Airmen)*		Established attainable goals for subordinates and self; ensured progress to meet those goals *(majority of Airmen)*		Driven leader; led others and self to pursue professional and personal development goals with distinctive increase in work center performance *(some Airmen)*		Tenaciously led others and self to exceed developmental goals, resulting in significant positive impact that radiated beyond unit; benchmarked by other work centers (very few Airmen)	
3. Esprit de corps and community relations: Consider how well Airman promotes camaraderie, enhances esprit de corps, and develops Air Force ambassadors	Made little to no effort to enhance esprit de corps or community *(few Airmen)*		Required subordinates to foster esprit de corps through personal volunteerism and involvement in base/community events *(majority of Airmen)*		Organized and led team building and community events; resulted in increased work center morale and improved community relations *(some Airmen)*		Consistently and selflessly cultivated leaders that inspired esprit de corps with significant positive impact to the mission and community *(very few Airmen)*	

4. COMMENTS

VIII. KNOWING YOUR AIRMAN *(To be discussed by Ratee and Rater during feedback session)*

1. How do you think you are *performing* in the unit? How can your unit help you *perform* better?

2. What are some of your *goals* for self-improvement? *(Goals should be SMART – Specific, Measurable, Attainable, Realistic, and Time-bound).*

   2a. Do you have *personal (family, financial, fitness, etc.) goals*? Would you like to discuss?

   2b. What are your *professional (assignments, academic, professional, etc.) goals (i.e., CCAF, BA, SNCOA completion, special duties, etc.)*?

3. Do you have stressors in your life? If so, what are you goals for reducing them? How can we help?

4. Do you have Wingmen? Do you have at least one mentor?

5. How would you rate yourself as a Wingman and a mentor? Can you provide some specific examples?

6. Would you like to offer any suggestions/feedback? *(e.g., unit improvements, safety, productivity enhancements, existing programs, living conditions)*

7. Expectations for unit and Ratee *(Areas for improvement, strengths and weaknesses; recommendations for improvement).*

NOTE: This information is to enhance open communication; the rater will not utilize or document any areas discussed in **Section III** or **VIII** when preparing evaluations *(Ref: AFI 36-2406).*

RATEE SIGNATURE	RATER SIGNATURE	DATE

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AIRMAN COMPREHENSIVE ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET *(2Lt thru Col)*

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10, United States Code (U.S.C.) 8013, Secretary of the Air Force; AFI 36-2406, and Executive Order 9397 (SSN), as amended.
PURPOSE: Form is used to document effectiveness/duty performance history.
ROUTINE USES: May specifically be disclosed outside the DoD as a routine use pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(b)(3). DoD Blanket Routine Uses apply.
DISCLOSURE: Mandatory. SSN is used for positive identification.

I. PERSONAL INFORMATION

NAME	GRADE	UNIT

II. TYPE OF ASSESSMENT: ☐ INITIAL ☐ MID-TERM ☐ RATEE REQUESTED ☐ RATER DIRECTED

III. SELF ASSESSMENT *(To be completed by Ratee and forwarded to Rater)*   Rating Scale: **Y = Yes, understands; N = Need more information**

RESPONSIBILITY:	RATEE
1. Understands the importance of doing the right thing even when it is unpopular or difficult.	
2. Understands the importance of responsibility in the use and care of equipment and assets.	
3. Understands the importance of admitting to shortcomings or mistakes.	
4. Understands the importance of refusing to participate in inappropriate behavior(s) despite social pressure(s).	
5. Understands the importance of accomplishing tasks in a timely manner.	
6. Understands the importance of providing support and welfare of family and ensuring they are prepared for separations and/or reunions. *(If applicable)*	
ACCOUNTABILITY:	
7. Understands the importance of the AF Core Values/standards and how others should be accountable.	
8. Understands the importance of application of situational awareness and sound judgment.	
9. Understands the importance of living within means financially *(budgets, saves, spends responsibility, etc.).*	
AIR FORCE CULTURE:	
10. Understands the importance of leading by example.	
11. Understands the importance of respecting self and others.	
12. Understands the importance of looking after fellow Airmen and their families *(to include while fellow Airmen are deployed).*	
13. Understands the importance of showing enthusiasm in being an Airman and inspiring others to reach their full potential.	
14. Understands the importance of upholding the proud heritage of the Air Force and the importance of displaying the professional characteristics of an Airman at all times (24/7).	
SELF:	
15. Understands the importance of setting aside time to assess self, as well as personal and professional goals.	
16. Understands the importance of setting aside quality time to be with family and friends.	
17. Understands the importance of striving to meet personal/professional goals. Review Section VII for discussing during the assessment session.	

IV. AIRMAN'S CRITICAL ROLE IN SUPPORT OF THE MISSION *(To be completed by Rater)*

V. INDIVIDUAL READINESS INDEX *(Completed by Rater after talking to unit deployment manager)*
R = RED *(UNSAT/NOT CURRENTLY DEPLOYABLE);* **G = GREEN** *(SAT/CURRENTLY DEPLOYABLE)* ☐

Are all deployment requirements current in accordance with AFI 10-403?   AEF Indicator [   ]

VI. PERFORMANCE FEEDBACK *(To be completed by Rater)* - Information may be used on next OPR

1. Job Knowledge. Has knowledge required to perform duties effectively. Strives to improve knowledge. Applies knowledge to handle non-routine situations.

☐ N/A Initial Feedback   ☐ Does Not Meet   ☐ Meets   ☐ Above Average   ☐ Clearly Exceeds

2. Leadership Skills. Sets and enforces standards. Promotes a healthy organizational climate. Works well with others. Fosters teamwork. Displays initiative. Self-confident. Motivates subordinates. Has respect and confidence of subordinates. Fair and consistent in evaluation of subordinates.

☐ N/A Initial Feedback   ☐ Does Not Meet   ☐ Meets   ☐ Above Average   ☐ Clearly Exceeds

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3. Professional Qualities. Exhibits loyalty, discipline, dedication, integrity, and officership. Adheres to Air Force standards. Accepts personal responsibility.

☐ N/A Initial Feedback ☐ Does Not Meet ☐ Meets ☐ Above Average ☐ Clearly Exceeds

4. Organizational Skills. Plans, coordinates, schedules, and uses resources effectively. Meets suspense's. Schedules work for self and others equitably and effectively. Anticipates and solves problems. Develops innovative solutions.

☐ N/A Initial Feedback ☐ Does Not Meet ☐ Meets ☐ Above Average ☐ Clearly Exceeds

5. Judgment and Decisions. Makes timely and accurate decisions. Emphasizes logic and decision making. Retains composure in stressful situations. Adheres to safety and occupational health requirements. Recognizes and acts to take advantage of opportunities.

☐ N/A Initial Feedback ☐ Does Not Meet ☐ Meets ☐ Above Average ☐ Clearly Exceeds

6. Communication Skills. Listens, speaks, and writes effectively. Clearly and succinctly conveys ideas.

☐ N/A Initial Feedback ☐ Does Not Meet ☐ Meets ☐ Above Average ☐ Clearly Exceeds

7. Physical Fitness. Maintains Air Force physical fitness standards. Discuss current AF Fitness Program and how lifestyle ensures fitness standard goals.

☐ Does Not Meet ☐ Meets ☐ Exempt Next FA Due ☐

VII. KNOWING YOUR AIRMAN *(To be discussed by Ratee and Rater during the feedback session)*

1. How do you think you are *performing* in the unit? How can your unit help you *perform better?*

2. What are some of your **goals for self-improvement?** *(Goals should be SMART -- Specific, Measurable, Attainable, Realistic, and Time-bound).*

2a. Do you have *personal* (family, financial, fitness, etc.) goals? Would you like to discuss?

2b. What are your *professional (assignments, academic and professional education, etc.)* goals *(i.e., SOS, ACSC, AWC, Masters Degree)?*

3. Do you have stressors in your life? If so, what are your goals for reducing them? How can we help?

4. Do you have Wingmen? Do you have at least one mentor?

5. How would you rate yourself as a Wingman and a mentor? Can you provide some specific examples?

6. Would you like to offer any suggestions/feedback? *(e.g., unit improvements, safety, productivity enhancements, existing programs, living conditions)*

7. Expectations for unit and ratee *(Areas for Improvement, strengths and weaknesses; recommendations to improve)*

8. NOTE: This information is to enhance open communication, the rater will not utilize or document any areas discussed in Section III or VII when preparing evaluations *(Ref: AFI 36-2406)*

RATEE SIGNATURE	RATER SIGNATURE	DATE

Enlisted Evaluation System

Cognitive Lesson Objective:
- Know elements of the Enlisted Evaluation System (EES).

Cognitive Samples of Behavior:
- State the purpose of Enlisted Performance Reports (EPR).

- Identify who is required to receive an EPR.

- Identify when an EPR is required.

- Describe the promotion methods for enlisted personnel.

- State an officer's responsibilities to subordinates in the career progression system.

Affective Lesson Objective:
- Value the Enlisted Evaluation System.

Affective Sample of Behavior:
- Interject appreciation for the EES during class discussion.

Officer Evaluation System

Cognitive Lesson Objective:
- Know the Air Force Officer Evaluation System (OES).

Cognitive Samples of Behavior:
- Describe the three steps of the evaluation process.

- Describe the different types of performance reports and uses for each.

- State when performance reports are prepared.

- Identify inappropriate comments for performance reports.

- Describe "best" qualified and "fully" qualified promotions for officer personnel.

Affective Lesson Objective:
- Respond to the importance of the Officer Evaluation System.

Affective Sample of Behavior:
- Openly discuss the importance of Officer Performance Reports in class.

The Officer Evaluation System (OES) and specifically, the Officer Performance Report (OPR), has the most impact of any factor involving your future as an officer. Why? Because we already know the most valuable thing you can do for the Air Force is your job; and your job is documented through use of the Officer Evaluation System. As with any system that impacts you personally, you must have an understanding of that system.

Background

The exact origin of military effectiveness evaluations is not known. Examples of informal reports are found in the Bible, Caesar's Gaelic Wars, and in the memories and reports of almost every military commander. Napoleon made many such reports about his subordinates to the French authorities during his campaigns. It wasn't until after World War I that a standard form and regular procedures were implemented for use in the United States Army.

Army rating procedures provided the historical precedent for the Air Force. Understandably, use of the Army form was continued by the Air Force when it became a separate service in 1947. The Air Force stopped using the Army system in 1949 and devised a unique system of its own. The Air Force system evaluated officers and enlisted personnel on "character" and "efficiency" only. Each command devised its own rating forms according to its own directives. In 1954, the first Enlisted Performance Report (EPR) form was adopted, and the officers retained the previous form as an OPR.

PERFORMANCE REPORTS

Education/Training Report

Throughout your professional development, you'll receive various types of training. When the education/training lasts 8 weeks or more (there are exceptions in AFI 36-2406), an AF Form 475, Education/Training Report, is used to document the time you attended the course, and how well you performed in that course. Such courses include, but are not limited to: Developmental Education (DE), degree granting academic education programs such as the Air Force Institute of Technology (AFIT), and initial training in a utilization field such as Undergraduate Pilot Training (UPT), Undergraduate Navigator Training (UNT), and Aircraft Maintenance Officer Course, just to name a few. Whatever the course may be, the person ultimately responsible for ensuring this report gets into your personnel records is—YOU. You'll find a sample of this form attached at the end of this lesson.

Officer Performance Report (OPR)

OPRs are governed by AFI 36-2406, Officer & Enlisted Evaluation System. The purpose of the OPR is to record an officer's performance over a specific period. The OPR provides a brief description of the unit mission, your job description, and a short narrative to document your most significant achievements and the impact of these accomplishments on the unit mission. In addition, several performance factors will be rated on a two-block scale: "Meets Standards" or "Does Not Meet Standards."

Performance reports make up the cumulative record of your performance. They'll weigh heavily both in the promotion board's deliberations and in the senior rater's recommendation for promotion.

Letter of Evaluation (LOE)

The LOE (AF Form 77, Letter of Evaluation) cover periods of your performance too short to require an OPR (Change in Reporting Official (CRO) with less than 120 days supervision), or periods of time when you're under the supervision of someone other than your designated rater. In either case, LOEs are optional for officers. Officials who've been in a position to directly observe your duty performance or personal qualities prepare LOEs. Although LOEs are optional, it's highly recommended the observing official completes one to cover significant information that may help your rater in accomplishing your OPR. You'll find a sample of this form attached at the end of this lesson.

USES OF PERFORMANCE REPORTS

There are many uses of performance reports. As mentioned earlier, the promotion board uses these reports to determine an individual's potential based on his/her past performance. The best source of information the promotion board members have for learning what you've done and how well you've done it, is your performance record. After all, when it's time to be promoted, you don't go and sit in front of the promotion board for review—your record does.

Performance reports assist assignment personnel at the AFPC in choosing the right person for the right job. Performance reports provide information on your breadth of experience, training, level of responsibilities, and prior assignments.

A third use of performance reports is for investigations. What better place to start than with a review of your personnel record? When investigators review your record, they usually look at your performance reports. Investigators may use performance reports for determining an individual's security level and for criminal investigations.

Finally, performance reports are useful in helping commanders make decisions when determining disciplinary action. For example, if a person commits a minor offense and has an outstanding personnel record, as substantiated by his/her performance reports, the deciding official may take outstanding past performance into consideration when determining a method of corrective action.

Performance reports are NOT used as a counseling tool. In addition, Airman Comprehensive Assessment (ACA) sessions are NOT used as counseling sessions. If counseling is required, then conduct a private counseling session. If the counseling session needs to be documented, then document the session on AF Form 174, "Letter of Counseling."

INAPPROPRIATE COMMENTS FOR

PERFORMANCE REPORTS

Certain material is inappropriate and must not be considered in the performance evaluation process or included in comments on any OPR form unless specifically authorized by AFI 36-2406. This instruction states you should not consider or refer to:

- Recommendations for promotion, except on AF Form 709, Promotion Recommendation Form (PRF).

- Completion of, or enrollment in Developmental Education (DE), advanced academic education, or failure to obtain such.

- Charges/investigations not completed.

- Acquittals or failures to implement an intended personnel action.

- Recommendation for decoration (ribbon/medal).

  - Include only those decorations actually approved or presented during the period covered by the report.

  - Nominations for honors or awards such as "Outstanding Maintenance Officer" may be mentioned.

- Race, ethnic origin, gender, age, or religion of the ratee. Do not refer to these items in any report when such references could be interpreted as reflecting favorably or unfavorably on the person. You may use the pronouns reflecting gender (e.g., he, she, him, her, his, and hers).

- Drug or alcohol abuse rehabilitation programs.

  - Report on behavior, conduct, or performance resulting from alcohol or drug use as opposed to the actual consumption of alcohol or drugs.

- Family activities or marital status.

- Previous reports or ratings.

NOTE: For examples of appropriate/inappropriate comments, see AFI 36-2406.

REFERRAL REPORTS

A referral report means that the report MUST be referred to the ratee. The ratee is given an opportunity to comment on items that cause a report to be referred before it becomes a matter of record. A matter of record simply means officially posting the report in your personnel record. An OPR becomes a referral report when either of the following occurs:

- Any performance factor in Section V, Performance Factors, is marked "Does Not Meet Standards."

- Any comments in the OPR, or the attachments, referring to behavior incompatible with minimum standards of personal conduct, character, or integrity.

Items that cause a report to be referred include mention of such things as:

- Omissions or misrepresentation of facts in official statements or documents.

- Serious financial irresponsibility.

- Serious mismanagement of personal or government affairs.

- Confirmed incidents of discrimination or mistreatment.

- Possession or illegal use of drugs.

- Absent Without Leave (AWOL).

If there's any question whether the report is referral, it should be referred. In this case, the final decision of whether or not to refer the OPR will be a concerted decision between the ratee's evaluator and unit commander.

NOTE: The ratee, has 3 calendar days (30 calendar days for non-active duty personnel) from the date of receipt of the referral letter to provide comments to the evaluator named in the referral letter.

APPEALING PERFORMANCE REPORTS

AFI 36-2401, *Correcting Officer and Enlisted Evaluation Reports*, states:

"You must provide convincing documentation for your appeal. The willingness of evaluators to change a report is not enough. You must offer clear evidence that the original report was unjust or wrong."

You can file an appeal to correct or remove an evaluation report from your records if you believe the report is incorrect or unjust. You must:

- clearly and concisely state what you want,

- make sure that no rule in AFI 36-2401 prohibits your request, and

- supply clear evidence to support your application.

Consult your servicing Military Personnel, evaluations section, for assistance; they'll help you prepare an appeal package. Military Personnel is responsible for ensuring your appeal package is complete and properly documented.

After the package is completed, Military Personnel forwards the package to the AFPC, Randolph AFB, Texas for final disposition. You have up to three years to contest a report.

NOTE: Since ACA sessions are private between the rater and ratee and represent the rater's personal assessment of the ratee, the results of those sessions are not subject to appeal.

PROMOTION RECOMMENDATION FORM

One of the goals of the OES is to identify and recommend for advancement the best qualified officers based on performance and performance-based potential. One part of the promotion process is the AF Form 709. It's a separate form used by the senior rater to make a promotion recommendation to the central selection board.

Your senior rater knows you. The senior rater, the person who prepares the promotion recommendation, is in the best position in the organization to understand an officer's long-term record of performance.

He or she has personal knowledge, or access to personal knowledge, of both your most recent performance and cumulative performance. For captain through major, unless the officer works directly for a general officer, the senior rater is a colonel or equivalent in a wing commander or equivalent position. The senior rater for active duty lieutenant colonels is the first general officer or equivalent in the rating chain. The senior rater for Reserve Air Force lieutenant colonels and below is the same as the active duty senior rater for majors

and below. The senior rater is also the reviewer on the OPR. The same person who reviews and concurs/nonconcurs with each officer's performance report (and is aware of performance strengths and weaknesses) makes the promotion recommendation.

An eligible officer's senior rater completes the PRF no earlier than 60 days prior to the selection board for which the officer is promotion eligible (PRF Cutoff Date) and awards one of three recommendations:

- A "Definitely Promote" recommendation says the strength of the ratee's performance, and performance-based potential alone warrants promotion.

- A "Promote" recommendation says the ratee is qualified for promotion and should compete on the basis of performance, performance-based potential, and broader considerations such as duty history, PME, etc.

- A "Do Not Promote This Board" recommendation says the ratee does not warrant promotion at the central selection board for which the PRF is being prepared.

Evaluators must review unfavorable information files (UIF) and any filed adverse information prior to completing a PRF. Evaluators must also consider making comments on the PRF if an officer receives adverse actions such as Article 15, Letter of Reprimand, Admonishment, or Counseling. Comments are mandatory when an officer is convicted by court martial, and when an officer receives a "Do Not Promote This Board" recommendation.

CAREER PROGRESSION SYSTEM

There are two methods used in selecting officers for promotion to the next higher grade. The first method is called the "fully qualified" method and is used for promotion to first lieutenant and captain. If the commander determines an officer is fully qualified for promotion, that officer will be promoted. This method is not competitive.

The other method, used by HQ USAF promotion boards, is called the "best qualified" method. This method is used when considering officers for promotion to the grades of O-4 (major) through O-6 (colonel). Each officer's records are screened by a promotion board, and the officers who are best qualified for promotion are promoted. This method is highly competitive. All personnel will not be promoted.

Finally according to AFI 36-2611, each officer is charged with the following responsibilities and is obligated to:

- Plan his/her career realistically. The officer has the major responsibility for achieving professional and technical competence, level of performance, and leadership abilities.

- Seek additional duty responsibilities, which expand qualification and competency to assume more complex duties.

- Take advantage of all professional development opportunities.

- Actively seek advice on duty performance and career objectives from supervisors.

- Accurately communicate professional development plans to higher echelons by explaining your current career preferences.

- Devote sufficient off-duty time to enriching technical and professional military knowledge.

- Ensure that basic personnel records are accurate at all times, so personnel officers at all echelons will have adequate information for making proper career decisions.

Officer Air Force Specialty Code (AFSC) System. To understand more fully the job you will be performing in the Air Force, you must be able to understand the officer classification system of the AFSC. This system identifies abilities with respect to education, training, experience, aptitudes, and interests.

The system makes it possible to match the right person to the right job with the weapon and support system being used at present. It facilitates the transition of personnel to operate new weapon and support systems.

The classification system has the following objectives: to provide for the effective use of Air Force personnel by designing skills in terms of Air Force requirements; to furnish a basis for assigning personnel so they'll use either their present skills or their aptitudes for learning new skills; to provide a method for showing the current inventory of Air Force skills; and to allow for uniform personnel action so that everyone has a chance for fair treatment in assignment, promotion, and training.

All Air Force officer specialties are represented in the classification structure according to similarity and transferability of skills and knowledge. An officer's AFSC consists of four digits. The first and second numbers identify the career group and career field. The third digit, in combination with the first two, identifies the specific functional category. The last digit serves two purposes: it identifies whether the individual is fully qualified in his or her job or whether he or she is at the entry level, and it serves to show the highest officer grade that normally performs in that specialty.

A table explaining the AFSC system can be found immediately following the bibliography in this lesson.

Bibliography:

1. AFI 36-2101, *Classifying Military Personnel (Officers and Enlisted)*, 14 June 2010.
2. AFI 36-2401, *Correcting Officer and Enlisted Evaluation Reports*, 10 March 2006.
3. AFI 36-2406. *Officer and Enlisted Evaluation Systems*, 2 January 2013 (Incorporating Air Force Guidance Memorandum 3 [AFGM3], 1 July 2014).
4. AFI 36-2611, *Officer Professional Development*, 1 April 1996.
5. *AFPC Officer Promotion Web Site*, http://www.af.pc.randolph.af.mil/offprom/. 11 July 2007.

Officer AFSC

1	2	3	4
Career Group	Utilization Field	Functional Area	Qualification Level

Character	Identifier (see notes)
1st character (numerical)	**Career Group** 1- Operations 6-Acquisition or Finance 2-Logistics 7-Special Investigation 3-Support 8-Special Duty Identifier 4-Medical or Dental 9-Reporting Identifier 5-Legal or Chaplain
2d character combined with 1st character (numeric)	Utilization Field Example: 11 - Operations, **Pilot**
3d character combined with 1st and 2d character (alpha)	Career Field Functional Area Example: 11A - Operations, Pilot, **Airlift**
4th character (numeric)	Qualification Level 0-Qualified Commander (when used in conjunction with "C" in 3d position) 1-Entry (any AFSC) 2-Intermediate (only used for pilots, bomber navigators, and missile launch officers) 3-Qualified (any AFSC) 4-Staff (Note: Designation of "staff level" relates only to the level of functional responsibility and is restricted to positions above the wing level. It does not denote additional specialty qualifications.) Example: 11A3 - Operations, Pilot, Airlift, **Qualified** Example: 11A4 - Operations, Pilot, Airlift, **Qualified and serving in a staff position above the wing level**
Alpha Prefix	An ability, skill, special qualification, or system designator not restricted to a single AFSC Example: B - Squadron Operations Officer

LETTER OF EVALUATION

I. RATEE IDENTIFICATION DATA

1. NAME *(Last, First, Middle Initial)*	2. SSN	3. GRADE	4. DAFSC
5. DUTY TITLE OR TITLE OF ADDITIONAL DUTY	6. DEPLOYED LOCATION OR NAMED OPERATION *(If applicable)*		

II. GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS:

DEPLOYED CC MANDATORY LOE: Must complete Sections I - VII. If referral, complete Section VIII. (Complete Section IX only if applicable).

OPTIONAL LOE: Must complete Sections I (Blocks 1 - 5), Section II (Part A, B1, B2), Section IV, and Section V. If comments warrant permanent recording, prepare a performance report IAW AFI 36-2406 and the LOE will become a referral document attached to the performance report.

ACQUISITION/FUNCTIONAL EXAMINER OR AIR FORCE ADVISOR: Must complete Section I (Blocks 1 - 5), Section II (Part A and Part B (Blocks 1 - 2) and Section X).

A.	TYPE OF REPORT:	
	1. FROM THRU	2. REPORT IS
B.	3. LEVEL OF DEPLOYED COMMANDER DUTIES PERFORMED	4. NUMBER OF DAYS IN CC POSITION:
	5. G-SERIES ORDER NUMBER: DATE OF ORDER:	

III. DEPLOYED COMMANDER ASSESSMENT *(For Deployed CCs only)*

OFFICER SATISFACTORILY COMPLETED THEIR DEPLOYED COMMAND TOUR. ☐ YES ☐ NO *(If NO, report must be referred.)*

IV. COMMENTS/IMPACT ON MISSION ACCOMPLISHMENT *(Use bullet format)*

V. RATER IDENTIFICATION DATA

NAME *(First, Middle Initial, Last),* GRADE, BRANCH OF SERVICE, ORGANIZATION, COMMAND, LOCATION	DUTY TITLE	DATE
	SSN SIGNATURE	

VI. ADDITIONAL RATER *(Use only for Deployed CC LOEs. Insert comments only if referral or to document non-concurrence.)* ☐ CONCUR ☐ NON-CONCUR

NAME *(First, Middle Initial, Last),* GRADE, BRANCH OF SERVICE, ORGANIZATION, COMMAND, LOCATION	DUTY TITLE	DATE
	SSN SIGNATURE	

VII. RATEE'S ACKNOWLEDGMENT

I understand my signature does not constitute agreement or disagreement.	SIGNATURE	DATE

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Air Force Form 77, Supplemental Evaluation Sheet (Front)

LETTER OF EVALUATION *(Continued)*	RATEE NAME:

VIII. REFERRAL REPORT *(Complete only if report contains referral comments.)*

I am referring this LOE to you according to AFI 38-2406, para 3.9. It contains comment(s) that make the report a referral as defined in AFI 36-2406, para, 3.9. Specifically,

_____

Acknowledge receipt by signing and dating below. Your signature merely acknowledges that a referral report has been rendered; it does not imply acceptance of or agreement with the ratings or comments on the report. Once signed, you are entitled to a copy of this memo. You may submit rebuttal comments. Send your written comments to: _____

not later than 10 calendar days (30 for non-EAD members) from your date below. If you need additional time, you may request an extension from the individual named above. You may submit attachments (limit to 10 pages), but they must directly relate to the reason this report was referred. Pertinent attachments not maintained elsewhere will remain attached to the report for file in your personnel record. Copies of previous reports, etc. submitted as attachments will be removed from your rebuttal package prior to filing since these documents are already filed in your records. Your rebuttal comments/attachments may not contain any reflection on the character, conduct, integrity, or motives of the evaluator unless you can fully substantiate and document them. Contact the MPF Career Enhancement Section, or the AF Contact Center if you require any assistance in preparing your reply to the referral report. It is important for you to be aware that receiving a referral report may affect your eligibility for other personnel related actions (e.g. assignments, promotions, etc.). You may consult your commander and/or MPF or Air Force Contact Center if you desire more information on this subject. If you believe this report is inaccurate, unjust, or unfairly prejudicial to your career, you may apply for a review of the report under AFI 36-2401, Correction of Officer and Enlisted Evaluation Reports, once the report becomes a matter of record as defined in AFI 36-2406, Attachment 1.

NAME, GRADE, BR OF SVC OF REFERRING EVALUATOR	DUTY TITLE	DATE
	SIGNATURE	

SIGNATURE OF RATEE	DATE

IX. REFERRAL REVIEWER *(Complete only if Additional Rater referred the LOE)*

Ratee ☐ DID   ☐ DID NOT submit comments for my consideration.   I ☐ DO   ☐ DO NOT concur with the assessment.

NAME *(First, Middle Initial, Last),* GRADE, BRANCH OF SERVICE, ORGANIZATION, COMMAND, LOCATION	DUTY TITLE	DATE
	SSN SIGNATURE	

X. ACQUISITION OR FUNCTIONAL EXAMINER/AIR FORCE ADVISOR REVIEW *(Indicate review by marking the appropriate box.)*

☐ ACQUISITION EXAMINER   ☐ FUNCTIONAL EXAMINER   ☐ AIR FORCE ADVISOR

COMMENTS *(Use bullet format.)*

NAME *(First, Middle Initial, Last),* GRADE, BRANCH OF SERVICE, ORGANIZATION, COMMAND, LOCATION	
	SIGNATURE DATE

XI. ACQUISITION OR FUNCTIONAL EXAMINER/AF ADVISOR REVIEW INSTRUCTIONS:

1. The acquisition examination is completed for certified acquisition members *only* when the member is filling a designated acquisition position. Comments are not mandatory and only required for *clarification* about *acquisition-related* considerations. The comments will not be used to include additional comments, accolades, etc. If used, comments are limited to five lines.
2. The Functional Examiner Review is for AF cryptologic units and allows DIRNSA and AIA/CC to sign specific officer reports. Comments are not mandatory and only required for *clarification* about *intelligence-related* considerations. The comments will not be used to include additional comments, accolades, etc. If used, comments are limited to five lines.
3. When the evaluator on a mandatory deployed CC LOE is not an AF officer or DAF official, an AF Advisor will be designated by the MAJCOM Combatant Command or Component Command. Comments are not mandatory and only required to provide clarification and ensure the report is written in accordance with AF standards, *not* to list additional accomplishments/voice disagreement. If used, comments are limited to five lines.
4. When this Form is used in other than a deployed environment, refer to AFI 36-2406 for detailed information.

AF FORM 77, 20090212   PRIVACY ACT INFORMATION: The information in this form is

Air Force Form 77, Supplemental Evaluation Sheet (Back)

I. IDENTIFICATION DATA *(Read AFI 36-2406 carefully before filling in any item)*

1. NAME *(Last, First, Middle Initial)*	2. SSN	3. GRADE	4. DUTY AFSC

5. ORGANIZATION, COMMAND, AND LOCATION

6. PERIOD OF REPORT		7. LENGTH OF COURSE	8. REASON FOR REPORT
FROM:	THRU:	WEEK(S)	☐ ANNUAL ☐ FINAL ☐ DIRECTED

9. NAME AND LOCATION OF SCHOOL OR INSTITUTION

10. NAME OR TITLE OF COURSE

II. REPORT DATA *(Complete as applicable for final report)*

1. AFSC/AERO RATING/DEGREE AWARDED	2. ☐ COURSE NOT COMPLETED *(List reason in Item 4 below)*

3. **DISTINGUISHED GRADUATE**	☐ YES *(List criteria in Item 4 below)*	☐ NO DG PROGRAM

4. DG AWARD CRITERIA/COURSE NONCOMPLETION REASON

III. COMMENTS *(Mandatory)*

ACADEMIC/TRAINING ACCOMPLISHMENTS

PROFESSIONAL QUALITIES *(Bearing, appearance, conduct, fitness)*

OTHER COMMENTS *(Optional)*

IV. EVALUATOR

NAME, GRADE, BR OF SVC, ORGN, COMD, LOCATION	DUTY TITLE	DATE
	SSN	SIGNATURE

AF IMT 475, 20000601, V1 PREVIOUS EDITION IS OBSOLETE **EDUCATION/TRAINING REPORT**

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY *(when filled in)*

Air Force Form 475, Education/Training Report

OFFICER PERFORMANCE REPORT *(Lt thru Col)*

I. RATEE IDENTIFICATION DATA   *(Read AFI 36-2406 carefully before filling in any item)*

1. NAME *(Last, First, Middle Initial)*	2. SSN	3. GRADE	4. DAFSC	5. REASON FOR REPORT	6. PAS CODE

7. ORGANIZATION. COMMAND. LOCATION. AND COMPONENT	8. PERIOD OF REPORT THRU	9. NO. DAYS SUPV.

II. JOB DESCRIPTION   *(Limit text to 4 lines)*   10. SRID
DUTY TITLE

III. PERFORMANCE FACTORS

	DOES NOT MEET STANDARDS	MEETS STANDARDS	FITNESS EXEMPTION
Job Knowledge, Leadership Skills (to include Promoting a Healthy Organizational Climate). Professional Qualities, Organizational Skills, Judgment and Decisions, Communication Skills, and Physical Fitness *(see reverse if marked Does Not Meet Standards)*	☐	☐	☐

IV. RATER OVERALL ASSESSMENT   *(Limit text to 6 lines)*

Last performance feedback was accomplished on: _____ IAW AFI 36-2406) (If not accomplished, state the reason)

NAME. GRADE. BR OF SVC. ORGN. COMMAND & LOCATION	DUTY TITLE	DATE
	SSN SIGNATURE	

V. ADDITIONAL RATER OVERALL ASSESSMENT   *(Limit text to 4 lines)*   ☐ **CONCUR**   ☐ **NON-CONCUR**

NAME. GRADE. BR OF SVC. ORGN. COMMAND & LOCATION	DUTY TITLE	DATE
	SSN SIGNATURE	

VI. REVIEWER   *(If required, limit text to 4 lines)*   ☐ **CONCUR**   ☐ **NON-CONCUR**

NAME. GRADE. BR OF SVC. ORGN. COMMAND & LOCATION	DUTY TITLE	DATE
	SSN SIGNATURE	

VII. FUNCTIONAL EXAMINER/AIR FORCE ADVISOR
(Indicate applicable review by marking the appropriate box)   ☐ FUNCTIONAL EXAMINER   ☐ AIR FORCE ADVISOR

NAME. GRADE. BR OF SVC. ORGN. COMMAND & LOCATION	DUTY TITLE	DATE
	SSN SIGNATURE	

VIII. RATEE'S ACKNOWLEDGMENT

I understand my signature does not constitute agreement or disagreement. I acknowledge all required feedback was accomplished during the reporting period and upon receipt of this report.	Yes No ☐☐	SIGNATURE	DATE

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Air Force Form 707, Officer Performance Report (Front)

RATEE NAME:

IX. PERFORMANCE FACTORS (If Section III is marked Does Not Meet Standards, fill in applicable block[s])

DOES NOT MEET STANDARDS

1. Job Knowledge. Has knowledge required to perform duties effectively. Strives to improve knowledge. Applies knowledge to handle non-routine situations. ☐

2. Leadership Skills. Sets and enforces standards. Promotes a Healthy Organizational Climate. Works well with others. Fosters teamwork. Displays initiative. Self-confident. Motivates Subordinates. Has respect and confidence of subordinates. Fair and consistent in evaluation of subordinates. ☐

3. Professional Qualities. Exhibits loyalty, discipline, dedication, integrity, honesty, and officership. Adheres to Air Force standards. Accepts personal responsibility. Is fair and objective. ☐

4. Organizational Skills. Plans, coordinates, schedules and uses resources effectively. Meets suspenses. Schedules work for self and others equitably and effectively. Anticipates and solves problems. ☐

5. Judgment and Decisions. Makes timely and accurate decisions. Emphasizes logic in decision making. Retains composure in stressful situations. Recognizes opportunities. Adheres to safety and occupational health requirements. Acts to take advantage of opportunities. ☐

6. Communication Skills. Listens, speaks, and writes effectively. ☐

7. Physical Fitness. Maintains Air Force physical fitness standards. ☐

X. REMARKS *(use this section to spell out acronyms from the front)*

XI. REFERRAL REPORT *(Complete only if report contains referral comments or the overall standards block is marked as does not meet standards)*

I am referring this OPR to you according to AFI 36-2406, para 1.10. It contains comment(s)/rating(s) that make(s) the report a referral as defined in AFI 36-2406, para. 1.10. Specifically,

Acknowledge receipt by signing and dating below. Your signature merely acknowledges that a referral report has been rendered; it does not imply acceptance of or agreement with the ratings or comments on the report. Once signed, you are entitled to a copy of this memo. You may submit rebuttal comments. Send your written comments to:

not later than 3 duty days (30 for non-EAD members) from your date below. If you need additional time, you may request an extension from the individuals named above. You may submit attachments (limit to 10 pages), but they must directly relate to the reason this report was referred. Pertinent attachments not maintained elsewhere will remain attached to the report for file in your personnel record. Copies of previous reports, etc. submitted as attachments will be removed from your rebuttal package prior to filing since these documents are already filed in your records. Your rebuttal comments/attachments may not contain any reflection on the character, conduct, integrity, or motives of the evaluator unless you can fully substantiate and document them. Contact the MPS, Force Management section, or the AF Contact Center if you require any assistance in preparing your reply to the referral report. It is important for you to be aware that receiving a referral report may affect your eligibility for other personnel related actions (e.g. assignments, promotions, etc.). You may consult your commander and/or MPS or Air Force Contact Center if you desire more information on this subject. If you believe this report is inaccurate, unjust, or unfairly prejudicial to your career, you may apply for a review of the report under AFI 36-2406, Chapter 10, Correction of Officer and Enlisted Evaluation Reports, once the report becomes a matter of record as defined in AFI 36-2406, Attachment 2.

NAME, GRADE, BR OF SVC OF REFERRING EVALUATOR	DUTY TITLE	DATE
	SIGNATURE	

SIGNATURE OF RATEE	DATE

INSTRUCTIONS

ALL: Recommendations must be based on performance and the potential based on that performance. Promotion recommendations are prohibited. Do not comment on completion of or enrollment in Developmental Education, advanced education, previous or anticipated promotion recommendations on AF Form 709, OPR endorsement levels, family activities, marital status, race, sex, ethnic origin, age, religion or sexual orientation. Evaluators enter only the last four numbers of SSN.

RATER: Focus your evaluation in Section IV on what the officer did, how well he or she did it, and how the officer contributed to mission accomplishment. Write in concise "bullet" format. Your comments in Section IV may include recommendations for assignment. Provide a copy of the report to the ratee prior to the report becoming a matter of record and provide follow-up feedback to let the ratee know how their performance resulted in this final product.

ADDITIONAL RATER: Carefully review the rater's evaluation to ensure it is accurate, unbiased and uninflated. If you disagree, you may ask the rater to review his or her evaluation. You may not direct a change in the evaluation. If you still disagree with the rater, mark "NON-CONCUR" and explain. You may include recommendation for assignment.

REVIEWER: Carefully review the rater's and additional rater's ratings and comments. If their evaluations are accurate, unbiased and uninflated, mark "CONCUR" and sign the form. If you disagree with previous evaluators, you may ask them to review their evaluations. You may not direct them to change their appraisals. If you still disagree with the additional rater, mark "NON-CONCUR" and explain in Section VI. Do not use "NON-CONCUR" simply to provide comments on the report.

RATEE: Your signature is merely an acknowledgement of receipt of this report. It does not constitute concurrence. If you disagree with the content, you may file an evaluation appeal through the Evaluation Reports Appeals Board IAW AFI 36-2406 Chapter 10 (Correcting Officer and Enlisted Evaluation Reports), or through the Air Force Board for Correction of Military Records IAW AFI 36-2603 (Air Force Board for Correction of Military Records) and AFPAM 36-2607 (Applicants' Guide to the Air Force Board for Correction of Military Records (AFBCMR).

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10 United States Code (U.S.C.) 8013, Secretary of the Air Force: AFI 36-2406, and Executive Order 9397 (SSN), as amended.

PURPOSE: Used to document effectiveness/duty performance history; promotion, school and assignment selection; reduction-in-force; control roster; reenlistment; separation; research and statistical analysis.

ROUTINE USES: May specifically be disclosed outside the DoD as a routine use pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(b)(3). DoD Blanket Routine Uses apply.

DISCLOSURE: Voluntary. Not providing SSN may cause form to not be processed or to positively identify the person being evaluated.

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Air Force Form 707, Officer Performance Report (Back)

PROMOTION RECOMMENDATION

I. RATEE IDENTIFICATION DATA   *(Read AFI 36-2406, Officer and Enlisted Evaluation Systems, carefully before filling in any item)*

1. NAME *(Last, First, Middle Initial)*	2. SSN	3. GRADE	4. DAFSC

5. ORGANIZATION, COMMAND, LOCATION	6. PAS CODE

II. UNIT MISSION DESCRIPTION

III. JOB DESCRIPTION

1. DUTY TITLE:

2. KEY DUTIES, TASKS, RESPONSIBILITIES:

IV. PROMOTION RECOMMENDATION

V. PROMOTION ZONE	VI. GROUP SIZE	VII. BOARD	VIII. SENIOR RATER ID
BPZ ☐ I/APZ ☐			

IX. OVERALL RECOMMENDATION	X. SENIOR RATER
	NAME, GRADE, BR OF SVC, ORGN, COMD & LOCATION
DEFINITELY PROMOTE ☐	
PROMOTE ☐	DUTY TITLE
DO NOT PROMOTE THIS BOARD ☐	SSN SIGNATURE

Instructions

Senior Rater:
Review previous OERs, OPRs, Education/Training Reports, and Supplemental Evaluation Sheets. May consider other reliable information that is not contained in the record of performance when completing the PRF. Evaluate the officer's performance and assess his or her potential. Write Promotion Recommendation (Section IV) in concise "bullet" format.
Provide an accurate unbiased assessment free from consideration of race, sex, ethnic origin, age, religion, or marital status.
Provide the officer a copy of this report approximately 30 days prior to the board for which this report is prepared.

Officer:
Review record of performance, Officer Pre-Selection Brief, and PRF for accuracy. Prior to your board convening date, you must contact your senior rater to discuss if your PRF is not accurate, omits pertinent information or has an error. If your senior rater concurs, there are procedures to correct prior to the board (reference 36-2406, chapter 8). Per DOD Directive 1320.11, *Special Selection Boards,* paragraph 4.3., a supplemental promotion board "shall not consider any officer who might, by maintaining reasonably careful records, have discovered and taken steps to correct that error or omission on which the original board based its decision against promotion."

AF FORM 709, 20090210   PREVIOUS EDITIONS ARE OBSOLETE.   **FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY** *(When filled in)*

Air Force Form 709, Promotion Recommendation

Evaluation Concepts

Affective Lesson Objective:
- Value the impact of evaluation concepts on subordinate development.

Affective Samples of Behavior:
- Provide rationale for how and why evaluation concepts impact subordinate development.

- Assert the importance of developing effective standards for subordinates.

- Defend the importance of evaluation and reporting.

- Explain the uses for evaluation and reporting.

- Explain the impact of the pitfalls associated with evaluation and reporting.

What do you think of when you hear about evaluations? Most people immediately think of Enlisted Performance Reports (EPRs) or Officer Performance Reports (OPRs). While supervisors must evaluate and report on a subordinate's performance on an EPR/OPR, there are a lot more ways we are expected to evaluate and report on someone's performance. It's not easy to evaluate an individual, however, evaluating and reporting on someone's performance or behavior can and should be a responsibility you look forward to if you keep in mind that you're trying to help that person to better themselves. Understanding how to evaluate and report will help you to jump over the hurdle. As a supervisor, you must have an understanding of the concepts of evaluation and reporting. Then, there are some common pitfalls to be aware of during evaluation and reporting. Let's begin by looking at evaluation.

Evaluation

Evaluation is a process evaluators and supervisors use in a variety of situations. We evaluate individuals to determine if they should be retained or separated, for awards and decorations, and to select individuals for special positions. These are but a few examples of uses for evaluation. As such, it is vitally important to your subordinates and to the Air Force that you understand how this process works.

Evaluation should begin with communication. As a supervisor or evaluator, tell your workers exactly what you expect of them. Ensure your standards are clearly understood. By doing so, you're giving them the opportunity to meet your requirements. Obviously, if people don't know what is expected of them, they're not likely to meet unknown expectations. Therefore, this first step must be accomplished. Believe it or not, many evaluators neglect this important responsibility.

Once your workers know what is expected of them, your responsibility is observing their performance. How do you do this? Do you watch them constantly? Do you look over their shoulder? Obviously not. Observing performance simply means to be aware of what workers are doing and how they're doing it. Probably the best measure of their performance is the results of their work. If their results meet your standards, you can be sure they're doing what they are supposed to do. If not, find out why. Did they misunderstand the standard? Was it an unreasonable standard? In other words, was it a willingness problem or an ability problem? If it was an ability problem, provide more training or modify the standard if the worker is doing his or her best and is still unable to meet the standard. If it's a willingness problem, now might be the time for corrective counseling.

Observing performance takes place on a day-to-day basis over a long period of time. You can't observe performance for only a day or a week and know what an individual's typical performance is. Everyone has good days and bad days; over time these even out, and the result is typical performance. Eventually, you'll have to make an assessment of that performance. Comparing your observations with the standards you established initially with the worker does this. (Remember, we talked about communication in a paragraph above.)

Any time one human being evaluates another, his or her personal feelings, opinions, or judgments come into play. We can't help but judge others. As an evaluator, know the difference between subjectivity and objectivity. Subjectivity involves personal bias or opinion. On the other hand, objectivity involves only the facts. As an evaluator, make every effort to ensure your evaluations are as objective as possible, but keep in mind that sometimes subjectivity is necessary. The important thing here is to ensure you know the difference and ensure your evaluations are fair and honest. Don't allow personal feelings for an individual to invalidate your evaluation.

Reporting

Reporting is the end result of our evaluations. It isn't just tied to performance reports; we have various reports accomplished on us and will have to accomplish them on our workers. Updating On-the-Job-Training (OJT) records, signing someone off on his or her proficiency training, or writing up an awards package on an AF Form 1206 are some examples of reporting.

Also, reporting doesn't have to be a formal document. Anytime we provide information to a person for the purpose of maintaining or improving performance we're accomplishing reporting. It is not advice, which is, telling someone what he or she ought to do. It's simply letting people know how their performance affects you and your area of responsibility.

With a purpose in mind, a person selects a certain behavior or behaviors to achieve that purpose. These behaviors lead to the achievement of certain results. Reporting lets the person know the nature of these results. As an example, if you ask people to perform a specific task (tie their shoes), the steps they take to accomplish this task are the behaviors they show which lead them to the end result (shoes tied). Once they've completed tying their shoes, the feedback you provide them (either written or oral) is the report of their task completion. Reporting provides feedback to them on their behavior. It's just that simple.

A number of qualities and skills are required to be successful in reporting. Among them are honesty, courage, respect, confidence, and effective communication (seems like we can never get away from communicating, huh?). Reporting isn't something you can just start doing and be successful. Just like learning how to walk, you have to take "baby" steps to get there.

Evaluation and reporting is an important part of helping those who work with us to improve themselves. By using evaluations and correctly reporting your observations, you will help your subordinates to be more successful. If your observations tell you your subordinate is just meeting minimum acceptable standards and you report him or her as being your best worker, he or she will have a false sense of how good a worker he or she is.

Evaluating and reporting on subordinates is very important to a supervisor. They go hand in hand with each other. Be aware of the common pitfalls to help to ensure the evaluation is fair. It's not easy to evaluate an individual; however, evaluating and reporting on someone's performance or behavior can and should be a responsibility you look forward to if you keep in mind that you're trying to help that person to better themselves. You can

now see how supervisors use evaluation concepts to impact subordinates' development. You can help develop your subordinates' skills so they can effectively contribute to the Air Force mission. Isn't that what supervisors are all about? Learning the basics of evaluating and reporting will serve to make you a better evaluator. It will make your job easier and maybe even enjoyable. The most important thing is it will help your subordinates to better themselves.

Bibliography:
AFI 36-2406. *Officer and Enlisted Evaluation Systems*, 2 January 2013 (Incorporating Air Force Guidance Memorandum 3 [AFGM3], 1 July 2014).

USSOUTHCOM Area of Responsibility

Activity Statement:
- Deliver briefings and participate in discussions about various aspects of culture and US interests in the US Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) area of responsibility (AOR).

Affective Lesson Objective:
- Respond to the importance of Air Force officers understanding US national security concerns in the AOR, regional cultural perspectives, and the Combatant Command's mission in the AOR.

Affective Samples of Behavior:
- Voluntarily discuss US national security concerns in the USSOUTHCOM AOR.

- Value that an understanding of regional cultural perspectives is key to relating and communicating with partners in the USSOUTHCOM AOR.

- Assert the importance of the Combatant Command's mission in light of US national security concerns in the USSOUTHCOM AOR.

OVERVIEW OF UNITED STATES SOUTHERN COMMAND AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY

Command Establishment

United States Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) is a descendant of the US military units dispatched to Panama in the early twentieth century. USSOUTHCOM's history as a unified military headquarters began during World War II when US planners established the US Caribbean Defense Command. During the 1950s, the command's responsibility shifted from US military missions in the Caribbean basin to operations focused, primarily, in Central and South America. In 1963, US authorities gave the command its current name, US Southern Command.

Territory

USSOUTHCOM's present area of responsibility includes the land mass of Latin America south of Mexico, waters adjacent to Central and South America, the Caribbean Sea, and a portion of the Atlantic Ocean. Encompassing approximately one-sixth of the land mass of the world, it includes the following 31 countries and 15 areas of special sovereignty.

Recent History

The command faced disestablishment in the post-Vietnam military drawdown. For political reasons, however, the command narrowly survived. Later in the 1980s, internal conflicts in El Salvador, Nicaragua, and elsewhere rekindled US military interest in Latin America. The Reagan administration, in turn, revitalized US Southern Command. When the Cold War ended, the command, like other US military organizations, entered a period of dramatic change. In rapid succession, US Southern Command embraced counter-drug operations, expanded its area of geographic focus to include the Caribbean, and enhanced its capacity for humanitarian missions. In September 1997, US Southern Command moved to Miami with revised priorities, objectives, and capabilities.

USSOUTHCOM Mission and Current Posture

In a March 2014 Posture Statement to the House Armed Services Committee, the USSOUTHCOM Commander stated, "While other global concerns dominate the headlines, we should not lose sight of either the challenges or opportunities closer to home. In terms of geographic proximity, trade, culture, immigration, and the environment, no other part of the world has greater impact on daily life in our country than Latin America and the Caribbean."

Mission

Currently, USSOUTHCOM provides contingency planning, operations, and security cooperation for Central and South America and the Caribbean (except US commonwealths, territories, and possessions). USSOUTHCOM also oversees the force protection of US military resources in its area of responsibility and is responsible for ensuring the defense of the Panama Canal and the canal area.

Vision

USSOUTHCOM is a joint and interagency organization supporting US national security interests and—with our partners—fosters security, stability and prosperity in the Americas. To accomplish this mission and attain the goals of its vision, USSOUTHCOM employs resources in the following focus areas:

• Detainee Operations at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

• Contingency Response and Humanitarian Operations

• Building Partner (Military) Capacity

• Countering Transnational Organized Crime

Cultural Domains

A study of cultural domains can help Airmen better relate to international Airmen assigned to commands across the globe. In the case of USSOUTHCOM, one can particularly benefit by understanding how history and myth, religion and spirituality, economics and resources, and politics and social relations shape the attitudes and beliefs of peoples of the region.

History & Myth

Somewhere between 5000 and 2500 BCE, paleo-indian migrants from Asia and Europe moved south from North America into present day Central and South America. Those who evolved from this migration eventually spread throughout Central, South, and North America into the tribes and highly developed civilizations encountered by European settlers beginning with Christopher Columbus' landing on the island of Hispaniola (the present day Dominican Republic and Haiti) in 1492. The indigenous peoples of the Americas were greatly diverse (in many ways more diverse than the Europeans), were spread over an enormous territory, and were only faintly aware of one another from one major region to another.

Of all of the cultures that developed in the USSOUTHCOM region in the early history of the era, the Maya and the Inca were the two dominant and most well known. Between 300 and 900 CE, the Mayan civilization dominated in what is currently Central America, beginning in present-day Guatemala and spreading south into Honduras, and north into the Yucatan

peninsula. The Maya are one of only two peoples to develop an urban culture in a tropical rainforest. However, their urban hubs were religious centers supporting a rural population that settled around them. After 900 CE, the Maya abandoned their cities in large part due to religious proselytizing from the north. The rainforest location of their urban centers also contributed to the decline, as rainforests do not support large settled populations due to the poor quality of the soil for agriculture. Though the cities were abandoned, many of the native populations encountered by European settlers 500 years later were descended from the Maya. Much of Mayan culture, particularly the religious reckoning of time and Mayan concepts of beauty, remain present in Amerindian populations in Guatemala and Honduras. Likewise, the Maya left behind evidence of one of the most sophisticated pre-modern astronomically-based science and mathematics systems and the most complex and developed writing system in the Americas prior to European contact.

In the twelfth century, an ancient highland-based tribe in South America, the Inca, began to expand their influence. By the sixteenth century the Inca controlled more territory than any other people in South American history, expanding from modern-day Ecuador into northern Chile with a population of over one million people. Though they had an extremely structured and inflexible social organization, the Inca ruled primarily by proxy, incorporating local government under Incan control. The Inca were brilliant agriculturalists who carved mountains into terraced farmland to the extent that there was more cultivated land in the highlands of the Andes when the Spanish arrived in 1500 than there is today. Their massive stone forts were built without mortar and with such precision that they are still standing today; additionally, they built an impressive network of roads that included tunnels, bridges, and aqueducts. Of all the ancient peoples, they were the most advanced in medicine and surgery.

In 1494, Spanish and Portuguese representatives met to divide the land and sea routes discovered by Christopher Columbus and Vasco de Gama. The divide at 48 degrees west of Greenwich gave Africa and Asia to Portugal and all of the New World to Spain, though it significantly placed the coast of Brazil, discovered 6 years later, on the Portuguese side of the line. While the islands of the Caribbean quickly became secondary to the vast territory of North and South America, during the first few years of Spanish occupation the islands were the center of development of what eventually became Spanish-American life.

As Spanish immigrants arrived in South America, the landscape changed with imported crops and animals, the development of sugar plantations and vast estates, and legalized slavery of the native populations. Just as in North America, disease decimated the local populations, who had no immunity to European disease such as smallpox and measles. In these new circumstances, some areas saw nearly 95 percent of the native population wiped out. Meanwhile, Christian missionaries and laws that prevented the practice of any form of native religion worked to eliminate what was left of native cultures.

As the Spanish settled Central and South America, African slaves were brought in to work the land. African slaves typically outranked the indigenous workers in the social hierarchy. Once the conquest period ended, formal slavery of the native populations ended as well, and racial and cultural mixture began to complicate and blur social distinctions. By

the mid-eighteenth century, racial and cultural fusion was so advanced that traditional categories of ethnic hierarchy could no longer capture it. Those who were able to function within a Hispanic context were typically not labeled at all.

In a very short period in the early nineteenth century, all of the Spanish colonies in Latin America except Cuba and Puerto Rico left Spanish control. Reforms imposed by the Spanish Bourbons in the eighteenth century created instability in the relations between the ruling elites and the colonists in the Americas. As Enlightenment ideals swept through North America and Europe, most notably sparking the American and French Revolutions, they swept through Latin America as well and helped to inspire a series of wars of independence.

By siding with France in Napoleon's conquest of Europe, Spain pitted itself against Britain, the dominant sea power of the period. In 1806, a British expeditionary force captured Buenos Aires, leading to its independence from Spain in 1810. Buenos Aires led the spread of independence throughout Latin America. Other independence movements, such as in Venezuela or the massive slave revolt in the French Caribbean colony of Saint-Domingue (present-day Haiti) rose internally. Spain attempted to regain the territory in 1815 with a large military expedition, however this only increased the independence movement in South America. By 1824, South America was free of Spanish control.

Brazil was an exception to the violent revolutions that freed most of South America. The Portuguese had never ruled Brazil with the same heavy-handedness the Spanish used in the rest of South America; as a result, Brazilian independence was primarily a political movement. Though there were some regional revolts, Brazil maintained a continuity that left it largely intact and stable when compared to most of the other new countries in the region.

Though unable to entirely abandon the historic political practices that emerged from Spanish colonization of Central and South America, most of the Latin American nations to emerge post-colonial rule turned to political models from northern Europe and the United States to establish their new governments. The Enlightenment heavily influenced the earliest independent nations. Republics were the rule during the eighteenth century, when most of the independent governments were established. Massive economic challenges throughout the first 50 years or so of independence eventually settled down into more organized political systems in the late nineteenth century.

Most of Central and South America remained neutral during the world wars. A good reason for this, particularly in the Second World War, was the unwillingness of most of Latin America to offend the dominant power in the Western Hemisphere, the United States.

Religion & Spirituality

Due to the Spanish heritage of most of Central and South America, the vast majority of USSOUTHCOM nations claim high rates of Catholicism, although much of the population are not actively practicing Catholics. In the islands and countries that remain part of the British Commonwealth, Roman Catholicism tends to play a secondary role to Anglican or other Protestant faiths.

The exception to the Catholic and Protestant heritage of South America is most interestingly demonstrated in Guyana and Suriname. These two countries in northeastern South America were heavily influenced by an influx of East Indian indentured servants following the end of slavery in the mid-nineteenth century. As a result, the populations of both of these countries is primarily East Indian, and the predominant religion is Hindu. Suriname, additionally, is the only country in USSOUTHCOM with a significant Muslim population.

Roman Catholicism remained the most powerful force in Latin America from the arrival of the Spanish in the late fifteenth century through the second half of the twentieth century. In the late twentieth century, Protestantism, particularly the Evangelical and Pentecostal churches, rapidly expanded throughout the region.

Economics & Resources

The economic situation in most of Central and South America has been challenging from the time of independence into the present day. Gaining independence from Spain did not solve long-term transportation problems, and the entrance of foreign merchants and imported goods led to competition with and displacement of local producers. Destruction of human life and economic resources left some of the new countries with economies that took nearly 50 years to rebuild. The departure of skilled Spanish labor, administrative experience, and investment capital led to further problems. To make matters worse, the world market for exports such as coffee, sugar, and cattle was too limited to stimulate the economies of the newly formed countries.

The situation changed in the late nineteenth century and into the present day with the advent of free trade agreements and an increased market for Latin American exports. This propelled Latin America into an export economy and pushed Central and South America into a period of rapid urbanization. Agreements such as the Latin American Free Trade Association and Central American Common Market made some progress toward regional economic integration. Exports remained the primary driver of the Latin American nations' economies, though the nature of the exports changed. For example, Colombia became the second leading cut-flower exporter in the world as it simultaneously became the world's leading supplier of cocaine.

The greatest challenge to Latin American economies during the late twentieth century was foreign debt, which grew to dangerously high levels. When a worldwide recession hit in the 1970s, it brought with it hyperinflation and a drop in real wages across Central and South America. Unsurprisingly given its history, Brazil continues to have one of the largest, most stable, and rapidly expanding economies in South America. Argentina, by

contrast, was one of the world's wealthiest economies at the turn of the twentieth century, but recurring economic crises, mounting debt, inflation, and other problems culminated in the most serious economic, political, and social crisis in the nation's history in 2001. Trade is one of the more enduring issues in contemporary US-Latin America relations. Latin America is far from the largest US regional trade partner, but historically is the fastest growing one. Also, the US is by far the largest export market and primary investor in the USSOUTHCOM region, particularly in the Caribbean basin. Notably, 15 percent of all petroleum imports into the United States are from this region.

Politics & Social Relations

The majority of countries in the USSOUTHCOM territory are established republics or parliamentary democracies. Eight of the USSOUTHCOM countries which were originally British colonies remain part of the British Commonwealth and recognize the British monarch. Of the 15 special sovereignties within the USSOUTHCOM territory, five remain territories of the United Kingdom. Three are considered part of France, while the remaining belong to the Netherlands.

There are some exceptions to the democratic and republic states in the USSOUTHCOM region, notably: Cuba, Bolivia, and Venezuela. Though Venezuela claims to be a "federal democracy," the late Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez implemented his brand of socialism, which purports to alleviate social ills while simultaneously attacking capitalist globalization and existing democratic institutions. In Bolivia, President Evo Morales was elected by a wide margin after he promised to change the country's traditional political class and empower the nation's poor, indigenous population. However, his controversial strategies have exacerbated racial and economic tensions between the Amerindian populations and the non-indigenous communities. Cuba has been a communist state under the Castro family since 1959 when Fidel Castro led a rebel army to victory. Due to Cuba's close location to and challenging relationship with the United States, it remains one of the greatest threats to US national security in the USSOUTHCOM region.

Since the USSOUTHCOM nations are largely at peace with one another and with the United States, conventional military threats from the region remain low. However, nations throughout the hemisphere are contending with an asymmetric threat to national and international security: Transnational Organized Crime (TOC). In addition to this primary concern, USSOUTHCOM also remains watchful for the potential impact of natural disasters; the activities of violent extremist organizations; and the implications of the activities of nations such as Iran in their area of responsibility. Russia and China also factor into the strategic environment in the region. Russia's outreach to the region is centered primarily on arms sales and expanding military ties. China's strategy vis-à-vis the region is based on expansion of trade and investment in commodities. Beijing has also increased its engagements in the military realm; Chinese arms sales to regional militaries have more than quadrupled in the past five years, while the frequency of high-level Chinese visits has also increased substantially. Currently, 18 countries in Central America, South America, and the Caribbean receive military training from China.

Conclusion

The political, military, economic, and diplomatic issues in Central and South America directly impact the United States and vice versa, as demonstrated throughout the history of the Western Hemisphere. As the nearest neighbor to the United States, the USSOUTHCOM region remains and will remain an area of critical interest to our country. Hopefully this overview has piqued your interest to learn more about this area of the world. To help you do that, refer to the below section for links to Internet sources that provide more specific information about the countries included in this command's area of responsibility.

STUDENT ASSIGNMENTS

Students will select a specific country from the list provided and deliver a 5-9-minute prepared briefing addressing the topic. Use the framework below to develop the main points, but to ensure the topics are covered you must submit your list of preferred main points to your instructor for approval prior to beginning your research. To assist in your research, a list of Web sites is provided on the next page.

Additionally, you must prepare a ½ to 1-page bullet background paper on your subject. You should provide a copy of your paper to your instructor prior to your briefing. You can then use the paper to give your briefing. The bullet paper will follow the format in *The Tongue and Quill*. Pick a country and two domains from the lists below:

Countries: Brazil,Colombia,Cuba,Haiti,Honduras,Venezuela

Domains: Family & Kinship, Religion & Spirituality, Sex & Gender, Politics & Social Relations, Economics & Resources, Time & Space, Language & Communication, Technology & Material, History & Myth, Sustenance & Health, Aesthetics & Recreation, Learning & Knowledge

Main Point 1 (choose one from the list of cultural domains)

Main Point 2 (choose a different domain for your 2nd main point)

RESEARCH SITES

- **Defense Language Institute** http://www.dliflc.edu/products.html

- **Field Support Modules** http://fieldsupport.dliflc.edu/index.aspx

- **Library of Congress** http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/profiles.html

- **Military Policy Awareness Links** http://merln.ndu.edu/index.cfm?type=page&pageID=3

- **Miller Center of Public Affairs** http://millercenter.org/scripps

- **NATO** http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/index.htm

- **The World Factbook** https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/index.html

- **United Nations** http://www.un.org/en/

- **US Department of State—Background Notes** http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/

- **US Department of State—Regional Bureaus** http://www.state.gov/p/index.htm

- **US Department of State—Terrorism Country Reports** http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/

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Information Assurance, Computer Security, and Information Operations

Cognitive Lesson Objective:
- Know the fundamental characteristics of Information Assurance, Computer Security, and Information Operations (IO).

Cognitive Samples of Behavior:
- Name the threats and vulnerabilities to information systems.

- List virus prevention processes.

- State unauthorized activities when performing duties on Information Systems (IS).

- Outline the incident reporting process.

- Define Information Operations.

- Identify the three key components of IO.

Affective Lesson Objective
- Respond to the importance of Information Assurance, Computer Security, and Information Operations to the mission of the US Armed Forces.

Affective Sample of Behavior:
- Receive information about Information Assurance, Computer Security, and Information Operations. Participate in classroom discussion.

INFORMATION ASSURANCE, COMPUTER SECURITY,

AND INFORMATION OPERATIONS

Fifty years ago, information systems presented relatively simple security challenges. They were expensive, isolated in environmentally controlled facilities, and their use was an arcane art understood by few. Consequently, protecting them was relatively easy, a matter of controlling access to the computer room and clearing the small number of specialists who needed such access.

As size and price came down, microprocessors began to appear in the workplace, in homes, and eventually on the battlefield. What was once a collection of separate information systems is now best understood as a single, globally connected network. Because of this global connectivity, a risk accepted by one is a risk shared by all. Frequent hardware and software changes, in addition to exponential use of the Internet, have posed a significant risk to our information.

As the need for computer security increased to deal with those risks, the need to educate you on how to handle internal and external threats has also increased. This increase in computer security has created a new concept of information assurance. In this new age, your role in securing information has not technically changed, but the environment where the information resides has dramatically changed.

Basic Terminology and Concepts

Now let's learn some concepts of computer networks as well as who to go for when you need assistance.

Information Assurance (IA) - Information operations that protect and defend information and information systems by ensuring their availability, integrity, authentication, confidentiality, and non-repudiation. This includes providing for restoration of information systems by incorporating protection, detection, and reaction capabilities.

Information Operations (IO) - Actions taken to affect adversary information and information systems while defending one's own information and information systems.

Information Warfare (IW) - Information operations conducted during time of crisis or conflict to achieve or promote specific objectives over a specific adversary or adversaries.

Computer Security (COMPUSEC) - The protection resulting from all measures to deny unauthorized access and exploitation of friendly information systems.

Who do you go to for help? That depends on what help you need. The following people are there to meet your needs and concerns:

The Workgroup Manager (WM) is the first line of help you should contact to resolve problems. WMs possess developed knowledge of hardware, software, and communications principles, and install, configure, and operate client/server devices. They resolve the day-to-day administrative and technical system problems you experience and contact the Help Desk if they cannot resolve a problem.

The Help Desk (HD) is the base's focal point for problem resolution and is the primary point of contact for problems WMs cannot resolve. The HD determines the type of reported system problem, reports the status of problem resolution to the affected customer, and maintains a historical database of problem resolution.

The Information System Security Officer (ISSO) or Information Assurance Officer (IAO) supervises the units Computer Security Program (COMPUSEC). The term ISSO is used synonymous with the term IAO. The ISSO/IAO implements the COMPUSEC program in accordance with AFI 33-202, *Network and Computer Security*, and any MAJCOM or wing supplements.

Computer Security

In order for our information systems to remain secure, the system must have these five properties: confidentiality, integrity, availability, non-repudiation, and authentication.

Confidentiality ensures people who don't have the appropriate clearance; access level and "need to know" do not access the information.

Integrity ensures information has not been modified during transmission or processing.

Availability means information services are there when you need them.

Non-repudiation ensures the sender of data is provided proof of delivery and the recipient is assured of the sender's identity so that neither can deny having processed the data.

Authentication is a security measure designed to establish the validity of a transmission, message, or originator, or a means of verifying an individual's authorization to receive specific categories of information.

INFOCON

Introduction to INFOCON

The INFOCON system is a commander's alert system that establishes a uniform process for posturing and defending against malicious activity targeted against DoD information systems and networks.

The INFOCON System:

- Impacts all personnel who use DoD information systems

- Provides a range of flexible, defensive measures implemented uniformly across DoD

- Protects information systems while supporting mission accomplishment

You are a vital part of the INFOCON system. You may need to take actions necessary to ensure the integrity of DoD information systems and networks. This includes:

- Vigilance in computer security practices

- Maintaining situational awareness

- Reporting anomalous activity to your ISSO

INFOCON Levels

The INFOCON system is characterized by five defensive postures designed to mitigate risk to DoD information systems and networks.

NORMAL

- Routine Computer Network Defense (CND) operations

- Little risk to ongoing military operations

- Information networks are operational

- Operational impact of degradation or loss of information and information systems is low

- Wide-scale network probing and/or ambiguous patterns of uncoordinated events, incidents, and intrusions; generally involve routine or non-time essential information systems and/or networks

Computer Network Defense

Those actions taken to plan, direct, and execute the response to unauthorized activity in defense of Air Force information systems and computer networks. Defense of the network includes a multilayered internal and external defense structure.

ALPHA

Increased intelligence watch and strengthened security measures.

- Condition of preparatory CND operations with a limited risk to operations

- Operational impact of degradation or loss of information and information systems is low to medium

BRAVO

A further increase in CND force readiness above that required for normal readiness.

- Risk to mission accomplishment is moderate

- Requires increased network defense

- Requires vigilance to maintain network security

CHARLIE

A further increase in CND readiness above that of INFOCON BRAVO but less than maximum CND force readiness.

- Characterized by concentrated CND operations capable of functioning in a prolonged threat environment

- Risk of mission failure is high

- Operational impact of degradation or loss of information and information systems is medium to high

DELTA

Maximum CND force readiness level.

- Condition of critical CND operations

- Total IO resources of the declaring commander are employed

- Risk to mission operations is extreme

- Operational impact of degradation or loss of information and information systems is high

The INFOCON system does interact with other alert systems like the Force Protection Condition (FPCON) and Defense Condition (DEFCON) when the situations warrants. The INFOCON posture level may change due to other alert system levels. Likewise, a change in the INFOCON posture may prompt a corresponding change in the other alert system levels.

Just as with other alert systems, your responsibilities depend on each level of the INFOCON. As the risk of attack increases, so should your level of awareness. For each INFOCON level, your Workgroup Manager (WM) or supporting Network Control Center (NCC) will provide you with necessary education and awareness on threats, new vulnerabilities, and any actions you must take.

Operations Security (OPSEC)

Operations Security (OPSEC) is the process of denying adversaries information about friendly capabilities and intentions. This process is accomplished by identifying, controlling, and protecting indicators associated with planning and conducting military operations and other activities. OPSEC applies at all levels of command. Individuals are responsible for complying with established security practices for protecting classified and unclassified information which they've been exposed to.

Classified information is official information, which, in the interest of our national security, requires protection against unauthorized disclosure. Only those individuals, who possess the proper security clearance, have a need to know, and present proper identification can be granted access to classified information. Proper security clearance means the individual must have a clearance equal to the classification level of the information.

A person who doesn't meet these requirements can't have access to classified information. A security incident occurs if someone who doesn't meet all these requirements accidentally sees, or has access to classified information.

There are four types of security incidents: compromise, probable compromise, inadvertent access, and security deviation.

- Compromise. Compromise is defined as the known or suspected exposure of classified information or material to an unauthorized person. The compromise of classified information presents a threat to our national security. The seriousness of that threat must be determined, and appropriate measures must be taken to minimize the adverse effects of such a compromise. Action must be taken to regain custody of the material and to identify and correct the cause of the compromise.

- Probable Compromise. An incident in which a reasonable presumption exists that an unauthorized person had or has access to classified information.

- Inadvertent Access. An incident in which a person had or has access to classified information to which the individual was or isn't authorized, but was or is the subject of a favorable personnel security investigation permitting the granting of an interim or final security clearance to the level category of classified information involved.

- Security Deviation. An incident that involves the misuse or improper handling of classified material, but doesn't fall into the previous three categories.

The most critical part of the security system is the act of determining and assigning a security classification. The key in this determination is whether the national defense risks are grave enough to classify and withhold the information from unauthorized persons. There are three security classifications for classified information. They are:

- Top Secret. National security information or material that requires the highest degree of protection and the unauthorized disclosure of which could reasonably be expected to cause exceptionally grave damage to national security.

- Secret. National security information or material that requires a substantial degree of protection and the unauthorized disclosure of which could reasonably be expected to cause serious damage to national security.

- Confidential. National security information or material that requires protection and the unauthorized disclosure of which could reasonably be expected to cause damage to national security.

For example, if we reveal information about our emergency defense plans to someone who doesn't need to know, it could harm our nation's defense.

Unclassified information is also official information, but it doesn't need the same safeguards as classified information. However, it may have certain restrictions against its release to unauthorized persons. Some unclassified information is controlled by marking it "FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY."

- FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). This is information that hasn't been given a security classification, but which should be publicly withheld for one or more reasons. For example, although not required to be marked FOUO, your personnel records are considered to be FOUO.

- National Security-Related Information. Some unclassified information concerning national defense or U.S. foreign relations is of possible intelligence value. When added to other unclassified information, it gives an insight into classified plans, programs, operations, or activities and becomes of intelligence value. For example, the number of fighter aircraft on the flightline is unclassified, but that information could be of value to the enemy.

Historically, OPSEC emerged during the Vietnam conflict. In Southeast Asia, the enemy had advanced knowledge of our operations which greatly reduced our effectiveness against them. To correct this problem, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) issued a Secretarial Memorandum initiating an operations security program armed forces wide. The Pacific Air Force's program was code-named "Purple Dragon." The Purple Dragon program denied the enemy vital information and had an immediate impact on the effectiveness of our combat operations.

Indeed, our adversaries are able to obtain a significant amount of intelligence through human sources. They befriend us, seeking information about our military forces as well as about scientific or technological advances. If any foreign nationals or others seek information or material from you, even if it may seem insignificant, report it immediately to your supervisor, security manager, commander, or the Office of Special Investigation (OSI).

We have the privilege of living in a great nation. To preserve the privileges and freedoms we enjoy, we must be constantly aware of the forces around us who would like to deprive us of our freedoms to further their own political and individual goals. To keep abreast of current programs and threats, the DoD has directed commanders to implement active OPSEC education programs.

You must realize it's not only the military member or the DoD civilian who's targeted for information, but it can also be the family, too. Remember, the bad guy doesn't run around in the black trench coat with the upturned collar!

Communications Security (COMSEC)

COMSEC is the protection resulting from all measures designed to deny unauthorized persons information of value, which might be derived from analysis of telecommunications. It can be achieved only through effective defensive and preventive measures against theft, espionage, observation, interception, traffic analysis, crypto analysis, deception, and other methods, which intelligence services employ.

The principle of COMSEC, defining the information which should be revealed, is simply this, "if it's classified, or deals with a classified project or mission, or contains information about our capabilities, strategy, plans, or limitations, give it only to those who have a definite need-to-know and who have the proper security clearance by a secure communications media."

Emission Security (EMSEC)

The Air Force Emission Security Program (formerly known as the Air Force TEMPEST program) defines Emission Security (EMSEC) as the protection resulting from all measures taken to deny unauthorized access to information of value which may be derived from intercept and analysis of compromising emanations. These emanations are usually electromagnetic or acoustic in nature. The term "TEMPEST" is used as a synonym for "compromising emanations."

How do compromising emanations reach the enemy? They may travel through the air as radio waves (radiated signals) or through wires, pipes or other electrical conductors leaving an equipment area (conducted signals). The more power used in a device, the stronger its emanations, and the further they can travel long distances over wires. Telephones are particularly great emission security hazards since conducted signals near the telephone can be sent out as a signal on the line, and travel almost anywhere in the world. Proper grounding and distance from equipment that processes classified information are the most common means of preventing compromising emanations.

Remember, any knowledge about specific emission security hazards may alert enemy agents to possible sources of classified information. Don't tell anyone about a specific Emission Security hazard unless that person has a need-to-know and is cleared for the information.

We will now discuss threats and vulnerabilities to our information and information systems and some of the tools used to perpetrate these crimes.

THE THREAT

What is the threat?

Threat is defined as:

- Any circumstance or event with the potential to cause harm to an information system in the form of destruction, disclosure, adverse modification of data, and/or denial of service.

- Current and perceived capability, intention, or attack directed to cause denial of service, corruption, compromise, or fraud, waste, and abuse to an information system.

Vulnerability

Vulnerability is a weakness in an information system, cryptographic system, or components (e.g., system security procedures, hardware design, internal controls) that could be exploited.

Risk

Risk is the probability that a particular threat will exploit a particular vulnerability of an information system. Not all threats actually happen and not all vulnerabilities are exploited. The risk assessment process helps IA personnel analyze threats to and vulnerabilities of information systems. They look at the potential impact the loss of information or capabilities of a system would have on national security and then use the analysis as a basis for identifying countermeasures.

Let's now look at some of the tools used to perpetrate these crimes.

Malicious Code

Malicious Code is software or firmware capable of performing an unauthorized function on an information system. It is designed with a malicious intent to deny, destroy, modify or impede systems configuration, programs, data files, or routines. Malicious Code comes in several forms to include Trojan Horses, Worms, and Viruses.

Trojan Horse

These are hidden computer viruses or viruses in disguise. Trojan horses are often computer programs embedded in other programs or software. This is done by the intruder so the user is unaware of the Trojan horse's presence or existence. Trojan horse programs do something the programmer intended but that the user would not approve of if they knew about it. A virus is a particular case of a Trojan horse that is able to spread to other programs. Some Trojan horses hide in a system and capture information (for example, IDs and passwords of legitimate users) so the programmer can return to the system at a later time to damage, destroy, or steal data. In the case of an ID/password capture or compromise, an intruder gains the capability of entering the system as a legitimate user.

Worms

A worm is an independent program that spreads copies of itself, usually through a network or other communication device. By not attaching itself to any program; worms maintain their independence. Although they don't usually modify other programs or destroy data, worms cause damage by harnessing the resources of a network, by tying them up, and eventually, shutting the network down. Worms can have a devastating effect when they strike due to the number of people and systems involved. To replace itself, a worm uses several methods. It can replicate through a network, looking for vulnerable computer systems, attacking them and then moving on to the next network. Through the use of e-mail, worms can mail a copy of itself to other systems or simply rely on an unwary user to open an e-mail attachment to keep it alive.

Virus

The majority of the most common viruses today are the macro viruses. A macro virus affects programs used to create documents and spreadsheets. Once infected, every document opened or created with these programs is corrupted, meaning that data could be lost or altered. Since they infect such commonly used applications, macro viruses can spread quickly.

Remember that viruses work only if you execute them!

As with any information system, one of the biggest concerns is the impact viruses have on the security of the network. This effect may vary from little more than an annoyance to erasing all data from a system.

Since viruses are transmitted over networks or distributed on infected media (portable media, CDs, etc.), the task to locate the true originator is quite daunting.

Sharing files through the use of diskettes and e-mail attachments or downloading files from the Internet are the most common forms of spreading malicious code. It is your responsibility to scan all outside files using current anti-virus software. Your system may contain a virus even if it appears to be virus free. Viruses can remain hidden and may show up months later to infect your system. For this reason, it is essential you scan your system based on local security policies using current anti-virus software.

Media – Any device that can carry data can carry a virus. This includes floppy disks, CDs, DVDs, USB devices and even music CDs. Scan any type of media before introducing it into your computer and network.

Web browsing – Use caution when visiting or downloading files from web sites because viruses can attach themselves to the file, infect your computer and spread to the entire network causing havoc on the system. This applies to sound and video files as well. If possible, download files to a portable media device and virus-check them before placing them on the computer's hard drive. To prevent the possibility of rapidly spreading a virus, never download files to a network or shared drive.

E-mail – Perhaps more than any other method of infection, you must use caution when opening e-mail attachments. Attachments may contain malicious code that could corrupt files, erase your hard drive, or even allow a hacker to gain access to your computer. Be especially wary of attachments that end with .exe, .com, .vbs, .bat, or .shs extensions. Don't assume an attachment is safe because you received it from a friend or coworker. Just as with files downloaded from the Internet, a good rule of thumb is to save the attachment and then scan it with current anti-virus software before opening it.

Protection and Prevention

To protect an information system against viruses, use anti-virus software. Anti-virus software performs three main tasks:

- Virus detection

- Virus removal

- Preventive protection

So how do you know whether or not a virus has infected your computer? Detecting viruses is sometimes difficult but there are a few indicators of virus infection besides alert warnings from your anti-virus software.

- Slow performance

- Files disappearing inexplicably

- Constant error messages

- Erratic flashing

If you suspect a virus:

- Stop using the computer so the virus doesn't spread

- Document exactly what happened

- Call your WM or ISSO immediately

You must report any suspected or actual malicious logic event to your Workgroup Manager (WM) or Information Systems Security Officer/Information Assurance Officer (ISSO/IAO). This includes reporting all virus alerts generated by anti-virus software, whether you believe them to be valid or invalid. This is so IA personnel can make a determination.

If the WM or ISSO is unavailable, report the event to the next IA person in the operational chain-of-command. Don't destroy or hide any information or material that may help in the investigation of the virus. IA personnel will need to trace, if possible, the origin of the virus and make a determination on how far the infection has spread. This is also crucial to prevent future virus infections.

Your Responsibilities

Air Force computer assets are similar to weapons systems in that they must be treated as mission critical assets. Air Force computer resources are provided for use to perform official government business or for authorized uses. However, these valuable resources may be wasted on non-approved or otherwise non-official business jeopardizing our communications and information activities resulting in fraud, waste, and abuse. Our information systems and networks must evolve to effectively implement the expeditionary air and space force vision. Unauthorized and non-official use of computer resources could result in mission impairment or even mission failure.

Some examples of computer misuse are: viewing or downloading pornography, gambling on the Internet, conducting private commercial business activities or profit-making ventures, loading personal software, making unauthorized hardware configuration changes, or violating license agreements or copyright infringements.

As an Air Force IS user, it is your responsibility to ensure you maintain and operate your information system within the limits set by the laws and policies.

Here are eight common sense rules to compute by when using a government IS:

- Don't use a computer to harm other people.

- Don't interfere with other people's computer work.

- Don't snoop in other people's files.

- Don't use a computer to steal.

- Don't use or copy software that you have not purchased.

- Don't steal other people's personal information.

- Don't use a computer to pose as another person.

- Don't use other people's computer resources without approval.

Keep in mind that your rights to privacy are limited when using government computer resources. When you log on to a government system, you give your consent to monitoring. Everything you do can be monitored. Use a government owned computer for official and authorized purposes only.

Misuse also includes using unauthorized hardware or software, which could introduce significant vulnerabilities to Air Force information systems.

Some examples of this include freeware, public domain software, and shareware. This software usually comes from questionable or unknown sources (e.g., Internet web sites) and is highly susceptible to malicious logic. If use of the software is based on an operational need, vulnerability testing must be performed on the software and approval must be obtained from the Designated Approving Authority (DAA). This also applies to trial or demo software.

Use of software or hardware not owned by the Air Force also carries restrictions. Examples of sources of software or hardware not owned by the Air Force include other services, military agencies, contractors, foreign, or privately owned software and hardware.

Designated Approving Authority (DAA) - Official with the authority to formally assume responsibility for operating an information system or network within a specified environment.

Obtaining, installing, copying, storing, or using software may also violate a vendor's license agreement. Coordinate with your Workgroup Manager (WM) or Information Systems Security Officer/Information Assurance Officer (ISSO/IAO) before installing any software or hardware on your government IS.

You as a user are responsible for reporting unauthorized or malicious activities to your WM or ISSO/IAO. This notification is critical because an unreported activity could jeopardize the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of our mission critical IS's. Examples of reportable activities are:

- Unauthorized disclosure of classified information

- Introduction of high risk software

- Introduction of malicious code

- Sharing passwords

- Fraud, waste, and abuse

- Creating denial of service

- Circumventing security policies, processes, or procedures

Unauthorized activities may also include the exploitation of technical or administrative IS vulnerabilities. If you suspect unauthorized activities, immediately report it to your WM or ISSO/IAO. The objective is to improve the overall security posture of the Air Force enterprise network, information systems, and stand-alone computing devices through quick, positive control and reporting of unauthorized activities. Unauthorized activities must be reported immediately to determine the extent of the problem and damage. Many reports from different information systems over a short period of time might indicate a coordinated attack or massive viral infection that may require immediate action.

User Access Controls

Access controls are restrictions that limit access to the resources of an information system (data and devices) to only authorized users, programs, processes, or other systems.

Foreign nationals and contractors must possess the need to know and the appropriate network access or background investigation before being authorized access to AF and DoD networks.

User IDs and passwords are the most common methodology comprising an identification and authentication program. Here are some key points to keep in mind concerning passwords:

- Memorize your password and don't write it down

- NEVER share your password with ANYONE including Workgroup Managers, Help Desk personnel, or System Administrator personnel.

- Choose a password that is easy to remember, hard to guess, and at least 8 characters in length, containing at least 1 number, 1 special character, with upper and lower case letters.

- Don't use personal information like the names or birthdays of family members, pet names, or the name of your favorite sports team.

- Avoid using words or phrases that can be found in a dictionary.

- Change your password on a regular basis.

- Do not use the same password on different systems.

- Passwords to classified systems must be treated at the same level of classification as the system it allows access to.

Poorly constructed passwords leave ISs vulnerable to hackers. Properly constructed passwords make it much more difficult for a hacker to access our ISs. Ensure you use the above password guidelines to create your passwords.

Media

Media is the physical medium on which data has been saved. Examples include hard drives, floppy disks, CD-ROM, CD-RWs, USB (e.g., thumb) drives and DVDs. The process you must take to erase, label, and transport each will depend on the classification of the material. You must properly follow established policies and local procedures when handling and transporting media. Improper use and handling of media could result in the loss or compromise of sensitive or even classified information.

In accordance with policy:

- Scan all media for viruses before use

- Media containing classified information must be marked accordingly

- Label CD-ROMs, or their containers or sleeves

- Media bearing a classified label may never be used in an unclassified system

- Once unclassified media is placed on a classified computer, it becomes classified

- Media containing sensitive data must be stored in a secure location

- If you are unsure of marking and labeling media, see your WM or ISSO/IAO.

You should back up all important computer files on a regular basis. These backups will minimize the loss of data if your hard drive crashes or is infected by a virus. Label the backups to reflect the sensitivity level of the information they contain. Prevent erasures by keeping diskettes away from magnetic sources such as radios and telephones. Store the media in areas safe from potential fire and water damage.

Remanence security is the use of prescribed safeguards and controls to prevent reconstruction of sensitive information from the internal or external media it resides on. In other words, Remanence security ensures no one can obtain any data from media you have thrown away. When releasing, reusing, or destroying any IS's external or internal media ensure you coordinate with your WM beforehand.

New Technologies

New technology brings new vulnerabilities to our network and our information. These include modern fax machines, cell phones, laptops, personal electronic devices (PEDs), multifunction devices (MFDs), wireless computer devices, and remote access capabilities. You must be vigilant and protect information stored or transmitted on devices other than your computer. You need to be as cautious about security on these devices as you are with your computer at work.

Social Networking

"The Air Force views the use of social media sites as a positive way to communicate and conduct business," says Gen. C. Robert Kehler, former commander of Air Force Space Command. "Social media and other emerging technologies provide an increasingly important means of communication and collaboration. Providing more open access will allow the Air Force to communicate more effectively to all Air Force personnel, their families and external audiences." Access to social networking sites from the Air Force network is for official use as well as limited personal use. Personal use will require supervisors approval in most cases. Internet-based social networking sites have become integral tools for all types of operations across the services. Therefore the Air Force wants responsible and effective use of such Web sites.

You must make sure when posting to these sites you don't post any classified or sensitive information. Inappropriate posts on the Air Force network and any other operational security violations are punishable under the Uniform Code of Military Justice.

The Air Force will limit or restrict the use of these sites as needed because operational security and the safety of the network are priorities. Gen Kehler said the Air Force is working to "strike a balance between maintaining a safe and controlled network while allowing Airmen to have appropriate access. Adversaries continually try to gain access to our mission critical systems. All users must do their part to help secure operations conducted in and through cyberspace."

There are other electronic devices that require safeguards as well.

If you use a fax, be careful. Make sure that the recipient will be there to pick up the fax immediately if you are sending sensitive information.

Did you know that cell phones are nothing more than glorified transmitters? Anyone with the right equipment could potentially listen to your conversation. Use a landline for more privacy, and never discuss sensitive information on an unsecured phone.

The convenience of laptops also makes them vulnerable to theft or security breaches. Put password protection on your laptop. Be careful what you display on your screen, especially in close quarters such as airplanes. Be aware of your laptop when traveling to prevent theft.

Smartphones pose a security threat for a number of reasons. Their small size and low cost make them easy to obtain and difficult to control. They have tremendous connectivity and storage capabilities, and are extremely popular. Smartphone capabilities make it very easy for a person to download information from your computer. Never place classified information on a smartphone.

Multi function devices (MFD) are a combination of network printer, copier, fax and scanners and present specific vulnerabilities to our networks if installed improperly. If you have a requirement for the installation of a MFD, ensure proper coordination is completed with your Designated Approving Authority before proceeding with the installation.

Wireless networking technologies incorporate specific vulnerabilities and must be implemented in accordance with established AF policy and guidance. See your WM or ISSO/IAO for further information.

Webmail and Remote Access Service (RAS) allow you to access your email account and home network from a remote location. When accessing webmail and your home network while TDY or away from your home station, ensure you protect your password. Ensure no one is in a position to steal your password via "over the shoulder" or insider snooping. Remote access passwords should always be different than your network password. You must ALWAYS ensure your password is properly protected!

While prohibitions for use of internet based capabilities through government computers have been relaxed, you are still restricted/prohibited from accessing Internet sites, or engaging in activity via social media sites, involving pornography, gambling, hate-crime and other prohibited activities

Information Protection

Proper protection of our information is critical to information assurance. The Department of Defense has three broad categories of information. DoD categorizes information as Unclassified, For Official Use Only (FOUO) or Sensitive, and Classified.

All DoD information warrants some level of protection. As a minimum, all DoD unclassified information must be reviewed before it is released in any form outside the U.S. Government. This includes information posted to Air Force public web sites. Contact your Public Affairs office before releasing information outside of your personal control.

Since computers are now so integrated into everything we do, it was only a matter of time until computer warfare evolved.

INFORMATION OPERATIONS

As defined in the beginning, Information Operations (IO) are those actions taken to affect adversary information and information systems while defending one's own information and information Systems. AFDD 2.5 defines IO as the integrated employment of the core capabilities of influence operations, electronics warfare operations, network warfare operations, in concert with specified integrated control enablers, to influence, disrupt, corrupt or usurp adversarial human and automated decision making while protecting our own. Information operations provide a nonkinetic capability to the warfighter. These capabilities can create effects across the entire battlespace and are conducted across the spectrum of conflict from peace to war and back to peace. Unlike air superiority, information superiority is a degree of dominance in the information domain which allows friendly forces the ability to collect, control, exploit, and defend information without effective opposition.

> "Information has emerged as both a critical capability and a vulnerability across the spectrum of military operations. We must be prepared to attain information superiority across that same spectrum. The United States is not alone in recognizing this need--potential adversaries worldwide are rapidly improving or pursuing their own information warfare capabilities. As the Air Force evolves into the air and space force of the 21st century, it must establish a foundation for developing capabilities critical to meeting the emerging challenges of the information age."
>
> MICHAEL E. RYAN, General, USAF, Former Chief of Staff of the Air Force
>
> 5 August 1998

Now that we've defined Information Operations and emphasized its importance in todays fighting environment, let's look closer at the three components of IO.

Influence Operations

Influence operations are focused on affecting the perceptions and behaviors of leaders, groups, or entire populations. Influence operations employ capabilities to affect behaviors, protect operations, communicate commander's intent, and project accurate information to achieve desired effects across the cognitive domain. These effects should result in differing behavior or a change in the adversary's decision cycle, which aligns with the commander's objectives. The military capabilities of influence operations are psychological operations (PSYOP), military deception (MILDEC), operations security (OPSEC), counterintelligence (CI) operations, counterpropaganda operations, and public affairs (PA) operations.

Network Warfare Operations

Network warfare operations are the integrated planning, employment, and assessment of military capabilities to achieve desired effects across the interconnected analog and digital network portion of the battlespace. Network warfare operations are conducted in the information domain through the combination of hardware, software, data, and human interaction. The operational activities of network warfare operations are network attack (NetA), network defense (NetD) and network warfare support (NS).

Electronic Warfare Operations

Electronic warfare operations are the integrated planning, employment, and assessment of military capabilities to achieve desired effects across the electromagnetic domain in support of operational objectives. These include radio, visible, infrared, microwave, directed energy, and all other frequencies. Electronic warfare operations is responsible for coordination and deconfliction of all friendly uses of the spectrum (air, land, sea, and space) as well as attacking and denying enemy uses. The military capabilities of electronic warfare operations are electronic attack, electronic protection, and electronic warfare support.

Conclusion

In summary, new developments in computer technology, like wireless communications and personal electronic devices, pose a great threat to our network security. Fortunately, we have also developed security mechanisms to mitigate those vulnerabilities. These new technologies have also introduced a new concept in the Information Age, Information Operations, that allow warfighters complete access to the information they need, where and when they need it. You play a vital role in this new concept to ensure the protection and defense of information and information systems.

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Risk Management

Cognitive Learning Objective:
- Know the significant elements of Risk Management (RM).

Cognitive Samples of Behavior:
- Define RM.

- State the goals of RM.

- Name the four RM principles.

- Identify the steps of the RM process.

Affective Lesson Objective:
- Value the goals and principles of RM.

Affective Sample of Behavior:
- Exercise situational awareness and risk management in routine activities.

This lesson introduces you to Air Force Risk Management (RM) and provides you with a basic understanding of the five-step process. The narrative below is excerpted from AFI 90-802 *Risk Management.*

AF RISK MANAGEMENT OVERVIEW

Definition

RM is a decision-making process to systematically evaluate possible courses of action, identify risks and benefits, and determine the best course of action (COA) for any given situation. RM enables commanders, functional managers, supervisors, and individuals to maximize capabilities while limiting risks through application of a simple, systematic process appropriate for all personnel and functions in both on- and off-duty situations. Appropriate use of RM increases an organization's and individual's ability to safely and effectively accomplish their mission/activity while preserving lives and precious resources.

Tenets

- Risk is inherent in all missions, operations and activities, both on- and off-duty.

- Risk can be effectively mitigated if understood and appropriate action is taken.

- All personnel are responsible for utilizing RM concepts, tools and techniques.

- The RM process outlined herein applies to risk-related decisions when such decisions are not governed via separately established requirements/guidelines (i.e., statutes, regulations, or DoD/AF policy/guidance that address personnel health and safety or environmental matters and dictate particular decisions or outcomes within these requirements/guidelines).

RM Goals

- Enhance mission effectiveness at all levels, while preserving assets and safeguarding health and welfare.

- Create an Air Force cultural mindset in which every leader, Airman, and employee is trained and motivated to manage risk in all their on- and off-duty activities.

- Integrate RM into mission and activity planning processes, ensuring decisions are based upon risk assessments of the operation/activity.

- Identify opportunities to increase AF warfighting effectiveness in all environments, and ensure success at minimal cost of resources. The RM process shall be institutionalized and be an inherent part of all military operations to address safety, occupational and environmental health risks.

RM Foundations

Essential concepts of AF RM:

- RM is a comprehensive system for improving individual and organizational performance in all functional areas, operations and activities, both on- and off-duty.

- RM must be tailored to meet the unique mission needs and operational requirements of each organization and personnel within the organization.

- RM provides the process and tools to develop and enhance awareness and understanding of at-risk activities and behavior of personnel both on- and off-duty. These processes and tools help create effective risk assessments that identify potential hazards and effective strategies to mitigate or eliminate the hazards.

- Effective RM has the added advantage of not only identifying risks, but also identifying areas where regulatory guidance or standard operating procedures may be overly restrictive or inconsistent with mission/activity requirements. In this event, a comprehensive risk assessment may be used to support solicitation of waivers, variances, or changes, but will not in itself constitute authority to violate or deviate from any directive, policy, standard, or other applicable regulatory guidance.

RM does not:

- Inhibit flexibility, initiative or accountability in any chosen course of action.

- Remove risk altogether or support a "Zero Defect" mindset. RM provides decision makers with the tools and strategies necessary to make the appropriate decision for a given set of circumstances.

- Take the place of training, practice, drills, rehearsals, tactics, techniques and procedures associated with a specific event and/or action.

- Override or supersede compliance with federally mandated Department of Defense (DoD), Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) standards, federal environmental cleanup standards, AF standards/criteria, or any risk-based statutory and regulatory requirements that apply and dictate the outcome of such requirements. The AF does not have authority to grant exemptions and waivers for statutory and regulatory requirements that have risk related exposure elements

or standards. All other waivers, variances, or change requests must be properly vetted through the appropriate agency for approval. In addition, the RM does not sanction or justify violations of any law.

AF RM CORE CONCEPTS

RM Principles

Four principles govern all actions associated with RM. These principles are the cornerstone of effective RM and are applicable 24-hours a day, 7-days a week, 365-days a year (24-7-365) by all personnel, for all on- and off-duty operations, tasks and activities.

- Accept no unnecessary risk. Unnecessary risk comes without a commensurate return in terms of real benefits or available opportunities; it will not contribute meaningfully to mission or activity accomplishment and needlessly jeopardizes personnel or other assets. All AF missions and daily routines involve risk. The most logical choices for accomplishing a mission are those that meet all mission requirements while exposing personnel and resources to the lowest acceptable risk; take only those risks that are necessary to accomplish the mission or task. However, we cannot and should not be completely risk averse; even high risk endeavors may be undertaken when there is a well founded basis to believe that the sum of the benefits exceeds the sum of the costs. Balancing benefits and costs is a subjective process and tied intimately with the factors affecting the mission or activity; therefore, personnel with prior knowledge and experience of the mission or activity must be engaged whenever possible in making risk decisions to ensure a proper balance is achieved.

- Make risk decisions at the appropriate level. Although anyone can make a risk decision that impacts their personal well being, some risk acceptance decisions must be made by an appropriate decision making authority that can effectively allocate resources and implement controls to mitigate or eliminate risks associated with an operation/activity. Making risk decisions at the appropriate level also establishes clear accountability. Leaders and individuals must be aware of how much risk they can accept and when to elevate RM decisions to a higher level. Those accountable for the success or failure of the mission or activity must be fully engaged in the risk decision process.

- Integrate RM into operations, activities and planning at all levels. Integrate RM into planning at all levels and as early as possible. This provides the greatest opportunity to make well informed risk decisions and implement effective risk controls. To effectively apply RM, commanders, supervisors, and personnel must dedicate time and resources to integrate RM principles into planning, operational processes and day-to-day activities. Risk assessments of operations and activities

are most successful when they are accomplished in the normal sequence of events (the pre-planning of a mission or activity) by individuals directly involved in the event, and not as a last minute or add-on process. Any amount of pre-planning that can be accomplished, even in a time constrained environment, is better than no planning at all.

- Apply the process cyclically and continuously. RM is a continuous process applied across the full spectrum of military training and operations, base operations functions, and day-to-day activities and events both on- and off-duty. It is a cyclic process that is used to continuously identify and assess hazards, develop and implement controls, evaluate outcomes and provide feedback to our Airmen to save lives and preserve combat resources.

RM Levels. The principles, goals and fundamental concepts of RM highlight the universal application of RM concepts both on- and off-duty. There are two primary levels of RM (Deliberate, & Real-Time) that dictate the level of effort and scope that should normally be undertaken when evaluating risk(s). Deliberate and Real-Time RM are interrelated when making RM decisions; they are separated only at the point where the planning phase transitions to the execution phase of the mission/activity. A strong, effective RM process involves careful and Deliberative planning coupled with effective, Real-Time RM. This full spectrum approach ensures comprehensive risk mitigation and the likelihood of mission/ activity success.

- Deliberate: Deliberate RM refers to pre-mission/activity planning and normally involves the full formal application of the complete 5-Step RM Process. This process can range from an in-depth planning process involving thorough hazard identification (ID), detailed data research, diagram and analysis tools, formal testing, and long term tracking of the risks associated with an operation, activity or system, down to normal day-to-day operations/activity planning that utilize the same 5-Step RM Process, but require less time and resources to complete. Generally associated with strategic-level planning, in-depth RM planning is reserved for complex operations/systems, high priority/high visibility situations or circumstances in which hazards are not well understood. In-depth RM planning is normally implemented well in advance of the target system, mission, event, or activity, and is normally reserved for more complex and riskier efforts (i.e. large troop/unit movements, airshow planning, system development, tactics & training curricula development, scheduled vacations, organized camping/hiking activities, scheduled home repairs, etc.). As the situation, operation or activity becomes less complex, familiar and/or closer to execution, Deliberate RM planning becomes simplified and the focus shifts to ensuring near-term hazards and mitigation strategies are considered. Across the spectrum of Deliberate RM, we must always include the experience, expertise and knowledge of experienced personnel to identify known hazards/risks and strategies to effectively mitigate risks for the

specific mission, activity or task in both on- and off-duty situations. Although pre-planning is always desired for any situation, we must also consider how we deal with RM once we begin the execution phase of an activity.

- Real-Time: This level of RM is always associated with RM decisions made in "Real-Time" during the "execution" or tactical phase of training, operations, emergency/crisis response situations, or off-duty activities where there is normally little or no time to conduct formal/Deliberative RM planning. It is usually an informal, mental risk assessment that is done "on the fly" (i.e. short notice taskings, weather/natural phenomena driven activities, emergency responses, spontaneous off-duty activities, etc.) using basic RM process steps to identify and mitigate hazards in the new or changing situation. As time is normally constrained or limited in these situations, Deliberate RM planning is impractical. In Real-Time situations it is imperative that individuals are able to efficiently and effectively apply RM concepts to mitigate risks.

5-Step RM Process

RM is a continuous, systematic decision-informing process consisting of five primary steps that define the formal RM process primarily associated with Deliberative RM planning and forms the basis for Real-Time RM considerations. The following is a brief description of the 5-Step RM Process.

1. Identify the Hazards: Step one of the RM process involves application of appropriate hazard identification techniques in order to identify hazards associated with the operation or activity. Hazards can be defined as any real or potential condition that can cause mission degradation; injury, illness, death to personnel or damage to or loss of equipment/property. Key aspects of this step include:

- Mission/Task Analysis: Review current and planned operations and/or tasks associated with the mission or activity.

- List Hazards: Identify and list hazards and/or factors that may lead to dangers and risks associated with the operation or activity.

- List Causes: List the causes associated with each identified hazard, and try to identify the root cause(s) against which to apply RM strategies.

2. Assess the Hazards: The assessment step involves the application of quantitative and/or qualitative measures to determine the probability and severity of negative effects that may result from exposure to hazards/risks and directly affect mission or activity success. This process can be formalized or intuitive. Key aspects of this step include:

- Assess Hazard Exposure: Evaluate the time, proximity, volume or repetition involved to determine the level of exposure to hazards.

- Assess Hazard Severity: Determine severity of the hazard in terms of potential impact on personnel, equipment, or mission/activity.

- Assess Probability: Determine the probability that the hazard will cause a negative event of the severity assessed above. Probability may be determined through estimates or actual numbers (if available).

- Assess Risk Levels: Determine the level of risk associated with the hazard as it relates to Severity and Probability. The level of risk will vary from "extremely high" as associated with frequent exposure and catastrophic effects to "low" as associated with unlikely exposure and negligible effects.

- Complete Risk Assessment: Combine severity and probability estimates to form a risk assessment for each hazard. By combining the probability of occurrence with severity, a matrix can be created where intersecting rows and columns form a Risk Assessment Matrix.

3. Develop Controls & Make Decisions: Step three involves the development and selection of specific strategies and controls that reduce or eliminate risk. Effective mitigation measures reduce one of the three components (Probability, Severity or Exposure) of risk. Risk mitigation decisions must be made at the appropriate level for the identified risk. The higher the risk, the higher the decision-level needs to be to ensure that an appropriate analysis of overall costs to benefits has been carefully weighed. Keep in mind there is no "cookie-cutter" approach or specific standard for establishing levels of RM decision authority across the Air Force. However, it is critical that leadership/decision makers ensure that the levels of decision authority are aligned appropriately for mission requirements and experience levels of the personnel conducting operations/activities under their responsibility. It is possible for decision-levels to vary within a command for differing operations/activities if training requirements, mission sets or activities are divergent enough to warrant separate standards (i.e., AETC, AF Special Operations Command (AFSOC), etc.). Decision-makers must ultimately choose the most mission supportive risk controls, consistent with RM principles that provide the best solution for the given hazards. Risk decisions must never be delegated to a lower level for convenience or when the situation dictates senior-level involvement; exceptions may be considered in time critical situations where delays might endanger lives, resources or equipment. Key aspects of this step include:

- Identify Control Options: Starting with the highest-risk hazards as assessed in Step 2, identify as many risk control options as possible for all hazards. Each hazard should have one or more controls that can effectively eliminate, avoid, or reduce the risk to an acceptable level.

- Determine Control Effects: Determine the effect of each control on the risk(s) associated with the hazard. With controls identified, the hazard should be re-assessed taking into consideration the effect the control will have on the severity and or probability. This refined risk assessment determines the residual risk for the hazard (assuming the implementation of selected controls). At this point, it is also appropriate to consider the cost (personnel, equipment, money, time, etc.) of the control and the possible interaction between controls; do they work together?

- Prioritize Risk Controls: For each hazard, prioritize those risk controls that will reduce the risk to an acceptable level. The best controls will be consistent with mission objectives and optimize use of available resources (manpower, material, equipment, funding, time).

- Select Risk Controls: For each identified hazard, select those risk controls that will reduce the risk to an acceptable level. As in prioritizing controls, the best controls will be consistent with mission/activity objectives and optimum use of available resources (outlined above).

- Make Risk Control Decision: Analyze the level of risk for the operation/activity with the proposed controls in place. Determine if the benefits of the operation/activity now exceed the level of risk the operation/activity presents. Be sure to consider the cumulative risk of all the identified hazards and the long term consequences of the decision. If the cost of the risk(s) outweighs the benefits, re-examine the control options to see if any new or modified controls are available. If no additional controls are identified, inform the next level in the chain of command that, based on the evaluation, the risk of the mission exceeds the benefits and should be modified. When notified of a situation in which risk outweighs the benefit, the next level in the chain of command must assist and implement required controls, modify/cancel the mission, or accept the identified risks based on a higher level of the risk-benefit equation. Keep in mind that as circumstances change for a given mission/activity, the benefit-to-risk comparison must also be made to ensure that previous "Go/No-Go" decisions are valid.

4. Implement Controls: Once control measures have been selected, an implementation strategy must be developed and carried out. The strategy must identify the: who, what, when, where and cost(s) associated with the control measure. For mission-related controls, accountability must be emphasized across all levels of leadership and personnel associated with the action so that there is clear understanding of the risks and responsibilities of commanders and subordinates alike. There must always be accountability for acceptance of risk regardless of circumstances. Key aspects of this step include:

- Make Implementation Clear: Provide a roadmap for implementation, a vision of the end state, and describe successful implementation. The control measure must be deployed in a method that ensures it will be understood by the intended audience.

- Establish Accountability: Accountability is a critically important area of RM. The accountable person is the one who makes the decision (approves the control measures), and hence, the right person (appropriate level) must make the decision. Also, be clear on who is responsible at the unit or execution level for implementation of the risk control. Individuals involved in a specific RM process must be aware of who is responsible and accountable at each stage of an operation/activity and when (if possible) decisions will be elevated to the next level.

- Provide Support: To be successful, command/leadership must be behind the control measure(s) put in place. Provide the personnel and resources necessary to implement the control measures. Incorporate sustainability from the beginning and be sure to deploy the control measure along with a feedback mechanism that will provide information on whether the control measure is achieving the intended purpose.

5. Supervise & Evaluate: The RM process continues throughout the life cycle of the system, mission, or activity. Leaders and supervisors at every level must fulfill their respective roles to ensure controls are sustained over time. Once controls are in place, the process must be periodically reevaluated to ensure controls remain effective and mission supportive over time. Key aspects of this step include:

- Supervise: Monitor the operation/activity.

- Evaluate: The RM process review/evaluation must be systematic. After assets are expended to control risks, a cost benefit review must be accomplished to see if risk and cost are in balance. Significant changes in the system are recognized and appropriate RM controls are reapplied as necessary to control the risks. Effective review/evaluation will also identify whether actual costs are in line with expectations and how the controls have affected mission performance (good or bad). Other considerations:

- Feedback: A review by itself is not enough; a feedback system must be established to ensure that the corrective or preventative action taken was effective and that any newly discovered hazards identified during the mission/activity are analyzed and corrective action taken. Feedback informs all involved as to how the implementation process is working and whether or not the controls were effective. Feedback can be in the form of briefings, lessons learned, cross-tell reports, benchmarking, database reports, etc. Without this feedback loop, we lack the benefit of knowing if the previous forecasts were accurate, contained errors, or were completely incorrect. Commanders, supervisors and individuals must work with appropriate RM Process Managers, Instructors/Advisors to ensure effective RM feedback and crosstell is collected and distributed to enhance future operations, and activities. Note: For a complete explanation of the 5-Step RM Process refer to AFPAM 90-803 *Risk Management (RM) Guidelines and Tools.*.

TERMS

Accept no unnecessary risk—Unnecessary risk comes without a commensurate return in terms of real benefits or available opportunities. All Air Force missions and our daily routines involve risk. The most logical choices for accomplishing a mission are those that meet all mission requirements while exposing personnel and resources to the lowest acceptable risk.

Environmental Health—The discipline and program concerned with identifying and preventing illness and injury due to exposure to hazardous chemical, physical, and biological agents that may be encountered in the ambient environment – air, water, or soil.

Hazard—Any active or latent condition that can cause mission degradation; injury, illness, or death to personnel; or damage to, or loss of, equipment or property.

Impact—Any change to the environment, whether adverse or beneficial, wholly or partially resulting from organizational activities. Activities can have tangible impacts on the environment either directly or indirectly.

Integrate RM into operations, activities and planning at all levels—To effectively apply RM, commanders must dedicate time and resources to integrate RM principles into the planning processes. Risks are more easily accessed and managed in the planning stages of an operation.

Make risk decisions at the appropriate level—Making risk decisions at the appropriate level establishes clear accountability. Those accountable for the success or failure of the mission must be included in the risk decision process.

Personal Risk Management (PRM)/Personal Leadership—The concept of taking personal responsibility for actions and applying sound RM principles before initiating any on- or off-duty activity. PRM considers risk decisions, mitigation strategies and impacts to self and others.

Preventive Action—Action to eliminate the cause of a potential noncompliance and/or nonconformity.

Risk—A combination of the probability and severity of a loss or an adverse impact resulting from exposure to hazards. The greater the risk, the more likely it will cause a drain on resource capability and negatively affect the mission.

Risk Assessment—The process of detecting/prioritizing hazards and their causes, and systematically assessing the associated risks to mission or activity success.

Risk Assessment Code—The assignment of a hazard severity and probability of occurrence indices to a potential hazard. The RAC provides the foundation for comparative analysis among identified hazardous conditions which may impact human health, public health or the environment.

Risk Management (RM)—The systematic process of identifying hazards, assessing risk, analyzing risk control options and measures, making control decisions, implementing control decisions, accepting residual risks, and supervising/reviewing the activity for effectiveness.

Safety—The discipline and program concerned with the prevention of any active or latent condition that can cause mission degradation; injury or death to personnel; or damage to, or loss of, systems, equipment, facilities, or property.

System—A composite entity, at any level of complexity, of personnel, procedures, materials, tools, equipment, facilities, and software. The elements of this composite entity are used together in the intended operational or support environment to perform a given task or achieve a specific mission requirement.

System Safety—The term used to describe the application of the RM principles and practices to the Systems Engineering ESOH risk management process during the developing, sustaining, modifying, and disposing of a weapon system.

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Noncommissioned Officer Perspective

Affective Lesson Objective:
- Value appropriate professional interaction between officers and enlisted Airmen.

Affective Samples of Behavior:
- Explain how appropriate interaction between officers and enlisted Airmen contributes to mission accomplishment.

- Assert the importance of maintaining proper interaction with enlisted Airmen.

- Actively participate in classroom discussion.

Air and Space Expeditionary Force

Cognitive Lesson Objective:
- Know the Air and Space Expeditionary Force (AEF) concept.

Cognitive Samples of Behavior:
- State the purpose of the AEF concept.

- Describe the elements of AEF.

- State the importance of readiness on mission accomplishment.

Affective Lesson Objective:
- Respond to the importance of the AEF concept in proper presentation of forces.

Affective Samples of Behavior:
- Assert the importance of the AEF concept on all Airmen.

- Explain the impact readiness has on mission accomplishment.

- Actively participate in class discussion concerning the AEF concept.

AIR AND SPACE EXPEDITIONARY FORCE

The Air and Space Expeditionary Force (AEF) concept is the force generation construct that allows the Air Force to prepare and present forces and capabilities globally. AEF's purpose is to organize, train, and equip to deploy and sustain our air and space capabilities for military operations worldwide. The United States Air Force has a long history of being an expeditionary force and we recognize that air and space power is critical to influence world events. We are a much smaller force than we were at the end of the Cold War, yet we are involved in more engagements worldwide. The AEF concept seeks to balance the workload for Airmen while still providing Combatant Commanders with the proper forces in the right place, at the right time.

Elements of AEF

Principles of AEF

The AEF concept is based on three principles—predictability, equitability, and transparency—which are the baseline of AEF.

- **Predictability.** It was determined that AEF needed to allow Airmen predictability about when they were next vulnerable to deploy. To insert predictability into deployments, AEF is a based on a recurring deployment rotation so Airmen are aware of when they are deployment vulnerable. Because of deployment predictability, Airmen have a better ability to plan their training, leave, advanced education, etc. around their deployment vulnerability rotations. Having this level of predictability enhances the quality of life and aids in giving Airmen a balance between their personal lives and Air Force career.

- **Equitability.** Based on what was seen in the post-Gulf War era where a large number of deployments were being supported by only a small group of Airmen, it was determined that AEF needed to increase equitability of deployments across the force. Equitability spreads deployments more equally across the force, which reduces stress on particular Airmen; this increases morale, retention, and overall quality of life. Therefore, AEF is designed with equitability of deployment taskings in mind. Although it may not be possible for every Airman across the Air Force to deploy at the exact same pace, AEF is designed to equalize deployments across the force as much as possible. Airmen in the same functional area can expect to deploy at the same pace with other Airmen assigned to a similar unit. Additionally, AEF provides deployment equitability across the Total Force—active duty, Air Force Reserve, and Air National Guard.

- **Transparency.** Based on what we saw throughout our expeditionary heritage, it was determined that AEF needed to be transparent to Airmen. Transparency allows Airmen to understand the how, when, and why of deployments. Transparency eliminates many of the unknowns associated with deployments. Eliminating the mystery of deployments has a positive effect on the morale, retention, and overall quality of life of Airmen.

AEF Applies to All Airmen

Based on the foundational AEF principle of equitability, *every* Airman is an expeditionary Airman and AEF applies to *all* Airmen. Every Airman needs to understand that he/she is a key part to the AEF; an individual Airman's readiness affects the whole system. The AEF concept applies to everyone—officer, enlisted, active duty, Air National Guard, Air Force Reserve—the Total Force.

Readiness

Your Role as an Individual Airman

Readiness is critical to the AEF concept. Readiness is the ability to fulfill the requirements of the mission. Airmen need to understand that they are a capability to the Air Force. The Air Force needs every Airman to be ready to deploy and answer the nation when called upon. The first step for Airmen to be ready is to know their deployment vulnerability period and plan accordingly. An Airman should plan leave, required schooling, even personal goals around when he/she is vulnerable to deploy.

Airmen need to be physically fit to maintain resiliency. Airmen need to complete all required training and appointments to maintain readiness as well. There are many required annual online trainings that need to be completed. Every year, Airmen must complete a Preventative Health Assessment (PHA). These tasks are monitored at the unit and sometimes wing level. Readiness is extremely important in today's Air Force, so much so that the readiness of assigned personnel is briefed to commanders frequently.

When discussing readiness, every aspect of life is important, not just work; home life and personal life are critical. Airmen need to ensure their personal life—finances, bills, housing, etc.—is squared away. However, perhaps more importantly, Airmen need to ensure their families are taken care of as well. Airmen need to communicate with their families what to expect and ensure that everything is taken care of if they are called to deploy, go TDY, etc. Airmen must complete compulsory training and appointments, maintain fitness, and take care of themselves and their families to maintain their readiness.

Your Role as a Leader and Supervisor

It is a leader or supervisor's responsibility to ensure that his/her subordinates are maintaining all aspects of readiness. Supervisors and leaders must communicate the importance of readiness and instill a culture where readiness is a priority. Supervisors must give Airmen the resources required to maintain readiness—this may mean giving a subordinate time off to run errands to take care of his/her personal affairs.

Readiness and Mission Accomplishment

Airmen's readiness is reported at all levels of the Air Force. Those reported levels of readiness are looked at by the highest levels of our Air Force, including senior leadership, and are used to assess what our capabilities are as a force and whether or not we can accomplish the mission.

There are multiple systems that are used to report readiness and communicate the status of our force. One of these systems is the AEF Reporting Tool (ART). Knowing the details of this system is not important at this time, but understanding the implications of this system on a personal level is. This system reports the readiness of capabilities, both people and equipment, and assigns a color—red, yellow or green—based on whether or not the people and/or asset can fulfill their mission capability.

On a personal level, it is important to understand the larger implications of seemingly small things. For example, an individual who is overdue for an annual appointment, such as a teeth cleaning or annual preventative health assessment (PHA), can be reported as "red," unable to deploy, in the system. Additionally, if an individual has a temporary crown on his/her tooth and is waiting for a permanent crown to be made and permanently fixed, that individual will be "red" in the system and unable to deploy for the time that he/she has a temporary crown. As you can see by these examples, very minor issues can make a person unable to deploy. Being ready to deploy 100% of the time may not be feasible at all times due to unforeseen circumstances, but forecasted issues should be taken into account and planned for while taking readiness into account.

The phrase "mission first, people always," is very fitting in a discussion about readiness. We as Airmen are capabilities. We have a duty and obligation to accomplish the mission. If we are not ready, we are unable to fulfill our capability and duty as Airmen. Being ready means we are able and ready to complete the mission. Each and every Airman is important to mission accomplishment, which is why we are all here and wear the uniform. Being anything less than ready can adversely impact mission accomplishment.

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Defense Support of Civil Authorities

Cognitive Lesson Objective:
- Know the elements of Defense Support of Civil Authorities.

Cognitive Samples of Behavior:
- Identify the elements of Defense Support of Civil Authorities.

- Describe aspects of the incident response chain.

- Explain the role of the Dual Status Commander.

Affective Lesson Objective:
- Value the unique mission of Defense Support of Civil Authorities.

Affective Samples of Behavior:
- Assert the importance of the role of the DoD in supporting civil authorities.

- Express appreciation for the direct impact DoD incident response has on American citizens.

Cognitive Lesson Objective:
- Know basic facts and significant vulnerabilities associated with cyberspace operations and the Air Force role in the cyberspace domain.

Cognitive Samples of Behavior:
- State the Department of Defense definition for cyberspace and cyber superiority

- Identify the specific threats and vulnerabilities associated with cyberspace operations.

- Define the unique relationship of the cyberspace domain to other air and space domains according to the Airman's perspective of cyberspace.

- State the roles and responsibilities of all Cyber Wingman.

Affective Lesson Objective:
- Value the need for every Airman to defend the cyberspace domain against threats.

Affective Sample of Behavior:
- Respond during guided discussion to the importance of the cyberspace domain.

THE IMPORTANCE OF DESIGNATING

CYBERSPACE WEAPON SYSTEMS

Brig Gen Robert J. Skinner, USAF. Reprinted by permission from *Air and Space Power Journal*. **September - October 2013.**

Joint Publication 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, defines *weapon system* as "a combination of one or more weapons with all related equipment, materials, services, personnel, and means of delivery and deployment (if applicable) required for self-sufficiency." When one thinks of the US Air Force and weapon systems, the B-2 Spirit stealth bomber, F-15E Strike Eagle fighter jet, or F-16 Fighting Falcon aircraft quickly come to mind. Even the Minuteman III missile, the Global Positioning System, or KC-135 Stratotanker air refueling aircraft could become part of the discussion because, after all, the Air Force's mission is to fly, fight, and win in air, space, and cyberspace. These assets, which fall under the air and space umbrella, have served as tried and true weapon systems for many years. The Air Force has now added to the long line of its weapon systems that support cyberspace operations "the employment of cyberspace capabilities where the primary purpose is to achieve objectives in or through cyberspace." These systems are unique in that they are tied to the newest domain of cyber—"a global domain within the information environment consisting of the interdependent network of information technology infrastructures and resident data, including the Internet, telecommunications networks, computer systems, and embedded processors and controllers."

On 24 March 2013, the chief of staff of the Air Force approved the official designation of six cyberspace weapon systems under the lead of Air Force Space Command (AFSPC), which is responsible for organizing these systems, equipping units with them, and training individuals to use the systems. The Air Force's provision of global reach, power, and vigilance across the domains of air and space now applies to the cyberspace domain through the designation of the following cyberspace weapon systems:

- Air Force Cyberspace Defense

- Cyberspace Defense Analysis

- Cyberspace Vulnerability Assessment / Hunter

- Air Force Intranet Control

- Air Force Cyber Security and Control System

- Cyber Command and Control Mission System

Although the names may imply some duplication of effort with respect to these capabilities, the personnel and equipment that comprise these systems perform unique missions and complement each other. All of them focus on providing and securing cyberspace as a mission enabler and protecting critical information while defending our networks from attack. Any consideration of the capabilities of these weapon systems would benefit from comparing this suite of cyberspace weapon systems to the Air Force's military airlift weapon systems (the C-5, C-17, C-130, etc.), each of which contributes uniquely to the overall air mobility mission. Just as clear distinctions exist among these platforms, based upon the operational capabilities required, so do the cyberspace weapon systems differ from each other. The systems may have overlapping mission areas, but they are complementary in much the same way as our airlift platforms—they offer comprehensive capabilities.

Revelations of Chinese activities on our networks, as outlined earlier this year in the Mandiant Company's report titled *Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) 1: Exposing One of China's Cyber Espionage Units*, emphasize the urgent need for the Air Force and the nation to develop capabilities to defend this critical domain and thereby ensure information superiority. The report illustrates the persistent threat, noting that "the details we have analyzed during hundreds of investigations convince us that the groups conducting these activities are based primarily in China and that the Chinese Government is aware of them... Our analysis has led us to conclude that APT1 is likely government-sponsored and one of the most persistent of China's cyber threat actors." The Mandiant report on APT 1 highlights only one of more than 20 APT groups based in China, tracking this single group to cyber attacks on nearly 150 victims over seven years with hundreds of terabytes of data exfiltrated. Clearly, though, this discussion does not confine itself to any particular adversary. Many aggressors inhabit the cyberspace domain, and the executor of these activities ranges from an individual in the basement of his house, to groups of individuals working as teams, to nation-states. Their intentions can also cover a spectrum of activities, including espionage, theft of intellectual capital, organized crime, identity theft, military operations, and so forth.

This article examines each weapon system, highlights its history and unique capabilities, and describes the specific units that operate the system. It then discusses the importance of classifying these capabilities as "weapon systems," illustrating how they directly address the threats we face today. Before doing so, however, the article presents a stage-setting vignette to establish an understanding of weapon system capabilities and their employment against an adversary.

Assume that you are a government civilian sitting at your desk at a major command headquarters when you receive an e-mail concerning sequestration and a potential furlough. Included in the e-mail is a link to a website for more information. You attempt to open the link but receive an error message. You try again with the same result. You then resume work on your tasks. Unknown to you, the link has directed you to a malicious web server that downloaded malware enabling an adversary to take command of your desktop computer. How could this occur, and why would anyone specifically target you? Actually, it was not difficult. Remember the conference you attended a few months ago, before temporary duty became restricted? The adversary lifted your e-mail

address from the conference sign-in sheet, also available to the event sponsors. Why you? Adversaries consider your unique expertise and access to valuable information a "target-rich environment." Only one person needs to click on the link to initiate a series of malicious actions. Because the adversary left no hint of a problem on your computer, he now has unfettered access to that unclassified but useful information.

How does the Air Force combat such intrusions? Actually, the best defense for phishing attacks is user education. However, these attacks are becoming more sophisticated and sometimes almost impossible to identify. All of the services have cyberspace units responsible for network defense. In this case, network traffic monitoring tips off the Air Force to the intrusion on your desktop computer. A network operations unit identifies an unusual amount of traffic leaving your base directed to addresses in another country. The unit notifies the 624th Operations Center, including Air Force Office of Special Investigations personnel, and the center begins command and control (C2) and law enforcement efforts to address the event. Cyberspace forensics experts are dispatched to review the situation, not only locating the "infected" equipment but also determining how the adversary accessed the Air Force system. Cyberspace C2 dispatches cyber operations risk-assessment personnel to survey the situation, determine the exact data exfiltrated, and assess the damage. The Air Force computer emergency response team (AFCERT) examines your base's computers and other hardware to footprint exact infiltration methods, using them to develop (and share) defensive actions specific to the threat and glean any new tactics, techniques, and procedures. The AFCERT pushes patches to all Air Force desktop computers to combat future attempts to employ this technique; it will support your base on further network cleanup and hardening. Now that we have described an attack from 50,000 feet, let us delve deeper into the weapon systems and units that carry out these missions.

Air Force Cyberspace Defense Weapon System

The Air Force Cyberspace Defense (ACD) weapon system prevents, detects, responds to, and provides forensics of intrusions into unclassified and classified networks. Operated by the 33d Network Warfare Squadron (NWS), located at Joint Base San Antonio–Lackland, Texas, and the Air National Guard's 102d NWS, located at Quonset Air National Guard Base, Rhode Island, the ACD weapon system supports the AFCERT in fulfilling its responsibilities. The crews for this weapon system consist of one cyberspace crew commander, one deputy crew commander, one cyberspace operations controller, and 33 cyberspace analysts, all of them supported by additional mission personnel.

The ACD weapon system evolved from the AFCERT, which has primary responsibility for coordinating the former Air Force Information Warfare Center's technical resources to assess, analyze, and mitigate computer security incidents and vulnerabilities. The weapon system offers continuous monitoring and defense of the Air Force's unclassified and classified networks, operating in four subdiscipline areas:

- incident prevention: protects Air Force networks (AFNet) against new and existing malicious logic; assesses and mitigates known software and hardware vulnerabilities.

- incident detection: conducts monitoring of classified and unclassified AFNets; identifies and researches anomalous activity to determine problems and threats to networks; monitors real-time alerts generated from network sensors; performs in-depth research of historical traffic reported through sensors.

- incident response: determines the extent of intrusions; develops courses of action required to mitigate threat(s); determines and executes response actions.

- computer forensics: conducts in-depth analysis to determine threats from identified incidents and suspicious activities; assesses damage; supports the incident response process, capturing the full impact of various exploits; reverse-engineers code to determine the effect on the network/system.

Cyberspace Defense Analysis Weapon System

The Air Force Cyberspace Defense Analysis (CDA) weapon system conducts defensive cyberspace operations by monitoring, collecting, analyzing, and reporting on sensitive information released from friendly unclassified systems, such as computer networks, telephones, e-mail, and US Air Force websites. CDA is vital to identifying operations security disclosures. The weapon system is operated by three active duty units (68 NWS; 352 NWS; and 352 NWS, Detachment 1) and two Air Force Reserve units (860th Network Warfare Flight and 960th Network Warfare Flight) located at Joint Base San Antonio–Lackland, Texas; Joint Base Pearl Harbor–Hickam Field, Hawaii; Ramstein Air Base, Germany; and Offutt AFB, Nebraska. The crews for this weapon system consist of one cyberspace operations controller and three cyberspace defense analysts. All mission crews receive support from additional mission personnel. The CDA weapon system's two variants are designed to monitor, collect, analyze, and report on official Air Force information transmitted via unsecured telecommunications systems to determine whether any of it is sensitive or classified. The system reports compromises to field commanders, operations security monitors, or others, as required, to determine potential effects and operational adjustments. The second variant provides additional functionality to conduct information damage assessment based on network intrusions, coupled with an assessment of Air Force unclassified websites. Only the 68 NWS operates the second variant.

The CDA weapon system supplies monitoring and/or assessment in six subdiscipline areas:

- telephony: monitors and assesses Air Force unclassified voice networks.

- radio frequency: monitors and assesses Air Force communications within the VHF, UHF, FM, HF, and SHF frequency bands (mobile phones, land mobile radios, and wireless local area networks).

- e-mail: monitors and assesses unclassified Air Force e-mail traffic traversing the AFNet.

- Internet-based capabilities: monitor and assess information that originates within the AFNet that is posted to publicly accessible Internet-based capabilities not owned, operated, or controlled by the Department of Defense (DOD) or the federal government.

- cyberspace operational risk assessment (found within the second variant operated by the 68 NWS): assesses data compromised through intrusions of AFNets with the objective of determining the associated effect on operations resulting from that data loss.

- web risk assessment (found within the second variant operated by the 68 NWS): assesses information posted on unclassified public and private websites owned, leased, or operated by the Air Force in order to minimize its exploitation by an adversary, diminishing any adverse affect on Air Force and joint operations.

Cyberspace Vulnerability Assessment/Hunter Weapon System

The Air Force Cyberspace Vulnerability Assessment (CVA)/Hunter weapon system executes vulnerability, compliance, defense, and non-technical assessments, best-practice reviews, penetration testing, and hunter missions on Air Force and DOD networks and systems. Hunter operations characterize and then eliminate threats for the purpose of mission assurance. This weapon system can perform defensive sorties worldwide via remote or on-site access. The CVA/Hunter weapon system is operated by one active duty unit, the 92d Information Operations Squadron, located at Joint Base San Antonio–Lackland, Texas, and one Guard unit, the 262 NWS, located at Joint Base Lewis-McChord, Washington. Additionally, two Guard units are in the process of converting to this mission: the 143d Information Operations Squadron located at Camp Murray, Washington, and the 261 NWS located at Sepulveda Air National Guard Station, California. The crews for this weapon system consist of one cyberspace crew commander, one to four cyberspace operators, and one to four cyberspace analysts. Additional mission personnel support all of the mission crews. Developed by the former Air Force Information Operations Center, the CVA/Hunter weapon system was fielded to the 688th Information Operations Wing in 2009.

Historically, vulnerability assessments proved instrumental to mission assurance during Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom. CVAs continue to provide this vital capability. Additionally, they now serve as the first phase of hunting operations. The hunter mission grew out of the change in defensive cyber strategy from "attempt to defend the whole network" to "mission assurance on the network," offering an enabling capability to implement a robust defense-in-depth strategy. CVA/Hunter weapon system prototypes have participated in real-world operations since November 2010. The weapon system attained initial operational capability in June 2013.

Designed to identify vulnerabilities, the CVA/Hunter gives commanders a comprehensive assessment of the risk of existing vulnerabilities on critical mission networks. It is functionally divided into a mobile platform used by operators to conduct missions either on site or remotely, a deployable sensor platform to gather and analyze data, and a garrison platform that provides needed connectivity for remote operations as well as advanced analysis, testing, training, and archiving capabilities. Specifically, the hunter mission focuses on finding, fixing, tracking, targeting, engaging, and assessing the advanced, persistent threat.

During active engagements, the CVA/Hunter weapon system, in concert with other friendly network defense forces, provides Twenty- Fourth Air Force/Air Forces Cyber and combatant commanders a mobile precision-protection capability to identify, pursue, and mitigate cyberspace threats. It can be armed with a variety of modular capability payloads optimized for specific defensive missions and designed to produce specific effects in cyberspace. Each CVA/Hunter crew can conduct a range of assessments, including vulnerability, compliance, and penetration testing, along with analysis and characterization of data derived from these assessments. The weapon system's payloads consist of commercial-off-the-shelf and government-off-the-shelf hardware and software, including Linux and Windows operating systems loaded with customized vulnerability-assessment tools.

Air Force Intranet Control Weapon System

The Air Force Intranet Control (AFINC) weapon system is the top level boundary and entry point into the Air Force Information Network, controlling the flow of all external and interbase traffic through standard, centrally managed gateways. The AFINC weapon system consists of 16 gateway suites and two integrated management suites. Operated by the 26th Network Operations Squadron (NOS) located at Gunter Annex, Montgomery, Alabama, AFINC has crews consisting of one crew commander, one deputy crew commander, one cyberspace operations crew chief, two operations controllers, two cyberspace operators, and three event controllers, all of them supported by additional mission personnel.

The AFINC weapon system replaces and consolidates regionally managed, disparate AFNets into a centrally managed point of access for traffic through the Air Force Information Network. It delivers network-centric services, enables core services, and offers greater agility to take defensive actions across the network. AFINC integrates network operations and defense via four subdiscipline areas:

- defense-in-depth: delivers an enterprise-wide layered approach by integrating the gateway and boundary devices to provide increased network resiliency and mission assurance.

- proactive defense: conducts continuous monitoring of AFNet traffic for response time, throughput, and performance to ensure timely delivery of critical information.

- network standardization: creates and maintains standards and policies to protect networks, systems, and databases; reduces maintenance complexity, downtime, costs, and training requirements.

- situational awareness: delivers network data flow, traffic patterns, utilization rates, and in-depth research of historical traffic for anomaly resolution.

Air Force Cyber Security and Control System Weapon System

The Air Force Cyber Security and Control System (CSCS) weapon system provides network operations and management functions around the clock, enabling key enterprise services within the Air Force's unclassified and classified networks. It also supports defensive operations within those AFNets. CSCS is operated by two active duty NOSs, one Air National Guard Network Operations Security Squadron, and two Air Force Reserve Command Associate NOSs aligned with the active duty squadrons. The 83 NOS and 860 NOS are located at Langley AFB, Virginia; the 561 NOS and 960 NOS at Peterson AFB, Colorado; and the 299th Network Operations Security Squadron at McConnell AFB, Kansas. Crews for this weapon system consist of one cyberspace crew commander, one cyberspace operations controller, an operations flight crew (conducting boundary, infrastructure, network defense, network focal point, and vulnerability-management functions), and an Enterprise Service Unit (supplying messaging and collaboration, directory and authentication services, storage and virtualization management, and monitoring management). Additional mission personnel support all of the mission crews.

The CSCS resulted from an operational initiative to consolidate numerous major command–specific networks into a centrally managed and controlled network under three integrated network operations and security centers. In 2007 the Air Force established two active duty NOSs to provide these functions. The Air National Guard Network Operations Security Squadron does the same for the Guard's bases and units.

The CSCS weapon system performs network operations and fault-resolution activities designed to maintain operational networks. Its crews monitor, assess, and respond to real-time network events; identify and characterize anomalous activity; and take appropriate responses when directed by higher headquarters. The system supports real-time filtering of network traffic into and out of Air Force base-level enclaves and blocks suspicious software. CSCS crews continuously coordinate with base-level network control centers and communications focal points to resolve network issues. Additional key capabilities include vulnerability identification and remediation as well as control and security of network traffic entering and exiting Air Force base-level network enclaves. CSCS also offers Air Force enterprise services, including messaging and collaboration, storage, and controlled environments for hosting network-based systems that support the service's missions.

Cyber Command and Control Mission System Weapon System

The Cyber Command and Control Mission System (C3MS) weapon system enables the Air Force mission by synchronizing the service's other cyber weapon systems to produce operational-level effects in support of combatant commanders worldwide. It provides operational-level C2 and situational awareness of Air Force cyber forces, networks, and mission systems, enabling the Twenty-Fourth Air Force commander to develop and disseminate cyber strategies and plans; the commander can then execute and assess these plans in support of Air Force and joint war fighters. Operated by the 624th Operations Center at Joint Base San Antonio–Lackland, Texas, the C3MS weapon system has crews consisting of a senior duty officer, a deputy senior duty officer, a defensive cyberspace watch officer, an offensive cyberspace watch officer, a DOD information network watch officer, three defensive cyber operations controllers, three offensive cyber operations controllers, three DOD information network operations controllers, a cyberspace effects planner, a cyberspace operations strategist, a cyberspace intelligence analyst, a cyberspace operations assessment analyst, and a cyberspace operations reporting cell analyst. All mission crews are supported by additional mission personnel. The C3MS weapon system evolved from the legacy AFNet operations security center's concept, personnel, and equipment. With the activation of US Cyber Command and Twenty-Fourth Air Force, senior leaders recognized the need for an operational-level cyber C2 capability.

The C3MS is the single Air Force weapon system offering perpetual, overarching awareness, management, and control of the service's portion of the cyberspace domain. It ensures unfettered access, mission assurance, and joint war fighters' use of networks and information-processing systems to conduct worldwide operations. The weapon system has five major subcomponents:

- situational awareness: produces a common operational picture by fusing data from various sensors, databases, weapon systems, and other sources to gain and maintain awareness of friendly, neutral, and threat activities that affect joint forces and the Air Force.

- intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) products: enable the integration of cyberspace indications and warning, analysis, and other actionable intelligence products into overall situational awareness, planning, and execution.

- planning: leverages situational awareness to develop long- and short-term plans, tailored strategy, courses of action; shapes execution of offensive cyberspace operations, defensive cyberspace operations, and DOD information network operations.

- execution: leverages plans to generate and track various cyberspace tasking orders to employ assigned and attached forces in support of offensive cyberspace operations, defensive cyberspace operations, and DOD information network operations.

- integration with other C2 nodes: integrates Air Force–generated cyber effects with air and space operations centers (AOC), US Cyber Command, and other C2 nodes.

Why Cyber Weapon Systems?

If we truly wish to treat cyberspace as an operational domain no different from air, land, sea, or space, then our thinking must evolve from communications as a supporting function to cyber as an operational war-fighting domain. To fly and fight effectively and to win in cyberspace, the Air Force must properly organize, train, and equip its cyber professionals. For many years, AFNet infrastructure and systems grew as a result of multiple communities adding components to suit their individual needs, often with end-of-year funds. Similarly, the components that now make up these six systems had no lead major command to articulate operational requirements and ensure standardized training as well as the effective management and resourcing of equipment life cycles. Such an inconsistent approach made mission assurance and the defense of critical Air Force and joint missions in cyberspace nearly impossible. Migration to the AFNet has allowed the service to take great strides towards realizing the vision from nearly two decades ago of operationalizing and professionalizing the network. AFSPC championed the effort to identify these six systems' weapon systems and facilitate this move to a more disciplined approach. Formally designating these systems helps ensure proper management and sustainment of equipment life cycles. It also expedites the evolution of Air Force cyber professionals from a communications or information technology mind-set to an operational one replete with mission-qualification training, crew force-management standards, and standardization and evaluation programs (where appropriate) to normalize cyber operations, as is the case with space and missile operations. Furthermore, formally designated weapon systems should help cyber receive the proper manning and programmatic funding necessary to ensure that the Air Force can fly, fight, and win in cyberspace.

The DOD construct for the management and resourcing of air, space, land, and sea superiority occurs via weapon systems. The best way to create and control effects in the cyber domain involves using the same weapon system construct to manage and resource cyber capabilities. Cyber weapon systems offer a path for the Air Force to operationalize, normalize, and ultimately standardize cyber, just as we have with the other war-fighting domains. The Air Force has been charged with securing, operating, and defending its portion of the DOD information networks and with defending Air Force and joint missions in the cyberspace domain. These cyber weapon systems give the Air Force a path to follow in normalizing operations to realize this goal.

The designation of cyber weapon systems created a separate cyber sustainment funding line in the overall process of sustaining Air Force weapon systems. By normalizing the funding process, the service has instituted proper long-term planning and programming of sustainment funding, thus enabling more effective and efficient use of these limited resources, as compared to uncoordinated execution of unreliable end-of-year funds—key tenets to guaranteeing standardized configuration management and servicewide (and,

where applicable, joint) interoperability. We are already realizing these benefits through the deployment of AFNet, whereby the Air Force enterprise has become easier to defend and the user experience continues to improve through ongoing standardization.

The benefits of designating cyberspace weapon systems are similar to those gained by weapon systems in other domains—it is the standard Air Force mechanism for organizing, training, equipping, and presenting mission capabilities. The weapon system construct allows the service to manage operational capabilities in a formalized approach and assure their standardization, sustainment, and availability to combatant commanders. When AFSPC personnel compared the air and space domains' normalization processes, they found that only weapon system designation delivered the desired end state. Such systems may not always be ideally resourced, but they certainly receive better support than they would without designations.

Furthermore, designating cyberspace weapon systems directly supports AFSPC's role as cyber core function lead integrator, enabling the command to meet responsibilities listed in Air Force Policy Directive 10-9 and facilitating standardization across cyberspace platforms. Designating these weapon systems is also critical to providing tactical units with the resources and training they need to operate in a normalized capacity. The core of cross-domain integration lies in the ability to leverage capabilities from different domains to create unique and decisive effects—if adequately resourced. Such designations will support proper evolution of the cyberspace domain and its relationship with the other operational domains—a critically important point because in modern warfare, cyberspace interconnects all domains. All of these efforts to normalize and operationalize cyberspace operations and missions drive the Air Force towards the joint information environment (JIE) construct, standards, and processes. As the DOD, US Cyber Command, and services implement the JIE, they are also standing up cyber mission teams to support national, combatant command, and service-specific cyber requirements. Designating these capabilities as weapon systems allows these teams to better support national and joint missions in, through, and from cyberspace.

Unique Challenges of the Cyber Domain

The air, land, sea, and space domains are natural areas—we didn't have to build them, as we did the tools to leverage those domains. Although none of the natural domains demands any maintenance, cyberspace predominantly exists within the equipment and devices designed, built, and configured by humans, requiring constant maintenance as equipment becomes outdated or worn out. Additionally, the way we construct cyberspace has a direct effect on our ability to operate and defend the domain. This aspect makes cyberspace unique in that its operation is just as important as its defense. We must constantly feed and care for the domain as well as innovate to stay ahead of or, preferably, drive the technology curve.

Defending cyber also presents its own challenges since an adversary can launch a cyber attack virtually without warning from any location on the globe. In the case of intercontinental ballistic missiles, we at least have sensors that detect the launch; thus, depending on the location of the launch, our forces have some modicum of warning and can respond. In cyberspace, attacks can occur without warning or time to craft and execute responses. The Air Force must develop capabilities to detect such attacks, prevent them if possible, and respond accordingly if required, just as it does in all other war-fighting domains. We must also develop the tools to leverage cyberspace for our own benefit. In reality, we may never be able to defend our networks completely—to do so would likely require so much security that we lose the force-multiplying benefits that cyberspace offers to all of our missions. If we keep all adversaries out, most likely we will keep ourselves locked in. The key lies in finding a balance so that we effectively defend our networks and the missions that rely on them from attack yet leverage cyberspace for the benefit it offers those same missions.

Moreover, cyberspace is critical to Air Force and joint operations in the other war-fighting domains. Practically everything we do in warfare these days relies on cyberspace, be it providing telemetry to satellites and missiles or controlling our military forces in Afghanistan—we depend upon the cyber domain to execute operations in all of the other domains.

Designating cyberspace weapon systems calls for a tremendous resource commitment to meet the standards of air and space weapon systems. Operating to this higher benchmark requires corresponding funding and manpower greater than the cyberspace domain received as a simple communications or information technology support function. However, failure to make these commitments could prove devastating to future operations throughout every other domain. The operationalization of cyberspace is more than just a way for AFSPC to properly organize, train, and equip cyberspace forces—it is the logical evolution of cyberspace to a true war-fighting domain and a critical enabler of all other war-fighting operations.

Air and Space Operating Center Example

In the late 1990s, the Air Force designated the Falconer AOC a weapon system with little or no formal acquisition, sustainment, or requirements rigor to back it up. Basically, the chief of staff just made it a "go do." The operations community found itself backing into the requirements in much the same way we do today with our cyberspace systems. By declaring the AOC a weapon system, the Air Force sought to normalize what was basically a homegrown "county option" collection of equipment and personnel that varied from one numbered air force to another. This thinking held that a designated weapon system would result in better training for AOC crews, better defense of the program in the program objective memorandum process, and some protection of the numbered air force's staff manpower from poaching to fill AOC billets.

In reality, the AOC funding line has suffered numerous cuts, the equipment baseline has always been problematic in terms of sustainment and modernization, and AOC manpower has remained subject to several efficiency drills, ultimately shrinking the footprint. It stands to reason that many members of the operations community would argue that classification as a weapon system has not necessarily helped the AOC.

In Air Combat Command's opinion, though, in spite of the serious challenges faced during the transition, the AOC is better off today than it was 15 years ago, especially in terms of training its crews. A dedicated formal training unit at Hurlburt Field, Florida, established a program of record, provided a rigorous configuration and change-management process, and ultimately resulted in recognition by the operations community that the AOC is the crown jewel in the joint force air component commander's tactical air control system C2 concept. Additionally, assignment to an AOC tour is no longer considered a career-ending event for rated officers—quite a change from the perception in the 1990s when an assignment to a numbered air force staff or an AOC was widely seen as the kiss of death for promotion in the rated career fields.

AFSPC would not let the initial pains of the AOC experience deter us from pushing the cyberspace weapon system concept forward. Every program (fighters, bombers, and ISR) confronted its fair share of challenges, but without a program—something with a name attached to it—cyberspace systems would always fight for scraps in money and manpower. As we integrate these cyberspace weapon systems into the Air Force construct, perhaps we can learn from the challenges of establishing the AOC weapon system and avoid the same pitfalls and mistakes.

Final Thoughts

Through the cyberspace domain, the United States exploits other war-fighting domains. Practically all warfare these days relies on cyberspace—everything from communications, precision navigation and timing, attack warning, ISR, and C2. Designating cyberspace weapon systems will help the Air Force guarantee persistent cyberspace access and mission assurance for other critical weapon systems and domains that rely on cyberspace. By doing so, the service has made a commitment that cyberspace will receive the programmatic and budgetary attention necessary to sustain cyberspace operations, support the cyber mission teams, and drive towards the JIE. Furthermore, cyberspace operations supported by core weapon systems offer increased security, performance, flexibility, and overall capability unmatched in a less normalized environment. The operationalization of cyberspace is more than just a way for AFSPC to properly organize, train, and equip the cyberspace domain—it is the logical evolution of cyberspace to a true warfighting domain and a critical enabler of all other such domains.

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Disclaimer:

Cognitive Lesson Objectives:
- Know the fundamentals of nuclear operations and the nuclear surety program.

Cognitive Samples of Behavior:
- State the fundamental purpose of the US nuclear arsenal.

- State the unique nature of nuclear weapons.

- Define the usability paradox.

- State the reason Airmen should neither confirm nor deny the presence of nuclear weapons at any location.

Affective Lesson Objective:
- Receive nuclear operations doctrine.

Affective Sample of Behavior:
- Read "Nuclear Operations" in student study guide.

FUNDAMENTALS OF NUCLEAR OPERATIONS

The end of the Cold War has had a major impact on the perceived utility and role of nuclear weapons in the US. Force reductions have reduced the specter of a large-scale, Cold War-type nuclear exchange; however, as long as nuclear weapons exist, the possibility of their use remains. This risk is aggravated as potential adversaries seek to acquire nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction (WMD). This continuing proliferation places US forces, allies, and civilians around the world at greater risk. Thus, while nuclear operations are not as visible a component of national security as they were during the Cold War, they continue to underpin US deterrence.

US nuclear policy is not static and is shaped by numerous considerations. As the civilian leadership changes US policy due to new threats or technologies, the Air Force will need to develop new concepts, systems, and procedures. For instance, the concepts of "mutual assured destruction" and "flexible response" required different types of weapons, different plans, and different degrees of survivability for command and control (C2) systems. Stated policies also affect the ability to deter an enemy. As an example, US policy on using nuclear weapons to respond to an adversary's battlefield use of WMD is purposely vague. The ambiguous nature of US policy makes it impossible for an enemy to assume such a response would not be forthcoming. Even though there is no guarantee nuclear force would be used to respond to a WMD attack, planners are responsible for making alternative options available for civilian policymakers.

This chapter examines the context of Air Force nuclear operations: its day-to-day role as an element of deterrence and in providing strategic effects; the capabilities in the new triad and theater-level weapons; a summary of key employment considerations; weapons effects; war termination; and additional considerations.

Deterrence

Deterrence is fundamental to national security. Per Joint Publication (JP) 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, defines deterrence as "The prevention of action by the existence of a credible threat of unacceptable counteraction and/or belief that cost of action outweighs the perceived benefits." For a nation whose security is predicated on an enduring strategy of dissuasion and deterrence, a failure of deterrence is a fundamental risk.

Although nuclear forces are not the only factor in the deterrence equation, our nuclear capability underpins all other deterrent elements, and the fundamental purpose of the US nuclear arsenal is to deter an enemy's use of its nuclear arsenal or other WMD. Additionally, our nuclear forces assure allies of our continuing commitment to their security, dissuade potential adversaries from embarking on programs or activities that could threaten our vital interests, and defeat threats that are not deterred.

Deterrence can be described as a state of mind created in an adversary's (or potential adversary's) leadership. Their leadership should believe the cost of aggression against the US, its interests, or its allies will be so high as to outweigh any possible gain. Deterrence requires the US to maintain the ability to use force, which means having trained, capable, ready, and survivable forces; a robust command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance structure; and timely, flexible, and adaptive planning capabilities. The second critical element of deterrence is the will to use nuclear weapons. If an enemy believes these tools will not be used, then their deterrent value is zero.

The effect our deterrence has on adversaries and allies stems from the credibility of our nuclear capabilities in the minds of those we seek to deter, dissuade, or assure. To achieve its psychological and political objectives of deterring opponents and reassuring allies, deterrence requires visible and credible nuclear capabilities. This credibility is attained through focused day-to-day training, periodic exercises, and regular inspections which ensures precise, reliable nuclear forces that prove our capability and will to use them if the situation warrants.

Extended Deterrence

During the Cold War the US provided for the security of its allies by threatening a nuclear response in the event of an attack on them by the Soviet Union. This policy, based on the threat of retaliation, served as the foundation for what is now called extended deterrence. Extended deterrence remains an important pillar of US policy; however, its application in the context of the twenty-first century is very different from the Cold War. Today, extended deterrence is less about retaliation and more about posturing to convince an enemy that they are unlikely to achieve the political and military objectives behind any attack on the US or one of our allies.

Through alliances and treaties, our extended deterrence strategy provides a nuclear umbrella to friendly and allied nations. Our nuclear umbrella assures allies of our commitment to their security and serves as a nonproliferation tool by obviating their need to develop and field their own nuclear arsenals.

In the case of the North Atlantic treaty Organization (NATO), the deployment of nuclear weapons in Europe is not a Service or regional command issue—it is an Alliance issue. Moreover, actions concerning nuclear posture in NATO have an impact on the perceptions of our allies elsewhere.

Strategic Effects

JP 1-02 defines effects as "the physical or behavioral state of a system that results from an action, a set of actions, or another effect." It is the convincing and widely recognized ability to execute and influence the perceptions, plans, and actions of one's adversaries that constitutes the essence of deterrence, which is the cornerstone of our nation's

strategic effects. Our day-to-day precise, reliable nuclear operations, underpinned by the unquestionable credibility of being prepared and able to execute a nuclear strike, are the heart of US Air Force responsibility and accountability for the nuclear deterrent mission.

The physical employment of nuclear weapons is a form of strategic attack. Strategic attack is "offensive action specifically selected to achieve national strategic objectives. These attacks seek to weaken the adversary's ability or will to engage in conflict, and may achieve strategic objectives without necessarily having to achieve operational objectives as a precondition" (AF Doctrine Annex 3-70, Strategic Attack). It is an offensive operation intended to accomplish national, multinational, or theater strategic-level objectives without necessarily engaging an enemy's fielded military forces. However, this does not preclude operations to destroy the enemy's fielded forces if required to accomplish strategic national objectives.

The nature of nuclear weapons is such that their use can produce political and psychological effects well beyond their actual physical effects. The employment of nuclear weapons may lead to such unintended consequences as escalation of the current conflict or long-term deterioration of relations with other countries. For this reason above all others, the decision whether or not to use, or even threaten to use, nuclear weapons will always be a political decision and not a military one, and will be made by civilian leaders. Additionally, the viability of deterrence relies on credible nuclear forces whose value resides in achieving national security goals through daily deterrent operations without the physical employment of nuclear weapons.

The physical employment of nuclear weapons at any level requires explicit orders from the President. Nuclear weapons are unique in their destructive power and psychological impact. The use of nuclear weapons represents a significant escalation from conventional warfare. The decision to employ nuclear weapons is a political decision and will only be made by national leadership to support national objectives. In the US, the President retains sole authority for the execution and termination of nuclear operations.

Nuclear Operations In Support Of Theater Objectives

The US employs extended deterrence on a daily basis to project deterrent effects in key regions across the globe. These forward-deployed assets combined with the global reach of continental United States (CONUS)-based nuclear forces provide theater-level assurance to allies abroad and deterrence to adversaries. Should deterrence fail, Air Force forces operating in a theater environment may be called upon to use nuclear weapons in order to obtain theater-level objectives. Though often referred to as "tactical" weapons, the designation is misleading. Terming the effect "tactical" implies attaining only limited military objectives. Activities at the tactical level of war focus on the arrangement and maneuver of combat elements in relation to each other and the enemy. While the use of nuclear weapons will affect an ongoing engagement between friendly and enemy forces, their use should also be designed to help achieve the political goals of the operation. Such use will additionally have an impact on the US's long-term relations with other countries.

In order to achieve theater-level objectives, combatant commanders (CCDRs) may request the use of CONUS-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) or theater-level nuclear weapons using either long-range bombers or fighters designated as "dual-capable;" i.e., capable of both nuclear and conventional operations. Cruise missiles allow for standoff attack which puts crew members at minimal risk and may deny an adversary significant tactical warning. Gravity bombs allow more flexibility in employment but put crew members at direct risk in a high-threat environment. Their delivery platforms, whether bombers or fighter aircraft, may require significant support in the form of aerial refueling or electronic warfare escort.

Units supporting the nuclear mission must be appropriately trained on the full spectrum of nuclear support to include safety, security, and handling of nuclear weapons and components. Generation to cover a nuclear tasking is a significant paradigm shift for those operating and supporting these forces; nuclear generation also removes assets from conventional tasking. Due to the operational tempo of such forces, training should be carefully balanced between the competing conventional and nuclear demands. Readiness and training requirements for Air Force nuclear forces in support of geographic combatant commands are determined by the respective CCDR with advice from the Air Force component commander.

Since the US is unlikely to engage in a major conflict unilaterally, the use of theater-level nuclear weapons would presumably occur while working in conjunction with other nations' militaries. When operating with members of treaty organizations, standardized nuclear policies may already exist. When functioning as part of a short-term coalition, however, common procedures for coalition forces should be developed during that conflict.

Employment

Different targeting strategies can enhance deterrent capability and, if employed, successfully achieve warfighting objectives. Changing circumstances will also affect the conditions under which the US should be prepared to employ nuclear weapons. An understanding of these issues is critical for the nuclear planner or commander at the global or theater level of conflict.

Targeting

Understanding the current strategic environment is essential to the development of a comprehensive nuclear employment strategy. Whether the enemy consists of a nation-state, rogue state, or is a non-state actor helps define the nature of the strategy. Regardless, deterrence, the ability to discourage enemy attack, is still a foundational concept in nuclear operations. Understanding the nature of deterrence, including the requirements to act if it fails, helps commanders and planners develop effective targeting strategies for nuclear employment.

As stated in AF Doctrine Annex 3-60, *Targeting*, "Targeting is a central component of Air Force operational art." A targeting strategy allows commanders and planners to choose the best ways to attain desired outcomes by melding ends (objectives and end states), ways (actions and effects of actions leading to the ends), and risk (the probable "cost" of attaining the ends in terms of lives, equipment, effort, time, and opportunities). Since joint and Air Force targeting doctrine encompasses both kinetic and non-kinetic employment to achieve desired effects, a complete nuclear targeting strategy must include a thorough understanding of the role of deterrence.

In order to accomplish objectives using non-kinetic means, deterrence focuses on preventing an actual exchange through demonstrating the commitment to employ weapons when required. The deterrence effort should be a clearly visible part of the strategy employed on a continuous basis through all instruments of national power. Examples include clear diplomatic and informational efforts including declaratory statements involving US nuclear posture and the commitment to act when required, military preparedness demonstrated through exercises and daily training, and economic incentives toward non proliferation efforts.

If a nuclear option is chosen, ending a conflict as soon as possible and on terms favorable to the US and/or its allies will help determine the level and scope of employment. Limiting unintended or collateral effects, consistent with AF Doctrine Annex 3-60, *Targeting*, can help minimize and mitigate enemy reactions such that they pursue a quick cessation of hostilities as well. Careful consideration should be given to containing effects to the maximum extent possible. Although there will undoubtedly be longer-term effects from nuclear employment, commanders and planners should develop consequence management into their strategies and remain consistent with law of armed conflict principles.

Law of Armed Conflict

The "law of armed conflict" is not based on a single treaty but is instead grounded in various treaties, customs, and national practices regarding the conduct of armed conflict. This body of international law protects combatants and noncombatants, safeguards human rights, and facilitates the achievement of peace by limiting the amount of force and the manner in which it can be applied. While there is a connection between the destruction of life and property and the defeat of enemy armed forces, neither the law of armed conflict nor US policy sanction devastation as an end unto itself. That having been said, **the law of armed conflict does not expressly prohibit the possession or use of nuclear weapons.** Under international law, the use of a nuclear weapon is based on the same targeting rules applicable to the use of any other lawful weapon, i.e., the counterbalancing principles of military necessity, proportionality, distinction, and unnecessary suffering.

Weapon Effects

The destruction wrought by nuclear weapons can be immense, or it can be tailored and limited for a particular scenario. The physical impact of a nuclear strike includes both short- and long-term effects. Beyond the physical repercussions are significant psychological and political effects, which may lead to unintended consequences.

The physical effects of nuclear weapons are pronounced. The degree of destruction depends upon a number of factors such as weapon design and yield, location and height of burst, weather, and others. Planners must consider the political and military objectives and the desired degree of destruction as well as the local conditions, available weapons, and delivery systems. The immediate operational impact of a nuclear detonation varies and may come from blast and heat, the subsequent electromagnetic pulse (EMP), or more far-reaching effects, depending on the variables discussed above. This will have an immediate effect on enemy forces, logistics, and C2. Communications and computer capability will be severely impacted by EMP, which is an operational effect that may lead to a long-term, strategic impact if the enemy is unable to completely restore those capabilities. Another operational effect with strategic implications is radiation, which will limit the effectiveness of enemy forces as they take protective measures but may also render enemy territory uninhabitable for a long period of time. Other significant effects may include extreme overpressure, dust, and debris.

Theater commanders and planners must consider that the operating environment after a nuclear exchange can be equally inhospitable for friendly forces. Movement through an area that has experienced a nuclear detonation will be slow because significant protective measures are required. Nuclear hardened communications and information systems are designed to be survivable in a nuclear environment and are expected to be available. The use of nuclear weapons to repel enemy forces in friendly territory will lead to long-term effects that may be unacceptable.

There are psychological effects associated with nuclear weapons that go beyond physical destruction. Notwithstanding the stark difference in physical effects between nuclear and conventional weapons, the use of nuclear weapons will have additional implications. It is difficult to determine exactly what that effect might be. A limited use of nuclear weapons may convince an enemy that the US is committed to using whatever degree of force is required and encourage them to cease and desist. It may have the opposite effect, enraging the enemy to the point where it escalates the conflict. When planning a nuclear option, it is important to consider the potential psychological impact as well as the enemy's ability to escalate.

Nuclear weapon use may also have short- and long-term negative effects on relations with other countries. The use of such weapons may be unacceptable to allies or other friendly nations. Their support for the conflict may be lost, and long-term relations may be damaged. It also has the potential to spur other nations to develop nuclear weapons. The

President will make the ultimate decision, and he or she will have to consider all of these factors. Military planners and commanders should understand these factors, too, so they can present military options in the full context of their effects rather than in isolation.

War Termination

The goal behind using nuclear weapons is to achieve US political objectives and resolve a conflict on terms favorable to the US. Nuclear operations, like all military operations, should use the minimum force necessary and should be terminated once the objectives have been attained. This requires that decisive targets be struck first, mandating the need for effective intelligence and targeting capabilities. While nuclear operations are in progress, a reliable C2 system is essential if operations are to be terminated when no longer needed or continued if required. Finally, the US must maintain forces in reserve which will continue to protect against coercion following a nuclear strike, convincing the adversary that further hostilities on its part will be met by a swift response.

Assessment is a critical tool for understanding when to terminate and when to continue the attack. Assessment is "a continuous process that measures the overall effectiveness of employing joint force capabilities during military operations. It is also the determination of the progress toward accomplishing a task, creating an effect, or achieving an objective" (JP 1-02). Assessment supports the commander's decision making process by providing insight into the validity of the strategy and accompanying plans. In terms of nuclear operations, it is thus a critical tool for understanding whether national objectives have been achieved, as well as when to terminate and when to continue an attack.

Refer to AF Doctrine, Volume 4, *Operations*, for more discussion on establishing assessment criteria.

Additional Considerations

The day-to-day purpose of nuclear weapons is to deter; to create desired political effects without actually employing nuclear weapon kinetic effects. Deterrence is a political tool which can be postured to affect the desired outcome. Civilian leadership can send strong messages to assure our allies and dissuade our adversaries through strategic messaging, generation of forces, posturing the forces, deployment of forces, and limited strikes to show our resolve and/or provide escalation control.

The decision to use nuclear weapons is one made only after careful consideration of all relevant factors. One issue which should be addressed is whether the objectives may be achieved through other means, either those offered by the new triad's non-nuclear strike capabilities or by other conventional capabilities. The use of nuclear weapons carries with it the potential for undesirable political consequences. There also may be additional logistical requirements associated with employing such weapons. Commanders and planners should consider exactly what effects they are trying to produce and consider non-nuclear alternatives as well.

If the focus of operations is on physical impact, other munitions may provide the degree of limited or widespread destruction desired without the long-term effects that would result from nuclear weapons. Precision-guided munitions may allow for destruction of hardened facilities without excessive collateral damage. Cluster munitions may be used to destroy or deny a wide area.

Psychological effects can also be achieved with conventional munitions, if the goal is to strike fear in an adversary's leadership or fielded forces. Operations DESERT STORM in 1991 and IRAQI FREEDOM in 2003 demonstrated that a combination of heavy aerial bombardment and psychological operations can severely degrade an enemy's operational effectiveness.

Planners should fully understand the political and military objectives before advocating the use of nuclear weapons. Depending upon the goal of the attack, it may be possible and preferable to use conventional weapons to achieve the desired effects.

Summary

The Air Force's role in nuclear deterrence is to provide secure, safe, reliable and ready forces in support of our national nuclear deterrent capability. Deterrence forces can be tailored to fit particular threats and respond to a broad array of challenges to domestic and international security. The role of nuclear weapons is to deter an attack against the US and its interests and, should deterrence fail, to terminate the conflict as quickly as possible on terms favorable to the US.

Commanders must be prepared to provide nuclear options to the President and Secretary of Defense (SecDef). If the US is to engage in nuclear operations, planners should have a clear understanding of the objectives involved, the conditions in the theater, the disposition of forces, and the weapons available. Commanders should attempt to terminate hostilities as quickly as possible but should be prepared to continue operations as needed. Nuclear operations involve issues beyond simply launching weapons, and commanders should understand the constraints that will be placed upon their employment.

NUCLEAR SURETY

"The goal of the Air Force Nuclear Weapons Surety Program is to incorporate maximum nuclear surety, consistent with operational requirements, from weapon system development to retirement from the inventory" (AFI 91-101, *Air Force Nuclear Weapons Surety Program*). This program applies to materiel, personnel, and procedures that contribute to the safety, security, and control of nuclear weapons, thus assuring no nuclear accidents, incidents, loss, or unauthorized or accidental use. The Air Force continues to pursue safer, more securable and more reliable nuclear weapons consistent with operational requirements.

Adversaries and allies should be highly confident of the Air Force's ability to secure nuclear weapons from accidents, theft, loss, and accidental or unauthorized use. This day-to-day commitment to precise and reliable nuclear operations is the cornerstone to the credibility of our nuclear deterrence mission.

Whether working with CONUS-based nuclear forces or conducting theater nuclear operations, commanders must ensure the safety, security, and reliability of their weapons and associated components. While the appropriate infrastructure already exists at CONUS bases with nuclear forces, geographic CCDRs should consider the additional needs incurred if they are going to have nuclear weapons deployed into their area of responsibility.

Safety

All individuals involved with nuclear weapons are responsible for the safety of those devices. Because of the destructive potential of these weapons, and the possibility that their unauthorized or accidental use might lead to war, safety is paramount. Per Department of Defense (DOD) Directive 3150.2, *Department of Defense Nuclear Weapons System Safety Program*, four specific nuclear surety standards must be met.

- There shall be positive measures to prevent nuclear weapons involved in accidents or incidents, or jettisoned weapons, from producing a nuclear yield.

- There shall be positive measures to prevent deliberate prearming, arming, launching, or releasing of nuclear weapons, except upon execution of emergency war orders or when directed by competent authority.

- There shall be positive measures to prevent inadvertent prearming, arming, launching, or releasing of nuclear weapons in all normal and credible abnormal environments.

- There shall be positive measures to ensure adequate security of nuclear weapons

These measures include inherent warhead design features that prevent accidental or unauthorized nuclear yields, delivery platform design features, and operational procedures that prevent accidental or unauthorized use. The positive measures may take the form of mechanical systems, such as permissive action links that do not allow the arming or firing of a weapon until an authorized code has been entered. They may also involve personnel monitoring systems, such as the Personnel Reliability Program (PRP) or the Two-Person Concept. Commanders are responsible for ensuring that appropriate systems are in place, as described by appropriate Air Force policies. To track the implementation of these positive measures, the Air Force certifies its nuclear weapons systems. The Air Force's Nuclear Certification Program includes safety design, weapon compatibility, personnel reliability, technical guidance, specific job qualifications, inspections, and Weapons System Safety Rules (WSSR). Refer to AFI 63-125, *Nuclear Certification Program*, and AFI 91-101, *Air Force Nuclear Weapons Surety Program*, for more specific guidance.

Weapon System Safety Rules (WSSR)

WSSR ensure that nuclear weapons are not detonated, intentionally or otherwise, unless authorized. Safety rules apply even in wartime. While commanders may deviate from a specific rule in an emergency, they may not expend a nuclear weapon until an authentic execution order has been received. This has led to the so-called "usability paradox." Nuclear weapons must be "usable enough" so an enemy is convinced they may be rapidly employed in the event of an attack. They must not be so "usable," however, as to allow for the unauthorized use due to individual action or mechanical error.

WSSR are implemented through a combination of mechanical means, security procedures, flying rules, and personnel programs. Different weapon systems will have different rules based on their capabilities. Storage and movement of weapons must also be consistent with WSSR. Commanders and operators must follow applicable Air Force policies for their weapon system and must ensure that non-US personnel adhere to applicable Air Force and multinational requirements. One key component of WSSR is that, while preventing the unauthorized use of nuclear weapons, they allow for timely employment when ordered. To this end, all personnel involved in the command, control, and support of nuclear weapons must be familiar with WSSR for their system.

Security

Nuclear weapons and their components must not be allowed to become vulnerable to loss, theft, sabotage, damage, or unauthorized use. Nuclear units must ensure measures are in place to provide the greatest possible deterrent against hostile acts. Should this fail, security should ensure detection, interception, and defeat of the hostile force before it is able to seize, damage, or destroy a nuclear weapon, delivery system, or critical components.

Commanders are accountable for the safety, training, security, and maintenance of nuclear weapons and delivery systems, and reliability of personnel at all times. Whether on a logistics movement or during an airlift mission, commanders should limit the exposure of nuclear weapons outside dedicated protection facilities consistent with operational requirements. Commanders must ensure that nuclear weapons and nuclear delivery systems are maintained according to approved procedures. Commanders are responsible for considering the additional needs incurred if nuclear capabilities are deployed into their operational area.

A security infrastructure exists at bases that routinely handle nuclear weapons. However, weapons and their delivery systems may be moved to other bases to enhance survivability or may be deployed into a theater. Commanders at such locations must ensure appropriate storage facilities are established and proper security measures are in place. The storage of nuclear weapons on a base not only requires a secure location and additional security personnel, but also impacts other areas such as driving routes, local flying area restrictions, aircraft parking areas, the use of host-nation or contract personnel, and other aspects of day-to-day operations. Note, too, that weapons are

most vulnerable in transit or when deployed for use, so special care must be taken at those times. Commanders and, in fact, all individuals have a responsibility for force protection, and the security of nuclear weapons is a key component of that concept. Air Force policies which outline security requirements must be understood by all affected personnel.

Airmen should neither confirm nor deny the presence or absence of nuclear weapons at any general or specific location. This US policy applies even if a particular location may reasonably be assumed to contain nuclear weapons, such as a missile launch facility or a bomber base. The goal of this policy is "to deny militarily useful information to potential or actual enemies, to enhance the effectiveness of nuclear deterrence, and contribute to the security of nuclear weapons, especially against the threats of sabotage and terrorism." (DOD Directive 5230.16, *Nuclear Accident and Incident Public Affairs Guidance*)

Reliability

The Air Force employs positive measures to ensure the reliability of its nuclear weapons systems and personnel to accomplish the mission. Reliability is also a product of the system's safety features, including safety design, weapon compatibility, personnel reliability, technical guidance, specific job qualifications, and nuclear technical inspections. Independent inspections and staff assistance visits are also an integral part of maintaining nuclear surety.

Weapon System Reliability

Through sustainment, testing, and modernization, the Air Force ensures the reliability of nuclear weapon systems. The Air Force engages the Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration and other government agencies to ensure nuclear warheads and relatedinterfaces continue to meet Air Force warfighting requirements. The Air Force continues to provide essential leadership of interagency reliability groups to include test planning, interface requirements and performance, and warhead design reviews.

Individual Reliability

Commanders ensure that only trained, certified, and reliable people have access to nuclear weapons, delivery systems, and C2 systems. The PRP is used to initially qualify, certify, and then monitor personnel assigned to nuclear operations tasks throughout their assignment. The PRP ensures that only those persons whose behavior demonstrates integrity, reliability, trustworthiness, allegiance, and loyalty to the US shall be allowed to perform duties associated with nuclear weapons. The Air Force also employs techniques such as the Two-Person Concept in all nuclear operations to ensure compliance with established procedures. The Two-Person Concept requires the presence at all times of at least two authorized persons, each certified under the PRP, knowledgeable in the

task to be performed, familiar with applicable safety and security requirements, and each capable of promptly detecting an incorrect act or improper procedure with respect to the task to be performed.

Summary

The Air Force implements a stringent surety program to assure that nuclear weapons and their components do not become vulnerable to loss, theft, sabotage, damage, or unauthorized use. All individuals involved with nuclear weapons and nuclear weapon components are responsible for the safety and security of those devices at all times.

Bibliography
Air Force Doctrine Annex 3-72, *Nuclear Operations*, 19 May 2015

USNORTHCOM Area of Responsibility

Activity Statement:

- Deliver briefings and participate in discussions about various aspects of culture and US interests in the US Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) area of responsibility (AOR).

Affective Lesson Objective:

- Respond to the importance of Air Force officers understanding US national security concerns in the AOR, regional cultural perspectives, and the Combatant Command's mission in the AOR.

Affective Samples of Behavior:

- Voluntarily discuss US national security concerns in the USNORTHCOM AOR.

- Value that an understanding of regional cultural perspectives is key to relating and communicating with partners in the USNORTHCOM AOR.

- Assert the importance of the Combatant Command's mission in light of US national security concerns in the USNORTHCOM AOR.

OVERVIEW OF UNITED STATES NORTHERN COMMAND AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY

The freedom America enjoys, employs in its commerce, and extends to non-US citizens presents various national defense challenges. Ruthless and resourceful enemies seek to threaten the nation with new technologies, dangerous weapons, and nontraditional tactics that exploit our freedoms. As the nation witnessed on September 11, 2001, our enemies have the resolve and means to commit acts of terrorism against innocent civilians and commercial interests within our country. The historical insularity of the United States has given way to an era of new vulnerabilities, and enemies may strike in new and unsuspecting ways.

In response to these threats, President George W. Bush, on April 17, 2002, announced the establishment of US Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) to consolidate under a single unified command those existing homeland defense and civil support missions that were previously executed by other military organizations. On May 8, 2002, US Air Force Gen. Ralph E. Eberhart was nominated to be the first commander, and USNORTHCOM assumed its responsibilities on October 1, 2002.

USNORTHCOM is co-located with North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) headquarters at Peterson Air Force Base in Colorado Springs, Colo. The headquarters site was chosen based on several considerations, such as military effectiveness, existing facilities, location, force protection, infrastructure, and costs.

Whether dealing with catastrophes like the Space Shuttle Columbia disaster or hurricane recovery efforts; countering potential terrorist threats at large-scale public events like presidential inaugurations, the economic Summit, or the Super Bowl; or conducting exercises aimed at preparing for pandemic threats, USNORTHCOM—from the moment it was established—has worked to ensure the safety and well being of the people in its sphere of responsibility.

Territory

The Area of Responsibility covered by USNORTHCOM encompasses the continental United States, Alaska, Canada, Mexico and the surrounding water out to approximately 500 nautical miles, and includes air, land, and sea approaches. It also includes the Gulf of Mexico, the Straits of Florida, much of the the Caribbean region (US Virgin Island, British Virgin Islands, Bermuda, Puerto Rico, The Bahamas, and Turks and Caicos Islands).

History

The history of the USNORTHCOM region is marked primarily by the spread of native populations through the North American continent and the arrival of European settlers.

North American Native Peoples

There is great debate about exactly when and how North America was originally settled. Archaeological evidence points to the earliest arrival of humans in North and South America somewhere around 12,500 years ago. However, archaeologists have identified five different biological lines among native populations which suggest four separate migration periods of peoples from Asia and one migration from Europe. About 5,000 years ago, agriculture began in North America when Paleo-Indians started planting the seeds of wild corn in what is now Mexico. By the year 1500 CE, the North American continent was highly populated by thousands of different tribes, each with their own distinct cultural and economic patterns. Many of the tribes in existence by the time Europeans arrived in North America in the sixteenth century were highly advanced, agriculturally based, culturally complex societies.

European Arrival

Though most European history in the USNORTHCOM region begins with the landing of Christopher Columbus on the island of Hispaniola (now the Dominican Republic and Haiti) in 1492, the first contact Europeans had with the "New World" most likely came from Greenlandic Vikings who arrived and briefly settled in what is now Newfoundland, Canada, around 1190 CE. Archaeological evidence confirms sporadic contact between Norse and Native American peoples in what is now Canada throughout the next 300 years.

Christopher Columbus named the islands of the "baja mar" (shallow sea), which have since become known as The Bahamas. When Columbus arrived in The Bahamas, approximately 40,000 Lucayan natives lived on the islands. Within 25 years, the entire population was wiped out by disease, hardship, and slavery. English Puritans settled on the islands in 1649, but The Bahamas became best known in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries as a haven for privateers and pirates including Blackbeard, Calico Jack, Anne Bonny, and Sir Henry Morgan. Following the American Revolution, The Bahamas became a haven for Loyalists exiled from the United States. The Bahamas remained a peaceful British colony until 10 July 1973, when it became a free and sovereign country.

Cabeza de Vaca was the first European to travel across North America and the first to describe the native people he met along the way. However, there is evidence that by the time de Vaca journeyed north in the early 1500s, many native tribes had already been decimated by the spread of European diseases like smallpox and measles, to which the native populations had no immunity. An estimated 95 percent of the native population of North America died as a result of these diseases, many without ever encountering a European explorer or colonist.

Spanish control of southern and western North America was, as the name Conquistadors suggests, primarily by force. What native populations were not killed by disease were generally subjected to slavery or other forced labor. Spain ruled Mexico for 300 years after the fall of the Aztecs, building Mexico City on the ruins of the Aztec capital, Tenochtitlan. By the end of the sixteenth century, the whole economy of Spain depended on riches from the New World.

French explorers and colonists, by contrast, typically had a good relationship with the native populations. The French came to North America primarily interested in trade, not conquest or land, which served a mutual interest for the natives. Though the French made nominal efforts to convert the native tribes to Roman Catholicism, they did not press the issue. When the Iroquois learned that the French and English did not typically get along, they willingly played one against the other and joined forces with whoever gave them the better deal, at least until the end of the French and Indian War.

The English attempted to establish their first settlement in America in 1585 with the doomed Roanoke colony, but it was Jamestown in 1607 and the Plymouth colony in 1620 which marked the first sustained English presence in North America. The English relationship with the native tribes was a constant struggle of competing interests, miscommunication, and distrust that was marked by equal efforts at peace treaties and open conflict that dragged out for generations.

Wars in North America

By the eighteenth century, Spain, France, and Britain controlled the North American continent. The three nations had long histories of warfare with one another in Europe, and the early conflicts that erupted in North America were largely an extension of these European wars. The French and Indian War was the last of these small wars. By its end, Britain solidly controlled territory previously held by France that stretched from the east coast of North America to the Mississippi River. Everything west of the river belonged to Spain, including land in the west which France gave to Spain purely to keep the British out. The end of the conflict, however, resulted in a large debt that the British Parliament decided to repay by raising taxes in their American colonies. In 1765, the colonists began to protest the taxes, which eventually sparked the American Revolutionary War.

Within 10 years of gaining independence, the American government was engaged in a series of conflicts with the native populations known as the Indian Wars, which continued until the end of the nineteenth century. French privateers, harassing American merchant ships during the French Revolution, caused the American Congress to wage an undeclared, entirely sea-based war between the US Navy and French privateers in the West Indies. This conflict continued until France agreed to a settlement in 1801.

By 1810, Napoleon Bonaparte's conquest of Europe was causing problems in North America. When France defeated Spain and Napoleon placed his brother on the Spanish throne, his actions posed a direct threat to Mexican culture and the Catholic church. Rallying around Father Miguel Hidalgo y Castilla on 15 September 1810, Mexico declared independence from Spain. Fighting dragged out for a further eleven years before Mexico was granted independence in 1821.

Conflict with Britain over American commerce resulted in the War of 1812, occasionally known as the Second War for Independence. Also linked to the war with Napoleon in Europe, the War of 1812 broke out in response to the British Navy's forced enlistment of American sailors into the British Navy and British efforts to prevent America from trading with France. In the north, Canadian colonists fought with British regulars to prevent the United States from taking over Upper and Lower Canada (modern day Ontario and Quebec). Though America was largely unprepared for war and popular support for the war was lacking, early American naval victories and other key assaults, combined with the increasing debt Britain faced from the war in Europe, quickly brought the war to an end. The Treaty of Ghent, which was signed on 24 December 1814, ended the war with no clear victor, returned northern land to Britain, and kept Canada a British colony until its independence was granted on 1 July 1867.

After the War of 1812, Americans turned their attention to exploring the new continent. Border disputes over the next few decades erupted into war between the United States and Mexico. The border between the two countries was fixed at the Neuces River by a treaty with Spain in 1819, in which the United States purchased Florida and renounced claims to Texas. Nevertheless, Americans continued to settle in Texas throughout the 1820s. Their growing numbers alarmed the Mexican government, who prohibited further immigration in 1830. When the Mexican dictatorship under General Antonio Lopez de Santa Anna abolished slavery in 1834, Texans revolted. The conflict that followed caused Texas to declare independence from Mexico. Though it remained an independent republic for almost a decade, voters in Texas overwhelmingly supported annexation into the United States. When the United States annexed Texas and moved the Texas border with Mexico to the Rio Grande River, Mexico broke relations with the United States.

War broke out between Mexico and the United States in April 1846. Early American victories resulted in a war that was fought almost entirely on the Mexican side of the border and gained vast new territory for the United States, including the present-day states of Arizona, Nevada, California, Utah, and parts of New Mexico, Colorado, and Wyoming. The question over what to do with this new territory, particularly the question of whether or not slavery should be permitted, increasingly divided the nation and contributed to the American Civil War 13 years later.

By the close of the nineteenth century, the United States stretched across the continent and was beginning to expand its power abroad. Spain, meanwhile, was struggling to overcome numerous independence movements in its remaining colonies in Cuba, Puerto Rico, the Philippines, and Guam. In 1898, a 113-day war broke out in the Caribbean, resulting in the cession of the Philippines, Guam, and Puerto Rico to the United States and independence to Cuba.

Major conflicts between countries in the USNORTHCOM region ended by the twentieth century. Canada, the United States, and Mexico were all heavily involved in both World Wars; even The Bahamas contributed volunteers to the fight. Since the twentieth century, the relationship between the nations of USNORTHCOM has been largely one of cooperation and assistance, whether it is homeland defense operations as supported by USNORTHCOM or worldwide political and military participation.

Family & Kinship

The vast majority of families in the USNORTHCOM region center around the nuclear family. In much of the United States, Canada, and The Bahamas, this is the central form of the family, and extended familial or kinship ties are generally not as strong as in other parts of the world. This focus on the nuclear, as opposed to the extended, family in the United States and Canada is due in part to the traditions in both countries of youth leaving their families behind to seek out better economic circumstances on the frontier or in the cities. In The Bahamas, adult migration to the cities to work often leaves children in the care of their grandparents, but the focus remains on the nuclear family.

Traditionally, a focus on the extended family, rather than the nuclear family, is more common in Mexico. It is not uncommon to find three generations or more living in the same home. In addition, the "fictive" extended family, or extended family that is not related by blood (for example, *compadrazgo*, or "godparenthood"), is as important a relationship in Mexico as blood or marriage ties. Family roles, particularly gender roles, tend to be more sharply defined in Mexico than in the United States or Canada, where men are expected to contribute to the household chores and women commonly work outside the home. However, it is also critical to note that this is a generalization about traditional Mexican families which is rapidly changing, particularly in urban areas, and the country is beginning to demonstrate a more nuclear-family oriented structure and contemporary gender norms similar to the United States or Canada.

Language & Communications

Unlike most of the combatant commands, the USNORTHCOM region can be characterized by only three primary languages: English, Spanish, and French. English and French are spoken as a first language in an approximately even split in Canada, and Spanish is dominant in Mexico. English is the dominant language in the United States, though the United States does not have an official language, and Spanish is rapidly growing as the first language for a significant minority of the population.

A significant minority in The Bahamas, largely Haitian immigrants, speak French Creole. Canada claims both English and French as official languages as fits their shared British and French heritage, though a significant minority of the population (19.6 percent) claim languages other than English or French as their first language. This minority percentage of other languages is significantly smaller in the United States and Mexico. In the United States, approximately 7 percent of the population speaks something other than English or Spanish as a first language, while in Mexico approximately 5 percent of the population also speaks one of the many indigenous native languages either in addition to Spanish, or—in significantly smaller numbers—as their only language.

Economics & Resources

The USNORTHCOM region is home to some of the largest and most economically and technologically powerful nations in the world. The United States tops this list, though Canada, with the 15th largest economy in the world, closely resembles the United States with its market-oriented economic system and affluent living standards. Mexico's economy is the 12th largest in the world as a result of free trade agreements with over fifty different countries, which puts more than 90 percent of its trade under free trade agreements. The Bahamas is one of the wealthiest countries in the Caribbean with an economy based largely on tourism and offshore banking.

In 1993, the United States, Canada, and Mexico signed the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which was implemented on 1 January 1994. Under NAFTA, most of the barriers to trade and investment between these three countries were removed. As a result of this agreement, Mexican trade to Canada and the United States has nearly tripled since 1994. 2010 United States Census report shows, US agricultural exports to Canada and Mexico have nearly doubled, making Canada the greatest market for US agricultural exports, followed by Mexico, which replaced Japan as the second largest market for US agricultural exports.

Since World War II, Canada has experienced an impressive growth in its manufacturing, mining, and service sector that transformed the country from an agriculturally-based nation into a worldwide economic power. Due in large part to the 1989 US-Canada Free Trade Agreement (FTA), followed by NAFTA, nearly 80 percent of all exports from Canada are to the United States.

There is a darker side to the economic power of the USNORTHCOM countries, which comes from the drug trade. Despite having the largest independent illicit crop eradication program in the world, Mexico remains a major producer of opium, marijuana, ecstasy, and methamphetamine. It is also a major transshipment point for cocaine from South America. The vast majority of all of these illegal substances are subsequently trafficked into the United States. The Bahamas also serves as a major transshipment point for illegal substances out of Central and South America into the United States and Europe, as well as serving as a transshipment point for illegal immigrants into the United States. Though not as prevalent as Mexico or The Bahamas, marijuana transport from Canada into the United States is also an increasing problem.

USNORTHCOM Mission and Current Posture

USNORTHCOM plans, organizes, and executes homeland defense and civil support missions, but has few permanently assigned forces. The command is assigned forces whenever necessary to execute missions, as ordered by the President or Secretary of Defense. The Commander, USNORTHCOM, also commands NORAD, a bi-national command responsible for aerospace warning, aerospace control, and maritime warning for Canada, Alaska, and the United States.

USNORTHCOM's civil support mission includes domestic disaster relief operations, as well as counterdrug operations and managing the consequences of terrorists attacks including the use of weapons of mass destruction. Per the Posse Comitatus Act, military forces can provide civil support but cannot become directly involved in law enforcement. Civil support emergencies must exceed the capabilities of local, state, and federal agencies before USNORTHCOM becomes involved. In most cases, support is limited, localized, and specific. When the scope of the disaster is reduced to the point that the primary agency can again assume full control and management without military assistance, USNORTHCOM will exit and leave the on-scene experts to finish the job.

USNORTHCOM relies heavily on partnerships with Canada, Mexico, and other governmental agencies. The command places a special focus on its relationships with these partners in three particular areas: a respect for the laws, sovereignty, and values of all partners; collaboration, communication and engagement with all partners; and advocacy for partners' appropriate capabilities, competencies, and resources. In other words, USNORTHCOM emphasizes the unique abilities and heritage of its partners and strives to maintain harmonious working relationships with them all.

Conclusion

In a dangerous world, vigilance and preparedness can help protect our nation from aggression and mitigate the consequences of natural and man-made disasters. To the USNORTHCOM team, this means making a difference within the nation's borders— protecting family, friends, and neighbors and providing life-saving assistance when America most needs it. Despite our friendly relationships with the countries in USNORTHCOM, we continue to face challenges to the security of our homeland, which makes having an

understanding of this region critical to our national security. Hopefully this overview has piqued your interest to learn more about this area of the world. To help you do that, refer to the next section for links to Internet sources that provide more specific information about the countries included in this command's area of responsibility.

STUDENT ASSIGNMENTS

Students will select a specific country from the list provided and deliver a 5-9-minute prepared briefing addressing the topic. Use the framework below to develop the main points, but to ensure the topics are covered you must submit your list of preferred main points to your instructor for approval prior to beginning your research. To assist in your research, a list of Web sites is provided on the next page.

Additionally, you must prepare a ½ to 1-page bullet background paper on your subject. You should provide a copy of your paper to your instructor prior to your briefing. You can then use the paper to give your briefing. The bullet paper will follow the format in *The Tongue and Quill*. Pick a country and two domains from the lists below:

Countries: Mexico, The Bahamas

Domains: Family & Kinship, Religion & Spirituality, Sex & Gender, Politics & Social Relations, Economics & Resources, Time & Space, Language & Communication, Technology & Material, History & Myth, Sustenance & Health, Aesthetics & Recreation, Learning & Knowledge

Main Point 1 (choose one from the list of cultural domains)

Main Point 2 (choose a different domain for your 2nd main point)

RESEARCH SITES:

- **Defense Language Institute** http://www.dliflc.edu/products.html

- **Field Support Modules** http://fieldsupport.dliflc.edu/index.aspx

- **Library of Congress** http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/profiles.html

- **Military Policy Awareness Links** http://merln.ndu.edu/index.cfm?type=page&pageID=3

- **Miller Center of Public Affairs** http://millercenter.org/scripps

- **NATO** http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/index.htm

- **The World Factbook** https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/index.html

- **United Nations** http://www.un.org/en/

- **US Department of State—Background Notes** http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/

- **US Department of State—Regional Bureaus** http://www.state.gov/p/index.htm

- **US Department of State—Terrorism Country Reports** http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/

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15. United States Census Bureau, Agricultural Exports and Imports, 856-Agricultural Exports-Value by Selected Countries of Destination http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/cats/agriculture/agricultural_exports_and_imports.html (accessed 16 January 2013).

Oath of Office

Student Preparation
- Read this student reader and the Introduction of *The Armed Forces Officer.*

Cognitive Lesson Objective:
- Comprehend the purpose of a military officer's oath of office and commission.

Cognitive Samples of Behavior:
- Identify the meaning of the oath of office.

- Identify the significance of the commission.

Affective Lesson Objective:
- Value the importance of the commission and the responsibilities placed on all officers.

Affective Samples of Behavior:
- Assert the importance of the need for all officers to take an oath.

- Actively participate in classroom discussion on the commission.

THE OATH OF OFFICE:

A HISTORICAL GUIDE TO MORAL LEADERSHIP

Lt Col Kenneth Keskel, USAF

Editorial Abstract: The oath of office as we know it has withstood the test of time. Although its words have gone through many transformations, the significance placed upon it by the founding fathers has remained the same. Lieutenant Colonel Keskel provides a brief historical background for the oath, followed by an examination of its specific wording and the ways it has changed over time. His insightful analysis will help military officers fully understand the moral implications of their actions.

I swear by Apollo the physician, and Aesculapius, and Health, and All-heal, and all the gods and goddesses, that, according to my ability and judgment, I will keep this Oath.

~Hippocrates, 400 B.C.

The first law of the United States of America, enacted in the first session of the first Congress on 1 June 1789, was statute 1, chapter 1: an act to regulate the time and manner of administering certain oaths, which was the oath required by civil and military officials to support the Constitution.[1] The founding fathers established and agreed upon the importance of ensuring that officials promised their allegiance; indeed, very little debate occurred before the first Congress passed this statute.[2] Although the wording of the military officer's oath has changed several times in the past two centuries, the basic foundation has withstood the test of time. The current oath is more than a mere formality that adds to the pageantry of a commissioning or promotion ceremony—it provides a foundation for leadership decisions.[3]

One finds numerous oaths in our nation. Just before commissioning or enlisting, every officer candidate and enlistee recites an oath. The president of the United States takes an oath before assuming duties. Senators, congressmen, judges, and other government officials take oaths of office. New citizens of the United States take a naturalization oath. Many schoolchildren take an oath or pledge allegiance to the flag. Although its members are not required to swear or affirm before going into combat, the US military developed a code of conduct to guide servicemen. When an officer is promoted, the promotion ceremony often includes a restatement of the officer's oath.

The military officer's oath is a combination of constitutional requirement, historical influence, and centuries-old custom. To better appreciate the oath, one must understand its history. Toward that end, this article first provides a brief, historical background on the oath of office and then examines its specific wording as well as the ways in which it provides guidance, including moral direction, to military officers.[4]

A Brief History of the Oath

According to one reference work, an oath is "a solemn appeal to God to witness the truth of a statement or the sincerity of a promise, coupled with an imprecation of divine judgment in the event of falsehood or breach of obligation."[5] This definition is captured in the Hippocratic oath, one of the world's oldest and most famous: "I swear…according to my ability and judgment, I will keep this Oath…With purity and with holiness I will pass my life and practice my art…While I continue to keep this Oath unviolated, may it be granted to me to enjoy life and the practice of the art, respected by all men, in all times! But should I trespass and violate this Oath, may the reverse be my lot!"[6] Several concepts in this oath still resonate in the one taken by today's military officer—a call to a higher power, a statement to perform to the best of one's ability, a sense of honor, and an acknowledgement of the consequences of failing to live up to one's word.

Military oaths date back to ancient Rome, where soldiers pledged loyalty to a specific general for a specific campaign. After the campaign ended, the oath no longer applied. By 100 B.C., Rome had established a professional military, and the oath became effective for the soldier's full 20-year service.[7] Since then, this custom has continued and expanded. For example, the kings of England in the 1500s (Henry VIII), 1600s (James I), and 1700s (George III), established oaths requiring subjects to swear loyalty to their specific king.

In the United States, oaths were a part of life from the early colonial days. In 1620, when the Mayflower landed, the Pilgrims established the Mayflower Compact—which served as an oath, a covenant, and a constitution—and then pledged allegiance to King James, agreeing to work together as a "civil body politic" for their betterment and preservation.[8] As settlers established colonies, they developed their own version of an oath of allegiance to English royalty.

While developing the oath of office for U.S. officers, the founding fathers had serious concerns about pledging allegiance to any specific person. For example, during the Revolutionary War, Gen George Washington issued a general order on 7 May 1778 that required all officers to take and subscribe to an oath renouncing King George III and supporting the United States.[9] Even prior to the 1789 constitutional requirement to take an oath, this general order had significant weight. On 1 October 1779, Washington court-martialed Benjamin Ballard for "selling rum, flour, pork, hides, tallow and other stores the property of the public without any orders or authority for doing so and contrary to the tenor of his bond and oath of office" (emphasis added).[10] This example shows that the oath represented more than a simple, ceremonial formality; rather, it provided overarching guidance and a standard of moral conduct, as opposed to dictating specific, limited criteria.

The first official oath of office for US military officers under the Constitution was established on 1 June 1789. The law implemented the requirement in Article 6 of the Constitution that "Senators and Representatives before mentioned, and the members of the several state legislatures, and all executive and judicial officers, both of the United States and of the

several states, shall be bound by oath or affirmation, to support this Constitution."[11] This first oath was short and to the point: "I, A.B., do solemnly swear or affirm (as the case may be) that I will support the Constitution of the United States."[12]

During a 60-year period in our history, both officers and enlisted personnel took the same oath, as required by Congress in April 1790. The oath used the wording "to bear true faith and allegiance to the United States of America" rather than "to support the Constitution," but it retained the concept of allegiance to the nation as a whole. It constituted one of 16 sections in an act that regulated the military establishment—the forerunner of today's "authorization" acts.[13] Congress periodically updated these authorization acts although the oath remained constant (with one minor addition in 1795).

The officer oath became separate from the enlisted oath again in 1862, when the 37th Congress passed an all-encompassing 176-word oath for all government officials (including military officers) to verify their loyalty during the Civil War. This "Ironclad Test Oath" included (1) a "background check" to ensure that government officials were not supporting, or had not supported, the Confederacy and (2) a part that addressed future performance, much of whose wording remains in today's oath.[14] In addition, this legislation specified that failure to comply with the oath constituted perjury and that violators would incur the associated penalties, thus formalizing the implied concept that officers are accountable for failing to live up to their oath. In 1884, after several years of multiple oaths that applied to different subsets of people (depending upon which side they fought on during the "late rebellion"), the 48th Congress amended a revised statute of 1873 that eliminated the first half of the Ironclad Test Oath and established the wording that has carried over into modern times.

At least 19 pieces of legislation address the oath; 11 affect the officer oath, three address the enlisted oath, and five address both. One notes four key variations in the wording of the officer and enlisted oaths over time (table 1).[15] The other changes are either administrative or concern the application of the oath.

Table 1: Key Variations of U.S. Military Oaths

Date/Statute	Oath	Comments
1 June 1789 1st Cong., 1st sess., statute 1, chap. 1	Officer Oath: I, A.B., do solemnly swear or affirm (as the case may be) that I will support the Constitution of the United States.	The very first law of the United States identified the requirement for government officials to take an oath or affirmation according to Article 6 of the Constitution.
29 September 1789 1st Cong., 1st sess., statute 1, chap. 25	Enlisted Oath: I, A.B., do solemnly swear or affirm (as the case may be) to bear true faith and allegiance to the United States of America, and to serve them honestly and faithfully against all their enemies or opposers whatsoever, and to observe and obey the orders of the president of the United States of America, and the orders of officers appointed over me.	This statute separated the military oath from the oath for other public officials. It also created an oath for enlisted personnel distinct from the officer's oath, with an allegiance to the United States rather than the Constitution and a requirement to obey the orders of their chain of command. The officer's oath mirrored the oath specified in statute 1, sec. 1 for members of Congress.
30 April 1790 1st Cong., 2d sess., statute 2, chap. 10	Officer and Enlisted Oath: I, A.B., do solemnly swear or affirm (as the case may be) to bear true faith and allegiance to the United States of America, and to serve them honestly and faithfully against all their enemies or opposers whomsoever, and to observe and obey the orders of the President of the United States of America, and the orders of the officers appointed over me, according to the articles of war.	This statute, passed as the means to continue the military establishment, required both officers and enlisted personnel to take the same oath. On 3 March 1795, the last phrase changed to "according to the rules and articles of war." Each new Congress would re peal the previous Congress's act and pass a new statute creating the military establishment, including a section on the oath. In 1815 (13th Cong., 3d sess.), Congress no longer duplicated the previous military- establishment act and identified changes only to previous law establishing the military.

Date/Statute	Oath	Comments
2 July 1862 37th Cong., 2d sess., chap. 128	Officer Oath: I, A.B., do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I have never voluntarily borne arms against the United States since I have been a citizen thereof; that I have voluntarily given no aid, countenance, counsel, or encouragement to persons engaged in armed hostility thereto; that I have neither sought nor accepted nor attempted to exercise the functions of any officers whatever, under any authority or pretended authority in hostility to the United States; that I have not yielded a voluntary support to any pretended government, authority, power or constitution within the United States, hostile or inimical thereto. And I do further swear (or affirm) that, to the best of my knowledge and ability, I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States, against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; that I take this obligation freely, without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion, and that I will well and faithfully discharge the duties of the office on which I am about to enter, so help me God.	The intent of this Civil War statute was to ensure that government officials were not supporting, or had not supported, the Confederacy. This "Ironclad Test Oath" greatly expanded and contained more detail than previous oaths. The statute also separated the officer oath from the enlisted oath, once again making the officer oath consistent with the oath of public officials.
11 July 1868 40th Cong., 2d sess., chap. 139	Officer Oath: I, A.B., do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; that I take this obligation freely, without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion; and that I will well and faithfully discharge the duties of the office on which I am about to enter. So help me God.	This statute was the first post–Civil War change to the oath. The new oath deleted the "background check" of the 1862 version and established the exact wording of the current officer's oath. Future legislative changes addressed the application of the oath but not the wording.

5 May 1950 81st Cong., 2d sess., chap. 169 (Public Law 506)	Enlisted Oath: I, ___, do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the United States of America; that I will serve them honestly and faithfully against all their enemies whomsoever; and that I will obey the orders of the President of the United States and the orders of the officers appointed over me, according to regulations and the Uniform Code of Military Justice.	This statute was the first post–World War II legislation on the oath, establishing the Uniform Code of Military Justice to unify, consolidate, revise, and codify the Articles of War, the Articles of Government of the Navy, and the Disciplinary Laws of the Coast Guard. Section 8 identified a standard oath for all enlisted personnel.
5 October 1962 87th Cong., 2d sess. (Public Law 87-751)	Enlisted Oath: I, ___, do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; and that I will obey the orders of the President of the United States and the orders of the officers appointed over me, according to regulations and the Uniform Code of Military Justice. So help me God.	This legislation was enacted to make the enlisted oath more consistent with the officer oath, using the phrase "support and defend the Constitution" and adding "So help me God" at the end. This was the last legislative change to the wording of either oath. Subsequent legislation on the oath addressed administrative issues.

THE OATH'S MESSAGE

Some people may think that the focus on the oath and our founding fathers is merely patriotic, feel-good rhetoric and may question the significance of the oath in today's environment.[16] However, during Operation ALLIED FORCE, Gen Wesley Clark encountered a dilemma that very much involved the oath. As combatant commander of US European Command, he had allegiance to the United States. But he also served as supreme allied commander, Europe, with responsibility to the countries of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). In his book, Waging Modern War, General Clark alludes to his dilemma. Who should have priority, the United States or NATO? Upon initiating the air campaign, Clark first called Javier Solano, NATO's secretary-general, before he called Gen Hugh Shelton, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Explaining his predicament, he notes, "I was the overall commander, but represented a nation that didn't want to participate."[17] Interestingly, rather than choosing a term such as worked for or served, he uses represented, which connotes a lesser degree of responsibility and a passive relationship instead of an active allegiance. Indeed, Clark dedicated his book to Solano and NATO's leaders and armed forces- not to the United States and its military.[18]

Although General Clark did not renounce his allegiance to the US Constitution in favor of the NATO alliance, he struggled with the question of where his responsibilities and priorities lay. Despite the differences of opinion between the United States and NATO regarding interests, goals, and methods, both parties had the same overarching objective- stopping the ethnic cleansing in Kosovo. Consequently, Clark did not have to make an either-or choice.[19] However, this example shows how the complexity of modern war and the problems generated by working with alliances can cause even a great American like General Clark to struggle. The act of reaffirming the oath of office should serve to guide all officers when they find themselves in difficult situations.

This brief history of the oath makes the significance of its wording more apparent. The oath provides enduring guidance for military officers. Each part carries its own history and message:

I, {state your full name}, Do Solemnly Swear (or Affirm)

The oath begins with an option to swear or affirm. Although current common law places less religious connotation on the word swear, the term oath clearly had such a connotation in the late 1700s. In fact, the original legislation referred to an "oath or affirmation." Recognizing that some religious groups, such as the Quakers, might object to "swearing" to a Supreme Being or that someone might not believe in a Supreme Being, Congress provided the option to affirm. This wording is also consistent with the option for the President to swear or affirm, as prescribed in Article 2 of the Constitution. Either way, the oath signifies a public statement of personal commitment. Officers must take personal responsibility for their actions.

That I Will Support and Defend the Constitution of the United States

To understand the opening pledge, one should know and understand the Constitution. Prior to taking their oath upon commission or reaffirming it upon promotion, too few officers take the time to read and study the document they swear to support and defend. The oath requires officers to support and defend the Constitution- not the President, not the country, not the flag, and not a particular military service. Yet, at the same time, the Constitution symbolizes the President, the country, the flag, the military, and much more. The preamble to the Constitution succinctly highlights the ideals represented by that document.[20] Because the Constitution was built on a series of checks and balances that distribute power across the executive, legislative, and judicial branches, officers must give their allegiance to all three entities- despite the fact that the chain of command leads to the President. These checks and balances create an inefficiency inherent in America's democratic system that often proves frustrating for military officers, whose environment tries to provide the most efficient and effective fighting force available.[21]

The original oath of 1789 mentioned only that one must support the Constitution. Although many people may at first consider the phrase support and defend as a single thought, each word carries a slightly different connotation. George Washington conveys the notion of support in his farewell address: "The basis of our political systems is the right of the people to make and to alter their Constitutions of Government. But the Constitution, which at any time exists, till changed by an explicit and authentic act of the whole people, is sacredly obligatory upon all. The very idea of the power and the right of the people to establish Government presupposes the duty of every individual to obey the established Government."[22]

The words and defend were added in 1862, during the Civil War, when defense and preservation of the nation became paramount.[23] The passive pledge to support was expanded to include an active requirement to defend. The phrase support and defend the Constitution is purposely vague, allowing better minds to interpret and improve, within certain guidelines.[24] To understand the significance of the wording, one should compare the U.S. oath to the Soviet version, the latter requiring officers "unquestioningly to carry out the requirements of all military regulations and orders of commanders and superiors."[25] It is a true blessing that America does not require its officers to obey "unquestioningly" but gives them the opportunity and flexibility for innovation. But with that flexibility come both responsibility and accountability for one's actions.

Against All Enemies, Foreign and Domestic

This phrase was added in 1862 as a direct result of the Civil War, specifically, to address the possibility of Union soldiers joining the Confederacy (most notably the forces commanded by Gen Robert E. Lee). That is, people who had previously sworn allegiance to the United States were now fighting against it.

Although people now have little concern about another civil war, our military must still prepare for all enemies and contingencies. The terrorist attack of 11 September 2001 caught many Americans off guard. The response to the launching of fighter escorts shows how the nation's leadership faced the dilemma of flying combat air patrols over the United States (defending the Constitution) while trying to comply with current laws on posse comitatus (supporting the Constitution).[26] Military officers cannot simply maintain the status quo, they must look toward the future, identify emerging trends, and develop capabilities to counter the entire range of threats. Apparently, our current capability to respond to and, more importantly, prevent a future asymmetric attack is inadequate. Officers must ensure that they address all enemies and not merely advocate servicecentric needs at the expense of national requirements. For example, we have long known about the shortage of intelligence from human sources that we need if we are to analyze the

capability and intent of emerging nonstate actors; yet, the Air Force intends to purchase F-22 aircraft at a cost of $63 billion to replace existing fighters that can already counter the air forces of any major state actor for the foreseeable future.[27] We must think hard about making improvements to an existing service strength instead of funding a known national shortfall.[28] Our oath demands that we support and defend against all enemies- not just high-profile or high-profit threats.

That I Will Bear True Faith and Allegiance to the Same

The phrase faith and allegiance dates back at least to 1606, when King James required an oath of "uttermost faith and allegiance to the King's majesty" from everyone leaving for America to work in the Virginia Company.[29] However, the officer's oath ensures allegiance to the Constitution as a whole, not just the President. Officers should pledge allegiance to the nation as a whole rather than their military service or organization, an idea reminiscent of the Air Force core value of "service before self." However, officers must not construe service as US Air Force. The Army's core value of "selfless service" provides a clearer connotation of the notion of serving others.[30] Furthermore, the Air Force's guide on core values discusses maintaining "faith in the system," which includes not just the military system but the system of democratic government embodied in the Constitution.[31]

Even though the Constitution built a system of checks and balances to embrace multiple branches of government, the founding fathers cautioned against counterproductive parochialism. In his inaugural address, Washington warned, "I behold the surest pledges, that as on one side, no local prejudices, or attachments; no separate views, nor party animosities, will misdirect the comprehensive and equal eye which ought to watch over this great assemblage."[32] Officers' allegiance compels them to work together to develop the best solutions for the nation, rather than engage in interservice competition to obtain the biggest piece of the defense budget.

That I Take This Obligation Freely, without Any Mental Reservation or Purpose of Evasion

This passage also originated during the Civil War. Congress and President Abraham Lincoln, wanting to ensure that soldiers not defect, expanded the oath in an attempt to guarantee loyalty.[33] In the final analysis, however, loyalty depends upon the integrity of the individual.

This notion corresponds to the Air Force's core value of "integrity first," the Marine Corps and Navy's core value of "honor," and the Army's core values of "integrity" and "honor."[34] Integrity is a learned trait. Whether that learning is based upon a religious upbringing or an embracing of acceptable norms of society, honor and integrity are part of the core of all military services. Maintaining integrity is implicit in the oath and must guide officers when they face conflicts of interest and hard choices.[35]

And That I Will Well and Faithfully Discharge the Duties of the Office on Which I Am about to Enter

This wording has its genesis in the first statute of 1789. In addition to the standard oath, the Secretary of the Senate and the Clerk of the House of Representatives had to take an additional oath to "solemnly swear or affirm, that I will truly and faithfully discharge the duties of my said office, to the best of my knowledge and abilities."[36]

This clause epitomizes the Air Force core value of "excellence in all we do," the Marine Corps and Navy's value of "commitment," and the Army's core value of "duty." We must be proactive and perform our duties to the best of our abilities, mastering our specialties while we are junior officers and then gaining breadth as we advance in rank. The progress of the nation depends upon our doing so.

So Help Me God

Controversy over the separation of church and state sometimes clouds this final phrase; nevertheless, it is the most important one in the oath. Our actions have moral and, for those who believe in a Supreme Being, even religious implications. Sometimes military officers seem hesitant to embrace their religion publicly or acknowledge the significance of divine guidance.[37] However, American history is replete with examples of public appeals to a higher being for guidance and protection. The Declaration of Independence includes an appeal "to the Supreme Judge of the world," and, although the Constitution does not include the phrase so help me God in the President's oath, Washington added those words when he took the first oath.[38] President Lincoln openly addressed the concept of divine guidance in the Gettysburg address: "This nation, under God, shall have a new birth of freedom." When the pledge of allegiance added the phrase "under God" in 1953, President Dwight Eisenhower commented, "In this way we are reaffirming the transcendence of religious faith in America's heritage and future; in this way we shall constantly strengthen those spiritual weapons which forever will be our country's most powerful resource in peace and war."[39]

So help me God became part of the officer oath in 1862, but the enlisted oath did not add these words until 1962. The Congressional Record provides superb insight into their meaning:

The words, "So help me God," are not a part of the obligation assumed upon taking the oath. They constitute rather an assertion of sincerity to undertake the duties of military service in good faith and with the aid of the highest power recognized by the enlistee. It is directed solely to his or her personal conception of the almighty, whatever that may be or whatever it may not be. There is no effort to impose on the enlistee any established religious conception, or even to require his acknowledgement of any religious conception… For the vast majority of the persons taking the oath, however, this addition will assure a unique degree of personal conviction not otherwise attainable, and will thus prove a welcome source of both personal and national strength.[40]

Even atheists have a moral obligation from a societal perspective. One finds this concept as far back as 400 B.C., when Sun Tzu, in The Art of War, starts his first chapter with the statement "War is a matter of vital importance to the State…Therefore appraise it in terms of five fundamental factors… The first of these factors is moral influence."[41] Clearly, one of the greatest military minds of all time understood the moral implications of our actions and their importance for success.

So help me God also implies retribution if officers do not keep their word. Compare the part of the Soviet oath that ends with "If I break this solemn vow, may I be severely punished by the Soviet people, universally hated, and despised by the working people."[42] Although that is quite a condemnation, in actuality it is less severe than the potential consequences for someone who has a strong moral or religious foundation. So help me God acknowledges that no stronger commitment exists.[43]

Conclusion

By studying the key documents and events in America's history, military officers can gain better insight into their oath of office and the moral implications of their actions. Junior officers should focus on how to well and faithfully discharge the duties of their office. For senior officers, the oath should carry even greater significance as they use a more indirect style of leadership to instill in their followers the service's core values.

Comparison of the Oath of Office to Core Values

Oath of Office		Core Values	
	Air Force	*Navy/Marine Corps*	*Army*
I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic.	Service before Self	Courage	Selfless Personal Loyalty
I take this obligation freely, without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion.	Integrity First	Honor	Integrity
I will well and faithfully discharge the duties of the office upon which I am about to enter.	Excellence In All We Do	Commitment	Duty Respect

Officers must develop the skills to make the appropriate leadership decisions when guidance may be vague on how best to support and defend the Constitution. They must take the time to identify capabilities for addressing the entire spectrum of conflict and wrestle with ways of resolving conflicting priorities in coalition warfare. Individuals at all levels must focus on the needs of the nation rather than on the desires of their services. Finally, officers must embrace the moral foundation symbolized in the phrase so help me God, since it is the heart and soul of the success of future generations of Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, and Marines.

Endnotes:

1. Richard Peters, ed., *The Public Statutes at Large of the United States of America*, vol. 1 (Boston: Charles C. Little and James Brown, 1845), 23.
2. See Joseph Gales Sr., ed., Annals of Congress: *The Debates and Proceedings in the Congress of the United States*, vol. 1, March 3, 1789 to March 3, 1791 (Washington, D.C.: Gales and Seaton, 1834). Although the Congressional Record contains hundreds of pages on topics such as public credit, public debt, and duties on tonnage, one finds only three pages on the oath that are worthy of discussion.
3. The Air Force's Air War College includes the officer and enlisted oath on the inside back cover of its textbook on leadership and ethics. The code of conduct is on the inside front cover. In his book *True Faith and Allegiance: The Burden of Military Ethics* (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1995), James H. Toner includes the officer and enlisted oaths on the page that precedes the table of contents.
4. Due to limitations of space, this article focuses on the officer's oath. Many of the same themes and ideas apply to the dedicated professionals in our enlisted force.
5. American Peoples Encyclopedia, 1956 ed., s.v. "oath." According to Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary, 10th ed., an oath is "a solemn [usually] formal calling upon God or a god to witness to the truth of what one says or to witness that one sincerely intends to do what one says (2): a solemn attestation of the truth or inviolability of one's words."
6. American Peoples Encyclopedia, 1956 ed., s.v. "Hippocrates."
7. Lt Col Thomas H. Reese, "An Officer's Oath," Military Review, January 1964, 25.
8. Harold Melvin Hyman, *To Try Men's Souls: Loyalty Tests in American History* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1959), 12–13.
9. John C. Fitzpatrick, ed., *The Writings of George Washington from the Original Manuscript Sources*, 1745–1799, vol. 11 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1931–1944), on-line, Internet, 13 January 2002, available from http://www. memory.loc.gov. (Click on "search"; search on "George Washington, May 7, 1778, General Orders.") Washington's oath for commissioned officers is as follows: I . . . do acknowledge The United States of America to be Free, Independent and Sovereign States and declare that the People thereof owe no Allegiance or Obedience to George the Third, King of Great Britain and I renounce refuse and abjure any Allegiance or Obedience to him, and I do swear (or affirm) that I will to the utmost of my Power

support, maintain and defend the said United States against the said King George the Third, his heirs and Successors and his and their Abettors, Assistants and Adherents and will serve the said United States in the office of . . . which I now hold with Fidelity according to the best of my skill and understanding.

10. Ibid. In another example, on 28 December 1780, Washington court-martialed Thomas Dewees, finding him guilty of two offenses: (1) not taking the oath of office and (2) "selling public wood to the prejudice of the service." Here we see that not taking the oath is not simply an administrative error. In fact, the practice at the time was to publish the sentence in a newspaper "to prevent in future the commission of such crimes." Today's 24-hour worldwide media coverage continues to publicize military indiscretions and has an impact on how the public perceives the military.

11. Mortimer J. Adler provides a superb analysis of the Constitution in *We Hold These Truths: Understanding the Ideas and Ideals of the Constitution* (New York: Macmillan, 1987).

12. Peters, 23. Using the initials "A.B." is a legislative format to identify a place filler for the person's first and last names.

13. Ibid., 119–21. As is the case today, separate "appropriation" acts specified the budgets.

14. The oath of 1862 is as follows:

I, A.B. do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I have never voluntarily borne arms against the United States since I have been a citizen thereof; that I have voluntarily given no aid, countenance, counsel, or encouragement to persons engaged in armed hostility thereto; that I have neither sought nor accepted nor attempted to exercise the functions of any officers whatever, under any authority or pretended authority in hostility to the United States; that I have not yielded a voluntary support to any pretended government, authority, power or constitution within the United States, hostile or inimical thereto. And I do further swear (or affirm) that, to the best of my knowledge and ability, I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States, against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; that I take this obligation freely, without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion, and that I will well and faithfully discharge the duties of the office on which I am about to enter, so help me God.

See An Act to Prescribe an Oath of Office, and for Other Purposes, 37th Cong., 2d sess., chap. 128.

15. To trace legislation relating to military oaths, one should understand the basic organization, structure, and four major changes to legislation in the United States. The original laws, starting in June 1789, were identified as statutes, organized by chapters and sections. On 1 December 1873, Congress enacted the Revised Statutes, a single act that codified all the permanent laws in force. These statutes superseded all the previous ones from 1789 through 1873. The Revised Statutes were organized by title and section. The next overall effort to better organize the laws of the land occurred in 1926, when the United States Code (USC) replaced the Revised Statutes. The laws were organized into 50 titles and divided into sections. Title 5 dealt with the Executive Department (including military officers); Title 10 dealt with the Army (and the Army Air

Forces within the Army); Title 32 concerned the National Guard; and Title 34 dealt with the Navy/Marine Corps. The most recent (and ongoing) version of the USC began in 1946, with a comprehensive project of revising and enacting all of the USC into "positive law," which did away with the need to refer back to previous statutes to clarify the current law of the land. The current USC is organized by title and section but also includes subtitles, chapters, and parts to further divide and organize the legislation. The current Title 10 consolidates the military services (except the National Guard) into a single title, although there is still legislation relating to the Department of Defense, a department in the executive branch, in Title 5. At least 19 pieces of legislation address military oaths. For a more detailed description of the legislative history of the oath of office, contact the author by E-mail: kdkkeskel@hotmail.com.

16. In a highly publicized confrontation between Gen Douglas MacArthur and President Harry S. Truman during the Korean War, Macarthur openly criticized the administration's handling of the war effort, even threatening to invade China and thus defy the civilian leadership's policy. As a result of the general's actions, on 11 April 1951 President Truman relieved MacArthur as supreme commander, United Nations Command. Truman explained how, from his perspective, MacArthur did not support the requirements of the Constitution and did not faithfully discharge his duties: "Full and vigorous debate on matters of national policy is a vital element in the constitutional system of our free democracy. It is fundamental, however, that military commanders must be governed by the policies and directives issued to them in the manner provided by our laws and Constitution. In time of crisis, this consideration is particularly compelling." "Truman Dismisses MacArthur," CNN Interactive, on-line, Internet, 14 October 2002, available from http://www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/ cold.war/episodes/05/documents/macarthur.

17. Wesley K. Clark, *Waging Modern War: Bosnia, Kosovo, and the Future of Combat* (New York: Public Affairs, 2001), 154.

18. Although it is well understood that the United States is a NATO member and therefore a part of Clark's dedication, he consciously seems to focus on NATO rather than the United States.

19. One could also argue that Clark's support of NATO over current U.S. policy is consistent with the Constitution, which provides the authority for the executive branch to make treaties; thus, the NATO alliance, ratified by Congress according to the Constitution, is consistent with that document.

20. According to the preamble, "We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defense, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America."

21. Maj Larry A. Helgeson has similar thoughts in his article "Moral Obligations from our Oath to the U.S. Constitution," in United States Air Force Academy Journal of Professional Military Ethics, 1988, 3–19.

22. George Washington's Farewell Address to the People of the United States, 17 September 1796, on-line, Internet, 4 January 2002, available from http://www. earlyamerica.com/earlyamerica/ milestones/farewell/text.html.

23. Part of President Abraham Lincoln's justification for the Emancipation Proclamation demonstrates the thinking of the era: "I felt that measures, otherwise unconstitutional, might become lawful, by becoming indispensable to the preservation of the constitution, through the preservation of the nation." See Helgeson, 15.

24. Even Washington understood that the Constitution was not perfect. Prior to the Continental Congress, he observed, "Let us raise a standard to which the wise and honest can repair. The event is in the hand of God." John Romain Rood, The History of Building the Constitution of the United States (Detroit: Detroit Law-Book Co., 1948), 13.

25. Helgeson, 4. Many countries today require an allegiance to a king or head of state. For example, the following countries require officers to swear allegiance to an individual:

   • Great Britain: "I swear by Almighty God that I will be faithful and bear true allegiance to Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth The Second, Her Heirs and Successors, and that I will as in duty bound, honestly and faithfully defend Her Majesty, Her Heirs and Successors, in Person, Crown and Dignity against all enemies, and will observe and obey all orders of Her Majesty, Her Heirs and Successors, and of the Air Officers and other Officers set over me."

   • Jordan: "I swear to be loyal to God, country, and the king, and conduct all my job requirements with honor and dignity, with no discrimination or bias, and to obey all military orders issued to me from my superiors."

   • Brazil: "As I incorporate to the Brazilian Air Force, I promise to obey strictly the orders given by the authorities, respect my superiors in hierarchy, and be good to my comrades/subordinates; dedicate myself entirely to the service of my country, defending honor, institutions and duties with the sacrifice of my own life."

   Information provided by international officers attending the U.S. Air War College, Maxwell AFB, Ala., spring 2002.

26. The concept of posse comitatus is based on an act of Congress (20 stat. L., 145, chap. 263, sec. 15, 18 June 1878). Sec. 15 starts with the following statement: "From and after the passage of this act it shall not be lawful to employ any part of the Army of the United States, as a posse comitatus, or otherwise, for the purpose of executing the laws, except in such cases and under such circumstances as such employment of said force may be expressly authorized by the Constitution or by act of Congress." The law was passed as a result of 15 years of perceived "military occupation" of the South after the Civil War. See The Posse Comitatus Act of 1878, on-line, Internet, 22 August 2002, available from http://www.dojgov.net/posse_comitatus_act.htm.

27. Jim Garamone, "F-22 Gets Green Light for Low-Rate Production," American Forces Information Service News Articles, on-line, Internet, 4 April 2002, available from http://www.defenselink. mil/news/Aug2001/n08162001_200108161.html.

28. In fact, the F-22 Web site highlights how our new-generation fighter will take us from air superiority to air dominance. The site actually has a clock that counts down the seconds to air dominance. See F-22 Raptor Team Infonet, on-line, Internet, 4 April 2002, available from http://www.f22-raptor.com. Another example of a neglected shortfall is strategic lift.

29. Hyman, 5.
30. The Army has seven core values: integrity, honor, loyalty, respect, duty, personal courage, and selfless service.
31. United States Air Force Core Values (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Air Force, 1 January 1997).
32. National Archives and Records Administration: Washington's Inaugural Address, 30 April 1789, on-line, Internet, 4 January 2002, available from http://www.archives.gov/ exhibit_hall/ american_originals/inaugtxt.html. Washington reiterated this warning against parochialism in his farewell address eight years later: "In the most solemn manner against the baneful effects of the spirit of party, generally." See George Washington's Farewell Address. The problem of parochialism is also highlighted in the New Testament of the Bible: If a kingdom is divided against itself, that kingdom cannot stand (Mark 3:24).
33. It is ironic that even patriots like George Washington and John Adams initially took an oath and swore allegiance to the king of England and later, as clearly stated in the Declaration of Independence, acknowledged that sometimes one must go against that pledge: "Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed, That whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new Government." In another piece of irony, immediately after the chancellor of New York swore in George Washington as president of the United States (during which Washington pledged to preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution), the chancellor proclaimed, "Long live George Washington, president of the United States," rather than proclaiming long life for the Constitution. See Gales, 27.
34. The Navy and Marine Corps share the core values of honor, courage, and commitment.
35. Vice Adm James B. Stockdale said that "a person's integrity can give him something to rely on when his perspective seems to blur, when the rules and principles seem to waiver, and when he's faced with hard choices of right and wrong." Quoted in Maj Mark A. Hyatt's "Honor and Ethics Must Be Reflected in the United States Air Force Officer's Oath of Office," United States Air Force Academy Journal of Professional Military Ethics, 1988, 25.
36. Peters, 24.
37. suppressing the spiritual core of our national being. Our nation could not have been conceived without divine help." See "Ronald Reagan: State of the Union Address, 27 January, 1987," This Nation, on-line, Internet, 14 October 2002, available from http:// www.thisnation.com/library/ sotu/1987rr.html.
38. Washington's farewell address highlighted the link between religious values and the success of this experiment in democracy: "Of all the dispositions and habits, which lead to political prosperity, religion and morality are indispensable supports." See George Washington's Farewell Address.
39. The Original Pledge of Allegiance, on-line, Internet, 25 September 2002, available from http://www.usflag.org/the.pledge.of.allegiance.html. The pledge of allegiance originated in 1892, when Francis Bellamy published a few words in The Youth's Companion magazine for schoolchildren to recite on 12 October 1892, the 400th anniversary of Columbus's discovery of America. Over 12 million children recited the

initial version of the pledge that day: "I pledge allegiance to my flag and the Republic for which it stands—one nation indivisible—with liberty and justice for all." On 14 June 1943, the first National Flag Conference changed the words "my flag" to "the Flag of the United States," and in 1942 Congress formally recognized the pledge. One year later, the Supreme Court ruled that students could not be forced to recite it. In 1953, after lobbying from the Knights of Columbus, the pledge saw its final change, adding the phrase "under God." Unfortunately, that phrase recently came under scrutiny when the 9th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals in San Francisco ruled that the pledge constitutes an unconstitutional endorsement of religion because it contains the phrase "under God." On the bright side, it is encouraging to see so many public officials actively working to reverse that decision.

40. House, Armed Forces Oath of Enlistment, Report to Accompany H.R. 218, 87th Cong., 1st sess., 25 July 1961, 4. The Constitution guarantees that "no religious test shall ever be required as a qualification to any office or public trust under the United States." Both Congress and the Supreme Court have ruled that including the words so help me God is not unconstitutional.

41. Sun Tzu, The Art of War, trans. Samuel B. Griffith (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963), 63.

42. Helgeson, 4.

43. The Bible includes references to oaths. For example, Matthew quotes Jesus as saying, Again, you have heard that it was said to the people long ago, Do not break your oath, but keep the oaths you have made to the Lord (Matt. 5:33).

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Virtual Staff Ride: Battle of Roberts Ridge

Activity Statement:

- Participate in a virtual staff ride and discuss the nature of leadership in an improvised war.

Affective Lesson Objective:

- Value the Battle of Roberts Ridge and the sacrifice of the military members involved.

Affective Samples of Behavior:

- Discuss the Battle of Roberts Ridge in relation to the Air Force Core Values.

- Explain the impact of the fog and friction of war on the outcome of events as evidenced in the Battle of Roberts Ridge.

- Present examples of warrior ethos during the Battle of Roberts Ridge.

OPERATION ANACONDA:

PERCEPTION MEETS REALITY
IN THE HILLS OF AFGHANISTAN

PAUL L. HASTERT
WASHINGTON, DC, USAF

The initial encounters between Al Qaeda and the U.S. military taught both a series of lessons that reverberate across the battlefields of Afghanistan today. Both sides entered the fray with preconceived ideas of their enemy—ideas that disappeared on the battlefields of the Shahi-Kot valley. The United States was determined not to repeat the mistakes of the siege of Tora Bora. Their battleplan called for a lightning fast operation using highly mobile US and Afghan forces to envelop the enemy, but failures of intelligence and the fog of war transformed Anaconda into a long, slow struggle against an often invisible foe. Al Qaeda had all the advantages of terrain and defense but was unable to cause the massive casualties they thought would drive the American invaders from Afghanistan. Both sides left the battlefield with valuable lessons that have prevented any similar encounters since silence returned to the Shahi-Kot.

What was the purpose of Operation Anaconda?

In early March 2002 US and Allied forces launched Operation Anaconda to dislodge Al Qaeda forces that had gathered near Gardez in southeast Afghanistan. This would be the first time that US forces had met Al Qaeda-trained jihadists in a large-scale encounter and the results did not match either side's preconceptions. Operation Anaconda was supposed to be a lightning strike by highly mobile US forces against rag-tag Al Qaeda remnants that had escaped destruction during Operation Enduring Freedom. The operation was supposed to be finished in 24 hours, but it took 10 days for the operation to finally wind down.[1] For Al Qaeda the operation came as a shock as well—although US forces occasionally backed off and withdrew, they continued their assault until Al Qaeda was swept from the battlefield. Anaconda did not proceed as the Americans had planned, but its results have prevented Al Qaeda from again seizing and defending such a large piece of terrain.

The US military had been highly successful during Desert Storm but Al Qaeda judged their competence and willingness to fight based on a series of attacks and confrontations that had occurred in the Middle East over the previous two decades:

- 1983—Hezbollah bombs the US Marine barracks in Beirut. U.S. forces pull out a few months later. [2]

- 1992—Al Qaeda finances bombing two hotels in Aden where US troops stayed while transiting Yemen on the way to Somalia.[3] US troops cease transiting Yemen shortly thereafter.

- 1993—Bin Laden dispatches advisors to train Somali warlord Mohammed Farah Adeed's militia. US forces withdraw from Somalia after the loss of two helicopters and 18 soldiers on 3 October 1993.[4]

- 1995—Bin Laden associates detonate car bomb outside US Office of Program Management—Saudi Arabian National Guard. US forces are reduced and relocated.[5]

- 1996—Bomb explodes outside Khobar Towers complex housing U.S. troops in Dhahran Saudi Arabia. US forces in the Kingdom relocate to Prince Sultan Air Base in the desert south of Riyadh.[6]

- 1998—US responds to African Embassy bombing with cruise missile attack.[7]

- 2000—USS Cole attacked and nearly sunk in Aden in a major Al Qaeda operation.[8]

These were not all Al Qaeda operations, but Al Qaeda judged the Americans' will to fight based on the results they observed. Osama bin Laden's public statements clearly show his opinion of the United States:

- August 1996—"However, when tens of your soldiers were killed in minor battles and one American Pilot was dragged in the streets of Mogadishu you left the area carrying disappointment, humiliation, defeat and your dead with you. Clinton appeared in front of the whole world threatening and promising revenge , but these threats were merely a preparation for withdrawal. You have been disgraced by Allah and you withdrew; the extent of your impotence and weaknesses became very clear. It was a pleasure for the "heart" of every Muslim and a remedy to the "chests" of believing nations to see you defeated in the three Islamic cities of Beirut, Aden and Mogadishu."[9]

- March 1997—"We learned from those who fought there [Somalia], that they were surprised to see the low spiritual morale of the American fighters in comparison with the experience they had with the Russian fighters. The Americans ran away from those fighters who fought and killed them, while the latter were still there. If the U.S. still thinks and brags that it still has this kind of power even after all these successive defeats in Vietnam, Beirut, Aden, and Somalia, then let them go back to those who are awaiting its return."[10]

- May 1998—"By the Grace of God, the [cruise] missiles were ineffective. The raid has also proven that the American army is going down hill in its morale. Its members are too cowardly and too fearful to meet the young people of Islam face to face."[11]

- May 2001—"Your brethren have taken up your struggle through out East and have come out to fight against Kuffir and the West has been threatened by their rise. The West fears that they (the Mujahideen) shall annihilate their very existence. Much that the West take sustenance in their arms and might, in their hearts of hearts they fear and are scared of them (the Mujahideen)…Unafraid of the might and size of the infidels, an appreciable small number of committed Mujahideen, shall prevail upon them. While they pride on their military resources, the Mujahid take the field through faith and conviction."[12]

How did Osama Bin Laden feel about the fighting ability of American combat troops?

Al Qaeda's leader felt the US military was a high tech paper tiger, unwilling to stand and fight. Bin Laden saw that the United States had been forced to withdraw from Beirut, Aden, and Mogadishu when faced with a committed jihadist resistance. Although it's unclear what response Bin Laden expected after the attacks of 9/11, it's likely he expected a US ground force that could be similarly attacked.

If Bin Laden had low expectations of the US response, the United States had a similarly low opinion of Al Qaeda. President Bush's second line on the afternoon of 9/11 was "The United States will hunt down and punish those responsible for these cowardly acts."[13] That evening in his address to the American people he said, "The search is underway for those who are behind these evil acts."[14] In his radio address on the 15th he said, "This is a conflict without battlefields or beachheads, a conflict with opponents who believe they are invisible. Yet, they are mistaken."[15] In his address to Congress on the 21st he said "Al Qaeda is to terror what the mafia is to crime."[16] The United States continued to focus on Al Qaeda as a terrorist, not a military, force. The public discussion on Afghanistan presented the Al Qaeda camps as terrorist training centers (which some were), not as military boot camps (which they all were).

The initial phases of Operation Enduring Freedom came as no surprise to the leadership of the Taliban and Al Qaeda. The heavy reliance on airpower to strike fixed facilities must have been expected after similar attacks on Iraq and Serbia. These strikes generated little movement on the ground and the calls in the western media for a heavier US presence certainly encouraged Al Qaeda. If US forces could be drawn into Afghanistan in significant numbers it would reorient the conflict from a quasi civil war into a battle against a non-Muslim invader. Unfortunately for Al Qaeda, as more bombing missions targeted the Taliban front lines the Northern Alliance began a rapid advance. The heavy presence of airpower over the battlefield destroyed military equipment, but more importantly it prevented reinforcements from reaching the front and prevented orderly retreats to the rear. By contrast, the Northern Alliance could move rapidly, was well supplied, and had the funds to bribe rival commanders. Frontline Taliban commanders began to see which way the wind was blowing. As they were threatened with personalized bombing missions and cajoled with bribes they began switching sides at what must have been an alarming rate to the Taliban's leadership.

By 13 November, the rapidly changing situation forced Osama Bin Laden to leave Jalalabad for Tora Bora in the White Mountains.[17] Tora Bora had been a focus of US bombing since the conflict began, but the Al Qaeda leadership must have felt the shelters and facilities there would be sufficient to withstand any US assault. Because Tora Bora had remained under the control of the Afghan resistance during the 1980s it is likely that Al Qaeda felt it could be defended against a US onslaught.

While the Al Qaeda leadership had withdrawn to Tora Bora, fighting continued to rage across Afghanistan. Kabul had just fallen and the situation remained very fluid in Southern Afghanistan.[18] Kandahar was the spiritual heartland of the Taliban and remained in their grip. US forces on the ground in Afghanistan remained minimal, and none likely would have been sent to Tora Bora even if the United States was aware of Al Qaeda's movement. Clear knowledge of what had happened only came with the arrival of journalists in Jalalabad. Once there, they determined and published details of Al Qaeda's movement to Tora Bora.[19]

The first US forces arrived in early December to coordinate an Afghan attack on Tora Bora. Simply put, there were not sufficient US forces or facilities nearby to launch an attack alone, and the attack's plan depended primarily on airpower to destroy Al Qaeda forces in place. Ironically, as US forces were arriving to coordinate the attack, Osama Bin Laden was starting to leave Tora Bora. In spite of the successful resistance against the Soviets in the same area he must have concluded that Tora Bora could not be defended successfully against the Americans. This is a significant (and often overlooked) event; bin Laden's first line of defense was the Taliban Army, the second line was Al Qaeda's fighters in Tora Bora (based on the anti-Soviet model) and the third line was a tactical withdrawal.

Bin Laden's decision and timing in exercising "Option 3" were both outstanding. Although Al Qaeda was able to hold out in Tora Bora for many weeks, it suffered heavy losses in personnel. Al Qaeda took advantage of the slow advance to pull out significant numbers of fighters. Many of the Afghans attacking Tora Bora had bonds to the Al Qaeda forces they were "opposing" and took advantage of the opportunity to get paid by the Americans and the Arabs.[20] In February 2003 Osama Bin Laden discussed Tora Bora in an audiotape:

"Not a second would pass without a fighter plane passing over our heads day and night. American forces were bombing us by smart bombs and bombs that weigh thousands of pounds and bombs that penetrate caves and other kinds of bombs enter into caves…In addition to the forces of the agents whom they pushed to attack us for a continuous half month. We fought back against all their attacks by the grace of God. And we defeated them every time. They were carrying their injured and their dead…In spite of all that, American forces did not dare to go into our posts. What sign is more than that for their cowardness and their fear in their claimed stories about their power? The jest of the battle was the extreme defeat for the world alliance of evil."[21]

Once Tora Bora was under US control it was clear that the caves and facilities were prepared for a long siege with massive quantities of supplies and ammunition. The heavy and accurate US bombing made the resistance tactics from the 1980s (sitting out aerial bombardments in a cave) suicidal in the new millennium. Being well protected reduces

the chance of being injured or killed, but when an enemy can bomb 24 by 7 it's only a matter of time until your number comes up. The evidence in the caves showed that many Al Qaeda fighters had wisely withdrawn. Despite bin Laden's positive spin, Tora Bora's fighters had either been killed (some), captured (few), or were moving away in small groups (most).

After it became clear that the Al Qaeda leadership had escaped from Tora Bora the US media began criticizing the US attack strategy for the faults identified earlier. The heavy reliance on Afghan forces of dubious loyalty, failure to close off all escape routes, and the inability of the Pakistani Military (still on high alert facing off against India) to close the border all drew sharp attention. At the same time some of the limitations that forced a dependence on Afghan forces began to dissipate. US forces began moving into Bagram Air Base north of Kabul (one of the two airports not targeted in Afghanistan) and established a major installation. Conventional Army Aviation helicopter units began arriving, providing mobility and combat firepower. Finally, the Army's XVIII Airborne Corps arrived to establish a forward command and control facility.[22] The conventional Army that had been left out of operations in Afghanistan was now in place and in force.

Why did we attack the Shahi-Kot valley? What is the "Hammer and Anvil" strategy?

After their withdrawal from Tora Bora, Al Qaeda was forced to reassemble, reassess, and regroup. Although they had survived to "fight another day," the Taliban had lost control of Afghanistan, the United States was exploiting documents found in the cities and Al Qaeda forces were widely scattered. In February 2002 Al Qaeda forces were detected assembling in the Shahi-Kot valley. The valley had been the site of a 1986 assault that had cost the Soviet Army over 400 lives. The terrain, caves, and fortifications that had withstood the earlier assault remained.[23] Shahi-Kot was defensible, close to Pakistan, and close enough to Tora Bora (approximately 130 km) that the scattered troops could be regrouped in short order. It's unclear if Al Qaeda felt they could escape US attention. Based on the slow US response to their retreat into Tora Bora they may have felt that they could delay or avoid detection all together.

United States Special Operations Forces (SOF) began planning on 13 February for an assault on Shahi-Kot with a focus on applying the lessons learned from Tora Bora. It became clear that a large number of conventional Army forces would be required so lead planning shifted to the 10th Mountain Division.[24] Operation Anaconda would use Afghan forces (advised and assisted by US SOF instructors) to hammer through the Shahi-Kot valley and drive the Al Qaeda fighters into the obligatory anvil manned by conventional US Army units. Unlike the "siege" of Tora Bora, the assault on Shahi- Kot would be an active one, with the promise of a relatively quick battle if things proceeded according to plan.

An extremely active reconnaissance effort focused on the valley using the U-2, Predator, and other assets to determine Al Qaeda disposition and numbers in order to identify helicopter landing zones, axis of attack, and so on. In order to "bait the trap" bombing was kept to a minimum. Although this kept Al Qaeda in the valley it also gave them time to regroup, reequip, and reorganize their defenses. While the United States had their eye on the valley, Intelligence believed Al Qaeda was unaware of the upcoming assault. The US estimates of the number of fighters in the valley varied widely—from 200 to over 1,000. The initial battle plans had been made assuming there would be 200–300 fighters but the estimates climbed to 600–700 as U.S. forces began the operation. It was unclear if the Al Qaeda forces were in "regroup" mode preparing for a guerilla war, or if they were waiting for a US assault. Because the Al Qaeda force consisted of light infantry the United States was not sure if they were in the valley or positioned in the surrounding hills.[25]

Early in the morning on 20 March 2002 the Afghan forces (aided by US Special Operations forces) began moving up the Shahi-Kot valley. As they advanced they came under heavy and sustained fire that killed an American Special Forces adviser and two Afghan troops. Many vehicles were destroyed and the Afghans began retreating back down the valley toward Gardez. Later investigation determined the heavy fire came from an American AC-130 that believed it was engaging an enemy convoy.[26] Anaconda's "Hammer" had been eliminated by friendly fire almost before the operation had begun. Despite this loss, no consideration seems to have been given to adjusting the battle plan.

Twenty minutes prior to the blocking force's infiltration, an airstrike hit Al Qaeda positions.[27] This certainly killed some of their forces, but it also alerted Al Qaeda to the upcoming assault. The 10th Mountain and 101st Airborne Division troops were transported in CH-47 helicopters from Bagram Air Base to the foothills on the eastern side of the Shahi-Kot valley. To prevent a repeat of Tora Bora the troops were to make their way up the hills to a series of blocking positions. It did not work out that way. Some insertions were met with hostile fire, whereas others began taking fire after the helicopters left.[28] Small arms and mortars were coming down from the hills where the blocking positions were to be established. The US battle plan was to seize the high ground and shoot down on the Al Qaeda forces being driven down the valley, but now the roles were reversed. The US troops (especially 10th Mountain) were pinned down between Al Qaeda in the high ground above and the cities below.

The Al Qaeda gunners proved to be extremely effective. Although the AH-64 Apache helicopter was identified as the most effective close air support asset,[29] five of the six Apaches available to support the operation were knocked out of action by midmorning. There would be no more attack helicopter support that day.[30] The ferocity and capability of the Al Qaeda resistance came as a shock to the Army troops. The Al Qaeda soldiers moved quickly from position to position in black tunics and head wraps like Ninjas.[31] Finally, as night fell, the CH-47 helicopters returned to exfil part of the 10th Mountain Division forces they'd inserted in the early morning.[32] Operation Anaconda would continue, but without the "hammer" or the "anvil."

Although the effort to have the Afghan forces drive Al Qaeda into the waiting Americans had failed, the insertion of US troops was having an effect. Al Qaeda fighters had begun streaming into the valley when they heard word of American troops on the ground.[33] Once again, Anaconda had been stood on its head—instead of worrying about Al Qaeda fleeing into Pakistan the operation would shift to targeting Al Qaeda entering from Pakistan. The metaphor shifted from the Hammer and Anvil to the Honey Pot and the Bees. The US and Allied troops would serve as the honey to draw in Al Qaeda.

What drove the decision to place observation posts (surveillance points) along the ridges of the Shahi-Kot valley?

In order to effectively strike the reinforcements streaming toward the valley the United States needed to establish surveillance points. Air assets such as Predator were effective when available, but bad weather always threatened (bad weather had delayed the start of Anaconda by two days). A decision was made to infiltrate Special Operations teams to conduct strategic reconnaissance on the various "ratlines" that traced through the mountains to and from Pakistan. One such post was planned for the top of a peak known as Takur Ghar. The 10,000-ft peak commanded a clear view of the southern approaches to the valley, the town of Marzak, and the "Whale"—the large ridge that stood on the other side of the valley.

Unbeknownst to the Americans, they had picked their observation point too well. Takur Ghar overlooked the most essential entry and escape route Al Qaeda used.[34] Al Qaeda saw the same advantages and had established a position to observe American activity and shoot down helicopters flying in the valley below.[35] Because of heavy snowfall the US forces planning the mission were unaware of any Al Qaeda forces or defenses on Takur Ghar.[36] The mission was assigned to a team of Navy SEALS accompanied by an Air Force Combat Controller.

What events transpired on the peak of Takur Ghar during the insertion of the special operations forces?

As the MH-47 (Razor 03) approached the helicopter landing zone at the top of the ridge they observed fresh tracks, goatskins, and a seemingly abandoned heavy machine gun.[37] The pilots discussed an abort but it was too late. The Al Qaeda forces, showing good fire discipline, waited until the helicopter was nearly on top of their positions, then opened fire with heavy machine guns and RPGs. ABH1 Neal Roberts was standing at the rear of the ramp preparing to rapidly exit and secure the landing zone after touch down. As the helicopter was hit, hydraulic fluid began spewing on the ramp and the helicopter lurched around to escape from the Al Qaeda bunkers. ABH1 Roberts slipped on the oily ramp and fell 5–10 ft down onto the snowy mountain. Razor 03 crash landed 7 km away and a headcount confirmed that one man was lost.[38]

In spite of the heavy resistance encountered, the remaining members of Roberts team loaded onto a second helicopter (Razor 04) to return to the top of Takur Ghar for a rescue attempt. Razor 04 took heavy fire but all six members of the "reconnaissance" team were able to exit onto the mountaintop. The team's situation quickly deteriorated as the Air Force Combat Controller, TSgt John Chapman was killed and two of the SEALS were seriously wounded. The remaining SEALS made the difficult decision to withdraw down the mountain.[39]

Why was the Quick Reaction Force sent in after we had already lost a helicopter?

Al Qaeda did not have long to wait for another helicopter. A 23-man Ranger Quick Reaction Force (QRF) was dispatched from Bagram on board two other MH-47s (Razor 01 and 02) to land on a displaced landing zone. Unfortunately, the helicopter crews never received the word to offset and as the sun began to rise they proceeded to the same landing zone. Neither the crews nor the Rangers knew that Al Qaeda "owned" Takur Ghar—only that they had been dispatched to assist the SEALS. As they approached the landing zone the SEALS they were sent to assist were already making their way down the ridge.[40]

Razor 01 was the first helicopter to approach the landing zone. Not surprisingly, the Al Qaeda gunners met its approach with machine-gun fire and RPGs from three different directions and shot it down. As the Rangers and crew emerged to establish a defensive perimeter they were met by Al Qaeda fire that immediately killed a helicopter gunner and three of the Rangers. Razor 02 offloaded its part of the QRF further down the ridge and its Rangers began a 2,000 ft climb to reach the rest of their team.[41]

Not knowing how long it would take for the rest of the Rangers to arrive, the survivors on top of the ridge began considering an assault on the Al Qaeda position. Four of the Rangers (including their commander and senior NCO) began a straight assault up the ridge but as they advanced they realized that instead of simply hiding behind rocks the Al Qaeda fighters were in well-established bunkers. The Rangers retreated and began depending on a constant barrage of air strikes to keep the Al Qaeda fighters' heads down and prevent them from launching an assault.[42]

The rest of the QRF reached the top of the ridge at 1030 and began organizing an attack up the ridge. The final assault was anticlimactic—all the Rangers found were dead Al Qaeda. By this time other Al Qaeda fighters were streaming into the area and soon began firing from adjacent knolls and ridges. A combination of direct fire from the ground and bombs and strafing from the air kept the Al Qaeda fighters from reaching too close. Again the "honey" of Americans on the ground proved a powerful lure to draw out Al Qaeda fighters. As evening approached the Al Qaeda firing began to diminish as the fighters began moving down the mountain towards Pakistan.[43] Later that evening four helicopters returned to evacuate the survivors. Seven Americans including pararescueman SrA Jason Cunningham had been killed and four had been seriously wounded—all but one of the fatalities had been dead within minutes of the crash of Razor 01.

Anaconda continued on for another two weeks. Instead of a rapid advance to flush Al Qaeda it became a slow slog against small teams of fighters in the hills and the villages. Initially Al Qaeda reinforcements streamed in from Pakistan, drawn in by the opportunity to go toe to toe with the Americans, but over time the flow of reinforcements turned to a flow of fighters withdrawing. Al Qaeda had enough—the Shahi-Kot belonged to the Americans.[44]

What was the outcome of Operation Anaconda?

Anaconda must be regarded as a humbling experience for the Americans. Their "Hammer and Anvil" strategy was destroyed almost before it began, not by enemy action but by friendly fire. The Infantry inserted into the valley did not know how many Al Qaeda forces they would find or where they would find them. The plan to move unopposed into the high ground was doomed to failure because Al Qaeda had already taken the high ground. Instead of shooting down on Al Qaeda they were being shot down at by Al Qaeda. Where they had expected to find a terrorist rabble, the US infantry found a well-trained, disciplined force. Instead of running from Americans they ran toward Americans for the opportunity to fight the infidel. The Americans depended on Apache helicopters to provide support from the air, but quickly lost them as the accurate Al Qaeda gunners took them out of the fight.

The SOF insertion on Takur-Gar showed many of the same problems. The insertion team was sized and equipped for reconnaissance—no hostile resistance was expected. After the loss of ABH1 Roberts the surviving members of his team attempted to retrieve him, despite the fact that he had been taken prisoner by a larger force of Al Qaeda or (more likely) had already been killed. The insertion of the first half of the QRF on the same LZ was almost certain to end with a helicopter shot down. Because of a failure in communications the crew did not receive the instructions to insert elsewhere on the ridge and did not know that the SEAL team they were coming to rescue was already retreating down the ridge.

For Al Qaeda the insertion of American forces during Anaconda was a near perfect opportunity. Instead of hunting for Americans they would be delivered directly to their doorstep in vulnerable helicopters. Al Qaeda occupied the high ground containing bunkers, caves, and established firing positions. They were well supplied with ammunition, weapons, food, and water. Yet despite all these advantages they were only able to kill 7 Americans (another was killed by friendly fire)—6 of which were killed in the battle to save an American who was likely already dead.

Why was Al Qaeda's military so unsuccessful? The US troops were equipped with the newest generation of Body Armor. Al Qaeda training camps likely taught to shoot your enemy in the chest where the likelihood of hitting a vital organ is high. Shooting an American soldier in the chest will knock him down and cause a serious bruise but it will not kill him or keep him out of the fight for very long. Mortar shells shot in the midst of the Americans failed to cause a fatality.[45] The US troops could call on a seemingly endless amount of airpower to rocket, bomb, and strafe their enemies. Even if the airplanes did not kill them, Al Qaeda fighters were forced to keep their heads down or move into shelters during the aircraft assaults. Airpower turns fighters into targets. The constant

aerial surveillance discouraged mutual support between Al Qaeda fighters. Attempting to move long distances would only bring attention. Motorized transport would draw aerial bombardment even faster so the Al Qaeda fighters that did move had to do it on foot and use mules to move equipment.

Although the American plan for Anaconda was in shambles almost before the operation began, they could call on the massive US war machine for backup support in ways in which the Al Qaeda fighters could only dream. When the Army's Apaches were damaged the Marines flew in their Cobras from ships off the Pakistani coast. Replacement Apaches were flown into Bagram a few days later.[46] To provide more air support a Squadron of A-10 air to ground aircraft were deployed to Bagram. Although some troops were withdrawn from the Shahi-Kot valley under fire, others were inserted in less hostile areas. By comparison the Al Qaeda reinforcements making their way from Pakistan had to travel over 45 km, at least partly on foot, with the constant danger of attracting a bombing or strafing run. Reinforcements did enter the valley, but the number of jihadists who wanted to die as shaheed to an unseen American's bomb eventually dried up. For the Al Qaeda fighter the honey was all too elusive and death all too inevitable.

After Anaconda ended an American spokesman claimed that in killing hundreds of Al Qaeda fighters they had saved hundreds of thousands of lives based on the equation of the 9/11 attacks where 20 terrorists killed 3,000 people.[47] Such an equation is clearly spurious. The Al Qaeda forces the United States killed in the Shahi-Kot valley were not the same Al Qaeda fighters sent on overseas terrorist missions. They were the Arab, Chechen, and Pakistani foot soldiers that in an earlier time would have been part of Al Qaeda's 055 Brigade, helping the Taliban fight against the Northern Alliance. Anaconda did not destroy Al Qaeda, but it did destroy its illusion of being able to go "toe to toe" militarily with the Americans. The Vietnamese General Vo Nguyen Giap divided guerrilla war into three stages:

- Very small unit, hit-and-run actions without any attempt to hold territory.

- Continuation of stage one attacks combined with larger units, regimental and below, engaging in more intense attacks and taking and holding remote terrain as needed.

- Conventional warfare against a weakened enemy who is engaged and defeated.48

Enduring Freedom forced Al Qaeda and the Taliban from a stage three conflict against the Northern Alliance to a stage two conflict against the new Afghan government and American forces. Al Qaeda's defeat in the Shahi-Kot showed their inability to take and hold terrain or operate as larger units and knocked them back to stage one. Any attempt to hold territory or form a larger military force would bring a strong reaction. Unlike the earlier conflict against the Soviets (to which it's often compared) there are no safe havens along the border and the supplies and institutional support coming from Pakistan are limited. Although there's a seemingly endless supply of young men yearning to be shaheed, you cannot take and hold territory with untrained suicide bombers.

In the end, bin Laden's troops did not find the cowardly US forces he had led them to expect. US troops prefer a helicopter extraction to a fight to the death, but when forced they proved their ability to hit Al Qaeda hard. Unlike Beirut and Mogadishu, they did not leave until they owned the battlefield. The US troops also found their Al Qaeda opponents to be different than they expected. Instead of terrorists they found a competent, disciplined, well-trained light infantry force, albeit one that could not defeat the nearly limitless capabilities of the US War Machine. Today the two sides continue in an uneasy standoff across Afghanistan, each waiting for the other to withdraw from the field.

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Ethical Decision-Making Case Studies

Activity Statement:

- Participate in discussion relating the concepts of leadership and professional behaviors to ethical decision-making scenarios.

Affective Lesson Objective:

- Value the relationship of ethical decision-making to mission accomplishment.

Affective Samples of Behavior:

- Openly discuss elements of ethical decision-making.

- Assert the importance of making proper ethical decisions.

- Explain how proper ethical decision-making impacts mission accomplishment.

Affective Lesson Objective:

- Value the relationship between the Airman's Creed, the Air Force Core Values, character, and Airmanship.

Affective Samples of Behavior:

- Defend the Airman's Creed and its importance to Airmen.

- Value the Airmanship culture in being an Airman of character.

THE AIRMAN'S CREED

I am an American Airman.

I am a warrior.

I have answered my nation's call.

I am an American Airman.

My mission is to fly, fight, and win.

I am faithful to a proud heritage,

A tradition of honor,

And a legacy of valor.

I am an American Airman.

Guardian of freedom and justice,

My nation's sword and shield,

Its sentry and avenger.

I defend my country with my life.

I am an American Airman:

Wingman, leader, warrior.

I will never leave an Airman behind,

I will never falter,

And I will not fail.

SERGEANT HENRY "RED" ERWIN

Medal Of Honor Citation

Sgt Erwin was the radio operator of a B-29 airplane leading a group formation to attack Koriyama, Japan on 12 April 1945. He was charged with the additional duty of dropping phosphoresce smoke bombs to aid in assembling the group when the launching point was reached. Upon entering the assembly area, aircraft fire and enemy fighter opposition was encountered. Among the phosphoresce bombs launched by Staff Sergeant Erwin, one proved faulty, exploding in the launching chute, and shot back into the interior of the aircraft, striking him in the face. The burning phosphoresce obliterated his nose and completely blinded him. Smoke filled the plane, obscuring the vision of the pilot. Sgt Erwin realized that the aircraft and crew would be lost if the burning bomb remained in the plane. Without regard for his own safety, he picked it up and feeling his way, instinctively, crawled around the gun turret and headed for the copilot's window. He found the navigator's table obstructing his passage. Grasping the burning bomb between his forearm and body he unleashed the spring lock and raised the table. Struggling through the narrow passage he stumbled forward into the smoke-filled pilot's compartment. Groping with his burning hands, he located the window and threw the bomb out. Completely aflame, he fell back upon the floor. The smoke cleared, the pilot, at 300 feet, pulled the plane out of its dive. Sgt Erwin's gallantry and heroism above and beyond the call of duty saved the lives of his comrades.

COMMISSIONED IN HANOI

A story about Capt William "Bill" Robinson and his fellow POWs

By Leo K. Thorsness.

Reprinted with permission from Air Force Magazine 2010, published by the Air Force Association Art Cormier, Neil Black, and Bill Robinson showed excellence in the POW camps around Hanoi.

In 1967, there was a "unit" of approximately 300 Americans fighting the Vietnam War from within a Hanoi prison. The unit—later named the 4th Allied POW Wing—was located in the drab North Vietnamese capital. Within this unit, every man had the same job: prisoner of war.

All—except three enlisted airmen—were officers, including me. Our job description was to continue fighting for the United States while imprisoned.

The three enlisted airmen were SSgt. Arthur Cormier, Amn. Arthur Neil Black, and SSgt. William A. Robinson. All were crewmen on helicopters that rescued aircrews from downed aircraft. The three were shot down in 1965.

They were captured, taken prisoner, and ended up in the Hoa Lo prison in Hanoi (the "Hanoi Hilton," in POW parlance).

POWs were dressed in pajamas, and were usually disheveled as a result of infrequent chances to bathe or shave. Given only two daily meals, and those of poor nutritional value, the POWs were thin. Under these conditions, enlisted men, officers, Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps all looked about the same.

A general rule, though with multiple exceptions, was that the higher ranking a prisoner was, the more torture he suffered. Art Cormier, Neil Black, and Bill Robinson were among the exceptions. They were tortured like the officer POWs.

A Daring Escape

An idea to do the "right thing"—in the absence of knowledge of specific regulations or rules—was hatched in early 1968.

At that time, the POW officers decided to commission the three enlisted POWs, Cormier, Black, and Robinson. Why? The commissioned men saw these three enlisted men show exceptional heroic qualities.

Until late 1969, most prisoners lived in solitary confinement or in small cells with one or two other POWs. The rules were simple: no noise from any cell. If a prisoner was caught trying to communicate with a POW in the next cell, through the concrete walls, he received a beating—or more.

Most of our torture was for propaganda. The North Vietnamese wanted us to write or make a statement of confession condemning the war. They thrived on the growing anti-war sentiment in the United States, and felt statements from POWs would support that movement.

The North Vietnamese put us in solitary because they believed in the divide-and-conquer theory. They believed that if they could isolate us, they could prevent us from communicating.

Both they and we knew that if the prisoners could communicate, we could organize. If we could organize, we could resist—or at least resist better.

The POWs lived in these conditions until early 1969. Then, some of us were moved into an area that we named the "Annex." It was part of the POW camp called the "Zoo," located a couple of miles southwest of the Hanoi Hilton. The Annex had larger cells holding up to about 10 POWs.

The cells had a high-walled tiny outside area where we could spend a few minutes on most days.

It was from the Annex that Capt. John A. Dramesi and Capt. Edwin L. Atterberry escaped on May 10, 1969. John and Ed escaped through the roof of the cell in which they lived with several others. They made it over the prison wall.

At daybreak the next day, they could find no cover and were spotted and recaptured. Atterberry was subsequently tortured to death, while Dramesi survived months of torture.

Following that escape, the POWs were taken back into the small Zoo cells. The systematic and horrendous torture that followed was long-lasting and as severe as any we experienced the entire time we all served as POWs.

This was the environment that the officers and enlisted men endured. We served our country and endured torture to our best ability. Over time, we strengthened our solidarity and, in our way, showed leadership in battle.

Our collective memory fades, but it is agreed that the idea to commission the enlisted airmen germinated in Annex cell #3, which held 12 men—eight Air Force and four Navy.

The five Air Force officers were Darrel E. Pyle, Harry D. Monlux, Michael L. Brazelton, Ralph "Tom" Browning, and John L. Borling. The Naval officers were Richard M. Brunhaver, David J. Carey, Read B. Mecleary, and James B. Bailey. All were O-2s when they were captured. The Air Force enlisted men were there as well.

By date of rank, Skip Brunhaver was the SRO, or senior ranking officer.

Once the commissioning idea was hatched, it consumed a lot of time—but having a new subject to discuss was refreshing. When the same men are together in the same cell 24 hours a day with no pencils, papers, or books, new subjects are welcome.

All men enthusiastically joined in. The three enlisted airmen found all of this interesting, but appropriately held back from offering opinions.

Conversation often centered on "could it be done?"

A frequent question was, "Skip, what do you think—you are the SRO." Of the nine officers in the cell, Borling and Browning were Air Force Academy graduates, and Carey and Mecleary were Naval Academy graduates.

Brunhaver generally responded with something like, "How in the world do I know? You, John, and Tom are the Air Force graduates. Did you flunk the battlefield commission course?" Brunhaver was never shy when expressing his opinion.

Battlefield Commissions

Borling and Browning did not think the Air Force had experience or regulations covering battlefield commissions. The Air Force had become a separate service in 1947 and there were no opportunities in Korea for enlisted airmen to receive a battlefield commission. Until Vietnam, the subject simply never came up in the Air Force.

As the conversation heated up, Borling and Browning would turn to Carey and Mecleary, their Annapolis counterparts, saying, "The Marines fall under the Navy. Marines have had a lot of battlefield commissions. What do your regulations say?"

Carey once tried to hoodwink the Air Force members. He said, "I recall in our plebe year, we had a course titled 'History of Battlefield Commissions in Blood and Guts Eyeball Warfare,'" adding that "it was covered under Naval Regulation 291-41-3A." Carey said it confidently, with a straight face. He turned aside to avoid looking at anyone and then, as if talking to himself, added, "Yes, the more I think about it, I'm sure that was the regulation."

At best he was believed for maybe 25 seconds before he turned back to the troops with a big grin.

One topic we discussed was whether, if the prisoners went through with their plan, the North Vietnamese would find out that Cormier, Black, and Robinson had become officers. If they found out, would the former enlisted men be tortured more?

This was one time all three enlisted men spoke up, saying, "We have been tortured already; we have nothing to lose."

After a week of conversation, Brunhaver declared that it was time to decide: "I would like your vote up or down to promote Art, Neil, and Bill to second lieutenants."

Without hesitation, the other eight officers raised their hands high. Brunhaver looked at Cormier, Black, and Robinson, who felt it was not their position to vote about a battlefield commission for themselves. Brunhaver didn't accept their deference, and sharply said, "Men, do I get the impression you don't want to be officers?"

When the three of them realized that Brunhaver truly wanted to know how they felt about being promoted to second lieutenant, the hands of all three shot up.

Brunhaver, as cell SRO, decided it was time to run the commissioning idea by the Annex's ranking officer, Capt. Konrad W. Trautman. There was a problem, however: how to contact him. In buildings with a common wall—and with time and a rusty nail—a small hole could be drilled from one cell into the next. Drilling a pencil-sized hole took time, but time was something the POWs had plenty of, and the hole could be covered or disguised when not used.

Cells without adjoining walls posed another problem. Fortunately, in the first few days we were in the Annex, we discovered that we could toss a stone from one courtyard to the next. Tossing a stone with note attached significantly increased the risk of being caught, however.

Bits of red tile roof, ground into powder and mixed with water, can make a faint ink. Blood makes a bold ink, and under the circumstances the POWs were willing to do whatever it took.

Generally, something could be found to write on. Our toilet paper, for example, was large (squares were about 15 inches across), very coarse, and tan-colored. Parts of the sheets were thick and parts had holes; sometimes small wood fibers were embedded in the papers.

It Won't Hurt To Try

We carefully tore the sheets into squares of about three-and-a-half by three-and-a-half inches. We did not get much toilet paper, and even if paper was used for a secret note, the receiver recycled it back into toilet paper.

A cryptic note was written, asking for permission to commission Cormier, Black, and Robinson. It was rolled tightly and pushed though a hole from cell #3 to cell #4. This was big news to the POWs in cell #4.

Once cell #4 had it, they glued the note with rice paste to a stone, and airmailed (threw) the note from Yard 4 to Yard 5, where Trautman was imprisoned. He consulted his "staff of eight officers" in cell #5, and, with little discussion, the decision was unanimous.

Trautman returned his answer—"Yes, commission Art, Neil, and Bill"—by airmail to cell #4 and back through the wall hole to cell #3.

The bottom line in all conversations about promoting Cormier, Black, and Robinson from enlisted to officers boiled down to: "It won't hurt to try. The Air Force can sort it out when we get home." Basic to all conversations, however, was the quality of the three enlisted men. All had "kept the faith" in America during four long and brutal years, from 1965 to 1969. All had withstood individual torture, kept their integrity, and served honorably in terrible living conditions with inadequate food. Despite all of this, they had kept their dignity intact.

We saw firsthand that these men exhibited heroic qualities in our daily POW battlefield.

With Annex SRO Trautman granting his approval, the day arrived. Although it had been several years since any officers had been sworn in, they collectively reconstructed the oath.

All remembered that you repeat your name and swear to defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, and take on the obligations without reservation. So help me God.

The oath that was administered was not perfect, but it was close enough under the circumstances.

Never had the oath been taken more seriously—nor, likely, taken in prison pajamas. Cormier, Black, and Robinson each repeated the oath standing at attention and proud. It was a solemn, memorable occasion.

After commissioning, the officers created an "in-cell Officer Candidate School." Cormier, Black, and Robinson gladly attended, took instructions seriously, and were on their way to becoming fine officers. The courses were taught by the Air Force and Naval Academy graduates, with the other officers helping out.

Then came the failed Son Tay raid of Nov. 20, 1970. Son Tay was about 23 miles west of Hanoi. The raid was perfectly executed, but when the American rescue troops landed in the POW camp there, the prisoners had already been moved.

Indirectly, however, the mission was a success. The North Vietnamese realized we could be rescued and they moved the prisoners into large cells in the Hanoi Hilton. Treatment started to improve, and living with up to 45 POWs in one cell was a much better arrangement.

Once in the Hilton, we settled into a routine. We now were allowed to talk out loud, and some of the barred windows were not bricked up, meaning we could see the sky.

With between 15 to 45 POWs in a cell, there was a lot of knowledge available, and we began to inventory who knew the most about subjects.

Eventually the POW with the most knowledge about a subject, if willing, began to teach, although it was hard to teach certain subjects like math without pencils or paper.

The last year we were held prisoner, we began to receive some medicine. We really didn't know what ailments the bottle of blue medicine treated, but it was great ink. If we got ahead and had extra toilet paper, with a bamboo pen and blue medicine, we could make class notes.

When the guards found these notes they typically destroyed them, but sometimes they did not mind us having a few math notes or Spanish vocabulary word lists.

At the Hilton—also called Camp Unity by the POWs—the O-5 and O-6 rank prisoners were kept separate from the more junior officers. Col. John P. Flynn was the ranking POW in Unity, and occasionally we were able to get a note to or from him at a "note drop" (small crack) at a common toilet. The toilet itself was, of course, a squat-over-the-hole model.

We were able to tell Flynn about the commissioning ceremony for Cormier, Black, and Robinson, and in his return note he enthusiastically approved.

Flynn made it a personal priority to make the commissions official when he got back to the United States. He also directed the academy graduates to teach a three month "officer" program to Cormier, Black, and Robinson. The word spread throughout Unity, so that whatever cells they were moved to, their training would follow.

The courses centered on leadership, management, motivation techniques, character development, command decision-making, and one combined course on supply and logistics. It was surprising how many POWs, officers all, listened in while the courses were being taught to the new second lieutenants.

President Nixon sent the B-52s—finally—over Hanoi in December 1972. The bombers came, wave after wave and night after night. The bombing started Dec. 18, and the B-52s, supported by F-105 Wild Weasels and F-4 Phantoms, came every night, except Christmas night, until Dec. 29.

The B-52s were allowed to drop their bombs within 2,000 feet of the Hanoi Hilton. When a string of 72 bombs goes off within 2,000 feet of you, it makes thunderous noise. The plaster falling off the cell ceiling was another good signal, as was seeing SAMs streak into the sky, and hearing the flak from every direction and the sound of many B-52 engines—first in the distance, then slowly getting louder. Combining the visual, audio, and "feel" senses together was the most wonderful experience for the POWs—we had waited years for it to happen.

Forced to the Table

This massive show of strength forced the North Vietnamese to go back to the bargaining table in Paris. Twenty-nine days after the final bomb, on Jan. 27, 1973, Henry Kissinger and Le Duc Tho signed the Paris Peace Accords, officially ending the Vietnam War.

POWs were released in four groups, one group about every 15 days starting in February 1973. The longest-held prisoners were released first. That group included the three new second lieutenants.

After our release, Flynn, by then a brigadier general, and Admiral James B. Stockdale, a former POW, joined forces to push for official recognition of the battlefield commissions that Art Cormier, Neil Black, and Bill Robinson had received. (Cormier asked that his commission be delayed until he was promoted to chief master sergeant.)

Flynn and Stockdale wrote a document explaining the rationale, process, and training for the battlefield commissions. They gave their strongest recommendation that the Hanoi commissioning of Cormier, Black, and Robinson be accepted.

Initially, Flynn and Stockdale took their request to the Air Force, since the three enlisted men were all airmen. On first contact, there was resistance by the Air Force because there were no regulations or precedents for USAF battlefield commissions.

Stockdale then unofficially talked to the Navy which, of course, had regulations and ample precedents involving both the Navy and Marine Corps. Soon the Air Force figured a way to be on board, and the battlefield commissions moved up the line. They were accepted and approved through the Secretary of Defense. The Defense Secretary decided, however, to take the request to the White House for final approval.

Nixon was briefed on the 1969 battlefield commissions in the Annex prison in North Vietnam for the three outstanding enlisted men. It was reliably reported Nixon's response to the commissioning request was, "Hell, yes!"

The promotion date was slipped from 1969 to the date of final approval, which was April 9, 1973. Flynn and Col. Fred V. Cherry, outstanding POWs both, administered the oaths of office at Andrews AFB, Md.

After the war, Black, Cormier, and Robinson demonstrated exemplary service as officers. Cormier and Robinson focused on support and maintenance duties. Black went to pilot training and spent many years as a rated officer. All three served honorably with distinction after prison, as they had while they were POWs. Cormier and Robinson retired as captains, while Black retired as a major.

Commissioning the three enlisted POWs in prison was one of the few positive events during those long years. It was the right thing to do for them, and it was the right thing for all of us, even though no one official was looking. We were cut off from our country, our military branches, and our homes. We didn't know how our lives would turn out, but we were—and are—proud to have lived this experience while serving our country during those extraordinarily difficult times.

COLONEL GEORGE "BUD" DAY

*Letter from General Mark A. Welsh III, Air Force Chief of Staff, to the Air Force
Dated 1 August 2013.*

By General Mark A. Welsh III, Air Force Chief of Staff

To the Airmen of the United States Air Force,

I am the very proud son of an American fighter pilot, one of that treasured group who served in three wars, built an Air Force, and gave it an enduring example of courage and mission success. My dad was a hero. As a young man, I asked him who his combat heroes were; he gave me only two names. One was Major General Frederick "Boots" Blesse and the other was Colonel George E. "Bud" Day. My dad was not easily impressed, so I knew that if they were his heroes, they were very, very special men. I was right.

Earlier this year, my wife Betty and I had the distinct honor of attending Boots Blesse's funeral at Arlington National Cemetery. And earlier this week, I heard that Col "Bud" Day had also "flown west." Our Air Force is in mourning. We know we can never replace him, but today, as he is laid to rest, we can honor him.

Many of you know his story. He fought in the South Pacific as a United States Marine in WWII and later became the Air Force's most highly decorated warrior. He was a Medal of Honor recipient with nearly 70 decorations, which span three wars and four decades.

The medals say a lot about Bud Day, but they cannot capture his unbreakable spirit, the life-saving impact he had on his fellow prisoners during his time in captivity, and the inspiration he has been to countless Americans who've been fortunate enough to have heard his story or shaken his hand.

In Vietnam in 1967, Major Day commanded a squadron of F-100s, the "Misty" FACs (Forward Air Controllers). Theirs was one of the most dangerous combat missions of the war, and they suffered high casualties.

On August 26 Day was shot down and captured. Seven days later, despite having a dislocated knee and a badly broken arm, he escaped captivity and evaded the Viet Cong for 10 days. He was recaptured just two miles from a US Marine Corps camp at Con Thien. Getting so close to freedom only to be recaptured would have broken the will of most men. Not Bud Day.

He was eventually moved to a prison camp known as The Plantation, where he was tortured daily, and was later moved to the Hanoi Hilton. Due to his resistance and toughness, Day became an inspiration to other POWs. His roommate at The Plantation, Senator John McCain, wrote, "He was a hard man to kill, and he expected the same from his subordinates. They (his roommates) saved my life--a big debt to repay, obviously. But more than that, Bud showed me how to save my self-respect and my honor, and that is a debt I can never repay."

In 1973, after more than five and a half years in captivity, he was released. The damage by the enemy permanently scarred his body, but his spirit emerged unbroken. A year later he was back on flight status, he became vice commander of the 33th Tactical Fighter Wing, and retired from active service in 1976.

Col. Bud Day spent a great amount of his remaining years sharing his story with our Airmen, young and old. Over the past 22 years, many of those Airmen have experienced multiple combat deployments themselves, leaning on the lessons Col Day passed on to all of us, including his two sons, who proudly serve.

He deeply understood the challenges we face as a military service, "trying to keep America aware of the fact that Airpower has been a substantial reason that we exist as a free nation."

I spoke with Col Day on the phone a couple of months ago, simply to introduce myself and thank him, on behalf of our entire Air Force, for his remarkable lifetime of service. I hung up feeling incredibly proud to be an Airman, and grateful that my real-life hero was even more impressive than I had imagined.

Future Airmen will honor his name and treasure his story, not because of the awards and buildings named in his honor, but for the legendary character, the unbreakable spirit and the values he demonstrated each and every day.

Airmen today strive to embody the same honor, courage, and integrity shown by Col Day and those who fought beside him. And we honor the sacrifices they made in the spirit of airpower and freedom.

"Push it up" Sir…we're still following your lead.

MARK A. WELSH III
General, USAF
Chief of Staff

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